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ABSTRACr 
This thesis analyses the development of trade unionism and working class political organisations in 
Catalonia between 1897 and 1914. Our study of the labour movement has been put within the 
context of both the structure of Catalan industry, and the response of the state and employer 
associations to the challenge of labour. The beginnings of the industrial revolution in Catalonia can 
be traced to the first half of the nineteenth century, when there grew up an important factory -based 
cotton textile industry. However, Catalan industry was faced with a serious difficulty. Outside 
Catalonia the Spanish economy remained backward and agrarian based. Demand for capital goods 
and manufactures was, therefore, low. This handicap slowed the rate of growth, and held up the 
technological transformation of Catalan industry. None the less, Catalan workers were not 
unaffected by the advance of capitalist relations of production. In order to cut costs and increase 
productivity cotton textile industrialists tried to replace male by female labour. Furthermore, in 
metallurgy and the artisanal trades new machinery was introduced piecemeal, and efforts were 
made to transform apprenticeship into cheap labour. Strong working class opposition was 
mobilised against such schemes. However, Catalan unions were faced with state repression and 
employer intransigence. This made it difficult for the workers to form stable bureaucratic unions 
which could enter into collective bargaining with employers. This fact had important political 
implications. It has been argued that the trade union practice of the Socialists was geared to the 
existence of such federations. The difficulties faced in organising them, therefore, hindered 
Socialist penetration. Unions in Catalonia were often unstable, and social conflict in much of 
Catalan industry was severe. This, together with the unwillingness of the state to carry through a 
serious programme of social reforms, increased working class support for the anarchists and 
syndicalists, for both anarchists and syndicalists rejected conciliatory wage negotiations and state 
intervention, and instead favoured the use of direct action and the revolutionary General Strike. By 
1914 the Catalan working class was still poorly organised. However, within the unions, it was the 
supporters of direct action who were in the strongest position. This provided a springboard for the 
rapid growth of the anarcho- syndicalist labour federation, the CNT, between 1916 and 1919. On 
the other hand, the inability of the Socialists to gain a strong union base in Catalonia also prevented 
them from becoming an important political force. As a result, left wing politics remained 
dominated by middle class led republican parties. 
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A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
All Catalan personal and place names have been written in Catalan. Similarly, the names of all 
bodies which operated specifically in the ambit of Catalonia have been written in Catalan. The 
names of those bodies which operated in other parts of Spain or throughout the Spanish state have 
been written in Castilian. Thus, for example, we would refer to the anarcho- syndicalist Catalan 
regional labour confederation as the ConfederaciO'Regional del Treball, but we would refer to the 
Spanish national confederation as the ConfederaciOn Nacional del Trabajo. 
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INTRODUCIIION 
This work is a social and political study of the Catalan working class during the first decade and a 
half of the twentieth century. The first part of the study analyses the social structure and economic 
development of urban Catalonia, working conditions in Catalan industry, trade union organisation 
and strikes. Its principal aim is to understand the pattern of labour relations in the various 
industrial sectors, and in particular the causes behind the proverbial militancy of the Catalan 
working class. Over the past twenty years historians of the British, French and German labour 
movements have undertaken a large amount of work on the social history of their respective 
working classes. In Catalonia, however, this type of work is still in its infancy. As a result, the 
background and class of workers most commonly involved in social protest is still unclear. 
Research into these questions is, therefore, urgently needed. This study aims to take a first step in 
this direction. 
The work was conceived of as a general study of the Catalan working class. Nevertheless, 
three geographical areas have been singled out for special attention. First and foremost, of course, 
Barcelona. During the first decade of the twentieth century there were some 145,000 workers in 
the Catalan capital. Numerically this represented nearly half the entire Catalan working class. 
Barcelona was, therefore, the metropolis of Catalonia. The industrial and semi-industrial towns 
around the city had only a few thousand workers each. In these circumstances, most attempts to 
form craft, industrial or general labour federations had to count on the support of the Barcelona 
workers. Indeed, on most occasions it was the Barcelona working class that was behind such 
initiatives. Furthermore, Barcelona was then as now the political and cultural capital of Catalonia. 
Accordingly, any political movement which wished to have an impact on the national political stage 
needed strong support in the city. 
However, by the late nineteenth century much of the region's largest industry, cotton 
textiles, was located outside Barcelona. The second area to which special attention has been given 
are the textile towns which grew up on the banks of the rivers Ter and Freser in the North-East of 
Catalonia. There were about 16,000 thousand workers employed on the Ter and Freser. This 
represented about 20 per cent of the region's cotton textile labour force. More important, it was in 
the largest of these towns, in the Ter and Freser valleys, that the region's strongest cotton textile 
unions were formed, and where many of the industry's most protracted labour disputes were to be 
fought. Moreover, the cotton textile industry was an exception to the rule that most labour 
federations were founded from Barcelona. Indeed, during the first decade of the twentieth century 
the Ter and Freser valley workers played a leading role in attempts to integrate all textile workers 
into a single industrial federation. Around Barcelona, as has been noted, there were several 
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industrial towns. The largest of these was Sabadell, and this town is the third area singled out for 
detailed study. By 1914 the town was second only to Barcelona in size, and had a workforce of 
about 12,000. About half of these workers were engaged in the manufacture of woollen textiles. 
Woollen textiles was the second largest of the region's textile industries. Sabadell was the largest 
producer of woollen textile fabrics. The Sabadell woollen textile workers were able to unionise, 
and in 1899 and 19 10 were involved in major conflicts with their employers, which were to have 
repercussions throughout the Catalan labour movement. Furthermore, the Sabadell woollen textile 
workers were also to play a very active role in attempts to set up textile and general labour 
federations in the region. 
All in all, then, the workers on which our study focuses represented about 60 per cent of 
the Catalan working class. The real importance of these workers was, however, that they formed 
the backbone of the Catalan labour movement. In addition, with very few exceptions the major 
labour disputes of the period 1897 to 1914 involved workers from one of these areas. The study 
of union organisation and labour protest in Barcelona and Sabadell, and on the Ter and Freser, is 
therefore vital for a clear understanding of the development of the Catalan labour movement as a 
whole. 
As an aid to our study of labour relations in Catalan industry the concept of the labour 
process has proved especially useful. The labour process refers to the technical organisation of 
work in a unit of production. This includes the technology employed, the division of labour which 
operates, payments systems and the pace and intensity of work. In recent years historians have 
drawn attention to the importance of conflict between employers and workers for control of the 
labour process. In the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century skilled workers were in a strong 
position on the shop floor. Through apprenticeship restrictions they were able to limit entry into 
the trade. Moreover, in artisanal workshops little or no machinery was used and the division of 
labour was rudimentary. The product's manufacture was, as a result, totally dependent on the skill 
of the artisan, who could therefore dictate both the method and pace of work. 
However, the development of a market economy encouraged manufacturers to intervene in 
the labour process in order to rationalise production and reduce costs. Often technological 
innovation reduced the skill content of a particular occupation. Employers were then tempted to 
introduce new work practices aimed at maximising profits. These goals, however, could easily 
lead manufacturers into conflict with their workers, who feared new divisions of labour which 
might make their skills worthless, and could either result in their unemployment or push them 
down to the same level as the unskilled proletariat. 1 
1. Michael P. Hanagan, The Logic of Solidarity. Artisans and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 
1871-1914 (Ilinois, 1980), Chapter One. 
8 
The manufacturers control over the labour process was greatest within modem industry. 
Industrial establishments usually enjoyed a greater use of machinery and the division of labour 
was more sophisticated. The industrial worker typically operated no apprenticeship system. In 
addition, he was not usually highly skilled and could, therefore, easily be replaced. Nevertheless, 
the process of deskilling associated with the development of modem capitalist manufacture was by 
no means unilinear. Capital and labour often reached a compromise over the technical organisation 
of production, and even unskilled workers were not automatons who could totally be dictated to by 
their employers. 2 Indeed, on occasion industrial workers were able to carve out a strong position 
for themselves at the point of production. The classic example is that of the English self-acting 
mule spinners in the second half of the nineteenth century. They were factory workers employed 
in large mills. Work on the self-acting mules was not intrinsically highly skilled, yet the spinners 
were able to impose informal apprenticeship restictions. Each mule spinner supervised two 
machines, and worked with four young assistants or piecers. Only when the spinner retired could 
the piecer take his place. 3 Recruitment into the trade was thereby severely restricted, allowing the 
mule-spinner to earn the equivalent of a skilled craftsman's wage. The intensity and outcome of 
conflicts over the labour process is, therefore, contingent upon the specific historical conjuncture. 
Our study of the Catalan labour movement, then, will need to be set within the context of such 
factors as the pattern of Catalan economic development, the attitudes of employers towards 
organised labour, and the nature and policies of the Spanish state. 
However, the causes behind labour militancy are not usually studied in isolation. 
Historians are interested in such matters to the extent that they aid our understanding of the reasons 
for which workers adopt specific trade union and political options. In this sense all social history 
is at the same time political history. The present work has two closely related political questions 
very much in mind. First, the causes behind the relative success of anarchism within the Catalan 
labour movement since it was first introduced into Spain during the years of the First International. 
In the second place, the explanation of the inability of the Spanish Socialists to play a leading role 
in Catalan politics despite the fact that it was the most industrialised region in the country. 
There have been a large number of attempts to explain the success of anarchism in 
Catalonia. These can be divided into several categories. The first set stress the impact of rural 
immigrant labour from Southern and Eastern Spain. A second set of explanations emphasise the 
importance of the small-scale disperse nature of Catalan industry. A third set may, finally, be 
2. Richard Price and Patrick Joyce conducted a lively debate on the place of conflict over the labour 
process in British labour history in, Social History, Vol-8., No-1 - January 1983, pp. 
57-75., Vol. 9-, No-1 
January 1984, pp. 67-76., Vol. 9., No. 2 ( March 1984), pp. 217-231. 
3. H. A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Spread. A Comparative History of the Cotton Unions 
(London, 1962), pp. 95-96,112,127-128. 
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grouped under the title "populist" explanations of Catalan anarchism, as they treat anarchism as an 
interclass popular rather than as specifically working class phenomenon, and usually dwell on the 
close relationship between the anarchists and republicans. 
Interpretations which try and explain the phenomenon of anarchism in Catalonia through 
the immigrant labour argument have in mind the rapid growth in anarchist influence in Andalusia 
since the 1870s. There has in fact been considerably more work done on rural anarchism in 
Southern Spain than on its urban counterpart. Much of this work has seen anarchism as 
particularly suited to the latifundia agrarian structure of Andalusia. Anarchism was, it is usually 
claimed, rooted in the vast inequalities of income and wealth in the region with half-starved 
landless labourers on the one hand, and rich and powerful landowners on the other. Ile power of 
the local political bosses or caciques, made local elections a farce, hence the popularity of anarchist 
antipoliticism. The isolation of the local villages from the state, with only the hated rural police or 
Civil Guard and tax collectors as evidence of its existence, lent credibility to anarchist calls for its 
disappearance. This isolation also formed the basis of support for the anarchists' totally 
decentralised vision of the society of the future, with the commune or collective as the centre of 
social life. Finally, the peasants' protest is often seen as millenarian in that no attempt was made to 
organise the take over of power. In this respect the mythical anarchist revolutionary General Strike 
is thought to have substituted other more rational forms of struggle. 4 
Anarchist inspired labour organisations have, on the other hand, often been seen as 
unsuited to the needs of urban workers. These workers, it was felt, tended towards reformism, 
and were more at home in the more centralised trade unions and political parties of the Socialists. 
This left the tricky problem of anarchist success in Catalonia. The simple answer was to argue that 
it was a result of massive immigration from Southern and Eastern Spain into urban Catalonia, and 
in particular Barcelona and the surrounding industrial towns. The idea that non-Catalan rural 
immigrants formed the backbone of the powerful anarchist or anarcho- syndicalist trade union 
confederation, the CNT, set up in 1910, found favour with middle class Catalanists, who felt that 
its radical tactics must be in contradiction with Catalan seny (i. e., good sense), and with some 
Marxists struggling to explain the anarchists' continued success in working class circles. 
The idea has, in fact, since been extended and it has been argued that all peasant immigrants 
have had a radicalising influence on the Catalan labour movement. Thus the prestigious Catalan 
historian, Jaume Vicens Vives, maintained that from the 1830s immigrant unskilled workers and 
subproletarians (not necessarily, in this case, from outside Catalonia) were the insurrectionary 
elements in the popular struggles of the period from 1833-1868, and that they thereafter formed the 
backbone of Catalan anarchism. The theory, therefore, attempts to explain both labour militancy 
4. Juan Diaz del Moral, Historia de las Agitaciones Andaluzas - C6rdoba (Madrid, 1979); Gerald Brenan, 
The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1942); Eric J. Hobsbawrn, Primitive Rebels (Manchester, 1959). 
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and the success of anarchism. It has since been uncritically accepted by a large number of 
historians, although it is often not clear whether these immigrants were anarchist because they were 
"uprooted", because they had brought anarchist ideology with them from their rural homelands, or 
because their semi-peasant nature predisposed them to embrace anarchist ideals. 5 
The "uprooting theory" was, until comparatively recently, adopted by many historians to 
explain worker militancy in nineteenth century Western Europe. Recently, however, historians 
have shown that there was an important time lag between immigration into an urban environment 
and integration into working class protest movements, and that unskilled labour was not an 
important element in the labour movement until the First World War. 6 As shall be seen, Catalonia 
was no exception in this respect, with skilled workers representing the mainstay of trade union 
organisation and labour protest through to 1914. 
The second line of inquiry, which tries to establish a link between anarchism and small- 
scale industry, has at its origin the Marxist claim that anarchism was an individualist petty 
bourgeois phenomenon and that whereas Marxists attracted support amongst the industrial factory 
proletariat the anarchists could only gain that of workers employed in small-scale industry. 7 Thus 
the leading trotskyist theoretician, Andreu Nin, stated in the 1920s that "petty bourgeois" anarchism 
had prevailed over Marxism in Catalonia as a result of the predominance of small-scale agriculture 
and scattered nature of its industry. 8 It may immediately be noted that there was a logical slippage 
between the claim that anarchism was petty bourgeois and the statement that it found support in 
small-scale industry, given that its supporters would not then presumably be petit bourgeois 
(clerks, office workers, shopkeepers etc. ), but skilled workers and artisans. This was the result, 
perhaps, of the fact that the term petty bourgeois anarchism was more a form of abuse than a fully 
worked out analysis. 
The idea that anarchism and small scale industry went together has, nevertheless, been 
developed by historians. Recent interpretations have maintained that the anarchists' ideal of 
decentralised labour federations, with each individual union retaining a large degree of autonomy, 
5. Jaume Vicens Vives i Montserrat Llorens, Industrials i Politics del Segle XIX (Barcelona, 1983), pp. 142- 
145,165-166. For some recent Anglo-Saxon interpretations which in some way incorporate this model 
see, C. A. M. Hennessy, The Federal Republic in Spain (Oxford, 1962), p. 67.; Richard Kern, Red Years 
Black Years. A Political History of Spanish Anarchism, 1911-1937 (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 69-71.; Murray 
Bookchin, The Spanish Anarchists. The Heroic Years, 1868-1936 (New York, 1977), pp. 69-71.; Gerald 
Meaker, The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Stanford, 1974), pp. 2-3. 
6. See, for example, David Crew, Town in the Ruhr. A Social History of Bochum, 1860-1914 (New York, 
1979), pp. 164-174.; Dick Geary, European Labour Protest, 1838-1939 (London, 1981), p. 19. 
7. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism (Moscow, 1972). 
8. Andreu Nin, "LPor qu6 nuestro movirniento obrero ha sido anarquista? " Reproduced in, Albert Balcells 
(ed. ), El Arraigo de Anarquismo en Cataldha (Barcelona 1973), pp. 106-108. 
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was well suited to the small-scale artisanal nature of much of Catalan industry. This is again 
compared to the more centralised, bureaucratic, nature of the Socialist UGT (Union General de 
Trabajadores), whose strength it is often stated lay amongst the industrial workers of Northern 
Spain. 9 
Such an analysis fits in well with claims that the success of French syndicalism -a 
movement closely related to Spanish anarchism - was based on the small-scale artisanal nature of 
much of French industry. 10 Nonetheless, a closer look at the actual distribution of Socialist and 
anarchist support in Spain tends to throw the existence of this relationship into doubt. The UGT 
was from its foundation in 1888 until the turn of the century not a confederation of industrial 
workers but, largely, of artisans. The only labour federation to function within the UGT through 
to 1898 was the Typographical Federation, and the printers were the epitome of a highly-skilled, 
craft-based, artisanate. From the late nineteenth century through to the Second Republic the centre 
of Socialist strength in Spain was Madrid, and as the Spanish labour historian Santos Julia has 
shown, their strength in the capital was based on the relatively cordial relations between masters 
and men in the almost pre-industrial structure of Madrid industry. This fact fitted well with the 
Socialists cautious approach to industrial relations, which placed a premium on negotiations and 
saw the strike weapon only as a last resort. It was only during the Second Republic that the CNT 
was able to gain a foothold in Madrid. This was the result of the appearance of a large-scale 
construction industry in part a consequence of a massive public works programme undertaken by 
the Republican government. There followed a great influx of unskilled labour into the construction 
industry, and the CNT was given its opportunity when it became clear that the high level of 
industrial conflictivity in the large new companies could not be solved through existing negotiating 
procedures. In this case, therefore, anarchist success was actually based on the breakup of small- 
scale artisanal industry. 11 
The Socialists also gained increasing support in the northern Spanish province of Biscay 
during the 1890s. Given that during these years the region's iron and steel industry was 
experiencing rapid industrial growth this has often been taken as a sign that the Socialists were 
mobilising the support of these industrial workers. However, as Juan Pablo Fusi has 
demonstrated, the Basque Socialists had little support from the iron and steel workers of Baracaldo 
and Sestao until the years 1915-1916. Until then their constituency was made up of workers from 
the small and medium-scale industry of Biscay's urban centres, and the open cast miners of the 
9. Albert Balcells, El Arraigo, p. 18.; Pierre Vilar, Historia de Espatia (Barcelona, 1978), pp. 105-106.; 
Manuel Tuhon de Lara, El Movimiento Obrero en la Historia de Espat)a (Madrid, 1977), vol. l., pp. 307- 
308. 
10. B. H. Moss, The Origins of the French Labour Movement 1830-1914 ( Berkeley, 1976), passim. 
11. Santos Julici Diaz, Madrid 1931-1934. De la Fiesta Popular a la Lucha de Clases (Madrid, 1984). 
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Somorrostro iron ore field. 12 After 1910 support for the Socialists amongst industrial workers 
increased, with the Asturian coal miners and Spanish railway workers at the fore. But, there 
again, the war years also saw the Socialists for the first time gain some support amongst the rural 
labourers of Southern Spain. The increase in this support was especially rapid during the first 
years of the Second Republic, and by 1932 38 per cent of UGT affiliates were landless 
labourers. 13 
It is perhaps because of the difficulties of this approach that many recent studies of 
anarchism have developed what we have termed a "populist" interpretation. These studies have 
focused on the development, in nineteenth century urban Catalonia, of a popular, interclass, 
cultural milieux. The ideology which bound workers, masters and petty bourgeois together was 
based on freethought and anticlericalism. These ideas formed part of the bourgeois rationalist 
tradition, which opposed progress, education and science to the church and tradition. 
Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century they penetrated deeply into working class culture, and 
formed the basis of the large number of free-thinking clubs, lay schools, masonic and spiritualist 
societies which sprang up during the second half of the nineteenth century. Bourgeois rationalism 
was the staple of republican ideology. In addition, it has been claimed that the anarchists laid far 
more stress on this question than did the Socialists. Thus, it is argued that the anarchists shared 
many of the same presuppositions as the republicans and that for their supporters the differences 
between them were often very blurred. Enric Ucelay de Cal has, moreover, given the argument a 
socio-economic twist by claiming that the disperse nature of Catalan industry provided the 
economic underpinning to this interclass alliance. 14 
An, offshoot of this interpretation is that developed by a group of historians formed around 
the student of labour and nationalist movements, Josep Termes. Termes has argued that there was 
a close relationship between popular protest movements and the national question in nineteenth 
century Catalonia. He maintains that with the Catalan bourgeoisie linked, albeit in a subordinate 
position, to the dominant Castilian-Andalusian ruling oligarchy, the fight against an alien 
centralising state was conducted by the "popular classes". It was in the context of this struggle that 
these classes developed a national identity , and therefore tended to 
form specifically Catalan unions 
and political parties. This remained a crucial feature of Catalan political life through to the 
12. Juan Pablo Fusi, Politica Obrera en el Pais Vasco (Madrid, 1975), PID. 129.484-485. 
13. Paul Preston, "The Agrarian War in the South", in Paul Preston (ed. ), Revolution and War in Spain 
1931-1939 (London, 1984), p. 166. 
14. Josd Alvarez Junco, La Ideologla Polifica del Anarquismo Espat)ol (Madrid, 1976), pp. 204-214. 
Angel Duarte i Montserrat, "El Republicanism CatalA a Finals del Segle XIV, (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
Unive-Fsitat Aut'o"'noma de Barcelona, 1986).; Enric Ucelay de Cal, La Catalunya Populista (Barcelona, 
1982), passim. 
13 
twentieth century and a party which, like the Socialists, did not take it into account was doomed to 
failure. 15 
On a number of occasions in the late nineteenth century the Spanish Socialists did, indeed, 
argue that the anarchists and republicans indirectly aided each other, and were united in their 
attacks on the Socialists. 16 However, for the populist view to stand it would be necessary to prove 
there existed an "anarcho-republican" cultural milieu from which the Socialists were actually 
excluded. To do this it is not enough to quote Pablo Iglesias on the primacy of the class struggle. 
What is needed is a study of the actual practice of the Socialists within Catalan social and cultural 
life. Once this is undertaken, as shall be seen, many of the claims listed above are called into 
question. Furthermore, underlying the debate is the question of the extent to which anarchism can 
be regarded as in some ways an interclass rather than a specifically working class movement. This 
is also a question to which considerable attention will be given. 
The arguments put forward to by Josep Termes serve to highlight the importance of the 
state in shaping middle and working class protest. It is certainly true, for example, that the most 
strongly supported current of republicanism in nineteenth century Catalonia, the federalists, shared 
with the anarchists a common distrust of central government. Nevertheless, the attempt to link the 
anarchists to Catalanism would appear dubious. The Catalan anarchist labour federations found no 
difficulty in joining up with workers' unions from the rest of Spain. Furthermore, within both 
anarchism and republicanism there were important anticatalanist currents. In the case of 
republicanism, indeed, the dominant group in Barcelona politics between 1901-1923, the 
"Lerrouxists" were strongly anticatalanist. 
As to the interpretation advanced by Ucelay de Cal, it tends to presuppose relatively cordial 
relations between masters and men in much of Catalan industry. Yet the main aspect of anarchist 
trade union strategy from the late nineteenth century was precisely its radicalism, with emphasis 
placed on the need to generalise individual strikes to the rest of the labour force, culminating 
perhaps in the revolutionary General Strike. The problem here is, perhaps, the widely held belief 
that small- scale industry necessarily implies class harmony. In nineteenth century Europe this was 
by no means the case. It is a well established fact that attempts to undermine established work 
practices and degrade the skilled status of journeyman artisans resulted in a high degree of 
industrial militancy and political radicalism. It is, for example, often held that such workers were 
at the root of the militancy of French labour in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. On 
15. Josep Termes i Ardevol, "El Nacionalisme CatalA: per una Nova Interpretaci6", in La lmmigracO a 
Catalunya i Altres Estudis dHist6ria del Nacionalisme Catahl (Barcelona, 1984). Enric Oliv6 Serret, review 
of J. B. Culla i ClarA in LAvenq (December 1987). 
16. See for example, Pablo Iglesias, "El Movimiento Obrero en Espaha", De Wahre Jacob 1897, 
reproduced in Estudios de Historia Social, /-// (1979). 
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the other hand, large-scale industrial enterprises often had the necessary resources to maintain 
labour quiescent through a mixture of strict labour discipline and paternalism. This was the case of 
much German heavy industry through to 1914. Finally new categories of industrial worker, even 
if able to unionise, would not necessarily have a radicalising influence. One needs, in this respect, 
only to think of example of the English cotton mule spinners who, as has been noted, were a 
relatively high paid group of workers, and played a key supervisory role on the shop floor on 
behalf of their employers. Hence they formed an important part of the conservative "aristocracy of 
labour" which emerged in Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century. 17 
What, therefore, emerges from these conflicting sets of explanations is in the first place the 
need for more detailed research on the composition of the Catalan working class. All too often the 
terms artisan and industrial worker are used in too loose a fashion, with insufficient regard for their 
actual content. More detailed studies are needed on the labour process in C atalan industry, placed 
within the context of the overall development of the economy. This would put us in a stronger 
position to analyse the causes behind the high level of industrial conflict visible in much of Catalan 
industry. In order to see how these conflicts were articulated at a political level it is, moreover, 
necessary to study the political and trade union policies of the anarchists, and Socialists. Only by 
so doing will it be possible to consider how successfully they related to the day to day struggles of 
the workers they purported to represent. 
However, the political activity of the workers was not merely a result of conflicts at the 
workplace being translated into the wider political arena. Labour politics needs also to be related to 
the whole question of state formation in nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain. Thus it was 
in opposition to the state that many aspects of working class and popular ideology in Catalonia 
were forged, and it was in their totally different views on state intervention and participation in 
electoral politics that many of the fundamental differences between members of the Spanish 
Socialist Party and anarchists were to be found. This thesis is intended as a contribution to the 
debate on these questions. 
17. B. H. Moss, op cit.; David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiaties of German History. Bourgeois 
Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford, 1984), pp. 110-111.; H. A. Turner, op cit, 
passim. 
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PART ONE 
THE ROOTS OF LABOUR MILITANCY 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND THE LABOUR 
PROCESS. PART 1: THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES 
As in a number of parts of Europe the first half of the nineteenth century saw the beginnings of an 
industrial revolution in Catalonia. As in Britain the "leading sector" of this revolution was the 
cotton textile industry. Catalan industry was, however, almost unique in that had to try and 
prosper within the context of a backward agrarian economy, and a state bureaucracy which until 
well into the nineteenth century showed little interest in the country's industrial future. This fact is 
of fundamental importance for our understanding of nineteenth and early twentieth century Catalan 
history, for it conditioned both the pace of Catalan industrialisation and the structure of the 
emerging industrial sector of the economy. Indirectly, it also conditioned the policies industrialists 
adopted with respect to the emergent labour movement. It is to an analysis of these questions that 
this first chapter will, therefore, turn. 
Over most of continental Europe in the early nineteenth century feudal impediments to 
capitalist development were swept away by the state, even though this remained in the hands of the 
old landed ruling classes. The paradigm example of this process was Germany, where an alliance 
was forged between the new middle classes and the land-holding aristocracy. Through this "pact 
of iron and rye" the middle classes proved happy to intermarry with representatives of the old order 
and adopt many of their mores and customs as long as their interests were safeguarded, and the 
landed aristocrats retained power but were willing to carry out the policies advocated by triumphant 
liberal ideology. This should not perhaps be too surprising. Once all feudal remnants had been 
swept away, and the factors of production could be bought and sold freely on the open market, 
agrarian and industrial interests, after all, came to represent two fractions of the same bourgeois 
class. 1 
in Spain the years 1833-1856 also saw lands held in mortmain disentailed and sold off to 
the highest bidders. After the loss of the greater part of the country's colonial empire at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century Catalan cotton textile industrialists looked to the internal market 
to sell their manufactures. They, therefore, also accepted a political system which protected 
Spain's landowners from foreign competition through high protective tariffs, as long as equally 
high duties on foreign manufactures reserved them the lions share of the Spanish market. 
1. For a European perspective see, E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London, 1977), p. 
15,21-33,90-91; The German case is dealt with in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, op cit, passim. 
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The great difference between Spain and the leading industrial states was, however, that 
throughout the nineteenth century it remained an overwhelmingly agrarian country. 711is is 
illustrated bylable 1.1. which outlines the percentage of the active population of Barcelona 
Province and Spain employed in the primary, secondary and terciary sectors of the economy 
between 1860 and 1920. As the table makes clear until the 1880s industrial development was 
limited to Catalonia. Indeed, up to the war years of 1914-1918 Spain's relation with the European 
core states was typical of the underdeveloped periphery: it supplied minerals and foodstuffs and 
imported manufactured products in return. 
Table IJ. Distribution of the active population in Spain and Barcelona Province by sectors, 1860- 
1920 
Spain Barcelona Province 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
1860 63.5 17.3 19.2 37.5 41.4* 21.1* 
1900 64.8 17.4 17.8 38.6 35.4 25.9 
1910 66.0 15.8 18.2 27.5 46.0 26.5 
1920 57.3 21.9 20.8 13.5 62.6 23.9 
* Catalonia 
Source. Vicente P6rez Moredo, "La modernizaci6n demogrAfica, 1800-1930. Sus limitaciones y 
cronologfa", in Nicolds Scinchez Albornoz, La Modemizaci6n Econ6mica de Espatia 1830-1930 (Madrid, 
1985), p. 57. 
Moreover, Spanish agriculture was in European terms highly inefficient. In much of 
northern Spain where landholdings were very small production was at little more than subsistence 
level. In the southern provinces of New Castile, Extremadura and Andalusia, landholdings were 
very large. The typical units of production were the latifundia. These were vast tracts of land, 
normally specialising in the production of grain, and worked by great numbers of landless 
labourers or braceros. Productivity on these estates was very low, and the distribution of wealth in 
these areas, with a few rich landowners on the one hand and the half starved braceros on the other, 
was hardly calculated to stimulate demand for manufactures. Catalan industry was, therefore, set 
apart from its European counterparts in that it found itself dependent on a backward agrarian 
economy, whose demand for industrial products was generally low and, furthermore, fluctuated 
wildly according to the state of the harvest. 2 
The continued predominance of agriculture, and the fact that Madrid rather than Barcelona 
was the political capital of Spain, ensured that during the whole period under study it was the large 
scale landowners who were most effectively able to influence government policy. This fact was to 
have a profound influence on Spain's economic, social and political development. On the 
economic front the years 1860-80 saw an important growth in agricultural production. However, 
2. For an overview of Spanish agriculture see, Joseph Harrison, An Economic History Of Modern Spain 
(Manchester, 1978), pp. 5-10. 
1 
this was due more to an extension in the area under cultivation than to increases in productivity. In 
the late 1870s falling transport costs and the opening up of virgin land for grain production in 
Russia and North America led to the European market being flooded by cheap imports of gain. 
Spain was affected later than most European countries because its duties on imported grains were 
already amongst the highest in Europe. The reprieve was nevertheless to be short lived, and from 
the mid- 1 880s the country's agrarian interests began ceaselessly to campaign for an increase in 
tariff levels. Their demand were answered at the end of 1890, and in the following years the tariff 
was raised still further. 3 
Perhaps the Goverment had to take some action. Indeed, all European governments with 
the exception of Britain did take measures to stem imports of foreign grain. Behind the towering 
tariff wall there were improvements in the productivity of Spanish agriculture, and an increase in 
the purchasing power of the rural population was visible, especially after 19 10. However, these 
improvements were largely limited to newer, export oriented sectors, such as fruit and garden 
produce, in which Spain enjoyed comparative advantages. The main effect of the new prohibitive 
duties was to consolidate the inefficient structure of most Spanish agriculture. The major 
impediment to the country's industrial development, therefore, remained. 4 Moreover, the decline 
in gain prices which had begun in 1880 was halted at the end of the decade, and from 1895 the 
depreciation of the Spanish peseta on international markets provoked an increase in the price of 
foodstuffs. As a result gain prices in Spain remained amongst the highest in Europe. 5 The high 
cost of living acted as a further break on demand for manufactures. Furthermore, the high price of 
foodstuffs made it difficult for industrialists to keep down wage costs. 6 Thus ccýton textile 
manufacturers maintained the somewhat exa 
9 
rated belief that wage-costs were amongst the ge 
highest in Europe, and this despite the fact that the level of wages were often little above the bread 
line. This fact has obvious social implications and will be discussed in more detail later. 
As table 1.1. indicates the social structure of Barcelona Province, which saw a modem 
0. 
cotton textile industry grow up between the years 1830 and 1886, was very different from the rest 
3. Ramon Gartabou, "La Crisi AgrAria Espanyola de Finals del Segle XlX: una Etapa del Desenvo upament 
del Capitalisme", Recerques, no. 5 (1975). 
4. Josep Fontana, "Transformaciones Agrarias y Crecimiento Econ6mico en la Espaha Contempor6nea", 
in Cambid Econ6mico y Actitudes Politicas en la Espat)a del Siglo IX (Barcelona, 1973); Jordi Nadal, uUn 
Siglo de Industrializaci6n Espahola, 1833-1930", in NicolAs Scinchez Albornoz (comp. ), La Modernizaci& 
Econ6mica de Espafla 1830-1930 (Madrid, 1985), pp. 93-95. 
A. 
5. Jos6 Maria Serano Sanz, El Viraje Proteccionista en la RestauracOn. La Polffica Comercial Espailola 
1875-1895 (Madrid, 1987), pp. 96-97,160-162. 
6. Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "La Revoluci6 Industrial a Catalunya: Las Transformacions Socials, Causa i 
Efecta de la Industrialitzaci6", in Catalunya, Fibfica dEspanya 1833-1936. Un Segle de IndustrialitzacO 
Catalana (Barcelona, 1985), p. 120 
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of Spain. After mid-century the industry experienced sustained economic growth, and the decade 
between 1876 and 1886 became known as the gold fever orfebre dor. Yet Catalonia's drive to 
industrialise was beset by a number of problems. Not only was growth limited by the nature of the 
Spanish market, but the lack of any high quality coal reserves also served to increase production 
costs. 
Asturias was the only region in Spain with large coal fields. However, these were not 
developed until the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the coal was generally of poor quality, and 
underdeveloped transport facilites greatly increased its price. This lack of native coal at a time 
when the steam engine had become the key source of energy of the new industrial age was indeed a 
serious handicap. During the nineteenth century most coal was imported from Britain through the 
port of Barcelona. Consequently, those industrialists who set up steam powered factories moved 
to the coastal plain in order to minimise transport costs. The city of Barcelona proved too cramped 
to accommodate the rapidly growing new industry, and it was the surrounding area known as the 
Pla which attracted most of the factories. Two districts in particular, Sant Martf de Provenqals and 
Sants, became centres of cotton textile manufacture. In 1897, along with the other outlying 
districts, they were incorporated into Barcelona. Weaving in particular thrived in the towns around 
Barcelona - the so-called Mitja Muntanya - and in towns located near the coast, both to the north 
and south. (see Fig 1-1 -) 
Imported coal, nevertheless, remained expensive. From the 1850s, an increasing number 
of industrialists adopted a very different solution. They moved their establishments to the banks of 
rivers in order to take advantage of cheap hydraulic power. This solution was particularly 
attractive to the owners of relatively large spinning and integrated spinning and weaving mills for 
whom energy requirements were an important part of total costs. They congregated in two basic 
areas. In the first place along the rivers Llobregat and Cardoner in the districts or comarcas of the 
Baix Llobregat, Bages and Bergueda. The greatest congregation of factories in this area were to be 
found between the towns of Manresa and Avia in the so-called Alt Llobregat. In the second place 
large number of factories were to be found on the banks of the Ter and Freser further to the north- 
east, in the Ripolles, Osona. and Garotxa comarcas. The greatest concentration of factories was to 
be found between the towns of Ripoll and Roda in an area known as the Ter Valley. The whole 
area outside Barcelona and the surrounding towns was known as the Alta Muntanya, and this term 
was particularly used to refer to these river bank factories. 
These factories proved economically viable, for the disadvantages of higher transport costs 
and a lack of trained personnel were more than made up for by cheap power and, 
in most areas, by 
lower labour costs. Thus, in 1913 of the 1,800,000 spindles employed in the industry, 1,200,000 
20 
were to be found in establishments along the river banks of the Alta Muntanya. However, it 
should be emphasised that costs were only lower in Catalan terms. The rivers on which these 
factories operated were of the typical Mediterranean variety. They carried little water most of the 
year round and were liable to dry up in Summer and ice up and on occasions flood in winter. In 
Catalonia the cost of both steam and hydraulic power was high by international standards. 7 
7. Joaquim Albareda i Salvad6, La Industrialitzaci6 a la Plana de Vic 1770-1875 (Vic, 1981), pp. 57-62. 
Miguel lzard, Industrializaci6n y Obrerismo, Las Tres Clases de Vapor 1869-1913 (Barcelona, 1973), 
pp. 59-60; Jordi Nadal, El Fracaso de la Revoluci6n Industrial en Espat)a 1814-1913 (Barcelona, 1975), 
pp. 195-201; Jordi Nadal, "La Formaci6 de la Ind6stria Moderna", in Catalunya, Fcibrica dEspanya, pp. 55- 
56.70; Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La Jdmada de Trabajo en la Industria Textil. Trabajds Preparatorios 
del Reglamento para la Aplicaci6n del Real Decreto de 24 de Agosto de 1913 (Madrid, 1914), p. 180. 
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The difficulties faced by the cotton textile industry became more acute in the 1880s. 
Growth in the previous period had been dependent on the expansion of Spain's agriculture, and 
hence the growth in internal demand. The crisis of Spanish agriculture, provoked by the flood oF 
cheap imported grains onto the home market seriously affected production. Thefebre d'or, 
therefore, ended in the economic depression of 1885-86. Industrialists reacted in two ways. In 
the first place, they made serious efforts to reduce costs through technological modernisation and 
the reorganisation of work structures in their plants. 
The first reaction was justified by the claim that wage costs in Catalan industry were the 
highest in Europe. Thus in the 1870s the leading manufacturer Josep Ferrer Vidal stated that the 
yearly cost of a spindle in Catalonia was 150 per cent greater than in England and 37.8 per cent 
greater than in France. Of this difference 27.9 per cent and 31.8 per cent respectively was made up 
by wage costs. 8 This was no doubt an exaggeration. In 1889, F Alzina, the director of one of 
Catalonia's most famous factories, the Vapor Vell of Sants, calculated relative costs for a similarly 
sized Catalan and English factory. He began with the premise the the Catalan plant used steam 
power and operated in the Barcelona Pla. He reached the conclusion that the Catalan factory's total 
costs would be 17.46 per cent greater, and that this difference divided in the manner indicated in 
Table 1.2. 
Compared to the estimate made by Ferrer Vidal, F Alsina considerably reduces both the 
total difference in costs, and the percentage of that difference taken up by wage-costs. However, it 
should be noted that Alsina's calculation refers to two similarly sized factories operating at the 
same technical level. As shall be seen, most Catalan factories did not match their English 
equivalents on either score, a fact which served to further widen differentials. 
It may, however, be surprising that wage costs were at all higher in Catalonia than in England. As 
has been suggested the cotton textile industrialists probably overstated their case. Evidence for 
other Catalan industries for the first decade of the twentieth century indicates that wage costs in 
Catalonia were in general low in comparison with those of her main industrial rivals. 
Nevertheless, two factors did keep wage costs up. First, the high level of food prices, which 
made Barcelona one of most expensive cities in Europe. The chief cause was the high duties on 
imported grains, but the situation was worsened by governments' reliance on indirect taxes on 
basic consumer goods. In these cicurnstances wages tended to be set at rather higher levels than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
Second, the cotton manufacturers claimed that the productivity of Catalan labour was 
considerably lower than that of its European counterparts. Tbus they maintained that Catalan 
workers were, in general, less disciplined and that a single worker was not able to mind as many 
8. Cited in Jordi Malucluer de Motes, "La Revoluci6 Industrial", p. 120. 
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power-looms or spinning machines. It does seem that the slow pace of economic development in 
Catalonia made the task of forming a disciplined industrial labour force a difficult process. This 
was admitted by a group of Catalan trade unionists who visited England in 1889. Yet they also 
pointed out that the main reason for the English worker's higher level of productivity was the 
"greater specialisation (of the workforce), better organisation in the factories, and high technical 
preparedness". 9 
Table 1.2. Relative costs oa Catalan and English Cotton Textile Mill 1889 f 
Concept Difference in Costs 
(percentage) 
Percentage of total 
costs 
Depreciation, Machinery, 
Installation 21,629 10.7 
Coal 23,102 11.4 
Cotton 27,798 13.7 
Taxes 20,776 10.3 
General Costs 21,000 10.4 
Interest on 
Capital 70,281 34.7 
Wages 17,863 8.8 
Source. F Alsina, Fonaments de la Reforma del Trevall en la Industria Cotonera Catalana, tal com es 
Comensada en Vapor Vell de Sans (Barcelona 1889). 
Nonetheless, it was to the reduction of wage costs that the industrialists turned their 
attention in the 1880s. F Alsina, for example, maintained that by reforming intemal work 
structures in the Vapor Vell, he could reduce wage costs to significantly below the English level, 
and thereby cut the difference in total costs between the Catalan and English factories of his 
example to 7.4 per cent. In the mid- 1 880s a leading representative of the Catalan manufacturers, 
Guillermo Graell, had indeed been commissioned to make a study on ways to reduce costs in the 
industry. Many employers were, therefore, thinking along the same lines as Alsina. 10 
There were several ways in which wage costs could be reduced. The first was through 
technological innovation; the second by speed ups and the intensification of labour; the third 
though the substitution of male by cheaper female and child labour; and the forth simply by cutting 
wages and lengthening working hours. Often all four methods were very closely linked. 
Technically Catalan industry was near the level oP its European competitors. Weaving had largely 
9. Memofia Descriptiva Redactada por la Comisiön Obrera Catalana Nombrada para Estudiar ei Estado de 
las Fäbricas de hilados y Tejidos de Algodön en lnglaterra... y sus Relaciones con ei Obrero Ingläs 
Ocupada en este Ramo de la Industria de dicha Naciön en lo que Tiene Referencia a la Organizaciön de 
las Fäbricas, con ei Organismo Societario y con las Leyes del Trabajo que los mismos Disfrutan (Barcelona, 
1889), pp. 24-28. 
10. F. Alsina, Tonaments de la Reforma del Trevall en la I ndustria Cotonera Catalana, Tal Com Es 
Comensada en lo Vapor Vell de Sans", Estudios Economicos No. 3 (Barcelona, 1889); Guillermo Graell, 
"La Inclustria Catalana", El Trabajo Nacional [ETN], 20 July 1902, pp. 65-66. 
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been mechanised and in spinning the modem self-acting mule predominated. Yet there was room 
for improvement. There were still a relatively large number of hand-looms and antiquated 
Crompton's mules in operation, and higher quality yams were largely imported. Catalan 
manufacturers went a long way towards correcting these defects in what remained of the 
century. 11 However, on the spinning side of the industry the major technological advance of this 
period was represented by the a spinning machine known as the ring-frame. 
In Catalonia the division of labour which operated in the spinning mills was the same as in 
England. Women and children were employed in most of the preparatory processes, but men 
worked in the cardrooms and on the self-acting mules, the operation of which was regarded as too 
physically strenuous for women. As in England the spinner worked alongside a couple of young 
lads known as piecers. It was his job to supervise the work done by the piecers, and they were 
paid out of his wages. Furthermore, there is evidence to show that a piecer could be sacked by his 
spinner if his work was not up to standard or he did not show due respect. 12 Like the i' r English 
counterparts, therefore, the Catalan self-acting mule spinners played a supervisory role on the shop 
floor, and by limiting the recruitment of labour they could ensure they were paid relatively high 
wages. It should be noted that this division of labour was not universal. In the USA, for 
example, spinners and piecers worked together under an overseer. 13 It was probably adopted in 
Catalonia for the simple reason that almost all the region's textile machinery was bought in 
England, and industrialists made frequent trips there to see it in operation. They were after all 
likely to copy the working arrangements that they found in the "workshop of the world". 
In Catalonia the ring-frame had been used as an alternative to the self-acting mule since the 
1840s, but its expansion was handicapped by relatively low productivity. However, this situation 
was to change in the 1870s, when a string of bitter conflicts between self-acting mule spinners and 
their employers in the United States stimulated the search for ways to improve the ring-frame. The 
result was a number of technical advances which made the substitution of the mule bý the ring 
frame an attractive proposition. 14 The relative advantages of the new machine were outlined in the 
Barcelona employer federation's mouthpiece, El Trabajo Nacional, a number of years later, when it 
stated: 15 
11. Guillermo Graell, op cit; Pau Romeva Ferrer, Hist6fia De La Inddstfia Catalana, Vol. 11 (Barcelona, 1952), 
pp. 419-420. 
12. Arxiu Municipal de Torel16 [AMT], T Trabajos Varios (2). 
13. William Lazonick, "Industrial Relations and Technological Change: The Case of the Self-Acting Mule", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 3 (1979), P. 243. 
14. lbid, pp. 256-257. 
15. ETN, 1 May 1912, pp. 89-92. 
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The ring-frame has advantages over the self acting mule with respect to the simplicity of it 
mechanism and the economy of its use. Its relatively simple operation pen-nits, with all the 
more reason than on the self-acting mules, the employment of women and girls. It is for 
this reason that the ring-frame has stood out to such an extent that it has almost done away 
with its rival. However, in some cases it has not been able totally to replace it, and the self- 
acting mule is still used for yams of higher quality. ( ... ) 
Nevertheless, new technical innovations are beginning to make it possible for the ring frame to advance in this direction. 
In other words the ring-frame was more productive, and made possible a redivision of the 
labour force by the substitution of males by cheaper female and child labour. The fact that Catalan 
industry tended to specialise in the spinning of low counts of thread made its use particularly 
attractive and it was, as the above quotation indicates, rapidly adopted. Thus, in 1907 60 per cent 
of the industry's spindles were ring-frame. This represented the highest percentage of ring-frames 
in any European country with the exception of Italy. The pace of tehnological. innovation in 
Catalonia was, in general, slower than that of her main continental rivals, but in this case she was 
at the forefront of change. (see Table 1.3. ) 
Tablel. 3. Number of Seýf-Acting Mule and Ring -Frame Spindles in Europe's Six Largest Cotton Textile Industries 1907. 
Country Self-acting mule 
spindles 
Ring-frame 
spindles 
Percentage of ring-frame 
spindles 
England 36,667,332 6,487,393 15 
Germany 5,469,785 3,722,155 40.5 
France 4,122,128 2,486,977 37.6 
Austria 2,307,267 1,277,167 36.1 
Italy 1,015,198 1,852,364 64.6 
Spain 740,000 1,315,567 60 
Source. IF Rahola y Tre-mols, "Comerc y industria de Catalunya", in F Carrera Candi (ed. ), Geografia 
General de Catalunya, Vol. L., (reed Barcelona, 1980), p. 397. 
On the weaving side of the industry there were no such spectacular technological 
developments, but the changes which did take place were no less significant. In particular, since 
the mid-nineteenth century men had steadily been substituted by women on the power-looms. 
Thus in 1856 the Barcelona cotton textile industry had been 60 per cent male, and probably about 
50 per cent of these were adults. By 1906, according to a census prepared by the Barcelona local 
government, men made up only 18.6 per cent of the industry in the city. Other sources, however, 
suggest that the proportion of adult men was considerably lower. The social-catholic publicist, 
NEguel Sastre i Sama, who carried out an exhaustive study of strikes in Barcelona between 1903 
and 1914, maintained that adult males made up only 3.3 per cent of the of the workforce. He was 
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11 
backed up by trade union sources, and evidence from other industrial towns in which weaving 
predominated also suggests that men formed well under 20 per cent of the labour force. 16 
The substitution of male for female workers seems to have speeded up in the 1880s. 
Weavers were also adamant that from this period there was a constant pressure on wage-rates, and 
that power-loom weavers' wages had fallen to under 20 pesetas a week since 18 80.17 At the end 
of the century, moreover, employer attempts to cut piece rates through lengthening the pieces 
woven, and to raise productivity by increasing the number of power-looms each weaver had to 
mind were a source of constant tension in the industry. The moves designed to cut wages and 
reorganise work structures continued through to 1914. Thus the conservative daily, La 
Vanguardia, stated in 190 1: 18 
The improvement of the jacquard looms in weaving and the substitution of the self-acting 
mules bo ring-frames, requires organisation to be very different than at present. It's 
necessary to save wages, eliminate the men and increase production, without there being a 
growth in general expenditure, which is already higher in our country than abroad as a 
result of the administrative chaos and the disorganised tax system 
The industrialists' second response to the mid 1880s economic crisis was to press for 
higher tariff duties on cotton textile manufactures. Their calls were given extra urgency by the fact 
that in the early 1880s the government had signed two important commercial treaties with France 
and Britain. These were aimed primarily at expanding foreign markets for Spanish wine. In return 
for concessions facilitating the entry of Spanish wine into France and Britain's home markets the 
government had agreed to reduce import duties on their competitors' industrial exports. 
This decision demonstrated the primacy of agrarian over industrial interests in the Spanish 
state. The Catalan manufacturers' chances of success were, however, enhanced by the fact that 
their demands coincided with the landowners' call for measures to be taken to stop the import of 
cheap foreign grains. None the less, the higher tariffs on manufactures were only to become a 
reality after 1890 as a result of the decision taken by France not to renew the commercial treaty it 
had signed in 1882. Industrial tariffs were increased sharply in 1891, with duties on imported 
iron, steel and textiles set at a particularly high level. Both Spanish industry and agriculture were 
16. Miguel Izard, Industrializaci6n, pp. 69-74; "Censo Obrero de 1905", in Anuarid Estadistico de la 
Ciudad de Barcelona, Ano IV, 1905 (Barcelona, 1907), p. 599; Miguel Sastre y Sama, Las Huelgas en 
Barcelona y sus Resultados durante el A6o 1905 (Barcelona, 1907), pp. 12-13; La Jornada... 1913, p. 43. 
53-54.453-459. 
17. El Socialista (ES), 27 January, 3 February 1899; La Jomada... 1913, p. 59. According to the labour 
journal Revista Social in Barcelona in 1873 power-loom weavers earned an average of 3.5 pesetas a day. 
In 1905 the average power-loom weaver's wage was 3.16 pesetas a day. See, Mipel Izard, "Entre la 
Impotencia y la Esperanza. La Uni6n Manufacturera (TV-1872 - 4-VIII-1873)", Estudios de Historia Social 
no. 4 (1978), p. 31. Tenso Obrero 1905", p. 618 
18. Cited in ETN, 30 December 1901, p. 195. 
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now heavily protected. Moreover, the general European climate of nationalist ambition and inter- 
imperialist rivalry, coupled with the weakness of the Spanish economy, stimulated successive 
governments to go further. As a result, by 1906 Spain had the highest tariff barriers in Europe. 19 
This was not the only concession to manufacturing interests. In 1882 some compensation 
for the trade agreements had already been given to the Catalan cotton textile industrialists in the 
shape of progressively reduced duties on their exports to the remaining colonies (Cuba, Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines). The position of the Catalans was made even more favourable in 1891 
when the higher tariffs on manufactured imports were also applied to the colonies. 
These measures helped the cotton industry weather the economic storm. Thus, during the 
1890s the Catalan industrialists, further aided by a fall in the value of the peseta, were able to 
substitute part of the higher quality fabrics still imported. In addition, the colonies provided a 
ready market for the industry's surplus production. Cotton textile exports to the colonies increased 
sixteenfold between 1876-1880 and 1891-1895, and by 1897 total exports made up over 17 per 
cent of production. Yet, the growth in exports was to prove a very short term solution to the 
problems which faced the industry. Indeed, by encouraging an expansion in productive capacity 
this growth only served to deepen the over-production crisis which was to hit cotton textiles at the 
turn of the century. 
After a brief and disastrous war with the United States Spain lost her last colonies in 1898. 
The cotton textile industry was, quite naturally, serious affected. It could not now compete with 
the United States in the Antilles and, in consequence, by 1902 exports had fallen to only 5.5 per 
cent of total production. 20 The industry was, nevertheless, able to fend off total disaster. During 
the first decade of the twentieth century there were, as has been seen, productivity gains in some 
sectors of Spanish agriculture, and sales of cotton garments did increase as a result. Moreover, 
desperate efforts were made to find alternative foreign markets. Some success was achieved in 
South America, and by 1913 exports were up to 8.5 per cent of total production. This did not, 
however, suffice to lift the cloud of gloom which hung over the industry. Throughout the period 
1900-14 it suffered from chronic over-production, which fierce competition between 
manufacturers only served to exacerbate. Particularly hard hit by the need to cut production were 
the Alta Muntanya industrialists who used hydraulic power, for they usually rented the water at a 
fixed price. The more they used, therefore, the cheaper it became. It was already the case that they 
19. Jordi Nadal, El Fracaso, pp. 213-214; Jos6 Maria. Serrano Sanz, op cit, pp. 164-214; Jos6 Luis Garcia 
Delgado, "Nacionalismo, Econ6mico y Intevenci6n Estatal 1900-1930", in Nicol6s SAnchez Albornoz 
(comp. ), op cit, pp. 184-185. 
20. ETN, 16 September 1907, p. 454; Eusebio Bertrand i Serra, "Un Estudio sobre la Industria 
Algodonera", Boletin del Comit6 Regulador de la Comisi6n Textil Algodonera (March, 19 31). 
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had to limit output part of the year due to lack of water. Between 1900 and 1914, however, they 
found that often they could not work at full production even when water was abundant. 21 
The major difficulty faced by the industry was that despite technological renewal, in 
international terms it remained uncompetitive. Quite apart from high energy costs, its plants 
remained smaller than those of its international competitors, and the limitations of the internal 
market made product specialisation difficult. Thus in 1884 the Catalan economist, Andr6s de Sard, 
pointed out that the average English spinning factory had between 40-50,000 spindles, while the 
average Catalan factory had under 10,000.22 
Little had changed by the turn of the century. Thus, in 1901, in what seems the most 
reliable guide, La Vanguardia calculated that there were 1,325 weaving and spinning 
establishments in Catalonia. Given that there were at this time, excluding the textile finishing 
trades, about 80,000 cotton textile workers, the factory-worker ratio in the industry was roughly 
1: 60. Spinning factories were, however, larger than their counterparts in weaving, and the 312 
such establishments in the region had an average of about 121 workers. With respect to spindles, 
the average per factory was still well under 10,000, at about 5,700, while the number of power 
looms per factory averaged 52.23 These figures probably underestimated the number of small 
weaving workshops that continued to operate throughout Catalonia. What they do indicate, 
however, is that although a true factory based industry had grown up, factory size still by no 
means matched that of the British, German and French enterprises. The drawbacks of this 
situation were summed up by a commission of leading cotton textile manufacturers, who stated in 
1906: "A greater industrial concentration is necessary. Small factories are expensive and 
uneconomic because they have to distribute general costs over a smaller production, and because of 
the greater cost of machinery.,, 24 
21. ETN, 1 July 1904, p. 257; 16 July 1909, p. 237; La Jornada ... 1913, pp. 49-50. This also explains why 
night work was so common in areas in which hydraulic power was used. 
22. Andr6s de Sard, Comparaci6n entre el Actual Estadd de Desarrollo de La Industria Algodonera en 
Ingaterra y el de La Propia Industria en Esparla (Barcelona, 1884), note. 1-p. 16. 
23. ETN, 30 December 1901, pp. 195-196; 16 May 1911, pp. 239-240; Boletin de la Cjmara de Industria 
y Comercio de Sabadell, January 1913; Federaci6n Internacional de Industrias Algodoneras, Memoria del 
Congreso Celebradd en Bremen los Dias 25 al 29 de Junid de 1906 (Barcelona, 1907); Many conf licti ng 
statistics were quoted in these years. The most accurate figures for the number of power-looms and 
spindles in Catalonia appear to be 55,982 and 1,800,000 respectively. The figure of 80,000 cotton textile 
workers was quoted by a number of sources. It is also backed up by other evidence. In 1908 the cotton 
textile employers Mutua de Fabricantes stated that there were 21 workers per 1000 spindles, 65 workers 
per 100 power-looms, 140 "ancillary service" workers per 1000 power-looms and 40,000 spindles; and 1 
transport or warehouse employee per 1000 power-looms and 40,000 spindles. ETN, 1 August 1908, 
pp. 289-290. In Catalonia this would leave us with 37,800 workers in spinning, 36,388 workers in weaving, 
6,800 ancillary workers, and 49 warehousemen. A total of 81,037. 
24. Memoria ... Bremen, pp. 
199-200. 
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The structure of the cotton textile industry did not, however, simply consist of a series of 
small enterprises ruthlessly competing against each other. In Barcelona by the mid-nineteenth 
century a number of relatively large concerns operated a variation of the putting out system. Thus 
they stimulated the creation of small, subordinate, workshops, sold them the raw materials and 
commercialised the final product. In this way the large concerns were protected against the 
vagaries of Spain's internal market, with its frequent agricultural crises and consequent 
contractions in demand. The large firms were as a result able to limit large capital outlays on 
equipment which would not always be in use, and respond to the crises by cancelling orders from 
the subordinate workshops. 25 
It was this industrial structure that explains why there existed in Barcelona a number of 
what were, in Catalan terms, very large integrated spinning and weaving factories, the best known 
of which were La Espafia Industrial and BatllO in Sants, and Sert Hermanos, Fabra y Coats and La 
Fabril Algodonera in Sant Marti and Sant Andreu de Palomar. Furthermore, when the spinning 
factories began to move to the river valleys, many kept their headquarters and warehouses in 
Barcelona, and, it appears, continued to farm out yarn to be woven by dependent enterprises. This 
practice was noted by the Socialist commentator J. J. Morato, who stated during the 1913 strike in 
the industry thatl "the conflict must be resolved principally in Barcelona, not only because the 
excellent Catalan organisations are to be found in Barcelona, but also because many weaving 
establishments, despite all their independence and personality, are only branches of the formidable 
spinning factories, whose headquarters are to be found in Barcelona, ( ... ). -26 
It was for this reason that one could talk of a haute bourgeoisie in cotton textiles, in which 
such family names as Muntades, GUell, Ferrer Vidal, and Rusiflol stand out. By no means all, but 
an important part of their wealth came from cotton textiles, and they were a leading force in the so- 
called Grupo Catalan, a powerful pressure group of Catalan industrial, financial and agrarian 
interests in the Spanish capital. Yet, it was also because of this industrial structure that a sixth of 
the industry's looms were still hand powered in 1907, and that there continued to exist a large 
number of small-scale employers scattered throughout the countryside near urban centres. 27 
It may be that the industrial structure of cotton textile manufacturing was well suited to the 
conditions of the Spanish market. Nevertheless, the objective handicaps faced by the industry 
meant that throughout the nineteenth century its growth rate was slower than that of its major 
25. Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "La Estructura del Sector Algodonero en Cataluha durante La Pdmera Etapa 
de La Industrializaci6n (1832-1861)", Hacienda POblica Esparlola, no. 38 (1976). 
26. La Publicidad, 1 August 1913. 
27. Jaurne Vicens Vives, op cit, pp. 127-128.; Federico Rahola i Tremols, "La Ind6stria a Catalunya", in F. 
Carrera Candi (ed. ), Geografia General de Catalunya, vol. 1, p. 399. La Jornada. .. 
1913, pp. 264-265.416. 
434-435. 
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European competitors. Moreover, the situation worsened in the years which followed the mid- 
1880s agrarian crisis. Thus, while imports of raw cotton into Catalonia increased at a rate of 5.54 
per cent a year between 1834-80, the growth rate was only 2.28 per cent between 1880 and 
1913.28 
Yet although by international standards the cotton textile industry grew at a slow pace, no 
other branch of the Catalan textile industries could match it. The woollen textile industry came 
closest, and it did so by following in the cotton industry's steps and mechanising production. In 
so doing the woollen textile industrialists were able to form a modem industry which at the 
beginning of the century was about 10 per cent the size of cotton. The relatively high price of 
woollen fabrics ensured that employers could more easily afford steam power, and thus there was 
no temptation to move to the river banks of northern Catalonia. Instead, to take advantage of 
external economies the industry became concentrated around Barcelona, and in particular in the 
historic woollen centres of Sabadell and Terrassa. These two important industrial towns were 
situated in the Valles comarca. The largest was Sabadell, a town which with 28,125 inhabitants in 
1913 was second in size only to Barcelona. Sabadell had an eminently industrial population. 
Thus, in 1914 there were over 11,000 workers in the town. About 5,500 of these workers were 
employed in woollen textiles, and they were responsible for about 40 per cent of the region's total 
production. 29 
The problems faced by the woollen industry were in many ways similar to those in cotton 
textiles. Most obviously, they both confronted the limitations imposed by the nature of the 
Spanish market. However, woollen textiles also had additional difficulties to overcome. Sabadell 
and Terrassa specialised in higher quality woollen fabrics, and consequently a high percentage of 
their wool requirements were for special classes which could not be obtained on the home market. 
They were, therefore, forced to import about 50 per cent of their wool, but because of the strength 
of the Castilian wool interests these imports carried a heavy duty. Moreover, the woollen textile 
industrialists had had even less success in opening up export markets than their colleagues in 
cotton. This was possibly a reflection of the fact that the climate in those areas in which exports 
were a possibility - South America and the remaining colonies - was not really suited to woollen 
fabrics. Consequently, at their high point in the 1890s exports to the colonies represented no more 
than 10 per cent of total production, and by 1907 this figure had fallen to 3 per cent. As in cotton 
textiles, therefore, the atmosphere during the years 1899-1909 was, in general, one of gloom and 
28. Jordi Nadal, El Fracaso, pp. 208-210. 
29. F. Rahola y Tremols, op cit, p. 397; Jordi Nadal, "La Formaci6", pp. 78-84. 
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despondency. The mood only lightened between 1910 and 1914, when there was a significant 
increase in internal demand for textile garments. 30 
Just as in the cotton textile industry, the woollen textile industrialists also had to adapt to 
the nature of the Spanish market. The use of steam power required important capital outlays, and a 
number of steam powered factories (vapors) were built in Sabadell during the nineteenth century. 
However, after they had been built, more than one industrialist often shared the same premises. 
Moreover, especially at times of peak demand, it was common for the industrialists to rent out 
unused rooms (cuadras) to independent weavers known as drepaires. These drepaires were ex- 
workers who had managed to buy a power-loom or two, and they worked alone or with an 
assistant. They bought the yarn off the industrialist and sold him the final product. 
The idea behind this arrangement on the part of the industrialists was as in the case of 
cotton textiles - to be able to meet peak demand, but not have to make large investments on 
equipment which would lie idle most of the time. The result was that establishments were 
generally small. Thus in 1914, even though the number of drepaires had declined drastically from 
their peak in the late nineteenth century, the average number of POwer-looms per employer was 
only 13.76, and there were just two employers with over 50 power-looms. This average was 
considerably lower than in cotton textiles, and a similar situation was to be found on the spinning 
side of the industry, where the average number of spindles per industrialist was 1,332.31 These 
figures can in one respect be misleading. On the weaving side of the industry at least, workers 
often worked in the same factory but under more than one employer. Yet they do show that the 
woollen textile industrialists were even less able to take advantage of economies of scale than their 
cotton textile counterparts. It was for this reason that Alba Rosell, an anarchist trade union 
organiser and educationalist bom in Sabadell, could state that at this time there were very few really 
rich industrialists in the town, and that most continually feared a bankruptcy "which would return 
them to the class from which, in general, they had come". 32 
The geographical location of the textile industries was, as the above sections indicate, very 
varied. Some factories were to be found in large towns and cities. Others on river banks, near 
small villages, or even in totally rural settings. The nature of the workforce employed was, in 
consequence, also very different. Furthermore, in cotton textiles, while weaving predominated in 
30. F. Rahola y Tremols, op Cit, pp. 405-406; Boletin de la Cjmara de Industria y Comercio de Sabadell, 
October 1913, pp-5-8; Josep Maria Benaul, "Notes Sobre La Industrialitzaci6 de Sabadell", Arrahona, 
no. 12 (Tardor, 1981); Esteve Deu i Baygual, "La Industria Llanera de Sabadell en el Primer Quart del 
Segle XV, (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona, 1986), pp. 6.69-6.72. 
31. Esteve Deu, op cit, pp. 3.17-3.106. 
32. Alba Rosell, Vidas Truncas, Mateo Morral 1879-1906. Unpublished Manuscript (Montevideo, 1940), 
pp. 18-19. 
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lowland areas, spinning prevailed along the Ter and Freser river banks. The skills required and the 
division of labour in these two branches of the industry also varied greatly. Finally, as has been 
noted, the structure of the woollen textile industry was in some respects unlike cotton, and this also 
had an important impact on the respective labour forces 
In cotton textiles, many industrialists who moved rural areas were able to employ peasants 
from the surrounding countryside. Many of these workers were women. Already in the 
eighteenth century female members of peasant households often combined agricultural work with 
domestic manufacture of textiles. This system came under increasing pressure when factory 
produced fabrics began to flood the market in the early nineteenth century, but the spread of cotton 
textile factories in rural areas provided an alternative source of income. 33 Women, therefore, often 
exchanged home manufacture for factory work. The employment of "mixed" peasant and 
industrial workers in weaving continued throughout the period under study. Thus the social- 
catholic publicist, Jose Elias de Molins, noted in 1913: 34 
In the countryside, the status of the woman is sometimes purely rural, and she only takes 
part in the duties of the home or the tasks of the peasant household. At other times it is 
mixed, and along with work on the land the female peasant is also involved in home 
industry, such as the manufacture of lace, rope sandals and the like. The rural woman is 
also often seen to go into the factories, but without leaving her home, and this occurs in 
numerous factories spread throughout the provinces of Barcelona, Girona and Tarragona. 
A similar observation was made in the same year by one of Catalonia's regional factory inspectors, 
who stated: 35 
Men and women are employed on the looms without distinction, although in rural 
populations there are a greater number of women employed, for the men are engaged in 
agricultural work. 
The wealth of the montafia is base on the fact that the men work on the land and the women 
in the factories. 
The employment of mixed workers made it possible to pay lower wages than in Barcelona 
and the surrounding towns. Workers in rural areas had little or no experience of trade union 
organisation. Furthermore, they often had to travel several miles to work each day, and lived in 
isolated farmhouses. In such circumstances it would be almost impossible to build up the on and 
off the job solidarity necessary for collective action to be taken. However, at the same time, 
33. Mipel Izard, "Origines del Movirniento Obrero en Espaha", En Teoria 819, (Octubre 1981-Marzo 
1982). 
34. Josd Elias de Molins, La Mujer Obrera en Catalut)a en las Ciudades y en el Campo (Barcelona, 1913), 
pp. 74-75. 
35. La Jomada... 1913, p. 449. 
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industrialists found it difficult to create the kind of trained, disciplined, labour force needed for 
constant industrial production. 
The mixed workers were still very much attached to the rural peasant economy. They were 
consequently difficult to train as industrial proletarians, and often abandoned their factories when 
needed on the land. There were a large number of complaints in this respect from the industrialists 
of the Manresa area. Manresa was perhaps the foremost Catalan weaving centre after Barcelona. 
In 1913 the Manresa Official Chamber of Industry and Commerce stated that at certain times of the 
year it was difficult to find enough workers, and lamented that: 36 
In the 11ano and on the outskirts of large towns ( ... ) the workers abound, are of fixed employment, and are more capable than in the mountainous villages, where the poor 
classes usually combine work in the fields and in the factory, and in not a few places in the 
Alta Montaga employers are forced to have their looms idle for a quarter of the year, 
because during the harvest, and even when certain crops are sown, the workers do not go 
into the factories. 
In a similar vein, the representative of the Alta Muntanya manufacturers stated that labour 
productivity was lower than in Barcelona, and that: 37 
This is a result of the difference in their capability, of the scarcity of workers (in the Alta 
Muntanya), and of their instability. To which should be added the natural attraction of the 
Capital, which exercises a great pulling power on the small centres of production, in which 
it can be said their exists a kind of apprenticeship for workers who will after work in the 
big centres. In these the atmosphere is also more professional and industrial than in the 
small villages, where the employees may be called mixed in that on occasions a large part 
of them are occupied in the fields. 
These difficulties were no doubt deliberately exaggerated. The industrialists quoted were 
speaking against a government Royal Decree which limited working hours in textiles to 60 per 
week. However, they serve to warn us against assuming, as historians often have, that when 
industrialists moved into rural areas they found a ready, cheap and "docile" labour force waiting 
for them. 
Small-scale industrialists, who specialised in weaving and often worked for the larger 
Barcelona based concerns, had no choice but to use the mixed workers. The industrialists who 
built the relatively large spinning and integrated spinning and weaving mills on the Catalan river 
banks needed to find an alternative. They aimed to form a relatively stable labour force over which 
they could impose social control, and many were able to do this by building company towns 
(col6nies industrials). 
36. lbid, p. 224. 
37. lbid, pp. 49-50. 
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The larger company towns, most of which were to be found in the Alt Llobregat, consisted 
not only of the factory premises, but also had housing for the workers, shops, provided after 
hours entertainments, and they often had a school and a church. The workers every need was, 
therefore, cared for. This was in fact necessary because some of these establishments were as 
much as 10 kilometres from the nearest town. Social control was maintained through a mixture of 
employer paternalism and strict labour discipline. The workers were typically very isolated from 
the outside world. There were controls on the kind of press they could read. The left-wing press 
was usually totally prohibited, and trade unions were banned. 
Indeed, opposition to trade unionism was often a significant factor in the the formation or 
strengthening of the company towns. Such was the case of the Ametlla company town near Puig 
Reig on the Alt Llobregat. Here the management response to a strike which spread from Manresa 
in 1890 was to reorganise. Several families were sacked, the internal structure of the town became 
more authoritarian, and great importance was attached to catholic propaganda. Similarly, in 1900, 
during an intense period of social conflict on the Ter, the Rusifiol company town near Manlleu 
opened a school on its premises, which it put in the hands of the clergy. 38 These towns were, in 
fact, steeped in conservative catholicism, with priests and nuns employed both for compulsory 
religious services and to educate the workers' children. 
The largest of the company towns in the Alt Llobregat were very successful. The 
workforce, which was almost totally of rural extraction, lacked any tradition of collective action. 
Moreover, in the countryside and-in many small towns the powerful industrialists and their 
representatives were easily able to impose their will on the local authorities. As a result they could 
put pressure on workers to vote for candidates of their choice at election time, and were backed up 
by the courts and police in cases of industrial unrest. In this way, there grew up the figure of the 
industrial cacique alongside the traditional agrarian cacique, of such importance in nineteenth 
century Spanish history. The power of the industrialist over his captive labour force also meant 
that labour costs could be cut to a minimum. Indeed, up to the mid- 1 890s at least, many Alt 
Llobregat company towns did not pay wages at all, but gave their workers vouchers which had to 
be exchanged for goods sold within the town itself. Finally, these company towns were notorious 
for their long working hours and low rates of pay. 39 
The other main areas of the Alta Muntanya in which hydraulic power was extensively used 
were the Ter and Freser valleys. In these areas, however, the company towns were not as 
38. Ignasi Terradus, Les Col6nies Industrials. Un Estudi entom del Cas de L Ametlla de Merola (Barcelona, 
1979), pp. 155-157.; El Ter, 19 May 1900. 
39. Josd Comaposada, "El Movimiento Fabril", La Justicia Social (US), 9 August 1913; Miguel 
Rentd, La 
Abolici6n del Salario por la Participaci6n en Ids Beneficids (Barcelona, 1899), p. 23; Miguel Izard, 
Industrializacidn, pp. 85-86. 
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numerous. Nor were they as all-inclusive as in the Alt Llobregat. This difference was made clear 
by the leading Catalan Socialist, Josep Comaposada. He had visited the Alt L16bre gat in 1913 
and gave a harrowing account of working conditions in the company towns. Yet, after a similar 
tour around the Ter and Freser in 1916 he stated: 40 
For the sake of the truth ( ... ), we must note that the company towns to which we have referred (in the Ter and Freser) are a long way from being the same as those which operate in the Al*Llobregat. 
While in the latter a despicable dictatorial regime has been established, the simple thought 
of which infuriates the spirit, for it converts the workers into slaves in the true sense of the 
word, the company towns along the Ter and Freser are no more than factories set up 
outside the towns. They exploit the workers as do all enterprises of this type, but without 
the attack on human dignity reaching the incredible extremes it does in the Alto Llobregat. 
The reason for this difference in the size and number of company towns in the two areas 
was in part technical. The Alt Llobregat specialised in the production of low quality standardised 
textile fabrics. For industrialists in this area it was cheaper to spin and weave the product in the 
same establishment. However, on the Ter, yam was produced for somewhat higher quality 
garments which were more subject to variations in taste and hence to fluctuations in demand. In 
this branch of the industry it was more economical for a factory which specialised in weaving to 
purchase the yam it needed at any given moment rather that spin a large and changeable variety of 
yams. The Ter Valley factories, therefore, tended to specialise in spinning alone. 41 
One consequence of this was that the vertically integrated plants of the Alt Llobregat were 
considerably larger than most of those on the Ter. Thus, on the Alt Llobregat in 1898 there were 
35 factories. Of the 14 on which we have information 11 both spun and wove, and they had an 
average of 7,477 spindles and 209 power looms per factory. In the principal Ter Valley towns the 
situation was clearly very different (see Fig 1.2. ). In TorellO in 1904 there were no weaving 
factories of any note and the 7 spinning factories had an average of 3,811 spindles. In Manlleu at 
the turn of the century the 10 large-scale factories were nearer the Llobregat average, with a mean 
of 6,820 spindles. However, only one of these factories also engaged in weaving. Manlleu was 
one of the towns on the Ter in which weaving was most in evidence, but the 10 small-scale 
employers who wove had only an average of 36.4 looms each. 42 
40. Jos6 Comaposada, "La Vida en La Comarca del Ter I", US, 4 November 1916. 
41. Lucas Fl6rez &Itr6n, La Industria Algodonera Espallola (Barcelona, 1943), p. 110. 
42. ETN, 17 July 1897, p. 35; AMT, Matricula Industrial-, Ajuntament Municipal de Manlleu (AMM), S. 149. 
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The cost of building a company town, which included housing for the whole workforce, 
was very high, and it was only the larger establishments that could afford such outlays. It was no 
doubt for this reason that in 1916, out of 76 factories to be found on the banks of the Ter and 
Freser, no more than 17 were in company towns. 43 Furthermore, as Josep Comaposada noted, 
they were not at all similar to those on the Llobregat. The most all-inclusive was probably Fabra i 
Coats' spinning factory, Noves Hilatures del Ter, which was built near TorellO in the 1890s. It 
was formed with English and Catalan capital, and out of a total workforce which at its high point 
was 500 strong, it provided housing for about 300. The town also had a church and two schools. 
The paternalist relation between the employer and his men was cemented though a pension fund, 
free medical treatment and a consumer co-operative. 44 In fact the regime in this company town, as 
in the two other factories owned by Fabra j Coats on the Barcelona Pla, was highly benevolent, 
and the working week was shorter than in the nearby factories. This ensured that Fabra i# Coats 
probably had the best industrial relations record of any factory in the areas under study. 
However, few of the Ter Valley company towns were involved in the lives of their 
workforce to such a degree as Fabra ' Coats. One of the basic dissimilarities I between the 
Llobregat and Ter company towns was that only a relatively small proportion of the workers 
actually lived and slept in the latter. La Mambla near the town of Orfs was one of the largest on the 
Ter. In 1914-15 it employed 225 workers, and there was housing for 102. However, the Vilaseca 
company town near Torell. 0 employed 450 workers at the same date, but housed only 62, and the 
Corominas company town, also built near TorellO, had 234 workers on its payroll in 1911, but 
provided housing for just 70.45 
The fact that many manufacturers did not set up company towns, and that those that 
functioned only provided housing for part of the workforce, does not, however, mean that they 
drew large amounts of mixed workers from the surrounding countryside. There were already in 
the mid-nineteenth century a number of significant urban centres on the Ter, and they grew rapidly 
as the area industrialised. Growth was most rapid in Manlleu and Roda. Thus, while Manlleu had 
1,991 inhabitants in 1842, by 1852 the number had risen to 3,300, to reach 5,823 by 1900. At the 
same time Roda increased its population from only 593 in 1843, to 1,913 in 1857 and 2,287 in 
43. Josd Comaposada, "La Vida I". 
44. ETN, 17 July 1898, p. 35. Memotia sobre Las Obras Sociales a Favor de Los Trabajaddres en La 
Compatlia Andnima de Fabra i Coats de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1916). 
45. Leopoldo Negre, "Enquesta sobre Les Condicions Econ6mic-Socials de les Conques del Ter i 
Fresser", Anuati dEstadistica Social de Catalunya, 1915 (Barcelona, 1917), pp. 124-125. AMT, 
Estadistica del Trabajo. Registro de los Obreros de Ambos Sexos que Trabajan en Esta Localidad El 
1911. 
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1900. By 1887 22,862 people lived in urban areas on the Vic Plain. This represented about half 
the area's total population. 46 
Table 1.4. Numbers of workers in the Ter Valley 1850-1914 
Town 1850 1892 1914 
Manlleu 1,116 2,620* 1,500 
Torello 307 1,029 1,300 
Sant Vicenq 
de Torello 65 610 
Vilaseca 
company town 
Fabra, " Coats Y 
company town 
Oris 
Vinyoles d'Oris 
La Mambla d'Oris 
company town 
Roda 
Sant HipO'lit 
Sant Quirze 
610 
198 
450 
225 
350 
290 732 1,300 
45 1,080 1000 
599 800 
Total 1823 7428 6925 
* This figure may be an overestimation. In 1891 the La Publicidad estimated there were between 1,600- 
1,800 workers in Manlleu. Sources. Guillermo Graell, Historia del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional 
(Barcelona 1908), pp. 442-492.; Juan Sallar6s y Pla, El Trabajo de las Mujeres y Nif)os. Estudio sobre las 
condiciones actuales ( Sabadell, 1892), p. 130; Leopoldo Negre, "Encuesta sobre les condicions 
econ6mic socials a les conques del Ter i Fresser", Anuari dEstadistica Social de Catalunya 1915 
(Barcelona 1917); LP, 14 October 1891, p. 2. 
A large part this increase can be put down to the immigration of peasants from the 
surrounding countryside in search of employment. AsTable 1.4. demonstrates, there was a 307 
per cent increase in the size of the Ter Valley working class between 1850-1892, with the greater 
part of this increase concentrated in the main urban centres. Most this growth took place in the 
period 1850-1885. Thereafter, as a result of the growing difficulties facing the cotton textile 
industry, there was a stabilisation of numbers. Indeed, in Manlleu, where costs were higher than 
in the surrounding region, there may even have been a slight fall in the number of workers between 
1892-1914. Nevertheless, there were about 7,000 workers in the principal Ter Valley towns in 
1914. At the same time the working class population around Ripoll and in urban centres on the 
Freser and so-called Alt Ter numbered another 6,100 workers, with perhaps another 3,000 
employed on the Ter around Girona. 
46. Joaquim Albareda, op cit, p. 99.105. 
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The development of these important urban centres was to be of geat importance for the 
subsequent history of the Ter Valley labour movement. The workers did not totally break their 
bonds with the land. As late as 1928 the Catalan geographer, Gonqal de Reparaz, could state: 47 
There is a very close relationship between industry and agriculture on the plain. In well 
organised company towns, like Fabra y Coats near Torello, each worker has his own small house and a piece of land behind it to cultivate. But there are some workers whose links 
with the land are closer. They are a type of fanner who, in addition to working in the factories as spinners, weavers etc., often cultivate one or two tracts of land they have 
rented on the outskirts of the town or company town. If the factory work goes well they have a labourer cultivate the land, and help during their hours off. But if there is a strike or 
a layoff, they cultivate the land themselves, and in this way they do not have to fall into 
debt and can resist crises far better than workers in the cities. 
Produce from these allotments was certainly a useful supplement to the workers industrial 
wage, and the possibility of turning to agricultural work also helps to explain, as shall be seen, 
their ability to resist prolonged strikes and lock-outs. Yet this should not obscure the fact that by 
the late nineteenth century in the Ter Valley towns the workers were primarily industrial. Their 
main source of income was wage labour, and most lived in an urban, industrial setting. Manlleu 
was the clearest example of this transformation, having "an essentially industrial appearance, like 
Sabadell, Terrassa, Mataro, and other towns of the same type". 48 
The importance of this point for our study is that in an urban setting workers were in a far 
stronger position to set up trade unions and other associations to defend their interests. 
Furthermore, because in the Ter and Freser part of- the company town workforce also lived in 
urban areas, and therefore mixed with the other workers in their free time, the associations the 
town workers created found support throughout the region. This fact was noted at the time. Thus, 
according to one commentator, on the Ter: "In the small industrial towns the caps (gorras) of the 
workers mix with the Catalan caps (barretines) of the peasants; the landscape is more appealing and 
life somewhat freer than in the company towns. " This could most clearly be seen in the largest of 
these towns, such as ManHeu and Roda. Along the Freser, Alt Ter and around Girona, on the 
other hand, the task of forming stable union or political bodies was far more difficult, for in Josep 
Comaposada's words: 49 
In spite of their best efforts it is impossible for the workers of the outlying 
districts to 
defeat the bourgeoisie single-handed. The bourgeoisie has all the power which money, the 
church, the civil guard and local authorities can bestow, and all the resources of state 
power. 
47. Gongal de Reparaz (fil), La Plana de Vic (Barcelona, 1928), p. 110. 
48. Josd Comaposada, "La Vida del Obrero en la Comarca del Ter X. Manileu", 
US, 28 December 1916. 
49. josö Comaposada, "La Vida... ill. Camprodon", US, 18 November 1916. 
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The collective strength of workers in the Ter Valley can be appreciated if wages and 
working hours in the area are compared to those in the rest of the Alta Muntanya. From the late 
nineteenth century through to 1914 working hours in Barcelona cotton textiles were 64 per week. 
In the Ter Valley they were officially 66 for day and 48 for night work, though they were in reality 
somewhat longer as workers were expected to take turns and mind each others machines during 
lunch and dinner breaks. This working week was most strictly enforced in the principal Ter Valley 
towns. Longer hours were more common in outlying areas. In the principal cotton towns around 
Barcelona and along the Baix Llobregat up to Manresa a 66 hour working week was also in force. 
It was, however, in the Alt Llobregat that working hours were longest. Here a 70 hour week was 
the minimum and a working day of up to 16 hours was not uncommon. Wage levels told a similar 
story. Wages on the Ter were appreciably higher than in other areas in which hydraulic power was 
used. Data for the Ter and Alt Llobregat in the early 1890s indicate that on the Ter wages were 
about 20 per cent greater in the processes prior to spinning, and about 30 per cent greater in 
spinning itself. 50 Indeed, consequent upon the decline in wages in Barcelona from the 1880s, 
associated with the substitution of male for female power-loom weavers, the difference between 
average wage rates in the Ter and the Catalan capital became increasingly narrow. This is made 
plain by Table 1.5 -, which compares wages in the two areas between 1913 and 1915. 
Wages in Barcelona and the Ter were almost identical on the weaving side of the industry. 
The Ter Valley, however, specialised in spinning. On this side of the industry, female workers in 
general earned slightly less than their Barcelona counterparts. Male fullers, carders and mule 
spinners earned between about 70 and 80 per cent of the equivalent Barcelona workers wage. 
Nonetheless, two further factors inclined the balance in favour of the Ter Valley workforce. First, 
the price of basic foodstuffs appears to have been on average a little lower on the Ter, and rents 
were without a doubt considerably cheaper. 51 Moreover, as we have seen, many Ter Valley 
workers still cultivated their own patch of land. Second, the relatively high paid male spinners 
formed a far higher proportion of thei cotton textile labour force on the Ter than in Barcelona. In 
the Catalan capital, it has been suggested, men may have made up no more than 3 per cent of the 
labour force. The mule spinners earned the princely wage of between 30-45 pesetas a week, and 
yet, according to Miguel Sastre i Sarna, in 1905 there were only 100 mule spinners 
in the whole of 
the city. 52 Male adults, on the other hand, represented about 23 per cent of the 
industry Is 
50. Miguel Rent6, op cit, pp. 22-23. 
51. Leopoldo Negre, op cit.; "Estadistica de Subsistencies a Barcelona (1914)", in Anuari 
d'Estadistica 
Social de Catalunya 1914 (Barcelona, 1915), pp. 31-34.; Pere Casals, "L'habitaci6 Obrera Ahir i Avui", 
La 
Naci6,2 October 1915. 
52. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resuftados durante El Aflo 1903 
(Barcelona, 1904), 
pp. 12-13. 
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workforce along the Ter and Freser, but in the larger Ter Valley towns this proportion was usually 
higher. In Manlleu, indeed, a majority of the workers appear to have been men. 53 
Tablel-5. Average weekly wages in the Ter Valley and Barcelona cotton textile industry 1913-15 (pesetas ). 
Category of ABA as a Percentage of B Worker The Ter Barcelona 
Spinning 
Fullers 17-18 20-22 79.5 
Carders 17-18 24-25 71.4 
Manuares 12-14 13-15 92.8 
Meaeres 13-16 12-18 93.5 
Ring frames(men) 20-25 
15-25 100 
Ring frames 
(women) 15-16 
Self-acting 
mules 24-28 30-35 69.3 
Weaving 
Rodeteres 12- 16 12-16 100 
Dobladores 14- 21 18-21 92.1 
Urdidores 20- 28 20-25 106.7 
Weavers 18- 20 18-21 97.4 
Sources. Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La Jomada de Trabajo en la Industria Textil (Madrid, 1914), 
pp. 417-418,440-443: Leopoldo Negre, "Encuesta sobre les condicions economic socials en les 
conques del Ter y Freser". Jose' Comaposada, "La vida del obrero en la comarca del Ter. X Manlleu". 
The fact that there were a relatively high percentage of male workers is of key importance 
for our understanding of labour protest on the Ter, for it was the men who were behind trade union 
organisation, and it was their interests that the unions were formed to defend. The workers of the 
Ter had only in the past generation been drawn from the surrounding peasantry, and they were still 
strongly influenced by the values of the peasant family economy. Throughout Europe these values 
were very similar. They did not oppose female labour, but stressed that it was supplementary to 
that of the male head of the household. 54 It was this notion of women's work as a supplement 
which allowed employers to pay women so much less than men. For this reason on the Ter male 
heads of household had been given higher paid work as spinners while women were employed in 
the low paid preparatory processes. It was a sexual division of labour of which, all evidence 
suggests, the men approved. Thus, the cotton textile industrialists were right in stating in 1911 
that: "The men have never worked on the manuares, mecheras, or aspes, either by day or by night, 
53. Josd Comaposada, "La Vida ... I".; Leopoldo 
Negre, op cit. 
54. Louise Tilly and Joan Scott, "Women's Work and the Family in Nineteenth Century Europe", in Charles 
E. Rosenberg (ed. ), The Family in History (Philadelphia, 1975). 
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for they regard it as improper of the male sex.,, 55 It was also for this reason that male workers 
would often complain at the employers attempts to pay them a "woman's wage". 
Within the peasant family economy daughters were expected to work full time. However, 
once a woman was married her primary role was seen as in the domestic sphere. These values 
were also pas on to the first generations of Catalan proletarians. The result was that most female 
workers tended to be young and unmarried. This could be seen in the case of the Torello cotton 
textile industry, where in 1909 in the factory of Castell, CalliS and Verdaguer, 66 per cent of the 
men over the age of 16 were married, but only 10.1 per cent of the women. Data giving the age of 
workers in Torello's cotton factories two years later shows why this was so. The average age of 
men over 16 was 36. The average age of women was 25, and there were also a large number of 
girls of between 14 and 16.56 
It was for these reasons that the cotton textile spinners were so outraged by the 
industrialists' attempts to replace them by women on the ring-frames. Their attitude could clearly 
be seen in 1911 when the Ter Valley unions launched a campaign in support of a government bill 
to abolish female night work. This the unions claimed was necessary "given the debility of the 
female sex", and they made no secret of the hope that: 57 
With the introduction of the said law hundreds of unemployed men will find work and they 
will, therefore, cease to be half women (hombres mujeres) dedicated to domestic chores, 
which are a woman's preserve. With this work they will be the family's bread winners, 
while their women will be able to stay at home and really carry out the sacred duties of a 
mother and wife. This does not happen at present due to the distribution of work in the 
factories 
Indeed, the radical nature of this critique of female factory work suggests that the male 
workers had at least partly accepted the liberal view that there should be a total separation between 
work and the domestic sphere. In the cotton textile industry conflict over wages and working 
hours were common. Nevertheless, on the Ter the most bitter fought industrial disputes were to 
revolve around the employers' efforts to replace male by female workers. 
It may be thought that the labour process in woollen textiles would resemble that of the 
cotton textile industry. In fact there were substantial disimilarities. In the first place, the sexual 
division of labour was quite different. Thus in Sabadell in 1914, of the industry's 5,441 workers, 
55. Boletfn de la Industria y Comercio de Sabadell, May 1911, p. 6. 
56. AMT. T. Trabajos Varios. The situation was similar in Barcelona. Thus, the Anuario Estadistico de la 
Ciudad de Barcelona stated in 1902 that, "women are occupied in many professions only when they are 
single, " and "the work is not constant and only lasts for brief periods. In Barcelona the 
immense majority of 
single women and widows have a job which does not pay enough for their sustenance, 
but helps to pay 
the family's bills". AECB 1902 (Barcelona, 1904 ), p. 152. 
57. AMT. (A), C. Asociaciones s- de 19 10 a. 
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38 per cent were adult males. 58 This percentage was considerably higher than in most of the cotton 
textile industry. The principal reason was that in the woollen textile industry only men were 
employed as spinners and power-loom weavers. Moreover, the well. paid spinners were hardly 
threatened by the introduction of female labour. The power-loom workers were not so well paid. 
None the less, their average wage of 28 pesetas a week was equivalent to that of a skilled artisan, 
and far higher than the 18 to 21 pesetas a week earned by the female power-loom weavers in 
Barcelona. 59 This was not the only advantage enjoyed by the woollen textile workers. From the 
late nineteenth century many Catalan unions had waged a constant struggle against the use of piece 
rates. They maintained that such a payments system set the workers against each other, and that in 
the long run they were forced to work harder without earning higher wages. In cotton textiles the 
workers had been forced to accept piece rates. Yet in woollen textiles during the first decade of the 
century most workers still enjoyed fixed wages. In addition the working week was slightly shorter 
in the woollen textile industry: 65 hours a week between 1899 and 1911, and 62 hours a week 
between 1911 and 1913. 
There were perhaps two main reasons why the Sabadell industrialists had made no 
concerted effort to restructure the labour process in their favour. First, the high value of woollen 
textiles probably made it possible for them to bear higher wage costs than their counterparts in 
cotton textiles. Secondly, most of them ran very small scale operations, and so had neither the 
capital resources nor the wifl to modernise their industries. Instead they seem to have largely been 
satisfied to run inefficient plants behind high tariff walls. 
Yet this does not mean that the woollen textile workers faced no dangers. The 1891 tariff 
greatly increased the cost of woollen textile fabrics imported into Spain. In order to get around this 
difficulty Europe's largest importer, the Paris based Seydoux y Compania, set up a factory in 
Sabadell in 1895.60 The factory was run on very different lines from its Spanish rivals. It was a 
large-scale integrated spinning and weaving concern. Its workers were non-unionised, paid piece- 
rates, and earned lower wages than those in the rest of the industry. Sabadell's other industrialists 
had little sympathy for the Seydoux plant. Yet they had to compete with it and some of the larger 
ones - the "big fish" in the workers own words - were suspected of wishing to 
imitate it. 
Sabadell's woollen workers, with the power-loom weavers at the forefront, were determined that 
this should not be the case. Thus the two greatest strikes in Sabadell during the period under study 
would be the result of attempts made by the unions to force Seydoux to conform to the work 
practices of Sabadell's other factories. 
58. Boletin de ... 
Sabadell, August 1915, p. 7. 
59. Esteve Deu, op cit, p. 4.4. At the same time the spinners earned between 30 and 
32 pesetas a week. 
60. ETN, 30 May 1895. 
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In conclusion, then, by the first decade of the twentieth century the Catalan textile 
industries lived in the shadow of recession. The cotton textile industry had tried to renew plant and 
machinery, but by international standards it remained uncompetitive. Employers in woollen 
textiles, on the other hand, had seemingly been unable even to attempt to meet the challenge. In 
cotton textiles it was the workers who bore the brunt of the pressure to modemise. Yet, one of 
points this chapter has brought to the fore is the great variety in the terrain on which the industry 
operated. There were several large-scale enterprises, and a large number of weaving factories in 
Barcelona and its surrounds; small-scale weaving workshops were scattered throughout the 
countryside; integrated spinning and weaving plants operated in the Alt Llobregat, and specialised 
spinning factories on the Ter. The type of worker employed by the manufacturers also varied 
enormously. In rural areas many "mixed workers" found employment. In the Alt Llobregat 
company towns large numbers of workers (also of rural extraction) formed a captive labour force. 
On the Ter, on the other hand, male spinners and their assistants often lived in urban areas and 
travelled to work each day. In Barcelona there were large numbers of female power-loom 
weavers, but in the Sabadell woollen textile industry men still operated the looms. The capacity of 
these various categories of worker to respond to developments in the industry and defend their 
interests varied enormously. In those areas in which it was possible to form trades unions, so did 
the typology of conflict with their employers. Thus, in the Ter Valley the male spinners became 
involved in a life or death struggle over the employment of women on the ring frames. In woollen 
textiles, however, through replacement by female labour was feared it had not yet become a reality. 
In Barcelona, finally, the female power-loom weaving labour force had come into being as a result 
of the almost total substitution of male labour. These are questions to which we shall return in 
Chapter Three. 
44 
CHAPTER TWO 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND THE 
LABOUR PROCESS II: BARCELONA AND THE ARTISANAL TRADES 
Cotton and to a lesser extent woollen textiles were, then, at the forefront of Catalonia's industrial 
revolution. This was reflected in the make up of the region's workforce. During the first decade 
of the twentieth century there were about 80,000 cotton textile workers in Catalonia, and there 
were at least another 20,000 in other branches of the textile industries. This represented roughly a 
third of the Catalan working class. By international standards this was very high. Thus in 
England, France and The United States the percentage of textile workers in the total workforce was 
12,13 and 6 respectively. 1 Furthermore, these figures do not take into account workers involved 
in the textile finishing trades. 
Yet, it was not only the cotton textile industry whose structure was profoundly altered by 
the industrial revolution. In the European core states industrialisation was also accompanied by a 
rapid growth and technological transformation of the iron industry. In the Spanish Basque country 
an important iron and steel industry also grew up in the late nineteenth century. In Catalonia, 
however, the lack of coal and iron ore resources made such a transformation impossible. It would 
have appeared more feasible for a solid metal working industry to have gown up, in order to serve 
the needs of the new industrial economy. Yet, during the nineteenth century the size of Catalonia's 
metallurgical sector remained small. The principal cause of this state of affairs is to be found in 
government policy, which adversely affected the prospects of the metallurgical industry in two 
respects. First, Spain's railway network was largely built by foreign interests, and with the object 
of hastening the network's completion Spanish governments pert-nitted foreign firms to import rails 
and rolling stock with minimal customs duties. The Spanish metallurgical sector, as a result, 
hardly benefited. Second, while tariffs placed on unelaborated or semi-elaborated iron and steel 
imports were high, those on machinery imports remained low. Home based companies, therefore, 
found it extremely difficult to compete with foreign suppliers. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century a number of relatively large companies were 
founded in Barcelona, the most famous of which was the Maquinista Terrestre i Maritima. They 
did not, however, meet with any great success, for unable to compete with most machinery 
imports they tended to specialise in less profitable areas such as the construction of bridges and 
i. Michael Hanagan, op cit, p. 8. For a quantitative survey of the Catalan working class see, Pere Gabriel, 
"La PobIaci6 Obrera Catalana, Una PobIaci6 Industrial?, " Estudios de Historia Social, nos. 32-33 (1985). 
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markets. Nevertheless, with the take-off of the ýasque iron and steel industry in the 1880s the 
situation improved, for Catalan metallurgy's dependence on foreign suppliers was thereby 
removed. 
The weight of metallurgy within Catalonia's industrial sector did, indeed, grow in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, while metallurgical industrialists paid only 2.66 per 
cent of the taxes levied on industrial establishments in Catalonia in 1856 they paid 7.05 per cent of 
these taxes in 1900. However, it was only from the turn of the century that the industry 
experienced quite rapid expansion. Important in this respect was the growing muscle of 
metallurgical interests as a pressure group with influence in government circles. This became clear 
in 1906 when a new tariff put greater restrictions on the import of machinery and railway stock. 
Furthermore, more capital to invest in industry had become available from 1899. The loss of the 
colonies had represented a severe setback for much of Catalan industry. Yet it had also resulted in 
a large influx of capital from Spain's ex-colonial possessions. Investment tended to flow into new 
areas of economic activity. Consequently, although textiles remained dominant a certain 
diversification of economic activity could be observed, especially during the economically buoyant 
0 
years of 1910-14. Already in 1906 the French economist Eduard Escarra could state that the 
various branches of the metallurgical industry "are very characteristic of Catalonia, and some have 
gown to an extent which could not normally be expected given the size of its population". Yet 
despite this expansion most machinery was still imported. Thus, to meet Spain's industrial needs 
imports of machinery, electrical equipment, instruments, vehicles and ships increased by 142 per 
cent between 1906 and 1913, and at this latter date their value was thirty times greater than that of 
exports. During this whole period Catalan industry continued to face fierce foreign competition, a 
fact which, as shall be seen, greatly influenced the shape of industrial relations in the industry. 2 
Yet excessive concentration on those industries which underwent a radical transformation 
during the nineteenth century tends to obscure other aspects of Catalonia's industrial structure. In 
particular, as recent research has shown, the industrial development of Europe did not lead to a 
rapid demise of the artisanal trades. The advance of mechanisation was uneven and many artisanal 
occupations were only slowly transformed before 1914. Indeed, the growth in demand associated 
with population increase, urbanisation, and greater wealth, initially led to an expansion in the 
number of artisanal workers. The case of Barcelona makes this clear. If those districts which 
were aggregated to the Barcelona in 1897 are included then the city's population rose from 
2. Jordi Nadal, "La Formaci6", pp. 103-111; "La Industria Espahola en 1900. Una Aproximaci6n", in Jordi 
Nadal et al (comp. ), La Economia Espallola en el Siglo XX Una Perspectiva Hist6fica (Barcelona, 1987), 
pp. 52-53.; Alberto del Castillo, La Maquinista Terrestre y Maritima, Personaje Hist6rigo, 1855-1955 
(Barcelona, 1955), passim; Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "De la Crisis", pp. 72-73,88; Eduard Escarra, El 4. 
Desarrollo Industrial de Catalutla, 1900-1908 (Barcelona 1970), p. 125.; Alejandro Planas "La Industria 
MetalOrgica", in Revista flustrada de la Industria y Comercid de Cataluria 1921 (Barcelona, 1922). 
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244,401 inhabitants in 1860 to 505,790 in 1897.3 Urbanisation stimulated a rapid expansion of the 
construction, woodworking and furniture industries. The growth in population was also 
accompanied by an expansion of clothing and shoemaking. A modem printing industry also grew 
up as a consequence of the formation of a literate middle class public. These, with the partial 
exception of clothing, were all areas in which artisanal workers tended to predominate during the 
first decade of the twentieth century. 
The continued importance of artisanal. work structures was, in fact, particularly pronounced 
as a result of the region's relatively slow, faltering, economic development. Most of Catalan 
industry remained, by international standards, very small-scale. The standard economic unit was 
the family firm, not the joint stock company. Capital was raised through the formation of sleeping 
partnerships, and growth secured via the reinvestment of profits. What was true for textiles was 
true for the rest of Catalan industry. The smallness of the internal market encouraged product 
diversification and made it difficult to take advantage of economies of scale and adopt production 0 line techniques. As Eduard Escarra observed: 4 4 
Given the absence of large-scale industry the progress of mechanisation has logically not 
been so spectacular in Catalonia as in other countries. Hand power ( ... ) has not been replaced in all those sectors in which it could have been substituted. Without mentioning 
small-scale industry, in many important industries, in particular in the preparatory and 
finishing processes, machines are used almost everywhere, but in Catalonia these 
processes are still carried out by hand. To this should be added the fact that when 
machines are used they are not usually the latest model, and there are even industrialists 
who buy second hand machine tools from foreign firms when these are renewing their 
equipment. Nevertheless, although it is insufficient, the machinery in Catalan factories is 
important and is being modernised. 
Indeed, metallurgy itself was a good example of this situation. Not only was average plant size in 
the industry very small, but many metalworkers remained highly skilled and retained an 
apprenticeship system. They could, therefore, be better classified as artisans than as industrial 
workers. 
This tendency towards small-scale production was, finally, also mirrored in commerce and 
retailing. In Britain and France larger departmental stores had made their appearance, but in 
Catalonia they were scarcely visible. In Barcelona there were two or three large stores, and several 
important wine, alcohol and flour merchants. Yet they were exceptions to the rule, and were 
surrounded by a sea of diminutive concerns. 5 
3. Anuado Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona (AECB), 1911 (Barcelona, 1912), p. 74. 
0 
4. Eduard Escarra, op cit, p. 68. These comments appear as particularly significant if it is remembered that 
EcFuard Escarra was French, and that the French economy also contained a large artisanal sector. 4 
5. lbid, pp. 44-47. 
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Table 2.1. Nwnber of Workers in Barcelona's Principal Industries in 1905 
Industry Number Percentage Of Total Workforce 
cotton textiles 18,251 12.6 
other textiles 8,478 6 
textile finishing trades 7,678 5.3 
clothing 20,479 14.1 
land transport 17,890 12.4 
construction 15,277 10.6 
metallurgy 8,943 6.2 
food industry 8,129 5.6 
printing 7,495 5.2 
paper and chemicals 6,183 4.3 
manne transport 4,437 3.1 
woodworking trades 3,858 2.7 
glass and ceramics 3,069 2.1 
furniture trades 2,686 1.9 
gas and electricity 2,224 1.5 
coach, cart and boat makers 2,206 1.5 
leather trades 1,628 1.1 
Totals 138,911 95.9 
Source. "Censo Obrero de 1905", in AECB 1905 (Barcelona, 1907). 
At the turn of the century, therefore, the textile industries still maintained a leading position 
within the secondary sector of the Catalan economy. Yet Catalan industry remained diverse. In 
small towns outside Barcelona a worker not employed in textiles was usually an artisan. As Table 
2.1. indicates the picture in Barcelona was somewhat more complex. There were a total of 
144,788 workers in the city in 1905. The percentage of textile workers in the Barcelona working 
class was lower than in most of urban Catalonia -a reflection of the importance of cotton textiles in 
the Alta Muntanya. As befits a port there were also a relatively large number of sailors and 
dockers, included under the heading marine transport. Any large city in an age in which the motor 
car was only making its first tentative appearance also employed large numbers of workers to 
transport goods and men by horse. The greatest number of workers in this category were the 
carters, of which there were over 5,000 at this time. 
There were 88,210 adult male workers in Barcelona in 1905. Artisanal workers probably 
made up nearly 50 per cent of the adult male working class. Along with those industries already 
mentioned, artisans were to be found in glass, ceramics, coach making and the luxury trades. 
Unlike textiles proper the textile finishing trades were also dominated by male adult skilled 
workers. In the food industry Barcelona's 3,000 bakers, though badly paid and forced to work 
extremely long hours, also maintained the semblance of an apprenticeship system. However, all 
these branches of industry had their share of unskilled labourers. These workers were often newly 
arrived immigrants, who once in the city milled around the docks, railway stations and 
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construction sites in search of work. Moreover, 34,333 Barcelona workers, or 23.7 per cent of 
the Barcelona working class, were female. Many, as has been seen, worked in textiles, but an 
increasing number - over 10,000 in 1905 - worked at home as seamstresses, dressmakers, ironers 
and the like in the rapidly expanding outworking branch of the clothing industries. This left, 
finally, a total of 22,245 children employed in Barcelona. Most of the girls worked in textiles or 
helped their mothers and elder sisters with homework. The majority of boys, at least theoretically, 
undertook some kind of apprenticeship. 
Table 2.2. Social Structure of Barcelona 1900 (in percent) 
Agricultural Workers 1.3 
Other Workers 61.3 
Commerce 11.6 
Domestic Service 9.3 
Liberal Professions 2.9 
Clergy 1.8 
Other Categories 11.8 
Total 100 
Source. Anuario Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona 1902 (Barcelona, 1904), pp. 160-161. 
The pattern of the city's economic development was also reflected in its social structure. 
Table 2.2. outlines the main social categories into which Barcelona was divided in 1900. The 
figures are by no means wholly reliable. They are based on a questionnaire sent out by local 
government officials, and the returns were incomplete. This is demonstrated by the fact that, 
according to the census, the city's active population represented only 28.8 per cent of total 
population. None the less, in the absence of any alternative the census does at least provide us 
with an approximation. 
The census confirms the large percentage of the city's active population dedicated to 
working class professions. However, this percentage was, as might be expected, not as great as in 
the most industrialised. parts of Europe. In the iron, steel and coal mining town of Bochum at the 
heart of the German Ruhr, for example, by 1907 almost 79 per cent of the active population was 
working class. 6 As a result of the region's relatively slow industrialisation drive, and of the small- 
scale of its industry and commerce, most urban areas in Catalonia also had a large petty bourgeois 
and lower middle class population. This could be seen in Barcelona where the majority of those 
classified in the "General Categories" were small-scale employers. 7 Together with those engaged 
in commerce they made up 23.4 per cent of the active population. 
6. David F. Crew, op cit, P. 19. 
7. The compilers of the census stated: "In this section are to be found those whose return did not state a 
specific profession such as industrialists, manufacturers etc. " p. 154. 
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Table 2.3. The Social Structure of Barcelona by Districts 1900 (percent). 
Districts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agricultural 
Workers 0.1 3.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.7 5.7 2.6 
Other 
Workers 79.6 61.6 48.9 40.6 65.5 51.4 70.2 60.1 70 73 
Commerce 2.5 11.4 25.1. 19.9 11.4 17.6 5.4 10.8 4.3 3.1 
Domestic 
Service 2.9 8.3 10.7 22.8 8.7 14.9 3.9 9.2 4.1 2.3 
Liberal 
Professions 0.8 2.5 7.4 6.2 1.6 5.1 1 2.5 0.8 0.7 
Clergy 0.1 1.1 2.4 2.8 1 2.2 1.5 4.9 1.6 0.1 
Other 
Categories 13.9 11.7 5.4 7.6 11.8 9.2 16.6 10.8 13.6 18.2 
Total 99.9 100.1 100 100 100.1 100.5 99.9 100 100.1 100 
Source. Anuario Estadfstico de la Ciudad de Barcelona 1902, pp. 160-161 
From 1897 Barcelona was divided into ten districts (see fig. 2.1. ). Table 2.3. outlines the 
class structure of these districts. The first thing that becomes apparent from this table is that 
Barcelona was not a city geographically divided by cast iron class barriers. Many small-scale 
employers, it seems, lived in the same districts as their workers, and even the more prosperous 
parts of town had an important working class population. 
Nevertheless, the third, forth and fifth districts stand out as the most bourgeois. The third, 
along with the more popular second district, was at the centre of Barcelona's Old Quarter. It was 
here that the Barcelona nobility had in the past built its palaces, and where the new class of 
bourgeois professionals had come to live during the nineteenth century. The area was crossed by a 
number of main commercial arteries, behind which were to be found a maize of dark, narrow, 
streets. On the more prosperous avenues bourgeois, merchants and master artisans often lived in 
the same building, the more wealthy patrons below and their more modest inhabitants above. 
8 It 
was also in these districts that one could still speak of a highly skilled, independent, artisanate of: 
9 
Ancient professions in old workshops, which resist the vulgar regime of capitalist 
exploitation and machinery. Reputable workshops which had filled with work the 
laborious Portal Nou, and other streets which still conserve something of their proud 
historic and artistic past. Preserved in the forged steel and cut stone, the elements which 
gave respect and gravity to the beautiful buildings around the Cathedral, La Plaqa del Rei, 
Santa Maria del Mar, and the interesting Moncada street. 
8. Joaquin Romero Maura, "La Rosa del Fuego. " El Obrerismo Barcelon6s de 1899 a 1909 (Barcelona, 
1974), pp. 58-59,132-133. 
9. Emili Salut, Vivers de Revolucionaris. Apunts Hist6fics del Districte 
Cinqu6 (Barcelona, 1938), pp. 59- 
60. 
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Across the Ramblas - the main artery which ran through the old city of Barcelona - 
was to be found the fifth district. The fifth district was well known for it bawdy Avenida del 
Paralelo, where small-scale employers, artisans and industrial workers rubbed shoulders at the 
weekend. 10 The district was also home to a subproletarian criminal underworld, and to a large 
community of prostitutes. In 1912 there were, in fact, about 12,000 prostitutes in Barcelona, and 
75 per cent of them were under age. Many of these prostitutes came from rural areas. Domestic 
servants were invariable young girls from peasant families who came to Barcelona alone. Their 
10. Un Segle de Vida Catalana 1830-1930, VoUl., (Barcelona, 1961), p. 1250. 
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original aim was usually to save enough to return home and marry. Most, nevertheless, ended up 
staying in Barcelona, and they were it seems particularly vulnerable. 11 
Yet the fifth district was at the same time far more proletarianised that either the second or 
third. Emili Salut, a friend of the great syndicalist trade union leader Salvador Segul, was brought 
up in the fifth district, and paints a vivid picture of working class life at the turn of the century. He 
point out that the district was teaming with small workshops. These included small textile 
factories, sweat shops such as those which employed women in the manufacture of cardboard 
boxes and paper cones, but also a large number of shops in which adult male skilled workers 
predominated. However, they could not be compared to the artisans of Barcelona's Old Quarter. 
In the barrack like constructions of the fifth district capitalist relations of production had made their 
appearance, and the jouneymen's position was under threat. Salut gives as an example the Vilella 
carpentry of which he states: 12 
The workers of that long disappeared factory justifiably referred to it as the "slaughter 
house", because every week they had to lament an accident involving the labourers or 
apprentices, and that at a time when there was no accident insurance. The excessive 
repetition of these accidents was the result of the desire to substitute Jou ey n for low ý 
ti Th paid labourers, at the same time as the labourers were substituted for ap ren ces. ese 
workers had to work under a management which showed a total technic incompetence in 
the installation and operation of the machinery. 
In fact, the district's industry was in decadence. Employers had begun to move to the cheaper and 
more spacious areas outside the old city of Barcelona, and over the next thirty years, either by 
design or by accident, most of the factories in the fifth district were burnt to the ground. 
The bourgeoisie also slowly moved out of the old city. After its walls had been knocked 
down in the mid-nineteenth century work began on the so-called Example, which to a large extent 
coincided with the fourth and sixth districts. There was no industry in the Example, and its sunny 
streets and spacious buildings provided a welcome change from the overcrowding of the Old 
Quarter. With the construction of the Example geographical class boundaries became somewhat 
more marked. This is partly obscured inTable 2.3. because a part of the socially diverse sixth 
district formed an extension of the fifth district rather than part of the Example proper. 13 
11. Albert Balcells, "La Mujer Obrera en la Industria Catalana durante el Primer Cuarto del Siglo XX", in 
idem, Trabajo Industrial y Organizaci6n Obrera en Ja Cata1uha Contemporcinea, 1900-1936 (Barcelona, 
1974), p. 95.; Jos6 Elias de Molins, op cit, pp. 17-19. 
12. Emili Salut, Op cit, pp. 59-60. 
13. Borja de Riquer, "Les Eleccions de la Solidaritat Catalana a Barcelona", Recerques no. 2 
(1977), p. 
119. 
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The second half of the nineteenth century also saw a new band of largely proletarian 
dwellings grow up around the city. These new working class districts had as there origin a 
number of towns which until 1897 had maintained a separate existence. Not all of the towns 
incorporated into the city of Barcelona in 1897 were clearly. working class. Gracia, most of which 
belonged to the eighth district, had a thriving petty bourgeois community and a long tradition of 
high quality artisanal manufacture. Hostafrancs and Sants to the east and Sant Martf de Provenqals 
to the west, however, had by far the largest concentrations of textile factories on the Barcelona Pla. 
This has led some historians to claim that a division could be seen between skilled workers who 
lived and worked in the old city and Gracia, and the factory workers of Sants and Sant Marti. 
Table 2.4. examines the extent to which such claims can be upheld. 
The table does show that textile workers were somewhat more likely to live in the 
proletarian districts outside the old city. Thus 38.8 per cent of textile workers lived in the seventh, 
ninth and tenth districts as against 33 per cent of all workers. Nevertheless the correlation was not 
very strong. The picture is perhaps to a certain extent obscured by the very poor census returns 
from Sant Martf. Contemporaries were unanimous in stating that it was the most industrialised part 
of the city, and it was often referred to as the "Catalan Manchester". The percentage of workers 
living in the area is therefore greatly underestimated by the census. There is, however, no reason 
to suppose that it was only textile workers who did not fill in their forms. 
Of the other groups of workers included in the table the most surprising residential pattern 
is at first si5ý&that of the clothing workers. As can be seen, they were strongly represented in the 
more prosperous districts. This apparent paradox is explained by the fact that many of them were 
female homeworkers. Although not admitted in polite society many female members of lower 
middle class and middle class families were employed by merchant capitalists as seamstresses or 
dressmakers: the extra income allowing the family to keep up appearances. 
Amongst workers from the skilled artisanal trades definite residential patterns were also 
often visible. Printers and workers involved in the furniture trades were overrepresented in the 
fifth and sixth districts and Gracia (54.7 per cent of furniture trade workers and 53.4 per cent of 
printers as against 34.5 per cent of all workers). Yet many journeymen did not reside in the old 
city. For example, 34.4 per cent of Barcelona's tanners and furriers lived in Sant Andreu and Sant 
Mard. Even greater was the concentration of woodworkers - principally sawyers, wood turners 
and coopers - ceramics and glassworkers in these areas. Thus, 41.4 per cent of woodworkers 
resided in Sant Marti, while 47.5 per cent of all glass and ceramics workers lived on the other side 
of town in Sants and Hostafrancs, and 34.8 per cent in Sant Martf. 
The proletarian circle which surrounded much of Barcelona was closed by the Barceloneta. 
It had originally been a village of fishermen, and was still distinguished as a centre of sailors 
taverns and dwellings. Thus it was that 80 per cent of all sailors and dockers lived in the First 
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District. It was also in the Barceloneta that many of Barcelonaýs larger metallurgical establishments 
were located. It was, therefore, this mixture of seamen and metalworkers, who formed over 50 
per cent of the district's working class population, that gave the Barceloneta its distinctive flavour. 
Table 2.4. Residential Patterns of Barcelona workers 1900 (percent) 
Districts 
23456789 10 Total 
All 
Workers 9.6 10.3 6 6.5 12.7 12.6 18.7 9.2 7.4 6.9 99.9 
Textiles 8.7 10.1 3.9 6.3 11.9 11.7 22.9 8.5 7.5 8.4 99.9 
Building 
Trades 5.9 8.8 6 7.1 12.8 15.5 13.3 13.1 12.8 4.7 100 
Clothing 
Industry 3.7 15.3 13 5.5 17.8 15.2 13.5 9.3 4.7 2.1 100.1 
Metal- 
Workers 11.6 9.5 5.7 6.1 12.3 11.8 16.9 9.4 10.8 5.9 100 
Food 
Industry 11.1 10.9 9 7.9 15.7 13.7 11.8 8.6 5.7 5.8 100.2 
Marine 
Transport 79.9 3.5 3.6 2.2 3.8 2.5 1.9 1.7 0.1 0.8 100 
Printing 5 8.1 9.2 9.2 17.7 20.9 11.4 14.8 1.9 1.9 100.1 
Land 
Transport 4.9 7.3 5.3 9.9 12.4 12.8 14.9 10.5 13.3 8.6 99.9 
Furniture 
Trades 3.6 4.1 9.6 11.6 17.1 21.2 12.2 16.4 2.5 1.6 99.9 
Tanners and 
Furriers 9.7 9.5 6.5 4.1 10 7.3 10.6 7.7 17 17.4 99.8 
Wood- 19.2 5.4 2.8 3.2 6.1 5.6 7.7 6 2.5 41.4 99.9 
Workers 
Ceramics 
and Glass 0.5 --- 0.2 1.3 1.1 2.1 47.4 7.4 34.8 5.1 100 
Source. Anuario Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona 1902, pp. 160-161. 
Table 2.4., therefore, points to important variations in workers patterns of residence. In 
particular it highlights the tendency of workers within a number of skilled artisanal trades to live in 
close proximity to their fellows. This fact tends to confirm research findings on skilled workers in 
other parts of Europe. On the job solidarity was often confirmed and reinforced by close contact 
within the neighbourhood. This is a question to which greater attention will be given later in the 
chapter. The data does not, however, bare out the idea that there was any clear division between 
skilled and factory workers. Suggestions that Sant Marti and El Clot formed ghettos of non- 
Catalan speaking immigrants who had recently arrived in Barcelona are very wide of the mark, and 
indeed misunderstand the nature of the Barcelona working class's family economy. 
14 As in the 
Alta Muntanya , in Barcelona young unmarried girls went out 
to work in order to supplement 
14. This is the interpretation put forward by Joan Conelly Ullman, La Semana Trigica. Estudio sobre 
las 
Causas Socioecondmicas del Anticleficalismo en Esparla 1898-1912 (Barcelona 1972), pp. 115-116. 
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family income. When they were married it was hoped they would be able to give up their work. 
Given the high cost of living, however, this could prove impossible. Female cotton textile 
workers, therefore, often formed part of the same family as skilled workers. Syndicalist trade 
union leaders, who made great efforts to convince male trade unionists to play an active role in the 
unionisation of female textile workers, noted this fact on numerous occasions. Thus, for example 
"Syndicalist Weaver" argued in 1911: "In this task (the unionisation of the weavers), workers from 
other trades - printers, metalworkers, painters, blacksmiths, etc. - can be of great assistance, 
because thousands of these workers have wives and daughters whom they could persuade to join 
the union if they showed a little interest and made the effort.,, 15 This fact was, as shall be seen, of 
great importance for our understanding of the Barcelona labour movement. 
Barcelona was not only one of the most expensive cities in Europe, it was also one of the 
most insalubrious. In the old city of Barcelona workers lived in damp, overcrowded, houses four 
or five stories high, in narrow, dark and smelly backstreets. In the populations of the Pla there 
was more space, and housing was generally better. Yet in these areas the lack of drainage systems 
also proved a serious health hazard. Epidemics of typhus, smallpox, and cholera were, 
consequently, very common. 16 
The high resultant mortality rate meant that the city was only able to expand through 
immigration. In the aftermath of the 1880s agrarian crisis there was no shortage of peasant 
immigrants. Thus the Barcelona Pla grew by almost 54 per cent between 1877 and 1900. On the 
Pla during these years death rates were generally higher than birth rates. As a result this growth 
was more than covered by immigration: 196,487 people came to live in the Pla during these years, 
and an average of 7,000 people a year arrived in Barcelona during the first decade of the century. 
In fact by international standards the level of immigration was not particularly high. Furthermore, 
it was to be dwarfed by the great wave of immigration which swept the Catalan capital between 
1916-19, and during the 1920s. Nevertheless, it was too much to be absorbed by the sluggish 
Catalan economy, particularly in times of depression. In Barcelona, therefore, there was usually a 
cc reserve army of labour" which served to keep down wage levels and increase the workers sense 
of uncertainty. Unemployed workers had to turn to begging and swelled the ranks of the so-called 
trinxaires, who wandered the streets of Barcelona. 17 
immigration during this period did not, however, as has sometimes been asserted lead to 
the formation of a non-Catalan speaking working class community. Much of the immigration was 
15. SO, 23 June 1911. 
16. Pere Casals, op cit, La Naci6,2 October 1915; Jos6 Elfas de Molins, op cit, pp. 32-33,42.; AECB, 
1905 (Barcelona 1906), pp. 171-178. 
17. AECB 1902 (Barcelona 1903), p. 109.; AECB 1911, p. 74. 
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from rural areas in Catalonia itself Thus in 1900 78.7 per cent of the inhabitants of Barcelona 
were born in Catalonia, and even in working class areas 74.6 per cent of the residents were 
Catalan. Moreover most non-Catalan immigrants were from Valencia (40 per cent), Aragon (25 
per cent), and the Balearic islands (5 per cent). With the exception of part of Aragon these were 
Catalan speaking areas. 18 
Catalan workers, in fact, found themselves in a somewhat paranoic situation. Central 
goverm-nent imposed Castilian in all its schools. The impact of this measure was limited. State 
schooling was highly inadequate, and illiteracy rates remained high. However, those workers who 
leamt the basis skills of reading and writing leamt them in Castilian. This in part explains why 
almost all the Catalan working class press was written in Castilian. Yet very few workers could 
speak the language. Several examples may serve to illustrate this point. Emili Salut recalls the 
great difficulty working class children faced in the fifth district at the turn of the century because 
schooling was not conducted in their maternal language. 19 Several years later a government 
delegate suspended a meeting of the Barcelona bakers union because the speakers would not talk in 
Castilian. The Socialist weekly La Internacional commented: "This had never happened in 
Barcelona. Especially not in a working class meeting where, thanks to the paternal care of the 
bourgeois state, there are always a large number of people who know no language except 
Catalan. -20 Finally , in 1914 a number of representatives of Catalan textile unions were sent to 
Madrid to give evidence at an enquiry on working hours in textiles. Several of these 
representatives lamented during their intervention that they could not express themselves 
adequately in Castilian. 21 Indeed, in Barcelona the only area in which a clearly non-Catalan culture 
milieux had developed was in a part of the fifth district which was later to be known as China 
town. Its inhabitants were closer to the underworld of petty crime and prostitution than to that of 
the proletariat. 22 Working class culture during this period, therefore, remained Catalan. As was 
noted in the introduction some interpretations of the roots of Catalan anarchism have tried to link 
the phenomenon with a high level of immigration from Andalusia. The evidence of immigration 
patterns before 1914 would, however, seem to discount any such correlation. 
In 1905 the average daily wage of Barcelona's adult male workers was about 3.9 pesetas a 
day. However, asTable 2.5. demonstrates, the level of wages varied considerably between trades. 
18. AECB 1902, P. 132. 
19. Emili Salut, op cit, pp. 23-24. 
20. La Intemacional, 4 December 1908. 
21. La Jomada... 1913, pp. 43.53.71.96. 
22. Emili Salut, op cit, pp. 75-76. 
56 
Skilled journeymen could expect to earn between 4 and 4.5 pesetas a day. Workers such as 
cabineýnakers, coopers, compositors and brickmakers, who were paid about 4.5 pesetas, earned 
by the standards of the time a good wage. It was only workers in a few highly skilled professions 
and self acting mule spinners who could expect to earn more. Unskilled labourers, on the other 
hand, averaged only about 3 pesetas a day, and most textile workers did little better. Moreover, 
workers were not paid on Sunday and many faced seasonal unemployment. 23 Female workers 
earned considerably less than their male counterparts, and there daily wage averaged at most 
between 2 and 2.5 pesetas. Children, as was to be expected, did even worse, and brought in about 
1.25 pesetas. 
Table 2 -5. Adult Male Wages in Barcelona Industry 1905 (pesetas a day). 
Average Wage Number of Workers Industries 
4.6-4.7 
4.4-4.5 
4.2-4.3 
4-4.1 
3.8-3.9 
3.6-3.7 
3.4-3.5 
3.2-3.3 
3-3.1 
1,903 
6,075 
2,028 
Makers of Musical Instruments 
Luxury Trades 
Printers 
The Furniture Trades 
Car and Coach Makers 
16,192 Textile Finishing Trades 
Woodworkers 
Metalworkers 
40,926 Land Transport Workers 
Food Industries 
Leather Trades 
Ceramics and Glassmakers 
Building Workers 
12,267 Paper and Chemicals 
Clothing 
Other Textiles 
3,402 Cotton Textile Workers 
339 Makers of Bone Objects 
Source. Censo Obrero de 1905; Miguel Sastre i Sama, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus 
Resultadds 
durante los Aflos 1903,1904,1905,1906,1907. 
23. The dockers were casual workers and, therefore, particularly severely affected 
by unemployment. 
Thus they earned about 7 peseas a day but could often only 
find work two days a week. Another group of 
workers whose level of wages is diff icult to classify are 
the sailors. The earned 75 pesetas a month but this 
included board and lodging. For this reason Barcelona's 
4,377 marine transport workers and dockers have 
not been included in the table 2.5. 
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However, it was the overall low level of wages in Barcelona that was most commented on 
by contemporaries, particularly as there was a tendency for real wages to decline between the mid- 
1890s and 1914. This was primarily due to inflation. The cost Of foodstuffs made up about 75 
per cent of a working class family's total budget at that time. In Barcelona their price began to 
increase from about 1895. Between this date and 1900 their cost rose by about 10 per cent, and 
between 1900 and 1914 by another 15 per cent. Rented accommodation took up another 10 per 
cent of the working class budget, and rents also rose considerably during these years - by as much 
as 60 per cent in the Old Quarter of the city between 1895 and 1915.24 
In 1917 Manuel Escude, a member of the Barcelona local government's technical staff, 
calculated that in 1914 the cost of living of a working class family with two children had been 5.75 
pesetas a day. 25 Yet wages were little higher than they had been in 1905. Other sources reached a 
similar conclusion. In the same year the report at the Metalworker Federation's conference stated 
that the minimum expenditure of a working class family with a similar number of children was 5.4 
pesetas a day. It pointed out that a metalworker's average pay was 4 pesetas a day, and that if 
Sundays and holidays were taken into account it was only 3.4 pesetas. If his wife worked, the 
report stated, she could earn 10 pesetas a week, but this still left a substantial deficit. 26 Many 
working class families probably managed on less. However, by 1914 it was becoming 
increasingly difficult for even a well paid journeyman to support his family without the wife and 
children going out to work. 
Low wages were not, however, the only problem facing the Catalan working class. 
Despite the technological backwardness of much of Catalan industry, it was not only the cotton 
textile workers who were seriously affected by employer attempts to maximise profits. Technical 
change and the replacement of male by female labour threatened workers in a number of branches 
of industry. An example of the first type of challenge is provided by the port of Barcelona. 
During the first decade of the century the port underwent a comprehensive modernisation 
programme. One of the main results was the greater use of steam powered loading and unloading 
equipment, and the construction of new wharfs which allowed ships to dock sideways and thereby 
24. Pere cle Prades, "Els Jornals i Les Subsist6ncies", La NacO, 2 October 1915; Manuel Tufion de Lara, 
El Movimiento Obrero, Vol. l., pp. 280-284.; Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 1,890-1,900. Pere Casals, op 
cit. 
25. Manuel Escud6, "Monografia Estadistica de las Clases Trabajadoras de la Ciudad de Barcelona", 
AECB 1917 (Barcelona, 1918), pp. 581-591. 
26. Federaci6n Regional Catalana de Sindicatos Obreros MetalOrgicos: Memoria del Congreso 
Obrero 
.1 Metalt; rgico Celebradd en el Palacio de Bellas Artes Ids Dias 12 y 13 
de Abril de 1914 (Barcelona, 1914), 
pp. 16-17. 
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did away with the need for lighter boats. The result was a great reduction in the demand for coal 
unloaders, a fact which was to lead to considerable industrial unrest. 27 
There were employer attempts to replace male by female workers in a number of industries. 
In commerce for example there were claims amongst the shop assistants that owners were 
employing increasing numbers of women. Bookbinders also attempted to resist the use of women 
as folders and cutters. The Barcelona waiters' unions also stated that new cafes were opening 
staffed by waitresses, and they even added a moral note to their protests arguing: 28 
The cafes in the centre of Barcelona, those which serve mocha cafe, high class liqueurs and excellent pastry, are shutting down through lack of clientele. The city has moved to the Paralelo and its surrounds, where as a result of the crowds each day new cultural centres open served by thirtyfive beautiful waitresses 
However, outside of textiles it was the artisanal trades that were most affected by the 
development of capitalism. Given the importance of this process for our understanding of the 
city's labour movement it is worth considering in some detail. The continuing importance of 
artisanal work structures in Catalan industry meant that the imposition of industrial discipline was a 
long and difficult task. Thus bourgeois sympathisprs could still lament in 19 10 "that not in France, 
nor Germany nor Belgium is the liberty that the workers of Catalonia enjoy in their workshops, 
particularly in all branches of Barcelona industry, at all common". And claim that: "A German 
worker, even when on day rates, is about 30 per cent more productive than a Spanish worker. 
This is a result of the rigorous discipline ( ... ) which does not allow smoking, singing, and other 
abuses so common in our workshops.,, 29 
These comments should not perhaps be taken at face value. They were made during a 
strike of Barcelona metalworkers in 19 10, and their object was to swing public opinion behind the 
employers. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that the Catalan journeymen had been able to preserve 
a large degree of autonomy on the shop floor. In the late nineteenth century in many respects these 
artisanal workers still moved in the same mental universe as their predecessors, who had been 
formed within the guilds. They considered themselves as craftsmen, and showed great pride in 
their work. Artisanal workers, their spokesmen maintained, should be well educated and have a 
solid grounding in all aspects of their trade. 30 
27. ETN, 30 March 1903; La flustraci6n Obrera, 27 August 1904; AECB 1907 (Barcelona, 1908), pp. 541 - 
551. 
28. LID, 21 April 1912. 
29. ED, 20 September 1912, ME; Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resultados durante los 
Af)os 1910 al 1914 ambos inclusive (Barcelona, 1915), p. 36. 
30. See, for example, the comments by a representative of the Barcelona compositors union in Boletin de 
la Sociedad del Arte de Imprimir (Boletin), May 1905. 
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In the second half of the century, however, their position within the labour process was 
threatened by a series of developments. Some artisanal workers were affected by the introduction 
of new machinery and the employment of female labour. They had, in addition, to face the 
growing use of piece rates and the degradation of the apprenticeship system. Piece rates were 
anathema to the journeyman because they led to a speed up of work and put the emphasis on 
quantity rather than quality. Apprenticeship, as was noted in Chapter One, was of key importance 
to skilled workers because it allowed them to limit access to the trade. Moreover, through the 
apprentice system it was the the journeyman rather the employer who trained the new workers. 
However, as the division of labour became more sophisticated in some trades the level of skill 
required of any particular worker fell. The length of apprenticeship training was in consequence 
reduced leading to a rise in the number of journeymen. Moreover, employers often tried to wrest 
the employment and sometimes even the training of apprentices out of the journeymen' s hands. 
By the beginning of the century there was, therefore, a tendency for employers not to accept the 
ratio of apprentices to journeymen which their workers had set, and in some cases, to use 
apprentices simply as a source of cheap labour. These changes were by no means limited to the 
carpentry workshop in the fifth district described by Emili Salut. Thus the Revista del Ateneo 
Obrero de Barcelona noted in 1897: 31 
For thirty years the fatal consequences of the present industrial regime have been felt. The 
division of labour, on the one hand, which transforms the worker into a simple machine 
destined to do only part of the work of his trade, and the excessive number of apprentices 
on the other, are a real danger for the future of our industry. 
When a master pays an apprentice he thinks that he has the right to employ him on all sorts 
of tasks, and makes little effort to teach him the trade. The result is that the majority of 
apprentices will inevitably add to the number of vagrants or have to apply for jobs which 
do not require any particular skill, like those of sweepers, porters, carriers, etc. 
Not all trades were, however, affected in the same way. There were a number of highly 
skilled well paid artisanal trades hardly touched by the onset of capitalist relations of production. 
This, for example was the case of the hatters, glove makers, gold and silver smiths, all of which 
maintained tight entry restrictions, and earned at least 5 pesetas a day. 
Other groups of workers did not maintain such a privileged position, but nevertheless faced 
no concerted attempt by employers to redivide the labour process in their favour. 
This was, for 
example, the case of the glassworkers. In fact, the average glassworks was considerably 
larger 
than that of most workshops. Tbus there were in 1907 two large 
bottlemaking plants in Badalona 
and Poble Nou which employed about 700 workers between them. 
By this time the larger 
factories had installed Siemens furnaces, which produced a continuous supply of molten glass. 
As 
3 1. Revista del Ateneo Obrero de Barcelona, February 1897. 
60 
can be seen in table 2.5. wages in glassworking were overall not very high. This was a reflection 
of the large number of unskilled labourers employed. It was also, according to the factory 
inspectors, the industry which most regularly flouted the laws relating to the use of female and 
child labour. At the heart of these capitalist enterprises, however, was to be found an artisanal 
work team or placa. The strength of this team on the shop floor rested on the inability of the 
employers to mechanise production. Thus a report noted in 1916 that in the glassmaking factory of 
Joan Girall Laporte in Cornella, "from the fusion of the igneous mass ( ... ) through to the 
packaging a long and complicated series of processes are carried out in which the hand of the 
worker is of primary importance. This is unlike most industries, in which the machine is the 
principal factor.,, 32 
At the centre of bottlemaking team was the glassblower who had to combine great skill with 
physical stamina. Thus according to El Trabajo Nacional, blowing the glass "requires a special 
skill and certain operations can only be learnt by youngsters of 14 to 16 years of age after 8 to 10 
years of practice". Glassblowers were thereby in a strong position drastically to limit entry into the 
trade, and this they did by "not teaching nor tolerating that anyone outside their own family should 
be taught the profession". 33 The glassworkers, therefore, retained a strong sense of their own 
professional identity, reinforced as has been seen by the close geographical proxin-lity in which 
they lived. Glassworkers clearly formed a closely knit team on the job and also met regularly in 
the local taverns and neighbourhood after work. 
However, the isolation in which the skilled glassworkers lived also led them to look upon 
other groups of workers with a certain disdain. The reasons for this attitude were explained by the 
glassworkers' trade union leader Joan Peiro in 1916. He maintained that the glassworkers did not 
consider themselves real workers "but as artists, as labour aristocrats". 34 Moreover, he observed 
that: 35 
( 
... 
), there exists a certain pride, arising ftom the historic "grandeur" of our trade, which 
leads them to think of themselves as superior to other groups of workers, the consequence 
of which is the absence of our collective personality, of our personality as a highly 
exploited class, from the annals of the working class's struggles for its dignity 
( ... 
) ne 
immediate consequence of that vane pride is a state of accentuated corporativism and 
its 
result: an ignorance of our most elemental duties as pan of that great 
family affected by the 
regime of exploitation of man by man, and the lack of a spirit of worker solidarity 
32. F. Rahola y Tremols, op cit, pp. 432-435.; La flustraciön Obrera, 25 May 
1905.; Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales, Memoria de la Inspecciön del Trabajo Correspondinente al Ailo 19 10 (Madrid, 1912), p. 
67. ; La 
Hormiga de Oro. liustraciön Catölica, 1 April 1916. 
33. ETN, 30 May 1895. 
34. El Vidrio, 1 January 1916. 
35. Ei Vidri0,1 August 1916. 
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This situation was only to change during the first world war when the glassblowers position was rapidly undermined by new machinery which used compressed air to blow out the bottles. 36 
Another group of workers which could to a certain extent be considered in a similar 
situation were Barcelona's 400 coopers. 
- 
Within Catalonia important nuclei of coopers were to be found in Sant Martf and in the towns around Reus, Tarragona, and Vilafranca del Penedes. From 
the 1880s they had, in fact, encountered considerable difficulties. They faced two basic problems. 
The first derived from the import of second hand casks through the port of Tarragona, which led to 
considerable unemployment in the region. The second was a result of the severe competition 
coopers faced from a large number of tiny workshops which had opened in rural areas around the 
town of Vilafranca. Employers in these workshops could not afford to keep journeymen on all 
year round, and those they did employ were paid very low rates. They survived the rest of the 
year through self exploitation. Merchant capitalists who bought the final product nevertheless 
encouraged them to remain in production. 37 
The Sant Marti coopers put pressure on the Barcelona merchants not to buy these cheap 
casks. In t4is they appear to have had considerable success. Working conditions in Sant Martf 
wereýh6'best in Spain. At between 4 and 5 pesetas a day wages were not very high, but the 
coopers kept a finn grip on the training of apprentices, and thereby ensured that the ratio of 
36. The use of glassblowing machinery was first reported in 1904. See, ETN, 1 May 1904. Its use did not, 
however, become generalised until after 1914. Thus Manuel Maria Balaguer an economist closely linked 
to the employers noted in 1923 that during the war years: "Not only did the rise in the price of raw materials 
used in the manufacture of these products lead to an increase in their sale price, but also to continuous 
strikes and wage rises. These were very important factors, for although they have affected all industries 
with more or less intensity in this one the problem has been particularly arduous as a result of the skills and 
physical strength needed by the workers in general and the glassblowers in particular. The decision taken 
recently to install glassblowing machines which use compresses air was therefore a good one. They are 
easy to operate and, above all, hygenic. " Manuel Maria Balaguer, "La Industria Oul"Mica", in Reser)a 
flustrada de la Industfia y Comercio de Catalulla 192 1, p. 115.1 n her study of the Resseguier bottlemaking 
factory in Carmaux Joan Scott states that the position of the skilled glassblowers was under pressure from 
the 1880s. The installation of Siemens furnaces led to a growth in unemployment as marginal f actories 
were forced to close down, and the introduction of closed moulds to blow the bottles reduced the skill 
content of the trade. In the Resseguier factory the coup de grace was provided by the introduction of 
glassblowing machinery in 1902. By this time, she maintains, "glassblowi I ng was no 
longer an exclusive 
craft In fact, there was little to distinguish it from many other semiskil6d trades". Joan W. Scott, The 
Glassworkers of Carmaux. French Craftsmen and Political Action in a Nineteenth Century City 
(Massachussets, 1974), pp. 73-77,170-175. The Catalan glassblowers, all evidence suggests, retained 
their artisanal status far longer. This was the result, at least in part, of the technological time lag which 
affected much of Catalan industry. 
37. El Eco de los Toneleros, 30 October 1887.; Federaci6n de Oficiales Toneleros de la Regi6n 
Espahola, Actas del 15 Congreso Celebradd en Sans los dias 9 al 18 de Mayo de 1887 (Barcelona, 1887), 
P. 111. 
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apprentices to journeymen remained low. 38 For this reason, as in the case of the bottlemakers, 
they kept somewhat aloof from the rest of the working class. Thus the syndicalist activist, Alfredo 
Bueso, noted that when he was a young lad at the beginning of the century the coopers were 
isolated from the other woodworking trades. The coopers, he maintained, were a 46 group apart" 
who "passed on the trade from father to son and only slowly admitted new faces into their 
union". 39 Their position certainly appeared more secure than that of other workers in the 
woodworking trades such as the power sawyers, cabinetmakers, and wood turners, who were 
conducting a vigorous campaign against the use of piece rates and to reduce the number of 
apprentices employed. 40 
From the late nineteenth century the coopers were faced by another concern, when news 
. 
r__ - came from. abroad that machinery had been developed to assist in the construction of the casks. 
The Spanish coopers' federation stated that the introduction of any such machinery would be a 
"terrible blow to our trade" and should be resisted. 41 Before 1914, however, the problem was 
never a serious one. Thus the syndicalist cooper, V Garcia, who had worked a number of years in 
France, noted that even in that country: 42 
The number of machines that are at present in operation is not large because, (in coopering) 
as opposed to other trades, the machine cannot attain the same level of perfection as a man. 
Moreover, the machines lack men to operate them, because a good worker does not 
surrender himself to a machine which is assassinating his comrades. 
The Catalan economist, Federico Rahola y Tr6mols, for his part, also stated about that time that the 
coopers "are well organised and up until now have managed to prevent machinery for making 
casks being introduced into Catalonia',. 43 
Both skilled glassworkers and coopers, then, were able to maintain a strong position within 
the labour process. Workers of other artisanal trades were, however, under more serious 
pressure. A case in point were the compositors. Printing was, asTable 2.5. indicates, relatively 
38. Miguel Sastre, Los Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resultados durante el AFIo 1905 (Barcelona, 1906), 
pp. 20-33. 
39. Alfredo Bueso, Recuerdos de un Cenetista, Vol. l. (Espluges, 1976), p. 26. 
40. Thus in 1899 the Barcelona cabinetmakers' union regarded piece rates as "the fundamental cause of 
the exploitation faced by our trade". LIP, 19 December 1899, NE. 
41. Federaciön de Oficiales Toneleros de la Regiön Espahola, Actas de la Conferencia Verificada en 
San 
Martin de Provensals los Dias 26,27 y 28 de Enero y del Congreso XXII Celebrado en la Misma Localidad 
los Dfas 9 al 16 de Abril de 1894 (Barcelona, 1894), pp. 22-23. 
42. SO, 9 May 1909- 
43. Federico Rahola y Tr6mols, op cit, p. 436. 
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well paid. Lithographers and photqýngravers earned 5 pesetas a day. Compositors could earn 4.5 
pesetas a day, by the standards of the time a relatively good wage, though there were it appears 
many employers who paid below official rates. Nonetheless, the attempt to ensure all the city's 
shops paid the same wages was not the only fight the compositors faced. 
The compositors, like workers in many other trades, had to tackle the problem of the 
employment of a growing number of apprentices paid by the piece. The compositors opposed their 
use for two reasons. First because they undertook tasks which had previously been reserved for 
the journeyman. Second, because they were given work which did not contribute to their training, 
and should therefore, the artisans maintained, be reserved for labourers. The overall result of the 
employers actions, it was felt, was to reduce the skill content of their work. Shoddy workmanship 
they claimed was being encouraged to the detriment of excellence. This was something, it has 
been emphasised, that skilled workers could not bear. 44 
Already by the early 1890s Miguel Rente, a leading figure in the Catalan co-operative 
movement, could claim that: "There are so many apprentices that the journeymen cannot find 
work. " Several years later in 1906 the compositors trade newspaper, El Boleffn de la Sociedad del 
Arte de Imprimir, stated that in newspaper offices there was a tendency for apprentices to replace 
the men on simpler tasks after only a year or two's training. In 1908 it talked of an "avalanche" of 
apprentices into the trade, which according to one compositor "will end up - if it has not done so 
already - by making the situation in our sad trade unsustainable". One of the results of the use of 
apprentices by employers to do all manner of work was the rise of the so-called "half journeyman" 
(medio oficial); workers who had not been properly trained and who "work for years and years 
without being considered as journeymen or receiving the wage which as such corresponds to 
them". 45 
Yet serious as this challenge was it was not the only one which faced the compositors. 
Hand compositry was a highly skilled job which required years of training. However, in Europe 
during the 1890s a technological revolution hit the industry. In the previous decade a new 
machine, the linotype, had been developed in the United States. It was introduced into Britain in 
1889. The linotype could set type far more quickly than could the hand compositors and, 
moreover, its operator only needed a short period of training. It was particularly suitable 
for 
newspaper publishing where speed was essential, while it was also the newspaper agencies that 
could afford the heavy capital outlays its instalment entailed. Furthermore, a 
few years later 
another American machine, the monotype, came onto the market. 
Production costs of the 
44. Boletin, May 1901; June 1901. 
45. Miguel Rentd, op cit, p. 25.; Boletin, October 1906; May 1908; 
Boletin de la Uni6n Obrera del Arte de 
Impfimir, 30 June - 30 September 1913. 
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monotype were higher than those of the linotype, but it was well adapted for book printing. The 
change-over to the new technology was extremely rapid in Britain and the USA. In Britain by 
1914 almost all news offices had installed linotypes, and all the main book houses were using 
monotypes. 46 
In Barcelona the new machinery was introduced more slowly. As the discussion of the 
first half of this chapter would lead us to suspect, this was primarily the result of the small-scale of 
much of the industry. There were over 300 printing houses in Barcelona in 1913. Between 
journeymen and apprentices there were at the same time about 2000 compositors, but they worked 
alongside the industry's 5,500 other workers. The factory-worker ratio was, therefore, at most 
1: 25, and it was probably considerably less. There were a number of large news offices and 
several important book houses. Yet at the same time there were large numbers of job houses 
which only employed 5 or 6 workers and, of course, could not afford significant capital outlays. 
This was a mixed blessing for the compositors. Conditions were often worst in these small, 
marginal, houses known as "coal yards.,, 47 However the news offices and a couple of the larger 
book houses began to introduce the linotype and monotype between 1900 and 1910. The resultant 
increase in production led to growing unemployment amongst the compositors. Thus their trade 
newspaper commented in 19 10: 48 
We feel that to talk here about what has happened since the introduction of the printing 
machinery in unnecessary. For, as you all know, in La Vanguardia, La Publicidad, El 
Noticiero, El Poble, La Tribuna, El Intransigente, La Prensa, and in the publishing houses 
in which it has been installed, personnel was shed as a result of over-production. 
In addition, as the new machines were relatively easy to operate, there was a temptation on the part 
of some employers not to train skilled compositors to operate them, but to use cheap female labour 
instead. As shall be seen, the male workers were to fight tooth and nail against any such attempt. 
Many skilled building workers had to contend with a quite similar set of problems. 
Within 
the construction industry there were, of course, a large number of trades. 
Wallpaperers and 
plasterers were the aristocrats of the industry, and could earn over 
5 pesetas a day. Another well 
paid group of workers connected to the building industry were the stonemasons who cut 
stone 
from the mountain of Montjtffc. The statutes of their union 
drawn up in 1895 stressed the need to 
maintain harmonious relations with their employers. 
Yet even in the case of these workers there 
was conflict over the use of piece rates. 
49 
46. J. Child, industrial Relations in the British Printing Industry 
(London, l 951), pp. 155-182. 
47. SO, 28 October 1910; 17 February 1911. 
48. Boletin de la Uni6n Obrera del Arte de Imprimir, 
20 July 1912. 
49. Reglamento de la Sociedad de Canteros 
de la Monta6a de Monjuich (Barcelona 1899), p. 6. Miguel 
Sastre, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resultados 
durante el AN 1907 (Barcelona, 1908 ), pp. 21-24. 
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Two other trades whose workers were employed in workshops away from the construction 
sites were the marblers and brickmakers. With an average wage of 4.5 pesetas they were, as in the 
case of the compositors, relatively well paid. The marblers, however, were on particularly good 
terms with their employers and maintained a tightly controlled apprenticeship system. 
Nevertheless, from 1911 there was an undercurrent of anxiety amongst the workers, caused by the 
decision of a factory in Cornella to introduce stone cutting machinery and raise working hours 
from the customary eight to nine and a half Brickmakers, also maintained strict entry restrictions, 
but there was a higher level of industrial conflictivity, as a result, as was so often the case, of the 
employers use of piece rates. 50 
Workers in these trades, however, formed only a small minority of those employed within 
the construction industry. The great majority of workers were bricklayers and their labourers, 
painters, and carpenters. These workers laboured in small groups on building sites under the 
supervision of contractors. The contractors were usually ex-workers, a fact which does not seem 
to have improved labour relations in the industry. Wages in these trades were lower than in those 
already analysed, and varied between 3.75 and 4.5 pesetas a day in 1905. In fact there real wages 
were considerably less than this daily wage. Like almost all workers they were not paid on 
Sundays. Furthermore, construction was very much a seasonal occupation and in the winter there 
was usually heavy unemployment. In the case of the bricklayers this was made even worse by the 
fact that they worked in the open and were not paid on rainy days. The result, a number of sources 
confirm, was that the bricklayers real wage was more like 2.5 pesetas a day. 51 Finally 
construction was also a industry prone to particularly violent cyclical swings. This could be seen 
in the depression years of 1904-1907. In Barcelona between 1900 and 1906, according to Miguel 
Sastre, the number of bricklayers and their labourers employed in Barcelona fell from 15,000 to 
3,500. Moreover, in 1905 out of Barcelona's 3,500 carpenters, 2000 were unemployed. 52 
The carpenters were the only group of workers in the building trades who faced a serious 
threat from mechanisation. Power saws were used by a large number of employers, and the 
carpenters claimed that they were the cause of rising unemployment within the trade. Thus in 1903 
when the carpenters struck for a reduction of working hours they: "Based their attitude on the 
fact 
50. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1906, pp. 39-50.; LP, 5 August 1911, ME.; Miguel 
Sastre, Las 
Huelgas... 1903, pp. 23-25. 
51. LID, 23 September 1901, NE; El Trabajo, 4 January 1902; Miguel Sastre, 
La Huelgas... 1906, p. 33. 
52. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1905, p. 22; 1906, pp. 30-34. 
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that with modem machinery in less time more work could be done, and by reducing the length of 
the working day the 400 workers in the trade who are at present unemployed would find work. "53 
The workers of the three trades, nevertheless, were all confronted by the contractor's 
employment of an increasing number of apprentices. Contractors also made a concerted effort to 
speed up the pace of work. In carpentry and painting piece rates were their favoured tool. In 
bricklaying they tried to increase the speed of work through closer supervision. The bricklayers, 
like other artisanal workers, showed great pride in their work. The restriction of their job 
autonomy and the attempt, as they saw it, to sacrifice the quality of their work for quantity was, 
therefore, greatly resented. Thus, for example, a leader of the Barcelona bricklayers' union 
showed his indignation at the methods employed by the contractors when he stated in 1901: 54 
Here we have gone though the shame of an employer, devoid of any sense of humanity, 
going so far as to dictate to a journeyman the way in which he should take hold of his 
trowel, bend down and pick up the mortar, because he considered the way the journeyman 
was doing it not fast enough, and he wished to save a few seconds for his own benefit. 
The anger and anguish caused by the development of capitalism and employer attempts to 
undermine these workers artisanal status is, however, perhaps best summed up by a resolution put 
forward by the Igualada and S ants bricklayers' unions at the first congress of the Regional 
Confederation of Bricklayers and Bricklayers Labourers held in 1914. It stated that to work in an 
"honourable" profession was the dream of any child. Unfortunately that of the bricklayer was 
44 rapidly degenerating"' as a result of the actions of their employers, who moved by "sheer material 
selfishness" had converted the trade into a "den of iniquity". This was, the resolution maintained, 
"intolerable behaviour in a trade like the art of bricklaying, whose reputation was since the remotest 
times well established, and which was at the head of all the trades in the construction industry. " In 
particular the report complained that the employers did not respect apprenticeship regulations. 
Thus they"avoid making any kind of commitment when employing an apprentice on one of their 
jobs, and in this way the situation had been reached whereby three quarters of the workers 
employed on a construction site are classified as and paid like apprentices". Moreover: 
55 
In some localities, especially in the big cities where exploitation by the bourgeoisie 
is at its 
height, apprentices are only used to put up the building site. When this is finished the 
employer is careful to discharge them or move them on to another site. 
53. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1903, p. 42. 
54. LP, 7 October 1901, ME. 
55. Confederaci6n Regional de oficiales y Peones de Alballil de Catalur)a: 
MeMOria y Actas del Primer 
Congreso Celebrado en Vilanueva y Geltrj en el Local del Ateneo V11anov6s 
los Dýs 28 y 29 de Julio de 
1914 (Barcelona, 1914), pp. 15-16. 
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When the apprentice regards himself as an adult and is ashamed to ask for work as an apprentice, his self respect is wounded and he decides, without consulting with anybody, to go up in rank and become a journeyman 
Metalworkers would at first sight be thought to ýe a very different category of worker from 
those considered above. On the European continent by the first decade of the twentieth century this 
was to a large extent the case. Ilie nineteenth century had seen a total transformation of work 
structures in the iron and steel industry, and in metalworking and machine building. At mid- 
century most metalworkers had been artisans. Even though many factories were by that time fairly 
large the workers continued to behave as if they were employed in small workshops: they 
controlled the pace of work, moved about the factory freely, and took breaks whenever they felt it 
necessary. However, the growth in factory size combined with the development of new 
technology gave employers the opportunity to break the hold the artisans had over the industry. 
The results could be seen in 1914, by which time most of the industry's workers were semiskilled, 
and required only a short period of training. 
This transformation took place throughout the metallurgical sector of the economy. The 
first process carried out in the industry was the smelting of coke and iron ore in a blast furnace to 
produce pig iron. The pig iron was then resmelted in a reverbatory furnace in order to produce cast 
iron. Cast iron was then used in the foundry. The key worker in a mid-nineteenth century 
foundry was the highly skilled moulder. However, from the 1860s the moulder was faced with a 
number of threats to his position. First, the invention of machine moulding. Second, the growth 
of mass production methods which allowed a standardised product to be cast by men with 
relatively little training. The result could be seen in England, where by the first decade of the 
twentieth century the craft based iron moulders formed only a small part of a labour force 
dominated by semiskilled moulders. 56 
Cast iron was, however, too brittle to be employed in the manufacture of a large number of 
products. For products such as rails, tools and guns, wrought iron had to be used. In order to 
convert cast to wrought iron it needed to be rolled and puddled. Great strength and stamina were 
required of the workers involved in this process. Like the mule spinners, therefore, they became 
another group of industrial workers who could command a high price for their labour. However, 
from the 1870s wrought iron was rapidly replaced by cheap steel. The most successful steel 
producing processes, the Bessemer converter and Sic mans Martin open 
hearth furnace, again 
. 
3skilled or unskilled labour force, which moreover could be closely supervised. required only a sem 
56. H. J. Fyrth and Henry Collins, The Foundry Workers. A Trade 
Union History (Manchester, 1959), 
passim. 
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Another group of workers with a strong position within the labour process were thereby 
eliminated. 57 
Once produced the wrought iron or steel. was forged. This process was originally carried 
out by a skilled forger. Yet as the size of the plates and beams which had to be forged increased it 
became clear that an alternative had to be found. This alternative was provided by the stearn 
hammer, which was increasingly employed on the continent from the 1860s. The steam harnmers 
were not difficult to operate. The result was again, therefore, to replace a group of skilled workers 
by another which was at most semiskilled. 58 
Iron and steel were, of course, the main inputs of machine construction. In the 1850s 
engineers were craft workers. Machine tools were very crude and the experience and eye of the 
engineer were, therefore, of the utmost importance. Production was not yet standardised and it 
was the job of the engineer to construct the entire machine. 17his situation was to change in the 
second half of the nineteenth century with the introduction of mass production methods. As a 
result far greater use was made of standardised, interchangeable, parts. Furthermore, new semi- 
automatic machine tools came onto the market. Here again, therefore, the content of the engineers 
work became de-skilled and it became technically feasible to employ semiskilled workers. 59 
As a consequence of Catalonia's lack of coal and iron ore resources no blast furnaces were 
to be found in the region. Cast and wrought iron was imported first from Britain and later from the 
Basque 'ountry and Asturias. The only factory that transformed cast to wrought iron on any scale 
was Fomento de Obras y Construcciones. In 1908 it finally opened aSi emons Martin open hearth 
furnace. Few factories, however, followed the same path. Foundry work was far more common. 
By the turn of the century a large number of foundries, some of which were very small, were to be 
found scattered throughout the region. 60 In Barcelona, moreover, most of the larger factories also 
had their own foundry. Nevertheless, almost half the city's metalworkers were employed by firms 
involved in machine construction. 
As in the case of most Catalan industry the Barcelona metallurgical industry was set apart 
from that of its continental counterparts by the small size of its plants. In 
1910 there were about 
350 metallurgical establishments in Barcelona, which employed some 
11,600 workers. T'he 
57. David Crew, op cit, P. 183.; Michael Hanagan, op cit, PP. 129-136. 
58. lbid, pp. 113-120. 
59. D. F. Galloway, "Machine Tools", in Charles Singer et al (eds. 
), A History of Technology, Vol. 5. (Oxford, 
1958). 
60. Federico Rahola y Tr6mols, op cit, pp. 420-421. 
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factory-worker ratio was, therefore, only about 1: 33. Indeed, looked at by international standards 
even Barcelona's largest two factories, La Maquinista Terrestre i Maritima and Fomento de Obras y Construcciones, which employed 700 and 750 workers respectively, were relatively small. About 
136 of the city's establishments, consisted of tiny workshops "in which the owner himself works 
with several apprentices". Many of them were to be found in the Old Quarter and they were 
dedicated almost exclusively to repair work. Given that most machinery was imported repair work 
was, nevertheless, an important part of the work of most factories. 'ne larger factories, as has 
been noted, tended to be located in the Barceloneta. This was where La Maquinista along with the 
important factories known as El Vulcano and Alexander Hernwnos were to be found. Fomento de 
Obras y Construcciones, on the other hand, was situated between Sant Mani and Poble Nou. 61 
Eduard Escard stressed the link between the small scale of Catalan industry and the lack of 
a large consumer market. In the case of machine construction this was particularly clear. Unlike 
their German and British neighbours Catalan firms found it impossible to mass produce 
machinery, and thus could to a far lesser degree use specialised machine tools which would allow 
them to subdivide the work in their factories. As Jose Playa, a commentator who had close 
contacts with the Catalan industrialists, stated: 62 
Here the machine construction firms can rarely specialise due to the lack of a market. That 
is to say they cannot fight with their foreign competitors in export markets, and in these 
circumstances they cannot take advantage of the the great benefits of serial production. 
What our industrialists do in general goes unnoticed, but is quite extraordinary and proves 
that the industry lies on firm foundations. Not being able to specialise, for a construction 
firm to survive it is absolutely necessary that it undertakes a wide variety of tasks, 
producing in each case only a limited number of copies, 
The need P--ý, ýdýuce to a wide variety of products was felt by even the largest Barcelona 
firms, and was not restricted to machine construction. La Maquinista, for example, received such 
a varied demand for cast iron goods that for each order it had to make a new mould. However, 
this was not the only factor that militated against the use of the latest production methods. The fact 
that labour costs were relatively low made employers reluctant to replace men by machines. Thus 
as A Escribano has pointed out Catalan industrialists were better able to compete with foreign 
suppliers in the production of machines like steam and hydraulic engines in which 
labour costs 
formed a large part of total costs. Finally technical modernisation was also slowed 
down by the 
absence of qualified technicians in the smaller workshops. 
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As Eduard Escarra had noted, therefore, the machinery employed in the Catalan k 
metallurgical industry tended to be out of date. This was even the case in La Maquinista where in 
1910 the management decided that its machine tools had become obsolescent and would have to be 
replaced. The renovation of the factory's machinery did not, however, take place until the years 
1917-23.64 
The result was that in Barcelona at the dawn of the new century the replacement of artisanal 
by semiskilled workers had only very partially been carried through. Of course by no means all 
metalworkers were skilled. The larger Barcelona plants used steam hammers. As noted, fierce 
competition from foreign firms also forced firms like La Maquinista into the fields such as bridge 
construction. The assemblers and riveters employed on these tasks were not highly skilled. 
Finally, some smaller workshops specialised in such fields as the making of wire netting, 
galvanised buckets, nails and screws, which needed few skilled workers. 
However, in many branches of the industry the employers inability to mass produce 
favoured the preservation of artisanal work structures. This was particularly so because so much 
of the work carried out by the metallurgical workshops involved repairs. Skilled workers were 
needed for such work. This was reflected in the survival of apprenticeship, and despite employer 
complaints that it did not produce a technically competent workforce nothing was done to find an 
alternative. 65 The difference between the nature of production in Catalonia and on the Continent 
was, indeed, favourably commented on by the Barcelona metalworkers' union, which hit the nail 
on the head when it stated: 66 
The majority of our employers only do repair work, and this shows us that Spanish 
metalworkers are not inferior to the rest. Foreign metalworkers, who are employed in large 
workshops, become specialists in one type of work and have no knowledge the rest. We, 
on the contrary, do all classes of work, and are therefore trained to be genuine workers, 
capable of all classes of construction and repair work. 
These workers were not, however, well paid. The average 4 peseta wage was, as table 
2.5. indicates, well down the league table of wages in the city. A skilled 
forger was the best paid 
workers in the industry, and in 1905 he could earn over 5 pesetas a 
day. In machine construction 
Spain. But the perfection with which the work is done and the favourable environment gives 
them an 
advantage over us. "Primer Congreso de Industrias Metahirgias. 
Exposici6n del Cuestionario (Barcelona 
1913), p. 31. 
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the best paid worker was the turner or lathe operator who only earned 4.5 pesetas a day. An 
adjuster, on the other hand, could only manage 4 pesetas. In foundry work the only worker to 
earn over 4 pesetas a day was, as might be expected, the skilled moulder, whose average wage 
was 4.25 pesetas. Moreover, it appears that as in the case of some cotton textile workers, 
metalworkers wages had actually declined since the mid-1880S. 67 
This was not the only grievance felt by the metalworkers. In Barcelona industry working hours were longest in the cotton textile industry where, as was seen in Chapter One, II hours per day was the norm. Most artisanal workers worked an 8 or 9 hour day. Since the 1870s, however, 
the working day in metalworking had been 10 hours. Any demand for a reduction in working 
hours or rise in wages on the part of the workers was, however, fiercely resisted by the 
industrialists, who maintained that only by keeping down labour costs could they compete with 
foreign imports. 
Furthermore, although metalworkers did not face a technological revolution in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, they were confronted by the same difficulty which so many 
artisanal trades had to cope with: the use of "an excessive" number of apprentices by employers 
who had wrested their employment and deployment from the metalworkers' hands. The 
background to a conflict involving the Sabadell engineering workers in 1899 serves to illustrate 
this point. Sabadell was the largest metalworking centre outside Barcelona. At the beginning of 
the year the engineers complained at the number of apprentices employed. Many of these so-called 
apprentices were brought in from rural areas outside Sabadell and lived with their employer. In 
order to obtain the maximum benefit from the apprentices' low wages the employers often 
stretched an apprenticeship out from three to three and a half or even four years. The apprentices 
were made to work over twelve hours a day and given work which the journeymen felt was their 
preserve. At the same time the engineers rejected the use of anyals. These were workers who 
were employed on a trial basis on low wages for one year after having completed their 
apprenticeship. 68 
Yet, it was in the clothing industry that the situation of male skilled workers was most 
desperate. The major contributing factor to the tailors' plight was the development of the sewing 
machine, which allowed employers to put out work to low paid female homeworkers who 
produced cheap, standardised, garments. 69 Shoemakers were faced by a similar set of problems. 
In Barcelona skilled male shoemakers were employed as cutters and fitters. However, women 
67. Ramon Gar r -1889)", Recerques, 
,,, 
abou, "Salaris i Ocupaci6 a la Maquinista Terrestre i Maritima (1872 
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69. Albert Balcells, "La Mujer Obrera", pp. 78-79. 
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were employed either at home or in the workshop to sew on the soles and polish the shoes. Moreover, work was also put out to large numbers of male shoemakers. They were particularly 
badly paid on average earning no more than 3 pesetas a day. For this reason they worked very long hours and, therefore, proved a serious competitive threat to the factory based workers. The 
position of these workers was further undermined by the loss of the last colonies which had 
absorbed a large part of Spain's production. As a result unemployment in the industry was 
particularly severe. A number of large factories closed at the turn of the century, and in Barcelona 
the number of shoemakers fell from from about 11,000 in 1903 to 6,000 in 1906, and half of these 
were unemployed. These factors help to explain why, in 1905, skilled shoemakers earned 
between 3.58 and 3.75 pesetas a day, little more than the average labourers wage. 70 But this does 
not end the catalogue of problems they faced. During the first decade of the century larger factories 
began to introduce machinery which was to make the skills of the fitter redundant. Thus by 1914 
the Barcelona shoemakers union reached the sombre conclusion that: 71 
At the present time a slow transformation is taking place within the industry which escapes 
the eyes of the observer. 
In Barcelona there are already five or six factories which make shoes with the new 
machinery, and its results are so prodigious that before long the other industrialists, not being able to compete with the new form of production, will be obliged to imitate them or 
else be defeated 
As a result of the small-scale of Catalan industry and the sluggish growth of the Catalan 
economy, then, artisanal work structures continued to predominate in many branches of Catalan 
industry at least until 1914. However, few artisans in Catalonia seem ever to have had the 
privileged status in society which had been accorded to the British "labour aristocrats" in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. 
In Britain, it has been argued, these aristocrats formed a higher stratum within the working 
class. They were separated from the "labouring poor" by the higher wages they enjoyed. 
Moreover, this division was cemented because the labour aristocrats adopted their own peculiar life 
style and culture. They aspired to "respectability", the main characteristics of which served to 
differentiate them from the majority of workers. Thus, for example, in the late nineteenth century 
even when unemployed the London bricklayers would not allow their wives to go out to work, and 
to be known to have visited a pawnshop was a great stigma. This was made possible not only 
by 
the higher wages the labour aristocrats earned, but also because they were cocooned. 
from the 
effects of sickness and unemployment by union benefits. 
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The aristocrats were able to carve out their privileged position through entry restrictions 
into the trade. Most like the compositors and workers in the building trades were craft workers as 
yet little affected by new divisions of labour. Some industrial workers like the self-acting mule 
spinners were, however, also able to enjoy the same status. It was as a result of the great mid- 
nineteenth century boom, when Britain became the "workshop of the world", that employers were 
able to grant these workers pay increases without eating into profits. From the 1870s competifion 
from the continent and the United States became more severe, but British exporters still had the 
alternative of moving into safe empire markets. The importance of the labour aristocrats lay in the 
fact that it was largely only they who were unionised and politically active, and given their 
privileged status in the working class they shunned any form of political radicalism. 72 
In Catalonia, however, thefebre d'or ended in 1885, and from this date the Catalan 
economy faced a continuous crisis. Catalan industrialists were, therefore, unlikely to grant 
concessions similar to those of their British counterparts. Moreover high food prices made it 
difficult for workers to afford anything but basic necessities, and the situation was to deteriorate as 
a result of the inflationary pressure of the years 1895-1914. One of the results of this situation was 
that although the distance between a journeyman and his master was often not as great as in Britain 
wage differentials within the working class were also less marked. Thus, in Barcelona the average 
labourers' wage was about 77 per cent that of the average artisan. 
Few workers, therefore, were able to afford the trappings of respectability. This could be 
seen in the fact that 1914 the wife of many a skilled worker had to go out to work to supplement 
the family income. Moreover, virtually all working class families were forced to visit the 
pawnshop in times of difficulty. The inadequacy of unemployment, accident and sickness benefits 
also meant that if the male breadwinner were affected by a long term injury his fan-fily soon lived in 
abject poverty, and workers seriously injured were forced to beg in the streets. 
73 By the late 
nineteenth century, moreover, craft controls in many branches artisanal industry were 
being 
undermined, seriously threatening the status of skilled workers. These difficulties, 
it will be 
argued, fort-ned the basis for much of the labour agitation of the period under study. 
However, there were also political factors behind the differences 
in the position of labour in 
British and Catalan society. In 1875 unions in Britain were 
legally recognised, thereby allowing 
employers and union officials to develop collective bargaining procedures. 
In Spain the class 
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nature of the state was more blatant, and unions found it far more difficult to operate. In addition 
even when unions were formed employers often refused to deal with them. It is with role of the 
state, employer attitudes towards organised labour and trade union organisation that the next two 
chapters wiU deal. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STATE, TRADE UNION ORGANISATION AND STRIKES, 1899-1914. 
PART 1: THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES 
The nature and actions of the state naturally played a key role in shaping the political conscience of 
ordinary workers. During the turbulent years of 1868 to 1873 the working class and petty 
bourgeoisie had for the first time forced themselves onto the stage of national politics. This period 
in Spain's history was finally 
- 
brought to a close by the Canovist Restoration of 1875. The 
Restoration was set up as a result of a conservative reaction against the threat to the interests of 
Spain's dominant classes represented by the reforming First Republic of 1873. The principal aim 
of its creator, Antonio Canovas del Castillo, was to lay the foundations of a stable political system 
which would effectively marginalise Spain's lower classes from political life. To do this he had to 
put a stop to the internecine struggles between the various political groupings of the ruling classes. 
As a consequence of these struggles the military coup had become the normal means of replacing 
one regime with another, and this had finally put in jeopardy the dominant position of the large- 
scale land owners and financiers within the Spanish state. 
. 0e Canovas set about this task by engineering the organisation of two new political parties - 
the Conservatives and Liberals - which represented the whole spectrum of ruling class opinion. 
These parties, it was Canovas's wish, would in the future regularly replace each other in power not 
by coups but through the so-called peaceful change-over (turno pactfico). These change-overs 
were, however, by no means the result of democratic elections. The regime adopted a liberal- 
democratic facade. The Liberals in particular were cast as the party of reform, and during their 
period in office during the 1880s they passed laws regulating the freedom of the press 
in 1883, 
legalising private associations in 1887, and restoring universal manhood suffrage (abolished 
by 
Canovas in 1876) in 1890. Yet the reality behind this democratic veneer was a very different one. 
The essence of the turno was that the parliamentary majorities necessary to govern were not won in 
the heated battle of elections but manufactured in the Nfinistry of the 
Interior, and this continued to 
be the case even after universal male suffrage had been reintroduced. 
I 
At a local level it was the task of the political bosses or caciques 
to get official candidates 
elected. The power of the caciques was based on their economic standing 
within the local 
1. The consolidation of the Restoration in Catalonia is 
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85 (September 1985). For an overview of 
electoral manipulation see in particular, Jos6 Varela 
Ortega, Los Amigos P01dic0s. partidos, Elecciones y 
Caciquismo en La Restauraci6n, 1875-1900 (Madrid, 
1977). 
76 
community. In rural Spain they were typically large-scale landowners or their representatives. Once the security forces had again been placed at their disposal after 1873 they re-established a 
very large degree of control over the local workforce and at election time, either through force or as 
a result of traditions of deference, they could ensure that workers voted for the candidates of their 
choice. 
In urban Catalonia, however, other fractions of the bourgeoisie could to some extent take 
the place of the landowning cacique. As comments made in Chapter One would lead one to 
suspect it was in the isolated company towns that the figure of the cotton textile baron most 
resembled that of the rural cacique, and there are numerous examples of industrialists in these areas 
forcing workers into voting for their candidates. In urban areas it was more difficult to exercise 
such blatant pressure. Nevertheless, in the larger industrial towns, and even in Barcelona up to the 
turn of the century, through their control of the levers of local government power and patronage, 
local elites were able to ensure that candidates they favoured were elected. 2 
The first instinct of the Restoration state was, as might be expected, to deal with the 
challenge of organised labour through repression. After the fall of the First Republic most unions 
were effectively repressed, and left wing organisations had to lead a clandestine existence. After 
the Liberals came to power in 1881 the situation improved greatly, and unions were able to operate 
freely. However, government repression again intensified after 1883. In Barcelona it reached its 
climax between 1893 and 1897. During these years martial law was in operation most of the fime, 
unions were closed down, and a large number of labour leaders and even left wing bourgeois 
sympathisers were arrested. 
Through to the end of the nineteenth century, then, the two official political parties, and 
especially the Conservatives, dealt harshly with the trade unions. It was only in the 1890s that 
Canovas del Castillo began seriously to consider the need to put industrial relations on a more 
stable footing. In part this was a reaction to a strike wave which swept the country between 1890 
and 1892. In addition, the growth in social legislation on continental Europe pointed the way to 
the kind of measures which could be taken by the state. The Conservatives, therefore, 
began to 
advocate greater state intervention to deal with the "working class threat". 
The result of this 
reappraisal could be seen in 1901 when the Conservative Government 
founded the Instituto de 
Reformas Sociales. This body was charged with the task of investigating social conditions 
in 
Spain and of preparing legislation. At the same time, the 
Spanish parliament or Cortes approved 
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Spain's first social laws. 3 The most significant piece of legislation was probably the act limiting 
female working hours to 11 a day and putting restrictions on the employment of children. 
Furthermore, laws were passed restricting Sunday trading, setting minimum standards of hygiene 
at work, and providing machinery for compensation in case of industrial accidents. Later in the 
decade the Conservatives also passed an - admittedly restrictive - law legalising strikes, and 
supported a scheme by which industrial tribunals could be set up to resolve disputes over pay and 
working conditions. 4 
In each locality so-calledjuntas locales de reformas sociales were meant to be set up to 
ensure the legislation was respected. These juntas were to be presided over by the Mayor, and 
included worker and employer representatives. Nevertheless, the reforming drive of the Spanish 
state was very weak. As shall be seen, government officials did little to ensure legislation was 
complied with, so it was only where trade unions were relatively strong that there was any chance 
of the reforms being implemented. Moreover, in Catalonia union officials continued to be subject 
to harassment. After the turn of the century martial law was declared at frequent intervals, and on 
each occasion the result was a total clampdown on union activities, 
The hostility of the state was naturally a serious obstacle in the path of trade union growth. 
The attitude of the employers was often a further impediment. On the European continent 
industrialists by no means naturally accepted the proposition that industrial peace could best be 
guaranteed by entering into negotiations with independent unions. On the contrary, it appears that 
only when workers showed sufficient strength to overcome employer opposition to union 
organisation could collective bargaining take place. Trade union organisation was, therefore, 
largely an outgrowth of power on the shop floor. Consequently, it was often artisanal workers 
who formed the strongest unions. This was in part because they were usually 
difficult to replace. 
Moreover, they were not in general subject to close managerial supervision, and therefore 
had the 
time and opportunity to plan industrial action. Industrial workers, on the other 
hand, were usually 
in a weaker position vis a vis their employers, and owners of 
industrial enterprises could take 
advantage of this fact to reject trade unionism and institute their own 
forms of social control. 5 This 
was particularly the case in large-scale heavy industry, where 
industrialists could more easily co- 
ordinate their actions, and where they had the necessary resources 
to develop an and-union strategy 
effectively. The best known example of this strategy 
is provided by the iron and steel industry on 
3. With the exception of legislation passed in 1873 regulating 
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the German Ruhr. On the Ruhr, industrialists combined strict labour discipline with employer 
paternalism. They used all means at their disposal to root out union organisers. At the same time, 
they rejected state intervention, and instead developed their own housing, insurance and benefit 
progammes. 6 This method of maintaining social control was, however, by no means limited to 
the German Ruhr. Indeed there are clear parallels with the paternalist regime adopted by the 
basque iron and steel industrialists, which ensured that trade unionism made little progress in 
Baracaldo and Sestao before 1916.7 
In textiles the situation was more confused. Cotton textiles was the pioneering industry of 
the new industrial age, and yet in many parts of Europe the spinners had been able to inýiitate the 
apprenticeship restrictions instituted by the skilled journeymen. Power-loom weavers operated no 
such apprenticeship system. Nevertheless, they were able to draw on the traditions of trade 
unionism developed by the hand-loom weavers during the first half of the nineteenth century. 8 
Moreover, in textiles the typical unit of production was smaller than in heavy industry and 
competition between individual employers was often fierce. As a result, it was often difficult to 
co-ordinate action against trade unions, and the capital outlays that could be employed in welfare 
schemes were limited. Within textiles, therefore, union organisation was typically stronger than in 
heavy industry. None the less, the situation varied greatly from country to country. 
In the Catalan cotton textile industry, the Alt Llobregat company towns were in the 
strongest position to adopt a paternalist regime. In urban areas, however, such a strategy was 
more difficult to pursue. Thus, despite determined employer resistance, there was a rapid growth 
of trade unionism during the "democratic six years" of 1868 to 1873. Consequently, some 
industrialists came to accept the need to negotiate with trade unions. This attitude was favoured by 
the rapid expansion of the industry between 1869 and 1883. During this time profit levels 
in the 
larger establishments were high, and there was thus an incentive not to provoke costly strikes. 
In 1868 a Catalan wide cotton textile labour federation was founded. 
This federation was 
called the Three Steam Sections or Tres Classes de Vapor 
(TCV) because it aimed to organise 
workers in the preparatory, spinning and power-loom weaving 
branches of the industry. From the 
outset it was centralised in Barcelona and developed rather a 
bureaucratic structure based on paid 
officials. It also adopted a very moderate trade union practice. 
Its main aim was to bring wage 
rates outside Barcelona up to level of those in the 
Catalan capital. This policy was cautiously 
pursued. All efforts were made to reach a negotiated settlement 
to disputes, and strikes were only 
6. David Crew, op Cit, PP. 146-148. 
7. Juan Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 76-78. 
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declared in the last resort. The TCV was forced underground after the fall of the First Republic. 
However, it was again to flourish in the more open atmosphere of the years 1881-1883. In this 
latter year it had about 20,000 members, over a quarter of the region's cotton textile labour force. 9 
As a result of the TCV's success then, there grew up a body of of icials who by the early fi 
1880s consciously modelled their policy on that of the reformist leaders of the English New Model 
Unions. Some employer representatives supported the TCV official's goal of peaceful collective 
bargaining within the framework of capitalism. From 1889 most cotton textile industrialists 
formed part of an employer organisation called the Foment del Treball Nacional (FrN). The 
Foment, as it came to be known, was by the end of the nineteenth century the most important 
employer organisation in the country, and its prestigious monthly publication, El Trabajo Nacional, 
had a very wide circulation. El Trabajo Nacional was first published in 1895 and from the start the 
contributors showed themselves to be in favour of union organisation. They argued that by 
accepting the right of unions to exist and giving them legal guarantees they would be taken out of 
the hands of extremists. And that once responsible leaders were elected it would be easier for 
employers to solve disputes than if they had to deal with a non unionised amorphous working class 
mass. 10 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this was by no means the dominant view 
amongst the cotton textile industrialists. The principal reason behind their increasingly anti-union 
stance appears to have been economic. As was seen in Chapter One, from the mid- 1 880s the 
economic climate in Catalonia became markedly more adverse. Cotton textile industrialists 
responded by cutting wages and by restructuring the labour process in their favour. In rural areas, 
where the company towns operated, this was a relatively easy task. The workers were able to 
offer little resistance to the omnipotent industrial caciques. In the towns, on the other hand, 
workers put up a stauncher fight, and for this reason industrialists had to break the bacý trade 
unionism in the industry in order to impose the new working conditions. 
The employer offensive began in Ripoll and Campdevanol on the Freser river, where in 
1889 local industrialists were able to destroy trade union organisation and impose harsher working 
conditions. 11 The offensive continued in Manresa in the following year. In the 
Manresa area, 
unlike the Ter and Freser, power-loom weaving predominated, and the 
labour force was by this 
9. Mipel Izard, "Entre la Impotencia y la Esperanza"; Industfializaci6n, pp. 11-12,120-129.; 
Ram6n 
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time to a large extent female. The industrialists main aim was, therefore, to cut costs at the expense 
of the female weavers and preparatory workers. Hostilities began in the Dolors power-loom 
weaving factory in March. The workers wages had seriously been eroded in the past few years 
and they took advantage of a temporary upturn in trade to demand that the old wage rates be 
established. No agreement was reached and, in consequence, the workers came out on strike. The 
employers' reaction was to lock-out the entire Manresa cotton textile labour force. There followed 
solidarity strikes in Barcelona and the surrounding towns, which according to some estimates 
affected up to 50,000 workers. 
In Manresa the workers achieved a temporary victory when the civil governor forced the 
townts industrialists to end their lock out and enter into negotiations with the workers. The victory 
was, however, to be short-lived. In July 1891 the Conservatives came to power. The party of 
Canovas had forged close links with the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie. The Manresa and Alt 
Llobregat industrialists, therefore, took advantage of the new political conjuncture to close their 
factories throughout the region and sack large numbers of workers. In Manresa the TCV declared 
a general strike in response to the sacking of its factory delegates. Several days later it was 
pressured into declaring a solidarity strike in Barcelona. Its actions were, however, all to no avail. 
In Manresa and industrial towns throughout the Alt Llobregat the workers were defeated and their 
trade unions outlawed. 12 
The workers of the Ter Valley were to face the employer onslaught in 189 1. The employer 
drive to cut costs on the Ter was to lead to bitter and protracted industrial conflict, for within the 
cotton textile industry it was the workers of the larger industrial towns on the Ter that were best 
able to defend their interests. There were two main reasons why this was so. First, as was noted 
inChapterOne, in the Ter Valley there were few large scale, isolated, company towns. In addition, 
workers in the Ter Valley towns were urban industrial and not mixed workers. In such a setting a 
sense of community could be built up, and trade unions could be established far more easily. 
13 
In the second place, spinners formed the backbone of the trade unions on the Ter. 
It has 
already been stressed that in cotton textiles it was the spinners who were in the strongest position 
to form trade unions. In areas where by the 1880s female weavers were 
increasingly predominant, 
it was relatively easy for the employers to victimise militant workers 
because they were unskilled 
and could, therefore, be replaced with relative ease. This was especially the case 
in Barcelona, 
which had a large floating population. In the Ter, on the other 
hand, the male spinners 
commanded a position of respect in the factory. They were regarded as skilled 
workers. This 
12. On these strikes see, Mipel Izard, Industrializad6n, pp. 
Maig" a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1972), pp. 61-68. 
13. Chapter One, pp. 34-39. 
167-172.; Joaquirn Ferrer, El Primer "ler de 
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perception may have been false to the extent that it took only a few weeks to train a worker to 
operate a spinning machine. However, whilst the spinners were able limit recruitment of piecers 
onto these machines they maintained great power on the shop floor. In the 1880s for the first time industrialists moved to replace them with female workers on the ring-frames. However, the 
spinners were able to respond by mobilising the whole of the cotton textile labour force behind 
their demands. 
As in the rest of the cotton textile industry, in the Ter Valley towns class conflict had 
become increasingly marked from the mid- 1880s. In Manlleu 1885 saw the first important strike 
in the industry since 1872. It was also around this time that a yellow union "set up under the 
auspices of priests and the bourgeoisie" began to function in the town. 14 In most areas, 
industrialists who introduced the ring-frame immediately tried to replace the male spinners by 
female workers on these machines. In Manlleu and other large Ter Valley towns, however, the 
strength of organised labour initially led the mill owners to adopt a more cautious approach. Thus 
according to "R. S" the correspondent of the republican daily La Publicidad in Manlleu: "When the 
first machines known as ring-frames were introduced a gentleman's agreement was reached to the 
effect that they would be worked by men, and that of the profits that resulted from the new 
machinery two-thirds would be for the industrialist and the rest for the worker. "15 However, as 
the economic crisis deepened the Manlleu employers became increasingly dissatisfied with this 
accord. 
The first serious attempt to replace men by women on the ring-frames was made in 1891. 
The first step taken by the employers was to found the Foment Moral i Material, which was to act 
as a co-ordinating body of all the town's industrialists. The employers' strategy was then to 
provoke a conflict, destroy trade union organisation in the industry, and finally impose the new 
work practices. Their action began in October when five female frame tenters were sacked from 
the factory of Rifa i Co. for no apparent reason. In response, the rest of the town's workforce 
came out on strike in solidarity. The reaction of the ManHeu employers could not have been more 
drastic. They locked-out the town's entire workforce and stated that work would not resume work 
until Rifa i Co. had restarted production without the five women. The real motives behind the- 
lock out were pin pointed by the correspondent of La Publicidad, who stated: "It seems that some 
intransigents, spurred on by the results of the conflicts in Ripoll, Manresa and the Llobregat, want 
to make a last ditch stand and subject their workers to the same conditions as in the factories in 
these towns. That is to say to break their old customs. " These were, he added, the agreements that 
14. ES, 23 October 1891. 
15. LP, 14 October 1891. He continued: "This to my mind is the only way to resolve these social 
questions, and is very different from the stance generally taken (by the employers) in Catalonia, which 
leaves the men without a job. " 
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men should work the ring-frames and that no worker could be sacked without a justifiable 
reason. 16 
As a result, not surprisingly, the workers adopted an increasingly radical stance. In 
October 1891 the Manlleu textile unions were described as "always moderate and without utopian 
demands.,, 17 Yet, in a leaflet published on 19 November the Manlleu Workers' Commission 
explained: 18 
The war between the exploiters and exploited has begun. The bourgeoisie has united to combat us. The most ridiculous demand is for them a rallying cry provided that it can be used to annihilate us and undermine the improvements in our working conditions. They have in common everything that signifies opposition to our plans. And so the position that 
every worker should adopt in this class struggle is well defined: given that all the industrialists have united against us it is our duty to unite against them without indulgence 
or pity, whosoever falls and whatever happens 
On this occasion the cotton textile industrialists were not to be successful. The workers 
had public opinion on their side and collected large amounts of money. They were, therefore, able 
to resist the lock out relatively well. Consequently, on the 12-13 of December the industrialists 
agreed to a compromise solution which in no way fundamentally affected the the position of the 
spinners within the labour process. The end of the Manlleu lock-out was an important victory in 
the context of the string of defeats which had recently been inflicted on the cotton textile workers. 
Yet the victory of the male spinners had only been partial. They had maintained their position in 
Manlleu and to a certain extent in the nearby towns of Roda and Sant Hip6lit. This fact confirmed 
that these were the strongest points of working class resistance in the area. It did not, however, 
prevent the employers from replacing men by women in the other Ter and Freser towns, not to 
mention the Alt Llobregat. 19 
Furthermore, the Manlleu victory was insufficient to halt the general collapse of trade 
unionism in the cotton textile industry. In the repressive climate of the 1890s this pattern would be 
very difficult to reverse. The TCV was almost totally destroyed in the employer offensive of the 
years 1889-1891, and over the next eight years trade union organisation in the industry remained 
very weak. Industrialists were, therefore, able to advantage of this conjuncture further to cut 
wages, lengthen working hours, and replace male by female labour. In particular the years 1896- 
1898, in which the industry was faced with a severe economic crisis, saw a significant 
deterioration of the cotton textile workers standard of living. 
16. LP, 1 November 1891. 
17. LP, 14 October 1891. 
18. ES, 23 November 1891. 
19. LP, November-December 1891; Josep Comaposada, "La Vida X". 
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In 1899, on the other hand, there was a short lived economic boom in the industry. At the 
same time government repression of labour in Catalonia eased significantly. It was the 
combination of these two factors which made possible the rebirth of trade union organisation in the 
industry. It was Manlleu and the principal Ter Valley towns that were at the forefront of this 
recovery. In Manlleu the 1891 pact not to use female labour on the ring-frames had only 
begrudgingly been accepted by the employers, and was, therefore, a source of constant tension. 
During 1897-98 the employers called the pact increasingly into question, and in line with 
industrialists in the rest of Catalonia they continuously chipped away at established work practices. 
Since 1894 only a small power-loom weavers union had functioned in Manlleu. During 1898, 
however, a process of trade union reorganisation began. A new industry wide union was formed, 
which was to grow rapidly in the following year. As a result the workers were able to launch a 
counteroffensive against the mill-owners in 1899. 
In February of that year the attempt was made by a number of employers to force their 
night shift to work through to 12 o'clock on Saturday nights. The new union responded by 
supporting a general strike in defence of the 1891 pact. This action forced the employers on the 
defensive, and after a few days they agreed to accept the workers' demands. 20 This victory gave a 
great boost to trade union organisation throughout the Ter. At the beginning of March general 
strikes were declared in Torello and Vic, with solidarity strikes by the workers of two factories in 
Roda. La Publicidad commented on these strikes: 21 
The workers say that having come to an end the war which led, as a result of the 
unfavourable economic conjuncture, to a 10 per cent reduction in wages, they want a re- 
establishment of their old rates. Furthermore, the fact that in Manlleu the rates, which are 
more favourable than in the rest of the comarca, have remained unaltered, besides being 
unjust favours, some industrialists at the expense of others 
After a long and arduous struggle the strikes finally ended in success, and wage increases 
were accepted in all of the factories. Just as important, it was also agreed that when spinning 
machines became vacant or new machines were installed they would in the future be operated by 
male workers. 22 
20. ES, 14 January, 25 February 1898,24 February 1899; El Ter, 18 December 1897,25 February 1899; 
LP, 17 February, ME, 20 February, ME, 1899. 
21. LP, ME, 5 May 1899. 
22. Juan de Catalunya, "Los Obreros de la Industria Textil IV. Continua el Relato , 
La Justicia, 26 February 
1930. That the workers intended the agreement to be honoured was shown 
later in the year in ToreII6, 
where a strike was called in the Colomer factory after a women 
had been employed on a ring-frame. ES, 29 
September 1899. 
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The events of these months confirmed the collective strength of labour in the larger Ter 
Valley towns. The towns' textile labour force almost unanimously seconded the disputes. This 
included workers from the areas larger company towns. 23 Female workers also came out in 
support. This is an important point to note, for although the strikes often involved claims for pay 
increases, the main underlying cause of tension was the employers' wish to replace male by female 
workers. Male and female textile workers, it should be remembered, formed part of the same 
families. Women textile workers, therefore, seem to have accepted the view that the male head of 
the household should be the main breadwinner, and that female labour was only supplementary. 
This vision was no doubt reinforced by the more prosaic consideration that if the male spinners' 
were made redundant the income of the whole family would decline. 
The support received by the strikers was not, however, limited to the working class. In 
these towns it embraced virtually the whole community. Particularly important in this respect was 
the attitude of the towns' petty traders, who proved willing to sell the workers food on credit. 
These tradesmen were almost totally dependent on the workers for business. They could therefore 
readily sympathise with the strikers' opposition to cuts in their standard of living. These ties were 
strengthened by the fact that most of the larger-scale industrialists in the area lived in Barcelona, 
and left the running of their factories in the hands of managers. Consequently, the majority did not 
build up personal contacts with the townsfolk, and could be seen as outsiders who damaged the 
local community's prosperity through their actions. Finally, during 1900 the strikes were also 
aided by the benevolent stance adopted by the province's civil governor. His attitude was probably 
not unrelated to the fact that after the loss of the last colonies many cotton textile industrialists 
began to distance themselves from the Restoration state's official parties. Through its actions it 
seems that the Government wished to frighten them back to the fold. 24 
After their victories the Ter Valley trade union leadership began to look further afield, and 
planned a recruitment drive through Girona and the Alt Llobregat. In order to co-ordinate their 
efforts the unions formed a district federation known as the Commission for the Fourth District and 
appointed a full time official to run dayýto day business. The first fruit of this drive was the 
extension of union organisation to the more outlying areas of the Ter and into the Freser 
Valley. 25 
23. Thus workers from the Rusihol company town participated in the february 
1899 strike in Manlleu. In the 
March-June conflict in Torelb workers from Filatures del Ter and La Mambla 
d'Oris struck. 
24. On this point see, Juan de Catalunya, "Los Obreros Iv". 
25. Particularly important in this respect was the case of Ripoll which had a large working class population. 
A new union was formed in the town in August 1899, and the employers were 
almost immediately 
presented with a demand for improved wages and working conditions. 
The strike which followed met with 
success, and an accord was signed which stipulated not only an 
increase in wages, but also that, "the 
means by which the personnel on the ring-frames might 
be changed, occupying them with men, will be 
subject to study. " ES, 29 September 1899. 
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The Ter and Freser Valleys were not, however, the only points in Catalonia in which there was a 
resurgence of trade unionism. In Manresa, where all organisation in the industry had been 
destroyed in 1890, there was also a parallel growth. A new union was formed in the town in 
1898. In the following year it was involved in a number of strikes, in which the demand for all 
wage rates to be restored figured prominently. They were, in general, successful. In consequence 
the union grew quickly and extended its influence to the workers of nearby towns. By Febuary 
1899 it had about 4000 members. 26 
This union revival crystallised in the Autumn of 1899 when the Ter Valley unions were 
able to organise a new cotton textile labour federation. The founding congress was held in 
Barcelona between the 8 and 10 of September 1899. At the congress it was agreed that the 
federation should be called the Federacion de la Industria Textil Espafiola (FIFE), that its central 
committee should reside in Manlleu, and that it should have its own publication entitled Revista 
Fabril. 27 The decision to set up the central committee of the FTE in Manlleu represented an 
important break with past practice, for the Catalan wide TCV had been centred on Barcelona. This 
break was a reflection of the fact that since the mid 1880s it was the Ter Valley unions that had 
most successfully been able to defend their workers' interests. In Barcelona, on the other hand, 
from the 1870s many spinning factories moved to the Alta Muntanya river banks. Moreover, those 
mill owners who stayed in Barcelona had been able to replace the male by female power-loom 
weavers with relatively little difficulty. It was these male spinners and power-loom weavers who 
had been in charge of the TCV. With their departure, therefore, an increasingly large percentage of 
the cotton textile labour force was female, and these female workers found it very difficult to 
unionise. 
This basic shift in the geography of Catalan textile trade unionism became clear in the 
following year. At the time of its foundation the federation had about 7,000 affiliates, so its first 
priority was to extend its membership. In order to carry out this objective recruitment drives were 
made throughout the region in the following months. The result of this activity could be seen at the 
FIFE's second congress held in Manresa between 29 June and 1 July 1900. There were 84 
delegates from 34 localities present. It was claimed that they represented the no doubt exaggerated 
figure of between 50,000 and 70,000 affiliates. Whatever the true number, 
however, it was 
clearly above the peak of 21,000 affiliates which the TCV had reached 
in 1891. Trade union 
organisation was still centred on the larger Ter Valley towns and the 
Llobregat around Manresa. 
Nevertheless, it had also made significant headway in the Alt Llobregat and on the 
Ter around 
Girona. In the Ter Valley towns themselves union organisation was now very strong. 
In Manlleu, 
for example, it was impossible to find work without 
being unionised. Barcelona, however, 
26. ES, 10 February, 10 March 1899. 
27. LP, II September 1899, MIE. 
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remained a black spot. Despite the growth of union organisation in much of the industry the 
female power-loom weavers had found it impossible to follow suit. Thus the TCV rump had only 
250 members and other textile unions in the city were equally weak. 28 
From the start the FrE adopted a more combative stance than the old TCV, which during 
the 1880s had became increasingly class collaborationist. At the same time, however, it structured 
itself along lines similar to those of the TCV. Thus, its General Secretary and President were paid 
officials. The Federation was divided into eight different districts each covering a part of 
Catalonia, and full time officials were also appointed in each of these areas. The FTE pursued two 
basic aims. The first was to reverse the trend in the industry towards the substitution of male by 
female labour. 29 Its second aim was to improve wages and working conditions. Like the TCV it 
aimed to secure wages and working hours in the area in which working conditions were best and 
then try and bring conditions in other areas up to the same level. By 1900, however, it was in 
Manlleu that unionised workers were paid the best rates. 
This strategy was, however, soon to run into difficulties. Workers had not been able to 
express their discontent for a number of years and so there was a great feeling of pent up anger and 
frustration. There was, therefore, a tendency for many workers to go on strike immediately they 
had begun to organise. At the same time, in the textile towns, industrialists who had grown 
accustomed to dominating the affairs of the locality were loathe to accept a weakening of their grip. 
The result was a rapid escalation of industrial conflictivity. Thus, for example, between October 
and December 1899 there were at least twenty strikes or lock-outs in the industry. In these 
circumstances the FIFE central committee began to fear that the whole organisation might collapse. 
It therefore counselled prudence in the declaration of strikes, and formed a commission to try and 
reach a negotiated settlement to those disputes in progress. 30 
Despite these problems, while the economic conjuncture remained favourable the FIFE 
could continue to expand. The conjuncture, however, was dramatically to change in the Summer 
of 1900 when another severe economic recession hit the industry. As a result, unemployment 
grew rapidly. By September 1,500 textile workers were unemployed in Barcelona and the Pla, 
6,500 in the province as a whole. Particularly hard hit was the Ter Valley were labour costs were 
28. LP, 11 September, ME, 18 October, ME 1899,5 July, ME, 1900; Revista Fabril (RF), 7 June, 5 July 
1900; La Plana de Vich (LPV), 1 August i goo. 
29. This became official policy at the federation's second congress, at which a delegate from Vic 
presented a motion which asked: "Is it advisable that as the spinning machines and power-looms became 
vacant they be occupied by men over fourteen years of age? " He stated that in his town this policy had 
been implemented and was a great success. The motion was then put to the vote and approved 
unanimously. RF, 5 July 1900. 
30. RF, 7,28 June, 1900. 
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higher than in the rest of the Alta Muntanya. In October in Manlleu alone there 1,163 unemployed, 
a figure which represented over 50 per cent of the town's labour force. 31 
As the economic recession deepened so industrialists throughout Catalonia prepared to 
strike back against the FIT-. In the Ter their first reaction to the challenge of labour had been to 
build up their own organisations. The Manlleu employers had already associated in the late 1890s. 
The mill owners of Vic and Roda followed suit in the Summer of 1900, and, according to La Plana 
de Vich, by the Autumn of that year: "Fifty nine of the sixty three Ter industrialists have associated 
and in the future they will not allow delegate inspectors from the Workers' Association into their 
factories. -32 
The first sign of an impending employer onslaught came at the beginning of 1900, when 
after unsuccessful negotiations over new wage rates a lock-out was declared throughout the length 
of the Freser river. In all about 5,000 workers were left on the streets. Although the dispute was 
primarily over wages, conflict over attempt made by the ME to reverse the substitution of male by 
female spinners on the ring-frames was never far below the surface. 33 The lock-out was to last for 
four months with work not resuming until the 15 May. Nevertheless, the trade unions remained 
solid, and work did not finally resume until the mill owners had agreed to re-employ all sacked 
workers. 
The lock-out, therefore, highlighted the determination of the Ter and Freser workers to 
resist their employers' demands. Nevertheless, as the economic crisis deepened so tension 
continued to mount. This is illustrated by the fact that employers began to use increasingly anti- 
union rhetoric. For example, the president of the Alt Ter i Freser employers association, though 
recognising the economic factors behind the recession, maintained that wage costs were higher in 
Catalonia than in any other part of the world. He also accused the workers of ignorance because 
they had opposed the introduction of new machinery, and claimed that this attitude was the root 
cause of the technological backwardness of Catalan industry. Finally, he accused the Government 
of exacerbating industrial conflict by favouring the workers' demands. 34 Clearly this represented a 
call on the Government to support the employers forthcoming attack on the unions. Josep Ma Prat 
31. LP, 2 September, ME, 6 October, ME, 1900. 
32. LPV, 8 August 1900. By this time there were four employer asociations in the Ter and Freser: Manlleu 
and District, Vic-Roda, Alt Ter and Freser, and Torelb and Sant Quirze. 
33. Thus "A Worker" declared in La Publicidad on the real motives behind the employers' actions: "As the 
Textile Federation tends to regulate these machines (i. e., the ring4rames) it is not surprising that the 
industrialists try by all means at their disposal to destroy the workers' organisation". LP, 6 January 1900, 
ME. 
34. LP, 18 October, ME, 1900. 
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i Vilaro, president of the Man1leu i Comarca employers' association, however, went further. He 
maintained that had it not been for the large number of strikes in the industry the loss of the 
colonies would have had absolutely no impact, and his reply to the question of how "class 
harmony" could be restored in the industry was a battle cry to the the region's mill owners. Tbus 
he stated: 35 
It could be achieved by making the principle of authority respected. Today the workers use brute force. They have become emboldened. 
Workers representatives, on the other hand, claimed that the industrialists' greed was at 
least partially responsible for the crisis. Josep Genolla, president of the FIE from August 1900, 
argued that the solution to the recession lay in the reduction of working hours and a rise in the price 
of textile fabrics to offset the increasing cost of raw material imports. He also stated that to 
maintain the workers' purchasing power an increase in wages would also be necessary. At grass 
roots level it seems the view that the mill owners had provoked the economic recession was 
widespread. Although Genolla refused to comment, therefore, the belief was growing amongst the 
workers that if nothing were done to alleviate the crisis strike action would be necessary. 36 
The conflict was precipitated in November. In Manresa the mill owners provoked 3000 
textile workers into taking strike action by sacking their trade union leadership. They followed this 
measure up with the introduction of good conduct certificates. In the future no worker was to be 
taken on unless he was recommended by his previous employer. At the same time there were 
widespread sackings in Ripoll and on the Ter around Girona. In Manlleu the union presented a 
new wage list and, after it had been rejected, went on strike on 19 November. This decision 
proved to be a serious tactical blunder. The mill owners were confident of their strength and so 
reacted by sacking the entire Manlleu workforce. Accordingly, by the end of the month much of 
the FTE's membership was either on strike or locked-out. The workers position was, in addition, 
made more difficult by the fact that the Conservative Government changed its previous stance, and 
decided fully to support the employer offensive. Thus, it reacted to the disturbances by sending 
large numbers of troops and civil guards into the textile towns. Furthermore, large numbers of 
workers were imprisoned - including the central committee of the FTE -, union headquarters were 
closed down, and the working class press found it difficult to publish. Revista Fabril, for 
example, was forced to suspend publication never to reappear. 37 
35. LP, 19 October, ME, 1900. 
36. LP, 9,22 October, ME, 1900. 
37. On the repression see, ET, 14 December 1900; ES, 23 November 1900. 
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In response the FIE attempted to organise a solidarity strike of the entire Catalan working 
class. The strike appears to have been followed in the textile towns along much of the Ter, 
Llobregat and Cardoner. In Barcelona, however, it had no impact. Even the female weavers, who 
were still almost totally non-unionised, were in no position to second the action. Consequently, 
the general strike was a failure, and the back of the FTE was broken. T'he employer onslaught, 
nevertheless, continued unabated. In a meeting of cotton textile factory owners at the Barcelona 
headquarters of the FTN it was agreed not to employ those workers most identified with the 
unions. This decision became known as the "hunger pact". As a result about 800 workers were 
sacked and in order to find work in a Catalan cotton textile factory had to hide their real 
identities. 38 
This attack on the unions was combined with moves to intensify production and restructure 
the labour process. In Manresa no men were readmitted into the factories. Along the Llobregat 
efforts were made to increase the number of ring-frames each female spinner minded. 39 These 
moves were largely successful. In the Ter Valley, however, the workers put up a stiffer 
resistance. Between 1899 and 1900 the male spinners had succeeded in halting and even reversing 
the employer drive to replace them with female workers. Ile employers now looked to press 
ahead with their plans to employ women on the ring-frames. Conflict over this question flared up 
in 1901 in Roda when three factory owners tried to replace three male spinners, whom they had 
previously sacked, with women. The women's refusal to operate these machines led to a further 
lock-out in the town in March. Moreover, the Ter and Freser valley employer associations again 
threatened to extend the lock-out to all their factories if the Roda mill-owners' demands were not 
met. 
The workers of Roda refused to climb down and the new lock-out, therefore, began on 11 
March. As the Junta of the Manlleu textile union, the Art Fabril i Anexos, stated several years later 
it had been called: "Because it was planned to substitute the men who worked and still work on the 
ring-frames by women.,, 40 Yet, as the quotation suggests, things did not go according to plan for 
the industrialists, for it was as a result of the March lock-out that the pent up anger and frustration 
felt by the workers burst into violence. In TorellO, on the same day as the factories were closed, a 
group of workers set fire to the house of the ex-Mayor and factory owner, Antonio Mercadell. In a 
subsequent clash with the mossos descuadra several workers were injured. In Ripoll a 
demonstration of cotton textile workers ended in clashes with the Civil Guard. On this occasion 
the crowd was fired upon with the result that one worker was killed and two critically injured. The 
38. Josep Comaposada, "La Vida del Obrero... X". 
39. E/ Progreso, 26 October 1909. 
40. Ei ProgreS0,10 JUIY 1909- 
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most dramatic events, however, took place in Manlleu. Here the workers organised an attack on 
the local employers casino, and injured three of those inside. The crowd then attacked the houses 
of the Mayor and two more industrialists, setting them all on fire. The size of the crowd made it 
impossible for the Civil Guard to control. Luckily its commander adopted a conciliatory stance and 
avoided bloodshed. Order was, nevertheless, only restored when the local authorities promised to 
do everything in their power to find a solution to the conflict and obtain the reinstatement of the 
workers subject to the "hunger pact". 41 
With these events class hatred had reached a point difficult to surpass. The situation in the 
Ter Valley was now extremely explosive and another outbreak of violence was feared. Tempers 
were, nevertheless, cooled by the replacement of the Conservative civil governor in the run up to 
the Liberal victory in the elections held on 19 March 1901. The new civil governor adopted a far 
more even handed approach. Thus he chaired discussions between employers and workers in 
which he put pressure on the industrialists to reopen their factories. A compromise solution was 
then reached. On the one hand the employers agreed to end their lock-out and revoke the hunger 
pact. On the other hand, their right to employ women on the ring-frames was recognised. 42 
The factories finally reopened on 18 March. Amongst the workforce there was 
considerable discontent at the compromise reached, as it was felt that employers would now have a 
free hand to employ female labour. The feeling of betrayal became more intense when it emerged 
that few of the workers subject to the "hunger pact" would actually be reemployed. The workers 
fears were, however, in some respects exaggerated. It is true that as a result of the employer 
onslaught, and with no end to the recession in sight, trade union organisation was greatly 
weakened throughout the Alta Muntanya. In Manresa and its surrounds, along the Freser and 
upper Ter, and even in TorellO, the unions were completely destroyed. This left Manlleu, Roda 
and Sant Hip6lit as the only towns on the Ter in which unions continued to function. In these 
towns the ferocity of labours' reaction to the March lock-out had, nonetheless, made the 
industrialists draw back from their decision to employ women on the ring-frames. They, 
therefore, became the only areas in the Alta Muntanya which continued to employ large numbers of 
male spinners. 43 
41. LPV, 14 March 1901. The various reports of these events stressed the role played by working class 
women. Thus according to one correspondent: "Amongst the rioters who committed those outrages a 
multitude of women were to be seen, especially in Manlleu. No doubt they threw themselves onto the 
public footpath on seeing that they had nothing to give their children, and that the strike imposed by their 
bosses had shut out any hope. " LPV, 21 March 1901. 
42. LPV, 28 March 1901. 
43. La Guerra Social, 18 July 1903. 
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In the largest of these towns, Manlleu, the workers' opposition also made the mill owners 
reconsider their industrial relations strategy. As has become abundantly clear, by this time few 
cotton textile industrialists subscribed to the view, held by the leadership of the FIN, that stable 
industrial relations could only be attained by bargaining with the unions. On the contrary by 1900 
most industrialists felt they could impose social control by destroying the FrE. Yet, in Manlleu, 
labour's violent response to the mill owners attack on trade unionism had convinced the mill 
owners that they would have to find a means to lessen social tension, and tie the workers to their 
employers more effectively. 
Albert Rusifiol, the owner of Manlleu's largest factory, provided a possible answer to this 
dilemma. Rusiflol was, in fact, in a strong position to reduce industrial conflictivity in the 
industry. Conditions in his company town were amongst the best on the Ter. Moreover, he seems 
genuinely to have been respected by many of his workers. In 1905, indeed, he stood as a 
parliamentary candidate for the district of Vic (which included the Ter Valley) and received 
considerable worker support. 44 He seems, therefore, in many respects to represent what remained 
of the reformist tradition in the Ter labour movement, which stretched back to the heyday of the 
TCV. 
Albert Rusifiol's proposals were first outlined in 1900. In this year the Barcelona 
Provincial Council called on all those institutions interested to present studies on possible ways to 
solve the crisis in the cotton textile industry. 'llie FTN's study was elaborated by Rusihol, who 
was at that time the association's president. This study called for the setting up of mixed 
commissions of workers and employers representatives to settle their differences. The republican 
daily, La Publicidad, hailed the document as a serious attempt to end the bitter class conflict which 
had racked the industry over the past year. It then praised Rusinol as a "prudent and far sighted 
spirit", and lamented that "he is not understood and followed by those of his colleagues who only 
believe in the efficacy of terror and its corollary, the politics of the big stick". 45 
Leading figures in the FTE showed themselves to be interested in a possible negotiation. 
The following months, however, saw social tension intensify, a process which was to culminate in 
the lock-outs of December 1900 and March 1901. In this month La Publicidad announced that the 
FTN's project for the formation of mixed commissions had been put off after a number of 
industrialists representing the leading cotton textile employer associations had been incorporated 
into its leadership. These industrialists had apparently opposed the plan, "thinking that the social 
environment needed to make the institution work effectively does not exist. "46 
44. Gazeta Vigatana, 24 May 1905; La Justicia Social, (LJS) 6 November 1909. 
45. LP, 12 December, ME, 1900. 
46. LP, 12 March, ME, 1900. 
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The idea was, nevertheless, once again canvassed by the Ter and Freser employers' 
associations in 1902, and this despite the fact that they had chosen the path of confrontation rather 
than conciliation with the FTE. At first sight this gives the impression that these industrialists 
rM wished to reach an accornpdation with their workers. Careful attention needs, however, to be paid 
to the exact contents of their proposals. 
The view of the Ter and Freser employer associations was made public in a book published 
in 1902. The main concern of the associations was to bring an end to strikes in Spanish industry. 
They were at pains to stress their opposition to state intervention in industry. They had already 
campaigned against the new law regulating female and child labour, and in general felt that social 
legislation should be kept to a minimum. They were even more vigorous in their condemnation of 
state sponsored industrial tribunals. These, the Ter and Freser mill-owners maintained, would 
inevitably fail as no employer could possibly accept that outsiders should have the right to tamper 
with wages and working conditions in his factory. Any concessions he made in this respect, they 
argued, would inevitably foster indiscipline on the shop-floor and eventually lead to his firm's 
bankruptcy. The industrialists, therefore, seemed to argue that the individual factory owner should 
have complete freedom to order his factory as he wished. At the same time, however, they stated 
that they favoured the setting up of industrial tribunals or mixed commissions of workers and 
employers representatives through "private initiative" (i. e., by the industrialists themselves). Yet 
given the mill owners concept of the the employer's rights within the factory it is difficult to see 
what these tribunals would discuss. Even more contradictorily they gave the collective bargaining 
machinery developed in England as a shinning example to be followed. In that country, they 
stated, the "conservative" unions, which only went on strike in extreme cases, "supplied a 
powerful element in favour of industrial pacification". It was argued that the formation of such 
unions in Spain had proved impossible because of differences in "race", "temperament" and 
"industrial and general culture". However, no mention was made of the causes behind the demise 
of the TCV, an industrial federation which had as its ideal the establishment of industrial relations 
on the "English pattern". 47 
Indeed, throughout the whole discussion, a contradiction could be seen between the idea 
that the mill owner had an absolute right to order his factory as he wished, and the acceptance that 
some kind of collective bargaining machinery might prove a necessity. This same contradiction 
was to be seen in the industrial tribunal and friendly society that was actually founded in Manfleu 
in 
1902. The project had been worked out by Albert Rusifiol and was accepted by all the town's 
employers. Rusiflol had obtained the collaboration of leading figures within the FIN. 
Thus, 
47. Asociaciones de Fabricantes del Ter y del Freser, Los Juradds Mixtos en Espatla. Datos y 
Consideraciones Acerca de la Conciliaci6n y el Arbitraje en Ids Conflictos entre Patronos y Obreros 
(Barcelona, 1902), pp. 8.22-25. 
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Federico Rahola was given the task of elaborating the friendly society's regulations, and Joaquin 
Aguilar wrote the introduction to a book which explained how the industrial tribunal and friendly 
society was to work. 
Aguilar felt that the new institution represented, "the first step taken towards the solution of 
the industrial problem"), and that it "could be copied in other conwrcas, and thereby result in the 
disappearance of the anxieties felt by the people in these areas". 48 These were, indeed, high 
hopes. The industrial tribunal was founded on the understanding that wages and working 
conditions would remain at their present level. These could only be altered by a special sitting of 
the tribunal. This tribunal was, in fact, to be composed of two bodies, one which dealt with 
conflicts between the individual worker and the factory owner, and the other which had the power 
to resolve more general conflicts over wage rates, hours of work, etc. The employers and workers 
had an equal number of representatives on both these bodies. The friendly society was funded by 
both the employers and the workers affiliated. It consisted of a sickness fund, and would 
eventually include provision for old age pensions. Joaquin Aguilar saw it as a key element in the 
whole set up, and hoped it would lead to the creation of a conservative strata of the working class, 
who would defend the friendly society because of the pensions they received from it. 49 
Indeed, the whole scheme was based on the premise that workers represented on the 
industrial tribunal also had to form part of the friendly society. These workers could not, at the 
same time, form part of any other union. The new body was not, therefore, open to all the town's 
cotton textile workers, but only those who had agreed to separate from the old union which had 
formed part of the FIE. It was for this reason that, in the aftermath of the bitter social conflict of 
the years 1901-1901, many workers came to see the Patronat - as it was pejoratively called - as a 
mere tool in the hands of the employers. This, for example, was the view of the veteran anarchist 
militant, Francesc Abaya, who commented at the end of 1901: "Some of the nosiest workers do 
not now open their trap, and form part of the dirty mix of idlers and workers thinking they will 
land something worthwhile". 50 
This comment illustrates the main problem which faced the Patronat. The mill owners had 
attempted to impose social control in the industry through a mixture of intransigent anti-unionism 
and paternalism. The paternalist element was provided by the new friendly society. At the end of 
the day, however, they had been forced to recognise that they could not impose their demands on 
48. Alberto Rusihol, Bases para la Creaci6n y el Funcionamiento de los Jurados Mixtos en Manlleu - 
Proyecto de Montepio reductado por D. Federico Rahola por Encargo de la Junta de Conciliaci6n - con un 
Pr6logo de D. Joaquin Aguilar (Barcelona, 1902), p. IX. 
49. lbid, p. XVII. 
50. El Productor, 26 October 1901. 
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the textile workers with no regard for their opinion. It was for this reason that the Patronat 
included industrial conciliation machinery. Consequently, the Patronat was not, as some labour 
militants claimed, a simple creature of the employers. This is brought out by the fact that its 
statutes included the clause that wage rates could not be altered without a special session of the 
industrial tribunal. Accordingly, the workers who joined were offered some protection against 
further wage cuts. In addition, the workers affiliated were not wholly subservient to the demands 
of the industrialists. Certainly they had to abandon any social or political radicalisms. Yet, within 
Manlleu's junta local de reformas sociales - which functioned throughout the first decade of the 
twentieth century- representatives of the Patronat defended the textile workers demands, in 
opposition to the industrialists, on a number of occasions. The first of these was in 1902, when 
they argued in favour of a reduction in working hours in Manlleu from 68 to 66 a week. 
Throughout the period they also supported the observance of social legislation, and in particular the 
limits placed on the use of child labour. Finally, in 1909 they were to reject an attempt made by 
Albert Rusifiol to reduce the wages of male spinners in his factory. 51 
This did not, however, alter the fact that it was the town's bourgeoisie who had set up the 
Patronat and who determined the shape it should take. It was for this reason that the dream of the 
leaders of the FTN - that the Patronat should form the basis of stable labour relations in the 
industry - was unreal. It had been founded after the destruction of the FTE. In this destruction the 
Manlleu employers had fully participated. Thus 47 workers in this town alone had been subject to 
the "hunger pact". The majority of Manlleu's workers, therefore, remained very suspicious of the 
Patronat. As a result the response to the mill owners call for their workers to join was 
disappointing. Between 1902 and 1909 the economic climate remained depressed and trade unions 
in the Ter Valley weak. Nevertheless, the Patronat only attracted between 150 and 200 workers, 
most it seems from the Rusifiol company town. 52 The Socialist weekly, La Guerra Social, 
maintained that those workers who joined knew that it was ineffective, and hence only did so to get 
the best jobs for them and their families. 53 This argument was no doubt one sided. As has been 
noted there does still seem to have existed a nucleus of workers identified with Albert Rusifiol. 
They were, however, in a minority. The Patronat was, consequently, very unstable. The power 
of the male spinners on the shop floor had not been broken, and they could still react violently 
against any move to cut their wages or endanger their position in the workplace. When the 
employers once again attacked working conditions in the industry in 1909, therefore, the spinners 
mobilised in opposition and the class collaborationist Patronat was swept away. 
51. AMM, Govemaci6 S149, A 395. 
52. AMM, Ibid. 
53. La Guerra Social, 4 July 1903. 
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Until the end of the decade, however, trade union organisation in cotton textiles - and, 
indeed in the rest of Catalan industry - remained very weak. It was not until 1908 that that the 
trade unions began to reorganise, and it was once again workers in the Ter Valley who led the 
way. In other parts of Catalonia the cotton textile workers found it more difficult to unionise. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of extending trade unionism was given a boost when in September 
1908 a new regional labour federation, known as Solidaritat Obrera, decided to launch a 
recruitment drive in the industry. This drive finally began in April of the following year, after an 
assembly of textile workers had met in Barcelona and agreed to lay the foundations of a new 
Catalan textile federation. In the Alta Muntanya union organisers had little luck outside the Ter and 
Freser. However, unions began to spring up in a large number of urban centres around 
Barcelona. 54 
Since 1901 unemployment in the textile industries had been high. Not surprisingly, then, 
the April assembly decided that its first priority would be 
* 
to reduce working hours in the industry. 
Any action the planned federation might take was, however, pre-empted by the employers. Once 
again, as during 1899 and 1900, the mill owners responded to the growth of trade union activities 
by opposing labour's demands, and in many cases the right of the workers even to form trade 
unions. Indeed, the industrialists resolve to oppose union organisation was strengthened by the 
fact that the economic recession faced by the industry actually deepened between 1908 and 1909. 
The result was another escalation of industrial conflictivity from late 1908. Once again, moreover, 
it was a dispute in the Ter Valley that was to have the most far reaching consequences. 
On the Ter employers had, as in the 1890s, taken advantage of the weak state of the unions 
to cut wages. Spinners were, in particular, seriously affected. The male spinners of Manlleu, 
Roda and Sant Hipo'lit nevertheless continued to earn far higher wages than female minders 
employed on ring-frames in the rest of the Alta Muntanya. Though the industrialists in these towns 
had been forced to abandon attempts to replace the male spinners, their relatively high wages were 
resented. 55 Matters came to a head in 1908 when employers reacted to the worsening crisis in the 
industry by attempting further to cut costs, and sacked large numbers of workers. The most 
dramatic events were to take place in the Rusifiol company town just outside Manlleu. 
Conditions in the Rusifiol company town were, it has been noted, amongst the best on the 
Ter. Profit margins in the factory had, therefore, no doubt been particularly 
badly squeezed. This 
explains why on 15 May 1909 Albert Rusifiol closed his factory and 
dismissed the 365 workers 
54. ET, 23 May 1908; SO, 4 December 1908; La Intemacional, 5 February 1909. For the 
history of 
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employed therein. Rusifiol made the excuse that he had closed the factory temporarily because it 
was changing hands. The new proprietor was, however, to be his brother, Josep Mana Rusi-ol. 
The workers would, Rusifiol stated, have to reapply for admission, and accept a new wage list 
which had been drawn up. Not surprisingly wages were in the future to be considerably lower. In 
particular male spinners who worked on the ring-frames would have to accept a cut in wages of 
about 20 per cent. 
The workforce replied that it would only accept wage cuts in those cases in which wages 
had actually been higher than in the other factories in the town. Rusifiol refused to compromise, so 
no solution to the dispute could be found. Thus, when th e factory reopened on June 31 the only 
people to go in were the managers and foremen. Another long strike ensued. The strikers were 
strongly supported by the Tees textile unions. Rusifiol tried to break the strike by sending agents 
out into the country to look for blacklegs, but he had little success: by November only 40 had been 
recruited. The result was deadlock, which was only broken in Febuary 19 10 when Rusifiol 
announced that he was to close the factory. 
The conflict had important repercussions within the Manlleu labour movement. Many 
workers in the Rusifiol company town still maintained close, paternal, relations with the 
management. It was, for this reason that the employer inspired Patronat was strongest in 
Rusifiol's factory. However, the lock out produced a change of attitude amongst these workers. 
During 1909 feelings amongst the workforce were running very high against the "inhuman" and 
"tyrannical" Rusifiol. Consequently, the members of the Patronat entered into negotiations with 
the town's independent union, known as the Art Fabril. They then agreed to dissolve their own 
association and entered the Art Fabril en masse, "convinced at last of the wickedness of the 
employer class". 56 
The events of 1909 showed once again how difficult it was to find a compromise solution 
to industrial disputes in cotton textiles. In the context of a seemingly permanent crisis in the cotton 
textile industry the mill owners were prepared to go to great lengths to push through their cost 
cutting reforms. In the Alt Llobregat, they had been able to impose social control, with the result 
that the workers in those areas were able to form no independent unions prior to World War One. 
On the Ter, however, their attempt to outlaw trade unions and cement a paternalist relation between 
masters and men had proved unsuccessful. Indeed, with the closure of the Rusihol company town 
and the demise of the patronat any organised paternalist link the workers was broken. 
56. SO, 4 June 1909; La Internacional, 28 May 1908; LP, 2 June, ME, 7 June NE, 12 June, NE, 1909; El 
Progreso, 3,4,5 July 1909; US, 6 November, 4 December 1909,19 February, 17 September 1910; 
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A pall of mutual mistrust and suspicion hung over industrial relations on the Ter. Open 
class warfare was not, however, resumed until 1914. In July 1909 anticlerical riots spread 
throughout much of urban Catalonia. The subsequent government repression greatly weakened the 
labour movement, and put paid to the attempt to form a Catalan wide textile federation. In July 
1913 cotton textile trade unions remained weak, with only about 10 per cent of the industry's 
workers organised. That year, nevertheless, was to see the beginnings of another revival in the 
fortunes of the textile unions. The revival was on this occasion led by a Barcelona union known as 
La Constancia, which was made up largely of female cotton textile workers. La Constancia was 
founded in 1912, and grew rapidly in the following year. By July 1913 it had about 8000 
members, a figure which represented roughly 44 per cent of the Barcelona cotton textile labour 
force. 57 
The rapid growth of La Constdncia was facilitated by a boom in sales in the cotton textile 
industry during 1912.58 Nevertheless, it was still a great surprise to most contemporary 
observers. In Barcelona and the other. textile towns, as has been noted, female weavers and 
preparatory workers had found it very difficult to unionise. Some employers had stepped in and 
developed a paternalist regime in their factories in order to increase the subservience of the labour 
force and head off possible conflict. The example of the two Fabra i Coat plants in the Barcelona 
Pla has already been mentioned. Another case in point was Catalonia's largest cotton textile 
factory, La Espafia Industrial, which was situated in Sants. The factory owners provided loans for 
the workers when necessary, and continued to employ them on menial tasks in old age. The vision 
of the company director that was projected was that of a father who saw the workers as his own 
children. In this way it was hoped the workers would develop a sense of loyalty towards the 
company and gratitude to its director. In this the company certainly had some success. The sense 
of belonging was strengthened by the fact that generation after generation of the same family 
tended to work in La Espafia Industrial. The rapport between master and men could be seen during 
the celebrations of the company's fiffieth anniversary in 1897. At these celebrations between 5 and 
20 pesetas were given to each of the workers, and a raffle was held with sizeable cash prizes for 
the eldest employees. This prompted a commission of workers to present a message to the director 
of the factory, Matias Muntades, which read: 59 
When a worker finds in his employer, not the selfish boss who looks at him with disdain 
and treats him harshly, but an affectionate protector who starts, when he is an 
inexperienced youngster, by acting as his guide, and later provides him with the means to 
work honourably, perhaps even the means to achieve what he has achieved with the same 
or less elements; who helps him when he is ill, and in periods of dearth and crisis; who 
57. ES, 18 April 1913.; LP, 4,28 July 1913. 
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does not abandon him in his old age nor in misfortune; and who perhaps even after his death continues generously to give a helping hand to his destitute child and Poor widow, as has always occurred in La Espaha Industrial. Then, he feels in his heart a great desire to demonstrate to he who behaves in this manner his gratitude, and heartfelt pleasure in so expressing it. 
The extent to which the Barcelona cotton textile industrialists followed the lead of La 
Espafia Industrial and instituted welfare programmes should not, however, be exaggerated. Thus, 
the reformist working class magazine, Revista del Ateneo Obrero de Barcelona, commented that if 
more factories in Barcelona functioned like La Espafia Industrial, then class conflict would be 
greatly reduced. Moreover, Miguel Rente, one of the magazines principal writers, lamented that 
friendly benefits had only been established in two factories from Sant Martf and one from 
Barcelona. 60 The reason for the lack of effort in this direction was apparently twofold. First, 
many industrialists operated relatively small-scale plants, and lacked the capital outlays necessary. 
Second, by the beginning of the twentieth century most of the cotton textile workers were female. 
These female workers often only worked in the factories a few years before getting married, and in 
such circumstances it would have been difficult to operate welfare schemes effectively. In 
addition, the position of these workers on the shop floor was very weak. Indeed, reports suggest 
that at the turn of the century in the larger Barcelona concerns the female power-loom weavers 
were subject to close managerial superivision, and that talking was not permitted while work was in 
progress. 61 As a result, most industrialists probably felt they could maintain social control 
effectively without the extra cost benefit schemes entailed. 
The task of organising the female weavers was not, however, only obstructed by the fact 
that they were unskilled, and that many spent only a few years in the labour market. It was also 
impeded by the attitude of many male trade unionists towards women. It was true that married 
female workers had increasingly to turn to full time work to supplement the family income. 
Nevertheless, most men still considered female labour largely as something transitory, to be 
undertaken by young unmarried workers. Due to force of circumstance many had to accept the 
employment of their wives. Yet they continued to view the use of female labour, while male 
workers were unemployed, as an unacceptable imposition on the part of the industrialists. 
Accordingly, they found it difficult to accept female workers as an integral part of the labour 
movement. This explains why syndicalist labour leaders frequently complained that 
in spite of the 
fact that male skilled workers and female textile workers often formed part of the same 
family, the 
male trade unionists did little to try and unionise the women. 
62 
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It was because of these difficulties that between 1891 and 1914 the Barcelona cotton textile 
workers were effectively able to organise only on two occasions. The first was at the end of 1901 
and the second, as has been seen, in 1913. In part the workers were able to unionise as a result of 
the efforts of pioneering female trade uniols, of which the most famous was the anarchist 
propagandist, Teresa Claramunt. However, on both occasions the Barcelona labour movement 
was buoyant, and male trade unionists overcame their indifference to play a key role in the 
organisation of the Barcelona weavers. Thus, in 1901 the all male bleachers and dyers unions 
played the leading role in a drive to unionise the female workers. In 1913, on the other hand, it 
was a syndicalist dominated labour federation, the ConfederaciO Regional del Treball, which was 
behind the foundation of La ConsOncia. 
These male trade unionists tried to unionise the female weavers for two main reasons. 
First, the working conditions of many skilled workers were also under threat from their 
employers. These workers had formed unions to defend their interests. In order to bring the 
maximum pressure to bear, however, it was important that the Barcelona labour movement as a 
whole was as strong as possible. The Barcelona textile workers represented about 15 per cent of 
the city's working class, and their unionisation would therefore increase the influence of labour on 
the local political stage. This is a question which will be discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
In the second place, there still persisted the hope amongst male trade unionists that if they 
were able to unionise the female weavers and bring their working conditions up to the same level 
as male workers, they would then be able to replace the female by male weavers. This idea was 
most clearly put in a communique which in 1907 the all male Barcelona union of textile finishing 
trades addressed to the female cotton textile workers. It began by arguing that in order to get rich 
the employers had replaced male by female workers, whom they paid less. Furthermore, technical 
advances had made it possible for employers to reduce absolutely the number of workers 
employed. There was, therefore, heavy unemployment in the industry, and a consequent 
downward pressure on wages. The solution proposed by the Barcelona finishing trades workers 
differed little from that put forward by the Ter Valley spinners: 
63 
It is essential colleagues that you help us so that we can, 
for now, reduce your working 
hours, so that more hands can be employed, and you have more time to rest and 
look after 
your families. And so we can, in the future, emancipate you 
from the factory, so that you 
can be free women and live up to your grand mission to 
be wives and mothers, not slaves 
and instruments of exploitation. 
The communique was a curious mixture of revolutionary rhetoric used 
to justify rather 
traditional demands. Yet, as in the Alta Muntanya these 
demands seem to have received 
63. SO, 16 November 1907. 
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considerable support from the female workers concerned. This was revealed in an article written 
by Adela Camprubi, a female power-loom weaver who spoke at a number of rallies held to 
organise the cotton textile workers in 1901. Thus, she argued: "It is essential that union 
organisation spread from factory to factory, and loom to loom. That we should make a start, in 
order first to reduce working hours, and later to hand over our machines to the men, our beloved 
colleagues. -64 
The call for the reduction of working hours was, nevertheless, the Barcelona cotton textile 
workers foremost demand, for while they worked an average of II hours a day, most skilled men 
worked only 8 or 9 hours. Once unionised these female weavers adopted a very combative stance. 
They had had to suffer for years in silence and were, therefore, hungry forjustice. This could be 
seen in November 1901 when a new union, known as the Art Fabril de Sant Marti de Provengals, 
was formed. A campaign was launched by syndicalist trade unionists to unionise the weavers 
towards the end of the year. On 18 November the first seven workers to have joined the new 
union in the Nadal cotton mill were sacked. However, to the owners' surprise a great solidarity 
movement followed. The whole of the labour force in the Nadal factory came out on strike, and a 
large number of meetings were held in support of the strikers. Rocked by these events the 
employers gave way and, moreover, made a compensation payment of 125 pesetas to the strike's 
organisers. Spurred on by this success the female weavers flocked to join the new union. 
There was a great deal of enthusiasm, and an eagerness to enter into combat against the 
employers. Accordingly, in Febuary 1902 the female weavers supported a general strike called by 
anarchist militants in support of the striking Barcelona metalworkers. The general strike, however, 
ended in failure, and as a result the mood of the workers changed completely. The great energy 
displayed in previous months was replaced by a feeling of disillusion and despondency. This 
sense of despair was accentuated by the relative ease with which industrialists were able to 
victimise union militants. Like their colleagues in the Alta Muntanya many Barcelona cotton textile 
mill-owners opposed independent trade unionism, and they were able to take advantage of the 
failure of the February 1902 strike totally to destroy the new union. 65 
A similar pattern emerged when the Barcelona cotton textile workers next organised in 
numbers during 1912-13. La Constancia, whose central committee was totally male dominated, 
did try to strengthen cotton textile trade union organisation throughout the region. 
In the Spring of 
1913 it established contact with the Sabadell and Terrassa woollen textile unions with the object of 
forming yet another Catalan textile federation. The efforts of these unions were soon to 
bear fruit. 
On 11 and 12 May delegates from a number of textile unions met 
in Barcelona and founded the so- 
64. El Productor, 16 November 1901. 
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called FederaclO'Regional Fabril de Catalunya. As in 1900 the formation of a new federation gave 
a great impetus to the spread of trade unionism amongst the textile workers. Little progress was 
made in the Alta Muntanya, but in the textile towns around Barcelona trade union organisation 
again grew apace. 66 
This organisational phase was, however, to be short lived. The female cotton textile 
workers were anxious that their working conditions be improved. As a result, La Constdncia 
quickly became involved in one of the greatest industrial conflicts in the whole period under study. 
in a meeting held on 8 June the FederacIO Regional outlined its main demands. These were: "A 40 
per cent increase in piece rates and 25 per cent increase in fixed rates. A reduction in working 
hours from 11 to 9, with mid day closing on Saturdays. That is to say the English week of 40 
hours. A reduction in the hours worked at night to 8, and recognition of the union". 
Moreover, it was agreed to call a strike if these demands were not met. 67 
The FIFN was presented with these demands on 16 June. In Barcelona it became clear that 
the most keenly felt of the demands was a9 hour day. In the following days a large number of 
meetings were held at which there were frequent references to the need for strike action. However, 
a general strike was called in the industry before even the most militant union leaders had 
imagined. In the previous week the Government had become increasingly worried at the prospect 
of a general strike in Catalan textiles. It, therefore, proposed that the Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales intervene and prepare a law which would regulate working conditions in the industry. At 
the same time it also made an effort to ensure social legislation regulating child and female labour 
were complied with. It was this decision to try and implement existing legislation which was to 
precipitate the conflict. In 1911 a law had been passed which aimed, over a period of time, to 
reduce female night work to nine hours a day. Most Barcelona factory owners, nonetheless, still 
maintained an 11 hour night shift. When the civil governor insisted, for the first time, that the law 
be complied with, a number of factories in Sants responded by simply cutting the night shift. This 
decision produced great indignation amongst the textile workers, leading to widespread calls 
for 
strike action. It was in these circumstances that delegates from the FederactO Regional met on 
25 
July. At this meeting it was agreed that La ConsOncia elect the federation's executive committee, 
and that this committee should call a strike when it saw fit. The committee's room 
for manoeuvre 
was very limited. On 29 July the workers from other Sants 
factories began to come out in 
solidarity with the sacked women. The committee was then pushed along 
by rank and file 
militancy and, fearing that once initial enthusiasm had worn off 
it would be very difficult again to 
mobilise the female weavers, it decided to call a general strike 
that very night. 68 
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Once declared the strike spread quickly. Thus by 22 July almost all the city's cotton textile 
workers had come out. The only factories which could have stayed open with the workers consent 
were those run by Fabra, i Coats. Yet even here pickets forced the suspension of production. The 
workers of La Espafia Industrial struck with no hesitation. Outside Barcelona the strike was 
seconded by the Mataro hosiery workers, and the Sabadell and Terrassa woollen textile workers. 
In the cotton textile industry, workers from a number of textile towns around Barcelona also came 
out in support. In the Alta Muntanya, on the other hand, union organisation was too weak, and the 
strike call was not heeded. Nevertheless, by the end of the first week it was claimed that up to 
50,000 textile workers were on strike. 69 
The Barcelona civil governor was quick to claim that the strike was seditious and 
revolutionary in nature. However, the Liberal Government in power was anxious to reach a 
settlement, especially as the Catalan railway workers had threatened to come out in support if the 
textile workers'demands were not met. The first problem the Government faced in this respect 
was that the textile industrialists had no regional federation. The civil governor, therefore, tried to 
work through the FIFN. The FTN's president, Eduard Calvet, was asked to consult with the 
cotton textile industrialists to ascertain the maximum concession they were willing to make. After 
holding a meeting with about 40 textile industrialists on 1 August, he informed the civil governor 
that they would not reduce working hours below 60 per week. The civil governor then called the 
strike committee and informed them of a government plan to resolve the dispute. It consisted of 
the introduction of a bill in Parliament which would limit working hours in textiles to 10 a day. 
There would, at the same time, be a compensatory increase in piece rates to ensure that wages were 
not adversely affected. 70 
The Government's formula by no means met with unanimous approval. Nevertheless, on 
10 August a meeting of Federado Regional delegates agreed to accept its offer. Especially 
favourable were the delegates from outside Barcelona, for whom a 60 hour week represented a 
significant reduction in working hours. The civil governor, thinking that the dispute was over, 
responded by asking the textile employers to open their factories the following day. However, the 
delegates resolution still had to be put to the Barcelona strikers in a meeting to be held that evening. 
The majority of the audience at this meeting was made up of women. When the president 
announced that the Government's formula had been accepted there was uproar. 
Most radical in 
their opposition were the female workers, with one speaker going as 
far as to a say, "that if the 
men are frightened they should retire, and let the women continue the strike". 
Many of the female 
69. LP, 28 July, 2 August 1913; US, 23 August; IRS, La Jomada... 
1913, pp. 599-603. 
70. LP, 1,4,6, August 1913; IRS, La Jomada... 1913, pp. 
599-603. 
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workers were reluctant to abandon their demand for a nine hour day, and all were unwilling to 
accept the Government's word that it would introduce a bill reducing the length of the working 
week when they returned to work. This fact contradicted the claims which were sometimes made 
by male trade unionists that female workers were invariable more docile and easier to exploit than 
their male counterparts. The intransigent stance adopted by the female weavers again demonstrated 
the radicalism of this group of workers. They had been unable to voice their demands since 1901, 
and vented their pent up anger and frustration as soon as it was possible to organise. 71 
The Government's reaction to the vote against its proposal was to put a heavy guard on the 
factories, and hope that most of the strikers would return to work in the following week. Once this 
proved not to be the case it agreed immediately to publish a Royal Decree reducing working hours 
if the the workers called off their action. In a meeting on 16 August, after hearing the 
Government's new offer, the leadership of La Constdncia and representatives of the Federacto 
Regional again agreed to accept. Once more, however, the female weavers would have none of it. 
The situation, therefore, appeared to be deadlocked. However, in the following week a number of 
factors worked against the strike's prolongation. First, the workers from textile towns outside 
Barcelona began to return to work, and the FederaciO Regional delegates publicly called on the 
Barcelona workers to follow suit. Second, the unity until then displayed by the female strikers 
showed signs of breaking up. A key factor behind their ability to resist so long had been the fact 
that in many households their wages supplemented those of the male members of the family. 
While the men continued to work, therefore, the household economy was not totally disrupted. 
Nonetheless, their will to resist was now being sapped, leading to a slow return to work. There 
were fears that in the following week this trickle would became a flood. For this reason in a 
meeting held on the Friday it was reluctantly agreed that work would begin on the following 
Monday. 72 
The final act of the great Catalan textile strike of 1913 was now to be enacted. It began 
with an employer revolt against the more reformist elements in their midst, and ended with the 
formation of a new Spanish textile federation, which adopted a significantly more radical stance 
71. IRS, La Jomada... 1913, pp. 510-513. The link between the radicalism of the power-loom weavers, 
and the difficulties they faced when trying to unionise was noted by the more reformist sectors of 
the 
bourgeoisie. Thus, La Vanguardia stated in August: "It must be admitted that part of the blame for the 
slavery (of the textile workers) lies with the employers and the conservative classes who, with short 
sighted and selfish criteria have obstructed all serious organisation on the part of 
the workers. It is true that 
organised workers are a danger to many pockets and many insaciable strong 
boxes, but unorganised 
workers are an even greater danger to society. They are the raw material of all 
tumults, as soon as anyone 
ill-intentioned stirs up the flames of revolt. Those of us who defend 
biological nationalism must hope that 
the workers will organise, thereby sanctioning the work of nature 
( ... ). 
That is socialism? It is preferable that 
it should be socialism - which on the other hand 
it is not - rather than anarchism or perpetual chaos". 
LP, 9 
August 1913. 
72. LID, 17,23 August; IRS, La Jornada... 1913, pp. 543-551. 
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than any of its predecessors. Both these developments are of key importance for our 
understanding of the nature of social conflict in early twentieth century Catalonia. 
Eduard Calvet, the president of the FTE, had been entrusted by the Government to find a 
solution to the dispute acceptable to the employers. Calvet was himself a substantial cotton textile 
manufacturer. Nevertheless, he was not a typical example of the cotton textile bourgeoisie. Like 
other leading figures in the FTE he adopted a conciliatory stance. Thus, when the strike began he 
emphasised that social legislation should be respected, and throughout he made great efforts to 
reach a compromise acceptable to both sides. Up until the end of the dispute it appeared that his 
efforts were supported by most of the employers. This, however, was soon to prove an illusion. 
Calvet had in the main consulted with large-scale employers with factories in Barcelona. For these 
men the reduction in working hours conceded would not be a great sacrifice. In the Alta 
Muntanya, however, where working hours were considerably longer, the industrialists had far 
more to lose. This was especially the case because the introduction of electrical power in 
Barcelona during these years was reducing the cost advantage the Alta Muntanya industrialists had 
in the past enjoyed. Accordingly, these Alta Muntanya employers were the first to complain at the 
Royal Decree. They were, nevertheless, followed by a large number of Barcelona industrialists. 
Apparently, these men had been too afraid to voice their dissatisfaction at the compromise 
proposed by Calvet whilst the strike was in progress. Once it was over, however, they quickly 
rallied against the Royal Decree. 
The industrialists' first move was to organise a meeting on Monday 25 August, the day 
work was supposed to restart, at the headquarters of the FTE. It was presided over by Josep 
Muntades, the director of La Espafia Industrial, and attended by 230 employers from the Barcelona 
Pla and Alta Muntanya. The most important step taken at the meeting was to elect a commission to 
inform. the Government of its views. The following day this commission presented the civil 
governor with a memorandum which called for the Decree to be suspended until 30 September, 
and for it to be implemented only after the question had been studied by the Instituto 
de Reformas 
Sociales; for traditional holidays to be included in the calculation of working hours; for government 
assurance that the workers would make no further demands over the next ten years; and 
for a series 
of limitations on the fines which could be imposed in case of non compliance. 
The Minister of the 
Interior quickly rejected these demands, thus provoking a very violent reaction 
from the 
employers. Josep Muntades, the president of the commission, stated that the workers 
had been 
forced out on strike, and suggested that the movement was part of an 
international conspiracy 
which had also affected the industrial centres of France and 
Italy. He claimed that most employers 
had known nothing of the negotiation which had taken place and that 
the few who had been 
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involved had always maintained that a study would have to be carried out of reform's Viability 
before it were implemented. The note concluded threateningly: 73 
Once the public authorities have taken this path they will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their independence, and the industrialists whom they have so deplorably 
abandoned and offended will have no choice but to prepare for a terrifying struggle in the 
near future( ... ). The NIinister is mistaken if he thinks that he has brought peace. 'ne facts 
will soon demonstrate that his Royal Decree means a civil war in the factories 
This campaign had important repercussions within bourgeois circles. In a meeting held on 
21 September at the headquarters of the FIN, Eduard Calvet handed in his resignation. He stated 
that while negotiations with the Government had been in progress he had heard no complaints. He 
then lamented that since the Royal Decree's publication he had been the subject of personal attacks, 
and concluded that he could not support the statements made by industrialists in the previous 
weeks. He was, nonetheless, backed by the FTN leadership. 74 
A division had, therefore, opened up between the cotton textile industrialists and the FIN. 
Indeed, these industrialists had themselves found it difficult to maintain a united front. Thus there 
was disagreement between some Barcelona manufacturers, who were prepared to accept a 62 hour 
week, and others from the Alt Llobregat, who opposed any concessions. 75 Nevertheless, Josep 
Muntades was soon able to reunite a large number of the mill-owners from both the Pla and Alta 
Muntanya, and in their name called for the Royal Decree's withdrawal. Then on 7 October he 
organised a meeting which was attended by a large number of industrialists from throughout 
Catalonia. At this meeting a new regional federation of cotton textile employers, known as the 
FederacIO de Fabricants del Pla i de la Muntanya was founded. This federation was formed in 
clear opposition to the FIFN. This was made clear when the FNT's acting president, Josep de 
Caralt, made a call for co-operation between the two bodies, to which Muntades replied, "the 
manufacturers have lost their confidence in the Foment and, consequently, they cannot accept its 
collaboration". 76 As a result of the 1913 textile strike, then, a majority of Catalonia's cotton textile 
industrialists formed a hard-line employer federation. This federation opposed the reformism of 
the FIFN's leadership, was hostile to government social legislation, and refused to deal with 
independent trade unions. 
73. LID, 26,29 August; IRS, La Jdmada ... 1913, pp 
Vol. 11., 1913 (Barcelona, 1915), pp. 96-97. 
74. IRS, La Jomada... 1913, pp. 611-613. 
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75. LP, 30 August, 11 September; 1 RS, La Jomada... 1913, pp. 
572.590-591.608-610. 
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Indeed, this federation was to a large extent able to ensure that the Government's decree 
was a dead letter. In Barcelona, when the workers began to resume work, some industrialists 
refused to implement the decree. At best a number agreed to work 62 rather than 64 hours a week. Similarly, in the Alta Muntanya, especially in those areas where there had been no strike, the 
industrialists made no move in the direction of reducing working hours. This attitude produced a feeling of great bitterness amongst the labour force, yet there was little union leaders could do to 
pressure the mill owners. Many of the unions which had participated in the dispute had been 
seriously weakened. La ConsOncia in particular went into rapid decline. Disappointment over the 
result of the strike had led many female weavers to withdraw, whilst there also developed an 
internal feud over the role played by the strike committee during the dispute. Moreover, the textile 
workers received little support from the state. Once the Royal Decree had been published the 
Government made very little effort to ensure it was enforced. 
It was to try and stop the textile barons from ignoring the decree that the Matar6 hosiery 
unions suggested that a congress be held to convert the FederactO Regional into a national body. 
The congress was held in Barcelona between 25 and 27 December 1913. Only two unions from 
outside Catalonia affiliated, and delegates were in fact largely drawn from the same areas as 
previously. Nevertheless, the congress did give the textile unions an opportunity to express their 
reaction to the events of 1913. Many adopted a very radical tone. Tbus, the TCV was excluded 
and declared "yellow and bourgeois"'. Indeed, as a direct result of this accord the historic textile 
federation was to be ignominiously wound- up in the following year. During the sessions the 
Government was heavily criticised for not having ensured the implementation of its own decree, 
and in a manifesto published by the delegates the Instituto de Refonnas Sociales was declared "A 
useless body". It was furthermore agreed that if the 60 hour week were not in the future enforced 
the federation's committee would, after having consulted with the membership, declare a general 
strike throughout the industry. 77 
Before the outbreak of the First World War, however, the only group of workers in a 
position to challenge the industrialists' refusal to implement the decree were those of the Ter and 
Freser valleys. In the Ter union organisation remained weak between 1910 and 1913. However, 
the Government decree of 25 September 1913 heralded a revival of trade unionism in the area. The 
Ter and Llobregat employers had argued their workers had not asked them for a reduction in 
working hours, and that there was, therefore, no reason for them to accept the decree. It was 
left 
for the Ter Valley workers to prove them wrong. Here, the desire to ensure that the 10 hour 
day 
was respected provided a great stimulus to trade union organisation. 
Consequently, the months of 
October and November 1913 witnessed a febrile campaign to strengthen the unions on the 
Ter and 
77. On this congress see, LP, 27,28 December 1913; SO, 1 January 1914; 
US, 3,10 January, 7 
Febuary 1914. 
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Freser. By the beginning of 1914 these unions felt they were strong enough to issue their 
employers with an ultimatum. They, therefore, called for "a 10 hour day together with a 10 per 
cent increase in piece rates", and threatened immediate strike action if their demand were not met. 
The industrialists, however, refused to budge. 
The workers responded by coming out on strike on 2 May 1914. The strike was seconded 
by over 15,000 workers throughout the Ter and Freser. Nevertheless, it was to prove a failure. 
The employers, whose profit margins were still under heavy pressure, would not hear of 
concessions. Moreover, after the strike of the previous year, the textile federation could offer little 
help. Yet, despite this failure, in the principal Ter Valley towns the unions ensured the return to 
work on the Ter was orderly, and that no workers were sacked. They, therefore, maintained a 
united front and, in the words of the corresponded of the Socialist weekly La Justicia Social, 
successfully opposed any attempt on the part of the employers to impose "a regime of terror, 
similar to the one operating in the Alto Llobregat,. 78 
By 1914, then, bitter industrial conflict was endemic within much of the Catalan cotton 
textile industry. This was by no means the case in all European states. In England the cotton 
textile workers - and in particular the spinners - were regarded as amongst the most reformist 
elements within the labour movement. A comparison of the economic and social development of 
the cotton textile industry in Catalonia and England might, therefore, shed light on the reasons 
behind the instability of labour relations apparent in Catalonia. In England, large weaving and 
spinning labour federations were consolidated in the 1860s and 1870s. These federations soon 
entered into collective bargaining arrangements with the employers. These employers, in general, 
respected the workers' right to form independent unions, and negotiated wages and working 
conditions with them. 
In weaving, as in Catalonia, by the end on the nineteenth century most of the workers were 
female. Nevertheless, no major assault was launched on the weavers' unions. It is, however, in 
spinning that the greatest differences between the position adopted by the English and Catalan mill 
owners was to be seen. In England the ring-frame made its appearance in the 1870s. Yet, the 
English industrialists made no attempt to oust the male spinners and replace them with female 
workers. On the contrary, despite the higher productivity of the ring-frame, English 
industry 
continued to use male workers on the self-acting mules. In order to counter the challenge of the 
ring-frames the spinners co-operated in the intensification of labour on the mules, and 
industrialists 
moved into higher counts of thread where the competitive advantage of the ring-frame was 
less 
notable. 79 The English employers appear to have adopted this stance 
because they were loath to 
78. US, 1 November 1913: 17,31 January, 21,28 February, 28 
March, 4 April 1914; SO, 26 March 19114; 
AMT, T. Trabajos Varjos (2); AM M, Gobemacid, S 152, A 398. 
79. William Lazonick, op cit, pp. 253-255. 
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provoke major confrontation in the industry, and at the same time to undermine a tried and tested 
hierarchy system. They were able to do this because they operated large highly productive 
concerns, which provided for a wide internal and oversees market. Despite these advantages 
foreign competition did intensify from the 1870s. However, English industrialists still had the 
alternative of falling back on exclusive Empire markets. 
With the exception of Spain's few remaining colonies the Catalan industrialists had no such 
possibility. Moreover, as has been seen, the Spanish internal market was limited in size and, as a 
result, the individual cotton mills were relatively small-scale. The limits to the growth of Catalan 
industry posed by Spain's archaic agrarian economic and social structure became clear in the 
1880s. From this date cotton textiles was faced with an almost permanent recession, and it was for 
this reason that the industry's mill owners showed themselves willing to push through cost cutting 
reforms at whatever price. The price was an escalation of class conflict in much of the industry. 80 
Cotton was by far the largest of the textile industries. It was, therefore, the pattem of 
industrial relations in cotton textiles which had the greatest impact on the shape of Catalan trade 
unionism. Nevertheless, woollen textiles predominated in the industrial towns of Sabadell and 
Terrassa. The industrialists'attempts to restructure the labour process and cut costs was at the root 
of the labour troubles in the cotton textile industry. In woollen textiles, however, as was noted in 
Chapter One, there was no concerted effort to undermine the position of the male workers within 
the industry, and for this reason industrial relations were on a very different from those in cotton. 
In Sabadell woollen and worsted spinning remained a relatively highly paid male dominated 
profession. This fact probably explains why this group of workers had a moderating influence on 
the Sabadell labour movement. It was the woollen power-loom weavers who formed the backbone 
of trade union organisation in the town. Power-loom weaving also remained male dominated, but 
the weavers felt rather more threatened than their colleagues in spinning. Many amongst the first 
80. During the 1880s the establishment of industrial relations on a pattern similar to those in the English 
cotton industry had been the goal of the TCV leadership. In 1889, therefore, it sent a commission to 
England to study the reasons behind the greater stability of labour reations in that country. It concluded 
that the low level of industrial militancy in England was the result of two factors. First, the implementation of 
a large body of social legislation. Second, the existence of co ctive bargaining arrangements 
between 
workers and employers. On this second point the commission stated that: the 
docility (quiefismo) of 
the English workers is the result of the assurances they receive from the employers' union, which 
maintains the collective agreements reached without any variation. It thereby offers confidence 
to the 
worker who, in return, offers peace to the employer. By this means the 
industry acquires continuity, that is 
to say life. The situation is very different to that of other countries and especially our 
own, which is the 
most in need of not suffer.... ing upheavals. Despite this, most 
industrialists do ndfaccept the rights of 
labour, and prefer strikes, with the accidents that go with them, 
to a collective agreement with the 
workers". The commision then went on to point out that in 
Catalonia over the past seven years the only 
branch of the industry in which a collective agreement 
had been in force was cotton printing. Memoria 
Descriptiva, op cit, pp. 6-7. 
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generation of power-loom operatives appear to have been recruited from hand-loom weavers, and 
they brought with them these workers traditions of union organisation. 
Unlike the female weavers of Barcelona, the Sabadell weavers were able to maintain a 
continuous trade union presence within the town. The task of maintaining trade union organisation 
intact was made easier by the fact that the industry's employers were generally prepared to 
negotiate with the men. The first collective agreements regulating wage rates in the various 
branches of the industry were signed between 1898 and 1900.81 The woollen textile employers 
then founded an Industrial Union to negotiate with the workforce, and in subsequent years it 
ensured that agreements signed were to a large extent respected. The employers willingness to 
negotiate with independent unions was in contrast to the state of affairs in much of cotton textiles. 
Their stance was facilitated by the fact that much of the woollen textile industry was very small- 
scale and retained a familial air. In Sabadell, moreover, geographical class divisions were not very 
marked, hence providing a favourable climate in which negotiations could take place. 
Nevertheless, the closeness of industrial relations in the industry should not be overdrawn. 
Already in 1883 Sabadell's woollen textile workers had been involved in a seven week strike to 
reduce working hours from 65 to 56 a week. When the strike was over the employers victimised 
union militants and set up their own friendly society. It operated along lines similar to those in 
cotton textiles. Workers who joined received a pension at the age of sixty, but could no form part 
of any other union. The Caixa dels Morts or Dead Box, as it was popularly called, did not receive 
a great deal of support, but at the turn of the century it was still operating. 82 
In the mid-1890s the woollen workers faced an even more serious threat. As was seen in 
Chapter One, at that time two French firms moved to SabadeH in order to circumvent the high tariff 
barriers established in 1891. The largest of these was the integrated spinning and weaving concern 
Seydoux and Company. The other was a worsted spinning factory under the name of Harmel 
Hermanos. Both these concerns took a strongly anti-unionist line. Labour was also more 
intensive in these factories. Furthermore, they adopted piece rates, and undercut the rates paid by 
local manufacturers. For a number of reasons, then, the Sabadell woollen workers were 
fearful 
that faced with competition from the French firms the Sabadell manufacturers might 
be forced to 
resort to the same methods. Their determination to force the 
French mills to conform to the work 
practices predominant in Sabadell was to poison industrial relations 
in much of the industry over 
the next fifteen years. 
81. Esteve Deu, op cit, p. 4.16. 
82. Andreu Castells, OP Cit, VOLIL, PP- 10.50-10.60.; ET, 23 
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The first conflict over methods of production in the French factories occured in 1899. The 
Sabadell labour movement had rapidly reorganised over the previous two years. By the end of 
1899 2557 workers formed part of the local labour federation, the Federado Obrera Sabadellenca 
(FOS). This figure represented nearly a quarter of the Sabadell working class. 'nie largest union 
was that of the power-loom weavers, which had 812 members, "a number of affiliates as great or 
greater than in its best moments',. 83 
In these circumstances the woollen textile unions felt they could move against the French 
concerns. On 25 May, therefore, they orchestrated a strike of 25 spinners at Harmel Herrnanos. 
The workers had two basic grievances. First, that they were prevented from unionising. Second, 
that they had to mind two spinning machines while workers in the rest of Sabadell's factories only 
minded one. The FOS was able to give mass support, and large numbers of workers congregated 
outside the factory gates each day. The owners at first refused to negotiate. However, when the 
factory's female weavers joined the strike they began to waver. The Mayor of Sabadell advised 
them, "there is nothing one can do but follow their ( i. e., the workers ) simple customs if one does 
not wish to be sacrificed". They followed his advice and gave way on 16 June. 84 
By far the most important strike of the year, however, was in Seydoux and Co. The 
Seydoux factory was by late 1899 the only non-unionised plant in town. Nevertheless, the FOS 
had forged links with the factory's workforce, and as a result of these contacts the workers agreed 
to call a strike for union recognition, the abolition of piece rates, and a wage rise. The strike began 
on 27 August. The French management again refused to give way and proceeded to recruit 
blackleg labour from outside Sabadell. The strike, therefore, dragged on, and with no solution in 
sight the social atmosphere in the town became increasingly rarified. It was in these circumstances 
that a single incident -a blackleg firing on a group of workers congregated outside the 
factory gates 
- provoked an extremely explosive situation. In response the workers called a general strike, 
which spread rapidly through Sabadell. On the first day of the strike the panicLstricken 
Mayor 
wrote to the civil governor to call for police reinforcements. His fears were, 
however, 
exaggerated. There was no attempt to storm the factory, and the general strike was to end on 
2 
December. Seydoux was then able to recruit the blacklegs it needed, and the 
factory, which was 
85 
surrounded by civil guard, continued production. 
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The strike defeat was a serious blow to the Sabadell labour movement. Yet, there was no 
parallel to the events in the Alta Muntanya in the following year. In Sabadell, the defeat of the 
Seydoux strike was not followed by an employer offensive against organised labour. The woollen 
power loom weavers union in fact remained strong through to 1902. Indeed, at the beginning of 
that year the weavers signed an improved wage deal with their employers, which gave them a 
minimum of 27 pesetas a week. 86 
Sabadell's autochthonous industrialists had little sympathy for the French plants. '111ey 
maintained no personal contact with the management, and neither of the French firms formed part 
of the local employers' federations. However, there was pressure on the Sabadell employers to 
meet the competitive challenge of Seydoux and Co and adopt some of its methods. The workers 
themselves realised that this was the case. Thus, in 1901 there were rumours that the industrialists 
had come to a secret agreement to introduce piece rates and sack the most militant trade 
unionists. 87 
These fears were not to be realised. However, as the economic climate further deteriorated 
in the Autumn of 1903 voices again warned that the mill owners would attempt to restructure 
working conditions in their favour. Over the next six years the Sabadell unions struggled to retain 
their membership at a time when the entire Catalan labour movement found itself on the defensive. 
During these years the power-loom weavers faced a number of challenges to their position on the 
shop floor. In 1904 there were once again rumours that the mill owners were thinking of replacing 
time rates. However, only one weaving factory actually tried to introduce piece work. The 
workforce immediately responded by taking strike action. The outcome of the strike appears to 
have been favourable, and nothing more was heard of employer attempts to pay by the piece for the 
rest of the decade. An even greater threat to the male power-loom weavers was the possibility that 
they might be replaced by female workers. During 1904 some males were replaced by female 
weavers in two factories. Strike action was again taken, and every attempt made to ensure the 
trend were halted. In this the weavers' union was again successful. At the same time the weavers 
tried to maintain the 27 peseta minimum wage, and 11 hour day. In this respect they were also 
successful. Between 1904 and 1906 there were a number of small conflicts over wage rates, but a 
27 peseta minimum wage remained the norm. 88 
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Although, then, the employers provoked a number of strikes between 1904 and 1906, the), 
remained small-scale. Furthermore, between 1907 and 1909 there were absolutely no disputes in 
the industry. Some weavers had come under pressure from their employers, but they had been 
able to head off any attempt to undermine their position on the shop floor. Indeed, a large number 
of the town's weavers continued to work in so-called "strong houses" in which collective 
bargaining agreements were respected, and who did not in consequence feel it was necessary to 
join the local union. 89 
It was not until 1910 that the Sabadell woollen workers were involved in another industry 
wide conflict, and as in 1899 Seydoux and Co. was to be at the centre of this dispute. During 
1910 there had been a marked increase in sale of woollen garments. The industry's unions were to 
take advantage of this favourable conjuncture to recruit new members. An important number of 
power-loom weavers still refused to join their local union, but by the Summer of 1910 it was as 
strong as at any time since the beginning of the century. In what was almost a re-run of the 
situation in 1899 the woollen textile unions began to recruit workers from the Seydoux plant. The 
management quickly responded by sacking three workers from the factory's worsted spinning 
section. The deep resentment the Sabadell unions felt towards Seydoux and Co. then burst to the 
surface. Thus, on 5 August 19 10 the Worsted Spinners' Union called out all the factories 
spinners. Along with the reinstatement of the sacked workers, it demanded the replacement of 
piece by time rates. In addition, in a hard hitting letter addressed to the fin-n's Parisian owners it 
stated that the workers were: 90 
( 
... 
) ready to come out and adopt a strategy very different from that of the peaceful strike, 
because they are tired of suffering the mockery and ridicule they are subjected to by that 
irascible character (the director) Mr Martfn. They are also fed up of living in poverty, of 
working a lot and of being paid little, and they do not wish our fellow employers to be 
obliged by the competition to cut wages and introduce piece rates. 
At first the Industrial Union tried to play a conciliatory role. However, as a result of the 
tactics followed by the Sabadell unions it was increasingly drawn into the dispute. When the FOS 
tried to extend the strike to the rest of the factory it found that the workers who, "are 
from the 
recruitment drive made through the country and mountains of Catalonia during the last strike eleven 
years ago", refused to come out. 91 It, therefore, hit upon the idea of declaring a 
boycott of all 
those establishments which supplied raw materials to, or worked for, the 
Seydoux plant. This 
boycott was enforced by demanding the payment of a fine and the 
breaking off of any contact with 
89. ET, 16 April 1909. 
go. Bojetfn de ja Cgmara de Industria y CoMerCjiýe Sabadell, October 1910. 
91. SO, 19 August 1910. 
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the French factory from all those employers who traded with Seydoux. If the fine were not paid 
then the employer's labour force was withdrawn, and additional expenses for maintenance of the 
strikers were demanded. 
By taking this action the FOS could bypass the problem of lack of support amongst the 
workers of Seydoux and Co. Yet it had the disadvantage that it antagonised Sabadell's other 
manufacturers. Matters came to a head on 15 September after the workers of a textile finishing 
shop walked out. The Industrial Union responded by immediately declaring a lock-out in all the 
town's finishing shops. Over the next two weeks the situation continued to deteriorate. 
Negotiations failed and as a result at the beginning of October the lock-out was extended to the 
entire industry. At the same time the Industrial Union called for more police to be sent to Sabadell, 
and put pressure on the authorities to take legal action against the FOS. Neither side, however, 
presented a united front. El Trabajo admitted: "Amongst the workers there was opposition to the 
tactic of the boycott amongst those weavers, who are generally occupied in good houses and do 
not know what it is to go on strike. " The FOS for its part claimed that it was the owners of 
relatively large-scale plants - the so-called "big fish" - who were behind the lock out. Some 
workers indeed showed considerable sympathy for those small-scale employers who had been 
forced by the Industrial Union to second its action. 92 
In fact, the Industrial Union was forced to call off its action after a week because of 
divisions within its ranks. Nevertheless, the leadership of the FOS maintained a hard line. Thus, 
the Federation's acting president, Bru. LladO, stated that the workers would not return to work until 
the owners had paid the men locked-out compensation for the days they had been idle. 
Furthermore, he stepped up pressure on the industrialists by declaring a general strike of all 
Sabadell industry on 27 October. 93 
The decision further to radicalise the conflict appears, with the benefit of hindsight, clearly 
mistaken. It was probably taken for two reasons. First, the woollen workers were desperately 
keen for the Seydoux factory to fall into line. Second, the FOS leadership was carried along by the 
increasingly radicalised atmosphere of these months. In Barcelona there had been a surge of 
industrial militancy in the Summer of 1910. Moreover, a new national syndicalist labour 
federation, to be known as the ConfederaclOn Nacional del Trabajo , was to 
be founded in 
Barcelona at the beginning of November. Bru Llad6 hoped that the delegates at the 
founding 
congress would take decisive action in favour of the woollen workers. 
Pius, in a meeting on 31 
October the FOS agreed to call a "revolutionary general strike" if it were approved 
by the congress. 
However, the FOS was to be disappointed. When the congress met 
it took a considerately more 
92. ET, 29 October, 30 September 19 10; ED, 11 October 1910., Vol. 11. op cit, p-14.42. 93. ET, 13,25 October; LP, 4,5,6,12 October; Andreu Castells 
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cautious line, agreeing that if the dispute had not been solved by the following Friday the Sabadell 
workers should abandon the town en masse. Should they be prevented from doing so a general 
strike would then be declared. 94 
In the following week the FOS began to prepare for the exodus which was to take the 
workers of Sabadell to the Barcelona Ramblas. Nevertheless, there appears to have been 
considerable opposition to such a move amongst the rank and file. For this reason the FOS began 
to work for a negotiated settlement and, it seems, finally decided to put off the march. Argument 
over this question was, however, soon to be made academic. From the beginning of November 
the Liberal Government, under the premiership of the Antonio Canalejas, launched a full scale 
assault on union organisation in the town. Leading union militants were arrested and great 
pressure was put on the strikers to return to work. With the labour movement decapitated this 
return began in the following week. Not all the strikers, however, were readmitted. According to 
El Trabajo a "hunger pact" was declared against 500 families. 95 
Industrial relations in Sabadell had now reached their nadir. The part played by the 
employers in inciting the authorities to move against the FOS, and their victin-ýsation of union 
militants, created great bitterness. Nevertheless, union organisation in the town was to recover 
surprisingly quickly. Indeed, in the following year the power-loom weavers union felt strong 
enough to present the industrialists with a demand for a 50 cents rise in wages, and the abolition of 
unofficial holidays. In order to maintain "harmony between labour and capital" the Industrial 
Union then offered the compromise solution of a 62 hour week which was accepted by the 
weavers. 96 
The Sabadell woollen textile industry was, therefore, set apart from cotton textiles by the 
fact that the employers were prepared to bargain with independent unions throughout the period 
under study. These employers maintained that there remained a strong sense of community in 
Sabadell. Thus the Industrial Union stated in 1910 that: 97 
He who knows life in our locality; he who has been able to appreciate that in Sabadell there 
are no class differences; he who knows that here the workers beliefs, ideas, aspirations, 
and even his foibles are respected. He knows that the Sabadell employer does not 
know 
94. SO, 26 October; ET, 29 October; Congreso de Consh . tudon de la Confederaci6n Nacional del 
Trabajo. Pr6logo de Juan Peirats (Barcelona, 1976), pp. 88-89,94-95. 
95. Cited in SO, 9 December 1910. 
96. LIP, 24 May, 15 July 1911; Boletin de la Cijmara de Industria y Comercio 
de Sabadell, September 
1912. Moreover, when in 1913 the Government introduced its 
Royal Decree limiting working hours to 10 a 
day it was respected in Sabadell woollen textiles. 
97. ED, 5 October 1910. 
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how to dislike or hold a grudge against his workers, and will always be found to be unselfish and generous. 
The picture given was of course idealised. Nonetheless, even the leadership of the FOS 
had stated at the end of 1910 that, "up until today the Sabadell bourgeoisie has pretended to be 
humane, almost a friend to the working class". 98 The closeness of social relations should perhaps 
not be exaggerated. As has been noted, the Sabadell manufacturers did set up a friendly society, 
and in 1910 called on the state to break union power and then sacked a number of workers. 
However, they had also been willing to negotiate agreements over working conditions. And, with 
the exception of the 1899 and 1910 disputes, industrial conflictivity in the industry remained low. 
Fear that other industrialists would follow the lead of the Seydoux factory and introduce new work 
practices led industrial relations to become increasingly tense. Yet, the most notable feature of 
Sabadell's economic and social development was that the industrialists never, in fact, attempted to 
take on their workforce and try to recast work structures in their plants. 
The contrast between industrial relations in cotton and woollen textiles in this respect was 
very marked. In cotton the industrialists had been prepared to break the back of trade union 
organisation in order to reduce labour costs. In the Alta Muntanya many tried to impose social 
control through a mixture of paternalism and labour discipline. They were aided in this task by the 
Spanish state, which usually backed up the employers. This was particularly the case when the 
Conservatives were in power. Yet, as the example of the 1910 strike in Sabadell shows, the 
Liberals were also prepared to act decisively against labour if they felt there was a revolutionary 
threat to the Restoration System. However, in contrast to the iron and steel barons of the German 
Ruhr, the cotton textile industrialists often lacked sufficient resources to act decisively against 
organised labour. They were most successful in the company towns of the Alt Llobregat, but in 
other areas they met with staunch worker resistance. This resistance was to be greatest in the Ter 
Valley. In other towns the workers were often non-unionised for years on end. However, when 
they were finally to organise the anger and frustration which they felt made them very volatile. 
This was most notable in Barcelona during 1913 when the female power-loom weavers 
became a 
highly radical force. The cotton textile barons had by no means, therefore, completely 
been able to 
stem the tide of labour protest, and when worker discontent did explode - as 
during 1901 and 1913 
- the fabric of Catalan urban society was shaken. 
98. SO, 23 December 1910. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE STATE, TRADE UNION ORGANISATION AND STRIKES. 
PART H: BARCELONA AND THE ARTISANAL TRADES 
Worker resistance in cotton textiles, then, was not successfully overcome by the bourgeoisie. 
industrial conflict in the industry contributed to the belief held by contemporary observers that the 
Catalan workers were the most rebellious in Spain. This image was not undeserved. No strike 
data is available for Spain before 1905. From this date the Instituto de Refonnas Sociales began 
annually to publish a quantitative survey of strikes. The data it used was by no means reliable. 
Nevertheless, it does provide us with a general picture of the intensity of strike activity in the 
various regions. 
Table 4.1. Strikes in Barcelona Province and Spain, 1899-1914 
1905-6 1907-8 1909-10 1911-12 1913-14 
Barcelona Province 
No of Strikes 59 57 78 71 119 
No of Strikers 5144 4084 35,391 12,336 72,980 
Spain 
No of Strikes 262 245 229 289 341 
No of Strikers 47,762 25,419 42,580 36,306 133,583 
Barcelona as a percent 
of Spanish Total 
No of Strikes 22.5 23.3 34.1 24.6 34.9 
No of Strikers 10.8 16.1 83.1 40 54.6 
Source. Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de Huelgas, 1905-19-14 (Madrid, 1906-1917). 
As the table suggests a high proportion of strikes in Spain were carried out in Barcelona 
Province, which comprised almost all the region's major industrial centres. 
This was particularly 
1. The Institute gathered strike data from the juntas locales de reformas sociales, and 
tried fill in gaps by 
using information found in the press. Where, therefore, the juntas 
locales did not function, or did not fulfil 
their obligations, strikes may not have been reported. For the city of 
Barcelona, between 1903 and 1914 
the catholic publicist, Miguel Sastre i Sama, undertook his own 
detailed study of strikes. Our own 
investigation shows the data collected by Miguel Sastre generally 
to have been more accurate. While, 
therefore, in the tables analysing strikes in Barcelona Province, 
Catalonia and Spain we have used data 
from the the Insfituto de Reformas Sociales, for the tables we 
have elaborated analysing strikes in 
Barcelona cityý$ave used information from the study 
by Miguel Sastre. From 1912 the Barcelona Museu 
Social published an Anuari dEstadistica Social de 
Catalunya(AESC). It included a section on strikes in 
Catalonia, which also proved more accurate than that elaborated 
by the Institute. 
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the case as class conflict became more intense after 1909. Thus, between 1910 and 1914 31.2 per 
cent of the strikes in Spain and 56.8 per cent of the strikers were from Barcelona Province. 
Strike action in Catalonia - as in other parts of Spain - was not constant but concentrated in 
bursts. The years 1890 to 1892 had seen a great upsurge in labour militancy. In the repressive 
climate of the mid- 1890s, on the other hand, labour was largely quiescent. Between 1899 and 
1903 another strike wave swept the country. The years between 1904 and 1909 again witnessed a 
rapid decline in the number of strikes, a trend which was reversed in the more favourable economic 
climate of the years 19 10 to 1914. These cyclical swings were especially clear in the case of 
Barcelona city. Thus, strike data published by Nfiguel Sastre i Sama shows the number of strikers 
plunge from the figure of 61,174 in 1903 to only 987 in 1909. There was then a rapid recovery, 
with the number of strikers reaching its high point of 80,071 in 1913, the year of the great cotton 
textile dispute. (see Graph 4.1. ). 
Graph 4.1. Strikes and Strikers in Barcelona, 1903-1914. 
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Source. Miguel Sastre y Sama, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resultados los At)os 1903-1914 
(Barcelona, 1904-1915). 
Barcelona was the focal point of this conflictivity. Thus, nearly 50 per cent of the 
Catalan 
proletariat lived in Barcelona, and despite bitter industrial strife in parts of the 
Alta Muntanya in 
most years the city accounted for over 50 per cent of strikes 
in the region. (see table 4.2. ). 2 
2. However, as table 4.2. indicates, for the years 1913-1914 data taken 
from the AESC give a significantly 
lower percentage of strikes in Barcelona than that taken from the 
Institute for Social Reforms. This reflects 
the fact that - as our empirical observations 
have born out - the Institute's figures missed a significant 
number of strikes outside Barcelona city. The Institutes 
data, therefore, tends to exagerate the 
percentage of Catalan strikes which took place in the capital. 
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Table 4.2. Strikes in Barcelona as a Percentage of all Strikes in Catalonia, 1905-1914. 
Source 1905-6 1907-8 1909-10 1911-12 1913-14 
Institute for Social 57 
Reforms 
Anuari d'Estadistica 
Social de Catalunya 
53.6 
Sources: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de Huelgas, 1905- 1914; Anuad d'Estadfstica Social de Catalunya, Les Vagues a Catalunya, 1913-1914 (Barcelona, 1914-1915). 
It was noted in the previous chapter that to form trade unions was far easier for workers in 
a strong position on the shop floor. In Barcelona, therefore, artisanal workers often formed the 
most robust unions. Many artisans were also at the forefront of strike activity. Table 4.3. 
outlines the propensity of workers to strike in the city's main industries between 1899 and 1914. 
Data for the years 1903-1914 has been elaborated from the statistics collected by Nfiguel Sastre. 
That of the years 1899-1902 is based on press reports. As in Chapter Two the 1905 worker 
census has been used as the best guide to the number of workers in each industry. 3 
The table has been ordered in terms of the relative propensity of workers in the various 
industries to come out on strike, with the most strike prone industry first, and the least strike prone 
last. The data has been arrived at simply by adding together the yearly figure of strikers, average 
length of strikes and working days lost. The two most strike prone industries were clearly 
construction and metallurgy. 4 
Over the whole period the number of strikers as a percentage of the workforce was highest 
in construction. Nevertheless, metalworkers were not far behind. Moreover, it was in the 
metallurgical industry that strikes tended to last longest. In construction it was the journeyman 
bricklayers, carpenters and painters who were the most militant. In metallurgy, as was seen in 
Chapter Two, many workers retained an apprentice system and hence could still be regarded in 
many ways as artisans. Within the industry it was these skilled mechanics, foundrymen and 
boilermakers who were the first to come out on strike. 
3. Only one alteration which has been made to Miguel Sastre's figures. 
Sastre claimed that 63,870 textile 
workers came out on strike in 1913. This is a great exaggeration, and 
the number has therefore been 
reduced to the 26,729 textile workers which according to the 1905 
Censo Obrero laboured in Barcelona 
at that time. 
4. The carpentry trade straddled construction and woodworking, and 
the carpenters unions developed 
close links with both construction and woodworkers. 
Following the classification adopted by the 1905 
Censo Obrero, however, the carpenters have been taken to be construction workers. 
Because 
carpenters proved highly militant the effect has, of course, 
been to boost the figures elaborated for the 
propensity to strike in construction. 
36.1 93.4 61.3 65.9 
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A similar picture prevailed in a number of other industries. In the leather trades it was the 
skilled tanners who were the most militant. In the textile finishing trades skilled male workers 
predominated, and it was they who organised the strikes in the industry. In the woodworking and 
furniture trades it was the artisanal power-sawyers, wood turners and cabinetmakers who were 
behind the labour unrest. In printing the only trade beset by strikes was that of the journeyman 
compositors. In the clothing and food industry skilled male workers were in a minority. 
However, it was still these workers who were best able to organise to defend their interests. In the 
clothing industry, as has been seen, the majority of workers were female. Most of them worked in 
their own homes as seamstresses and dressmakers. They were paid very low wages and were 
highly exploited. Yet they found it totally impossible to unionise and present any demands for 
higher wages. Within the industry it was only male workers employed in workshops and 
factories, of which the shoemakers and tailors stand out, who took strike action. The situation 
within the food industry was in some ways similar. There were a large number of unskilled male 
and female workers employed. However, the only large trade whose workers were able to take 
strike action effectively was that of the bakers. Bakers were not highly skilled, but they had 
retained an apprentice system which served to limit entry into the profession. 
Table 4.3. The Propensity of Barcelona Workers to Strike by Industry, 1899-1914. 
Industry No. of No. of Av. Length Days Strikers 
Workers Strikers Strikes (Days) Lost as per cent 
of Workforce 
Construction 15,277 43,274 33.9 1,636,218 302 
Metallurgy 8,943 26,305 60.5 1,591,735 209 
Marine Transport 4,437 9,924 31.9 316,879 202 
Land Transport 17,890 32,000 18.9 604,200 108 
Leather Trades 1,621 1,872 41.9 73,464 101 101 Textile Finishing 
Textiles 
7,678 
729 26 
8,637 
29,660 
26.1 
21.4 
225,134 
634,913 101 
Furniture Trades 
Clothing 
, 2,686 
20,479 
2380 
16,920 
32 
22.8 
76,222 
386,351 
90 
83 
Woodworking Trade s 3,858 2,901 32.4 2 
949134 
648 72 
80 
70 
Food Industry 
Glass and Ceramics 
8,129 
3,069 
5,551 
1,970 
13. 
37.7 , 749224 60 
Gas and 
Electricity 29224 960 8.3 2 26 
7930 
779 76 
40 
40 
Printing 7,495 2,931 . , 
Coach, Cart and 
Boat Makers 2,206 586 93.1 
549546 30 
Paper and 
Chemicals 6,183 1,063 9.4 
109000 10 
Sources. AECB, "Censo Obrero de 1905"; La Publicidad, 1899-1902; 
Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas en 
Barcelona y sus Resultados, 1903-1914. 
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Nonetheless, it was not only artisanal workers who came out on strike. In the previous 
chapter we saw how, despite the difficulties they faced, female textile workers were able to launch 
a general strike in 1913. Industrial unrest was also common amongst industrial workers on the 
Barcelona waterfront. Here the dockers - included under the heading marine transport - proved 
particularly strike prone. In addition, the city's carters - who often worked at the docks - also took 
strike action at regular intervals between 1900 and 1914. 
Trade union organisation strengthened rapidly between 1899 and 1902. Thus by February 
of this latter year there may have been as many as 45,000 workers unionised in Barcelona. 5 
During these years it became clear that artisanal workers formed the backbone of the Barcelona 
labour movement. However, the unions these workers formed in general remained small in size. 
As was seen in Chapter Two the towns on the Barcelona Pla were co-opted into the city of 
Barcelona in 1897. Nevertheless, the transport system between the old city and the industrial 
towns remained poor. In towns such as Gracia, Sants and Sant Marti Oc , the sense of I al 
community, therefore, remained very strong. Workers lived and worked in the towns and only 
went down to the centre of Barcelona on special occasions. The result was a great fragmentation 
of trade unionism. Thus, in 1903 there were 7 bricklayers unions and 6 carpenters unions, and 
overall at least 111 unions in the city. 6 In 1899 the largest union in Barcelona was that of the Sant 
Marti tanners with about 1,500 members, but most had less than 500. These unions, therefore, 
had limited resources. Many did not own their own premises, but had to sublet rooms in taverns 
or caf6s. The dues paid by members varied between 10 and 25 cents a month. With this money 
union officials usually built up a strike fund, and they also sometimes provided sickness benefit. 
However, the provision of more wide-ranging friendly benefits, such as retirement pay, was 
beyond the resources of these unions. Union organisation in Barcelona was also very unstable. 
Thus, many of the unions which operated at the turn of the century were only founded in 1898 and 
1899. In addition, as shall be seen, the loss of a strike or government repression could easily lead 
to a unions break up. Consequently, workers who could afford the 1 peseta a month quota, 
preferred to rely on independent benefit societies (montepios or germandats) for accident benefitS. 7 
5. Josd M. Boix, "Sindicalismo Cat6lico: Su Actuaci6n en Barcelona", Revista Social Hispano Americano 
11 (Barcelona, 1912), p. 123. 
6. "Sociedades Obreras", in AECB 1903. Miguel Sastre stated there were 123 unions in Barcelona in 
1903 and there were no doubt more. See, Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", p. 381. 
7. These Germandats proved very popular with the petty bourgeoisie, small scale employers and skilled 
workers. (artesanos and menestrales in the words of the AECB). Thus in 1901 
there were 116 
Germandats with 25,034 members affiliated to the Uni6 i Defensa 
dels Germandats de la Dutat de 
Barcelona. By 1913 the number of Germandats had risen to 685 and that of affiliates 
to 159,579. At the 
same time there were over 1000 Germandats in the rest of the province. 
AECB, 1904, p. 563; 1907, 
P-589; AESC, 1913, p. 158; 1914, p. 150. As was pointed out in 
Chapter Two, however, most Barcelona 
workers did not have good sickness cover. 
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Unions, therefore, were primarily seen as instruments to obtain improvements in working 
conditions. In fact, most unions were run on a very informal basis. There were no paid officials, 
and committee men were simply workers who dedicated their spare time to union business. The 
unions were also very democratic. The committees were renewed at regular intervals, and there 
were sometimes rules to stop the same persons from being reelected continuously. 
From the turn of the century an increasing number of regional, and even some national, 
craft federations were founded. Yet, they tended to operate on lines similar to those of the unions 
themselves. The location of the central committee was decided at conference time. Again, there 
were no paid officials, and the town which elected the committee was usually changed after each 
yearly congress. These federations, therefore, seem largely to have served to co-ordinate protest 
action. The only clear exception to this pattern was that of the coopers federation. The federation 
had been founded in 1882. Uniquely, it was able to survive right through to 1914. This 
federation, as might be expected, was far better organised than its contemporaries. Thus, in the 
1890s it set up a friendly benefits fund, which provided for accident and retirement payments. 8 
The geographical isolation of many Catalan unions could lead them to become very 
exclusive. To give one example, at the turn of the century some of the bricklayers unions outside 
Barcelona tried to stop bricklayers from other areas obtaining work in their town. 9 As was seen in 
the previous chapter male workers often found it difficult to regard women as part of the labour 
movement. Artisans, moreover, often adopted an exclusive stance with respect to the unskilled in 
general, and excluded them from their unions. Behind this attitude lay the artisans' belief that they 
worked in "honourable" professions. As was seen in chapter two, their spokesmen saw the 
artisans as trained workers, perhaps even as "artists", and argued that in order to be a journeyman 
a worker need to be cultured and have a good general education. 10 Such descriptions involved a 
deal of wishful thinking. 11 Yet, artisans often looked down upon workers who had not been 
apprenticed and learrit a trade. This was particularly clear in the case of workers from the more 
elitist trades, such as coopers and glassblowers. Yet, even poorly paid artisanal workers like 
bricklayers were guilty of such attitudes. Thus, it proved very difficult for syndicalist labour 
leaders to convince the Barcelona bricklayers that they should fon-n a single union with their 
labourers. In 1913, during one such attempt, the union leadership concluded an address: 
8. Most of the coopers' federation's congress reports for the years 1885 to 
1905 have been conserved. 
9. This was the case of the Reus and Badalona bricklayers unions. 
El Productor, 20 December 1902; 
Joaquitn Ferrer, Sim6 Piera: Nrfil dun Sindicalista (Barcelona, 1975), p-31. 
10. See, for example, Boletfn, December 1904; May, August 
1905. 
11 . Many workers 
in even the best qualified artisanal trades could not read or write. 
Thus in the late 
nineteenth century the coopers' federation faced the problem 
that most union members were incapable 
Of carrying out administative duties. 
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"recommending that all the bricklayers deign to recognise the labourers as their colleagues because, 
unfortunately, there are many who ( ... ) consider their colleagues in exploitation to be slaves. " 12 
By the turn of the century, however, this exclusiveness was breaking down, and from 
various quarters moves were being made towards greater working class unity. At the root of these 
moves was the need, as industrial conflict intensified from 1899, for closer co-operation to combat 
capital. The artisanal workers pursued a number of basic demands. As was seen in chapter two 
the general level of wages in Catalonia was low. In addition, prices began to rise steadily from 
1897. Workers responded with calls for wage increases. These calls were most vociferously 
made by workers in the more lowly paid artisanal occupations. Thus, for example, in the 
construction industry the bricklayers and their labourers, carpenters and painters, made an increase 
in wages one of their principal demands during these years. 
Nevertheless, what is at first sight surprising is that most artisanal workers laid greater 
emphasis on the need to reduce working hours. There were a number of clear reasons behind this 
attitude. As was stressed in chapter two, many artisans felt they had been adversely affected by the 
advance of capitalist relations of production. Technological innovation, the employment of a 
growing number of poorly qualified apprentices, speed ups and moves to deskill the labour force 
not only made the position of the journeymen within the labour process more vulnerable in many 
trades, it also led to a growth in unemployment. Catalan workers could not fail to note the impact 
of these developments. In particular, the argument that the advance of machinery was leading to a 
growth in unemployment was very common during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, 
and the main remedy proposed was almost invariably the reduction of working hours. To give a 
couple of examples, the shoemakers were faced with the growing use of machinery in the trade. In 
1900 the shoemakers union La Igualtat reacted by making the following plea to the workforce: 13 
We have to reorganise for the forthcoming struggle, a struggle in which we will have to 
defend progress and ensure that the bourgeois class does not seize control of it and use it as 
an instrument of exploitation. 
The use of machinery advances at an enormous pace and soon the installation 
in and 
outside all the factories will be a fact. 
We must not allow thousands of our workers to be left poverty stricken. 
12. SO, 16 November 1913. 
13. LIP, 1 June -1900, NE; It was not only the artisanal workers who put 
forward these arguments. Thus the 
central committee of one of the many Catalan textile federation 
founded before 1915, stated in 1905: "As 
a result of the alarming clesequilibrium which has developed 
between demand and supply it had been 
impossible to reduce the working day, and this dispite the rapid advance 
of technology. " ET, 12 August 
1905. 
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When the shoemakers came out on strike in 1903 one of their foremost demands was an 8 
hour day. The Barcelona compositors union, L Arte dImprimir, developed a similar line of 
argument. From the beginning of the century the compositors'position within the labour process 
had been threatened by the introduction of the linotype and monotype. The union maintained that 
the only way the resultant unemployment could be remedied was through an eight hour day. 
Furthermore, it argued that only when there was full employment in the industry could other 
demands be pursued. Thus it stated: "There also exists the probability, almost the certainty, that 
after finding work for those unemployed we could demand higher wages, put forward our claim 
over the employment of apprentices, abolish piece rates and carry out other reforms. All these 
measures are as urgent as they are necessary, but they are very difficult to carry out while there are 
colleagues on the streets.,, 14 
Some workers, no doubt, simply wished to prevent the introduction of new machinery. 
However, more thoughtful labour leaders argued that they were not opposed to technological 
innovation per se, because it should serve to ease the burden of work. They were opposed to the 
fact that under present conditions only the bourgeoisie benefited. This, for example, was the 
stance taken by the syndicalist printer Joaquin Bueso, who argued that, "mechanical progress, if 
we were prepared and studied its introduction, could serve to save our strength ( ... ), but in the 
hands of the bourgeoisie it is a weapon used to exploit. In this case greater production does not 
lead to a reduction in our hours of work, but to the number of hands employed in the 
workshops". 15 It should be emphasised that this analysis of the impact of technical progress under 
capitalism was not limited to the workers of those trades most under threat. It was very common 
throughout the working class and trade union press. Moreover, no voices were raised in dissent. 
In this respect, therefore, it could be seen as laboui's alternative to bourgeois political economy 
with its stress on the inevitably beneficial effects of technological advance. It was also analyses of 
this kind which opened the door to the advocacy of collectivist or communist solutions to the 
problems which faced the artisans. 
The journeymen, however, did not only try and bolster their position through the reduction 
of working hours. They also tried to prevent employers from undermining apprenticeship 
by 
44 regulating" it. The regulations outlined by the artisans'unions usually sought to 
limit 
apprenticeship to children over the age of 14 who could read and write. 
Most important, there 
were invariably provisions setting the ratio of apprentices to journeymen, the number or years an 
apprenticeship should last, and the rates of pay of apprentices. 
Apprenticeship regulations also 
sometimes included the proviso that apprentices should not 
be made to undertake unskilled tasks 
14. Boletin, March 1906. 
15. SO, 19 February 1910. See also, for example, Boletin, March 1905, 
February 1906; La Cur)a, 1 
January 1905; ET, 7 April 1906.; Joaquin Ferrer, P&N, pp, 189-190. 
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which served no training purpose. These, the unions maintained, should be left to labourers. 
Finally, in those industries in which piece rates were the norm artisans called for their abolidon. 
Demands for a reduction in working hours and other measures to bolster the the position of 
the journeyman on the shop floor were not lightly accepted by most employers. Indeed, it appears 
that between 1899 and 1903 only the cabinetmakers and stonemasons were able peacefully to 
obtain a reduction or working hours. In other trades strike action had to be taken. In the 
construction industry the attempts by bricklayers and bricklayers labourers not only to increase 
wage rates butalso to reduce working hours from 9 to 8a day resulted in a number of hard fought 
strikes. Thus, in October 19015000 bricklayers came out for ap. 8 hour day and to be paid on 
site at the end of the daily shift. In the following year increasingly close links were forged between 
the bricklayers and bricklayers'labourers. As a result in 1903 a federation of Barcelona bricklayer 
and bricklayers' labourers unions was formed in Barcelona with about 13,000 members. The 
federation was then able to launch a general strike in the trade for a 50 cents increase in wages. 
The carpenters soon followed suit. Already in 1898 a recently formed regional carpenters' 
federation had called for a minimum 4 peseta a day wage and an 8 hour day. Between February 
and March 1903 over 3000 Barcelona carpenters took strike action to enforce this demand. The 
Barcelona painters, on the other hand, did not have time to down tools. When in June 1900 the 
painters'union La Fraternal called for an 8 hour day, a minimum wage of 5 pesetas and the 
"regulation" of apprenticeship it was met by an employer lock-out. Construction workers has 
some success. All the trades within the industry were able to reduce working hours from 9 to 8a 
day, and the wages of bricklayers, bricklayers labourers and painters were raised by 50 cents. 
In the buoyant economic climate of these years other groups of artisanal workers were also 
able to press home their demands successfully. In the furniture trades the cabinetmakers were able 
to secure a9 hour day and the abolition of piece rates in 1899, and only had to carry out a number 
of partial strikes in the following year to ensure the agreement's observance. In woodworking the 
coopers already worked an 8 hour day. Yet, in the industry's other trades a 10 hour day was the 
nonn, and the workers set their sights on a one hour cut in working hours. T'his the power- 
sawyers and lathe operators achieved after taking strike action in 1903. In the textile finishing 
trades a strike of the industry's 3,700 workers in 1903 also forced employers to reduce working 
hours from 10 to 9a day. 
However, not all the artisans' strikes met with success. The most spectacular 
failure was 
the 1903 shoemakers' strike. As was seen in Chapter Two, 
in shoemaking by the first decade of 
the century skilled workshop or factory based male workers 
formed a minority of the trade. 
Women were employed in factories to do the simpler task, and much work 
was put out to highly 
exploited homeworkers. In addition, the male workers also 
faced the threat of mechanisation. As 
a result all shoemakers were badly paid and 
forced to work long hours. In 1899 the factory based 
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shoemakers had been able to form a union, and by 1903 it had over 1000 affiliates. It was 
therefore felt that the time was ripe to present a series of demands which aimed to defend the 
skilled shoemakers position. These included an 8 hour day, the abolition of piece rates, and a 
minimum wage of 2.7 pesetas a day. When their employers rejected the demand 10,500 workers 
came out on strike. Yet the strike was to end in defeat, largely because it was not seconded by the 
homeworkers. This strike defeat was to prove a watershed for the journeyman shoemakers. Their 
union was never to recover, and it undertook no other major strike before 1915.16 Consequently 
the shoemakers working conditions continued to deteriorate, and shoemaking was slowly 
transformed to a semi and unskilled mass production industry. 
Stress has so far been placed on industrial conflict within the artisanal trades. However, it 
was not only artisans who came came out on strike. On the waterfront, and amongst tramworkers 
and carters there was also a great deal of unrest. Industrial workers found it more difficult to 
unionise than skilled men. However, the case of the dockers, carters and tramworkers showed 
that when the Barcelona labour movement as a whole was relatively strong it was also possible for 
the unskilled to organise. In part this was due to the support these men received from the skilled 
workers. Perhaps the fact that they worked in the open air, and on the docks in teams, also made it 
more difficult for their employers to maintain close supervision, and thereby effectively pursue an 
anti-unionist policy. Whichever the case, these workers still found it very difficult effectively to 
press home their demands. This would give their strikes a certain desperate quality, which could 
lead them easily to burst into violence. 
The first union of unskilled workers to launch a strike were the tramworkers in 1900. At 
that time Barcelona and the surrounding towns were served by a network of trams operated by 
several different companies. Horse-drawn trams were the norm, although electricity was being 
introduced on some lines. The tram workers, who had not until that date been able to unionise, 
were subject to poor pay, extremely long working hours, and strict - often arbitrary - labour 
discipline. In 1900 workers from one of the largest companies, La Anoninw, formed a union. It 
then presented the company with a series of demands which included a5 peseta daily wage and a 
10 hour day. In order to force the company to accept its demands the union took strike action on 8 
March, and won a series of concessions. The relatively favourable result of the strike resulted 
in 
workers from other companies joining the union. 17 
Spurred on by this success the tramworkers union called a general strike 
in order to achieve 
a closed shop in the industry in April 1901. On this occasion, 
however, the companies offered far 
stiffer resistance. This led the strike to become increasingly violent. 
There were clashes between 
16. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1903, pp. 27-38.; SO, 9 December 
1910. 
17. LP, 8 March, NE, 9 April, NE; 19 April, NE, 1900. 
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strikers and blacklegs, in which firearms were used. Youngsters and women also prevented the 
trams from restarting by stoning them as they came through working class areas. These last 
actions demonstrated the high level of working class solidarity which existed. This became clear in 
the following month when a number of Barcelona unions agreed to call a general strike in the city if 
the tramworkers demands were not met. Ile general strike was called on 25 May with the support 
of 25 unions, including the Barcelona bricklayers, foundrymen, carters and coal unloaders. On the 
morning of the 25th strikers, along with working class women and youngsters, used intimidation 
to try and stop work at the docks and in the centre of town. This led to violent clashes with the 
police, and as night fell martial law was declared in the province. There then followed the arrest of 
a large number of union militants. The general strike had had a considerable impact in Sant Marti, 
Sants and Hostafrancs. Nonetheless, work was back to normal on the following day. The failure 
of the general strike also led the tramworkers to return to work. They were all readmitted but their 
call for a closed shop was not accepted. 18 
From this date the companies began to move against the tramworkers' union. The 
agreements reached in 1900 were increasingly ignored and union militants victimised. In response 
the tramworkers carried out a number of defensive strikes during 1903. They were to end in 
failure. From the Autumn of 1903 the economic climate deteriorated rapidly. Union organisation 
throughout Barcelona was in consequence weakened. This gave the tram companies the 
opportunity to launch a direct assault on the tramworkers. Thus, after a strike in September 1903 
in one of the most important companies, La Compaffla General, the workers were forced to 
abandon their union. A similar fate befell the workers of La Anonirm in the following year. Ile 
management appointed a new director, Mariano de Foronda, in order to restore social control. 
Foronda's first move was to sack most of the tram drivers. A compulsory friendly society was 
then set up, and any worker caught trying to form an independent union was faced with instant 
dismissal. At the same time he began to cultivate a highly paternalist regime. For example, the 
workers were allowed to travel on the trams free of charge, and their children received 
free gifts at 
Christmas. 19 
As in the case of some textile companies, therefore, the management of 
La Anonima tried to 
maintain their workforce union free through the use of a 
friendly society. Such a policy was 
indeed common amongst the employers of unskilled 
labour. On the docks between 1899 and 1903 
the underlying cause of industrial strife was the coal unloaders, opposition 
to a compulsory 
employer sponsored friendly society. Work on the 
docks required great physical effort, but was 
largely unskilled. Consequently, the waterfront acted as a magnet 
for immigrant labour in search 
18. LP, 7 May 1901, NE. 
19. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1903, pp. 47-49.; 
Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas ... 1904, p. 
101. 
127 
of employment. The result was a chronic oversupply of hands. Thus, by 1910 about 1000 coal 
unloaders turned up for work each day, but only between 600 and 700 could find work. The 
dockers were employed on a daily basis, and hence though they earned over 7 pesetas a day when 
in work, many were only employed two or three days a week. 20 
During 1900 the coal unloaders undertook four strikes which aimed to force the coal 
merchants to recognise their own independent union. The coal merchants reacted by taking on 
blacklegs. Given the unskilled nature of work at the docks, there were no lack of volunteers. The 
employers were, as a result, able to maintain the docks open during the strikes. This led to 
frequent clashes between the blacklegs and strikers. The last strike of the year held in October was 
a particularly violent affair, and ended in government repression. In these circumstances the 
employers were able to sack 550 strikers, and retain the 750 workers taken on during the dispute. 
The coal merchants did agree that membership of the friendly society would no longer be 
compulsory, but still gave preference to those workers who affiliated. 21 
The dockers were, therefore, in no better a position at the end of the year than they had 
been at the beginning. Furthermore, it was clear that they would have to strengthen their 
organisation before again attempting to challenge the authority of the coal merchants. The 
opportunity was provided by the unionisation of Barcelona's carters in 1900. At the end of 1901 
the carters union presented its employers with the demand for an increase in wages, and the 
establishment of collective bargaining arrangements. In order to enforce this demand it called a 
general strike in the trade at the beginning of 1902. The result of this strike was confused. The 
two employers" associations formally accepted a compromise solution. Some employers, however, Q, 
refused to implement the compromise, and sacked a number of the strikers. The carters, theifore, 
also had good reason to want further to strengthen their union. The carters regularly worked on 
the waterfront, and maintained close contacts with dockers. This was the background to the 
decision taken in June 1903 to form a Local Transport Federation, which included both dockers 
and carters. At the outset it had nearly 4000 members. The coal unloaders now felt they could 
take on the coal merchants' friendly society. Thus they called a strike for 15 June. 
The carters and 
workers from other dockers unions came out in solidarity several days later. 
The strike was, 
however, to end in total disaster. The coal unloaders were forced to return to work 
defeated on 17 
July. As a result, 700 of the 1,200 strikers were sacked, and the coal unloader's union was 
completely destroyed. The authority of the coal merchants was not again to 
be challenged until 
1910.22 
20. ES, 25 November 1900; LP, 15 December 1910, ME. 
21. LP, 17 March, NE, 27 March, ME, 1 April, NE; 26 October, 
ME, 29 October, NE. 
22. LID, 3 January 1902, NE.; Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 
1903, pp. 28-29. 
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In Barcelona, then, class conflict became increasingly bitter in a number of branches of industry between 1899 and 1903. Yet, the greatest disputes of these years were to be fought out in 
the metallurgical industry. In metallurgy, as in construction, the working day was still 10 hours in 
1898, and like their colleagues in the construction industry the metalworkers gave top priority to 
reducing working hours. However, they were faced with the determined resistance of the 
metallurgical bourgeoisie. As was seen in Chapter Two, the Catalan industry was faced with 
heavy foreign competition in the home market. This led Catalan industrialists to argue that any 
reduction in working hours would increase costs so much that they would be totally unable to 
compete with foreign suppliers. They were, indeed, to show themselves willing to go to any 
length to ensure the 10 hour day were maintained. 
The first group of metalworkers to call for a reduction in working hours were the iron 
foundrymen. In 1899 they asked their employers for an 8 hour day to remedy the heavy 
unemployment in the trade, the result so they claimed of the employment of large numbers of 
children. They came out on strike in August of that year, and were in fact very successful. Thus, 
they achieved a9 hour day, limitation of apprenticeship to boys over 14 years of age, and the 
setting up of a commission to settle any future disputes. 23 However, social relations in the 
industry remained tense. At the beginning of 1900 foundrymen from outside Barcelona began to 
press for a9 hour day, and in Barcelona there were a number of disputes over the application of 
the 1899 agreement. 
In these circumstances the foundry owners decided to roH back the rising tide of trade 
unionism in the industry. They had already founded an Association of Catalan Foundry Owners, 
and in a meeting held in April the Association decided that no striker be employed in any other 
Catalan foundry, that all those employers affiliated would be obliged to carry out any work needed 
for those foundries subject to strike action, and that any worker who wished to change foundries 
would need a good conduct letter - the so-called Llibreta - before being admitted to a new 
establishment. 24 The foundry owners intended to make strike action far less effective, and through 
the 11ibretas to impose greater social control. It was, indeed, to secure the abolition of the Vibreta 
that those Barcelona foundrymen whose establishments belonged to the employers' association 
again came out on strike in June 1900. Once again they were victorious. Internal divisions soon 
began to appear within the employers association and, as a result, the Barcelona 
foundry owners 
23. AMS, Treball 11.4, Conflictes Laborals 1899-1900. 
24. LIP, 18 April 1900, ME. In order to understand the first accord account needs to 
be taken of the high 
geographical mobility of artisanal workers. During disputes it was common practice 
for he men to move on 
to work in another town until a solution had been reached. 
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were obliged to accept the outlawing of the Llibretas, and promised to respect the 1899 
agreement. 25 
The success of the iron foundrymen prompted other groups of metalworkers to follow suit. 
Trade union organisation amongst the mechanics had also grown rapidly during 1899. By May 
1900 the Barcelona mechanics union had about 1300 members. This prompted it to issue a 
demand for an eight hour day, the abolition of piece rates in the industry, and for the installation of 
a closed shop. The employers refused to consider its proposals so the worker downed tools on 29 
August. Yet despite the fact that the strike spread to Sabadell, Terrassa and Manresa it ended in 
defeat. 26 
It was as a result of this defeat that the Barcelona iron foundrymen and mechanics unions 
began negotiations aimed at creating a united front. These negotiations crystallised at the end of 
November in the formation of The Barcelona Metalworkers Federation. 27 However, it was not 
only the metalworkers who looked to strengthen their organisation. The employers had also 
founded an association known as the Society of Barcelona Mechanical and Metallurgical 
Industrialists. Already in the Summer of 1900 it had organised a friendly society. This society 
was open to all those workers whose owners were members of the employers federation, who did 
not support, "inopportune or unfounded strikes or demands". 28 This move was indicative of the 
policy the employers would in the future pursue. At the same time it also resolved to resist any 
attempt by the workers to reduce working hours. When, therefore, the Metalworkers' Federation 
called for a9 hour day shortly after its formation the response of the employers' association was 
predictable. 
There was no possibility of reaching a compromise. The Metalworkers' Federation, 
therefore, called a general strike for 16 November 1901. The workers' response was mostly 
favourable. Nevertheless, workers from the larger Barceloneta factories, and especially La 
Maquinista, were reluctant to come out. This was, indeed, a problem which had plagued 
metalworkers trade unionism since the 1870s. The large Barcelona concerns had since that date 
adopted an anti-trade unionist policy. The implementation of this policy was made easier 
by the 
fact that they had the resources at their disposal to root out union militants. As in the case of La 
Espafia Industrial, they also tried to operate paternalist regimes. La Maquinista, for example, 
had 
its own friendly society, the so-called Agrupacion Hwnanitaria 
de los Obreros de los Talleres de la 
251a Protesta, 25 May; LP, 6 June, ME, 2 July, ME. 
26. LP, 29 August, ME, 25 September, ME. 
27. LP, 6 November 1901, ME. 
28. LP, 14 August 1900, ME. 
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Maquinista Terrestre y Marltima. The resentment of the metalworkers was, therefore, most clearly 
directed at the management of "that feudal fortress". 29 It was most clearly expressed in September 
1910 during another general metalworkers' strike, which had been called for exactly the same 
reasons. On this occasion the Barcelona union commented bitterly: 30 
( ... ) where our strength, our enthusiasm, our energy, have to make themselves felt is in that monster, La Maquinista, which is the cause of all our misfortunes and a hindrance to 
our aspirations. Since the 1870s this enterprise has opposed all our demands. Already in 
those times it took longer than the other factories to reduce our working hours, and 
since then during all the struggles we have maintained it has put up the same tenacious 
resistance. 
In May 1901 a large number of workers in La Maquinista had seconded the mechanics 
strike. The factory had responded by sacking those workers "who had been involved in coercions 
and the ringleaders of the disturbance". When the general strike was declared at the end of the year 
it then issued a warning stating that it would sack any worker who struck, and that if it was forced 
to close it would not reopen again for six months. This was enough to ensure that only a minority 
of the workforce downed tools at any one time. 31 
A large number of workers from the smallest workshops also continued working. In this 
case, however, the reason was that their employers had agreed to accept the 9 hour day. The 
existence of close social relations between masters and men in these very small Barcelona 
workshops is a well documented phenomenon. The best data on their number and size refers to 
the 1910 general strike. On this occasion the strike affected 180 of Barcelona's 326 metallurgical 
establishments. Nevertheless, at it high point 9000 of Barcelona's 11,600 metalworker 
had 
seconded the strike, and some of those who had not were from the large Barceloneta plants. 
This 
data suggests that in the small workshops which continued production the ratio of employers to 
workers was lower than 1: 15.32 
As was noted in Chapter Two many were found in the 
Old Quarter of Barcelona, and they 
represented what was left of the highly skilled artisanal tradition of 
Catalan manufacture. In 1910, 
the employers' Society maintained that they could afford to grant an 
9 hour day because they were 
only involved in repair work, and consequently they 
did not have to face foreign competition. The 
masters in these workshops refused to form part of the employers 
association, and many of the 
workers did not wish to unionise. They therefore 
lived in a world apart from the social conflicts 
29. "Sociedades Obreras", op cit p. 520.; LP, 15 January 
1902, NE. 
30. ED, 25 September 1910, EE. 
31. Alberto del Castillo, op cit, pp. 292-293; LP, 
15 January 1902, NE. 
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which affected much of Catalan industry. This was brought out in 1910 by the fact that many of 
the workers whose employers had accepted a9 hour day refused to subsidise those sfill out on 
strike. The existence of close contacts between masters and men in marginal workshops was not. 
in fact, limited to metallurgy. In both construction and the woodworking trades employers also 
tended to give way to the men's demands far more quickly in the smallest workshops. 33 
In the metallurgical industry strikes tended to last longest in those medium sized enterprises 
(medium sized for Barcelona that is) with between about 30 and 60 workers. The owners of these 
plants proved every bit as intransigent as those who ran the large Barceloneta factories. However, 
they found it more difficult to combat trade unionism. The Catalan employers, as was noted in 
chapter two, had not in general been able to modernise their plants, and replace the artisans with 
semiskilled workers. Instead they had tried to keep costs down by keeping working hours long, 
reducing wages, and undermining apprenticeship restrictions. This was a perfect recipe for severe 
industrial conflict. As the 1901 general strike proved, outside the Barceloneta plants the 
journeymen metalworkers were still able to organise effectively. Their unions were not, however, 
by themselves strong enough to defeat the employers' federation. 
The resulting impasse led the 1901 strike to become increasingly bitter. Thus, the president 
of the iron foundrymen's union was enthusiastically applauded in a meeting at the beginning of 
November when he asked: 34 
Where do all those immense ill gained fortunes come from? They have been robbed from 
the proletariat who by the sweat on his brow produced them. The employers are not 
ignorant of the misery which faces the workers, but as they are moved only by greed and 
selfishness. What do they care if the workers die of hunger, what do they care if the 
workers drop exhausted in the streets, what do they care if when the workers little ones ask 
them for bread they can't give it to them? 
As the strike dragged on the level of violence also escalated. There were constant clashes 
between pickets, blacklegs and the police, and as in the case of the docks strike the use of firearms 
was common. The two most serious incidents occurred in February of the following year. In the 
first incident a number of strikers burst into a factory in Gracia to stop production and stabbed the 
owner. Mounted civil guards then charged the strikers and four arrests were made. 
Six policemen 
tried to take the captured men to prison. However, they were soon surrounded 
by an angry 
crowd. The men escaped and four of the policemen were 
finally forced to take refuge in a house, 
where shots were fired at them. These events illustrate the widespread support 
for the 
metalworkers' strike within the working class. Thus, the republican 
daily El Diluvio commented: 
33. For the cases of the carpenters, power-sawyers and printers see, 
AESC, 1913, pp. 106-107,112- 
115; SO, 13 March 1913. 
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which affected much of Catalan industry. This was brought out in 1910 by the fact that many of 
the workers whose employers had accepted a9 hour day refused to subsidise those still out on 
strike. The existence of close contacts between masters and men in marginal workshops was not, 
in fact, limited to metallurgy. In both construction and the woodworking trades employers also 
tended to give way to the men's demands far more quickly in the smallest workshops. 33 
In the metallurgical industry strikes tended to last longest in those medium sized enterprises 
(medium sized for Barcelona that is) with between about 30 and 60 workers. The owners of these 
plants proved every bit as intransigent as those who ran the large Barceloneta factories. However, 
they found it more difficult to combat trade unionism. The Catalan employers, as was noted in 
chapter two, had not in general been able to modernise their plants, and replace the artisans with 
semiskilled workers. Instead they had tried to keep costs down by keeping working hours long, 
reducing wages, and undermining apprenticeship restrictions. This was a perfect recipe for severe 
industrial conflict. As the 1901 general strike proved, outside the Barceloneta plants the 
journeymen metalworkers were still able to organise effectively. Their unions were not, however, 
by themselves strong enough to defeat the employers' federation. 
The resulting impasse led the 1901 strike to become increasingly bitter. Thus, the president 
of the iron foundrymen's union was enthusiastically applauded in a meeting at the beginning of 
November when he asked: 34 
Where do all those immense ill gained fortunes come from? They have been robbed from 
the proletariat who by the sweat on his brow produced them. The employers are not 
ignorant of the misery which faces the workers, but as they are moved only by greed and 
selfishness. What do they care if the workers die of hunger, what do they care if the 
workers drop exhausted in the streets, what do they care if when the workers little ones ask 
them for bread they can't give it to them? 
As the strike dragged on the level of violence also escalated. There were constant clashes 
between pickets, blacklegs and the police, and as in the case of the docks strike the use of 
firearms 
was common. The two most serious incidents occurred in February of the 
following year. In the 
first incident a number of strikers burst into a factory in Gracia to stop production and stabbed the 
owner. Mounted civil guards then charged the strikers and 
four arrests were made. Six policemen 
tried to take the captured men to prison. However, they were soon surrounded 
by an angry 
crowd. The men escaped and four of the policemen were 
finally forced to take refuge in a house, 
where shots were fired at them. These events 
illustrate the widespread support for the 
metalworkers' strike within the working class. 
Thus, the republican daily El Diluvio commented: 
33. For the cases of the carpenters, power-sawyers and 
printers see, AESC, 1913, pp. 106-107,112- 
115; SO, 13 March 1913. 
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"News of these events spread rapidly throughout Barcelona. They were much commented on by 
all the various factions, and everybody agreed that they were very serious, and showed the 
restlessness which exists in important sections of the working class. -35 The second incident 
occurred after workers from an employer sponsored association, La Fraternal Obrera, had held a 
meeting in a local Catalanist club known as "Catalunya i Avant". Many of the men worked in La 
Maquinista. As a result, when they came out of the meeting they were attacked by a large group of 
striking metallurgists armed with guns and clubs. 36 
As these clashes demonstrate, by this time the swiking metallurgists were growing 
desperate. Elements within the workers' Metallurgical Federation had tried to reach a compromise 
solution. However, not only had the employers' association refused to negotiate, it had also 
encouraged the authorities to suppress the strike. 37 Consequently, the more moderate voices were 
finally silenced, and a growing number of workers came to the conclusion that the strike could 
only be won if the entire Barcelona working class launched a general strike in solidarity. Some 
anarchist labour militants indeed seemed to be pressing of a "revolutionary general strike" which 
would result in the overthrow of capitalism. 
Such indeed was the level of working class support for the metalworkers that on the 
morning of 17 February 1902 flying pickets had little difficulty in bringing the Catalan capital to a 
standstill. Furthermore, the solidarity strike quickly spread to all the surrounding industrial towns. 
It was to last for a week. The authorities were at first slow to respond. However, in the evening 
they declared martial law, and troops were then dispatched to all points of strategic importance, to 
the main squares and some side streets. There was no generalised uprising. Nevertheless, a 
number of barricades were constructed, and there were clashes between small groups of workers 
on the one side, and the Civil Guard and army on the other. The most reliable figures 
for 
casualties were probably those elaborated by the FTN, which gave the 
figure of 12 dead and 44 
injured. 38 
The general strike was to end in failure, and in consequence the metalworkers were 
left no 
choice but to return to work defeated shortly afterwards. The entire 
labour movement, in fact, paid 
a heavy price. As soon as the strike began the authorities 
began to close down union headquarters, 
and in all several hundred workers were arrested. This should not, 
however, detract from the 
35. ED, 16 February 1902, ME.; 
36. LP, 17 February, ME. 
37. LP, 18 January, NE. 
38. Ignaci6 ClariA, I'Mi Asasinato", in La Huelga 
General, 20 February 1903; Joaquin Romero Maura, op cit, 
pp. 211-218. 
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major significance of the strike. As Joan Connelly Ullman has pointed out, for the first time in a 
major European city the working class had been able completely to halt production. 39 This fact 
sent a wave of fear through bourgeois public opinion, and helped confirm the presence of labour as 
an active force in Catalan politics and society. 
The events of the years 1901-1902 also illustrate the way in which, in a context of acute 
industrial conflict, artisanal workers looked for the support of other sectors of the working class. 
This was by no means a natural phenomenon. In Britain between the 1850s and 1870s, for 
example, craft workers and some factory operatives had built up solid labour federations which 
tended to isolate themselves from the unskilled. Professor H. A. Turner, indeed, had 
demonstrated how in England the elitist mule spinner unions actually obstructed the organisation of 
the industry's unskilled workforce. These workers had little need for outside help. They were in a 
secure position on the shop floor, and had developed collective bargaining procedures to negotiate 
conflicts with their employers. Moreover, even though industrial relations deteriorated in some 
sections of British industry from the 1880s there was considerable resistence on the part of skilled 
men to the broadening of their unions to embrace the growing class of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workerS40 
In Catalonia, however, state repression precluded the formation of any such federations. 
During the nineteenth century unions had been able to function openly only during brief periods, 
and between 1893 and 1897 there had been blanket repression. The situation improved after 1899, 
but unions were never totally free from state harassment. One aspect of this problem was that at a 
local level control of the police remained in the same hands, and Barcelona's police officers always 
found it difficult to distinguish between criminals and labour leaders. In addition, government 
policy towards labour was never clearly defined. In 1899 unions were able to operate virtually 
without interference. This was, however, to change in the Spring of 1900. In March of that year 
martial law was declared in Barcelona province after Catalanist supporters had booed the Minister 
of the Interior during a visit to the city. During the following months the number of strikes grew 
rapidly. In response the Government used the martial law decree to back up an increasingly anti- 
union policy. Union meetings were frequently suspended, a number of arrests were made, and in 
August the press was even prohibited from reporting strikes. The Government's attack on labour 
39. Joan Connelly Ullman, op cit, p. 132. 
40. Gordon Phillips, "The British Labour Movement before 1914", in Dick Geary (ed. ), Labour and 
Socialist Movements in Europe before 1914 (Exeter, 1989), pp. 38-41.; H. A. Turner, op cit, pp. 144-149. 
See also, Chapter Two, pp. 73-74. The strong and successful resistence of many turners and fitters 
within the Amalgamated Society of Engineers to attempts by a "Forward Faction" within the union to 
broaden membership is dealt with by Keith Burges in "New Unionism for Old? The Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers in Britain", in W. J. Mommsen and Hans Gerhard Husung (eds. ), The Development of Trade 
Unionism in Great Britain and Germany, 1880-1914 (London, 1985), pp. 169-181. 
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was finally to culminate its overt support for the textile lock-outs at the end of the year. 41 
Government repression eased again when the Liberals came to power in 1901. However, the 
continuous shift back and forth from toleration to repression was a characteristic of the first decade 
and a half of the century. 
Moreover, as has been seen, many unions faced determined employer resistence. As was 
noted in Chapter Two the economic difficulties experienced by much of Catalan industry, 
especially from the mid- 1 880s, made industrialists reluctant to negotiate with their workers. The 
combination of these factors explain why few Barcelona unions had developed any kind of solid 
bureaucratic structure. Most, as has been seen, were founded between 1899 and 1900. Despite 
the rapid growth of union membership during these years, therefore, they remained still very much 
in an embryonic state, and the loss of a strike or government closure of their headquarters could 
easily lead to their disappearance. In such circumstances, in those sectors of Barcelona industry in 
which industrial conflict was most severe, and in which skilled workers were under serious 
pressure from the development of capitalism, union leaders sought to overcome the parochialism of 
some of their members and link up with workers in other branches of their industry. It was such a 
need which quickly led the metalworkers to form an industry wide federation in 1901. The need 
for support from other sectors of the working class also led anarchist labour leaders to try and 
break down the cultural barriers between skilled and unskilled and form unified bodies. The best 
example during these years was the federation of Barcelona bricklayers and bricklayers labourers 
formed in 1903. For similar reasons, later in the decade a number of skilled workers unions which 
had in the past excluded women from their union decided for the first time to admit them. As in the 
case of cotton textiles, the male workers were threatened with substitution by the women, and 
reasoned that if they could organise them and bring their wages up to the level of the men the threat 
could be averted. 42 Finally, in their desire to strengthen the entire Barcelona labour movement 
skilled workers also helped the unskilled of other professions to organise. The example of the 
Barcelona power-loom weavers has already been discussed in this respect, but other groups of 
worker such as the dockers and tramworkers never lacked support. 
The Barcelona metalworkers were the clearest example of a group of workers who could 
not by themselves defeat their employers. They had been very quick to come out on strike in 
November 1901. This was also very typical of the Barcelona unions. During the 1890s the 
metalworkers had not been able to voice their demands. The rapid growth of the union during 
1901 generated immense enthusiasm, and the workers felt they should present their demands 
41. ES, 30 November 1900; Chapter Three, pp. 89-91. 
42. Women were allowed to form part of the tailors union for the first time in June 1908. The bookbinders 
also encouraged women to form part of their union from this time. Nevertheless, the need to prevent more 
women from being employed remained a top priority in both trades. 
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quickly before it waned. By the new year, however, it had become clear that the metalworkers 
only chance of victory was to turn their strike into a general movement of protest. They were able 
to do this because workers from other trades came to feel that the defeat of the metalworkers, 
coming on top of the destruction of the ME the previous year, would represent a heavy blow to 
the whole Catalan labour movement. The anarchist weekly, La Huelga General, therefore 
probably gave a fair reflection of working class opinion when it stated: "It is necessary that the 
Catalan workers support a common act (in favour of the metalworkers), because disasters are very 
common, and we still haven't got even with the Ter Valley assassins.,, 43 As Ramon Homades, 
president of the metalworkers' federation, stated in a meeting called on 15 February to canvass 
support for the general strike: "Let no one think that we are defending the metalworkers here, 
because we are defending all the workers. "44 
Those workers who predicted that the defeat of the metalworkers strike would lead to the 
collapse of union organisation in that industry were not mistaken. On returning to work all the 
leading figures in the strike were sacked. Moreover, the Society of Mechanical and Metallurgical 
Industrialists took a number of urgent measures aimed at breaking the back of the metal unions. In 
the case of a strike, it was agreed, the employer would immediately give the committee the names 
and addresses of all those workers involved. During the strike the committee would then subsidise 
the industrialists affected so long as the number of strikers did not exceed 20 per cent of the 
industry's workforce. Finally, no industrialist affiliated to the Society would employ workers 
involved in the dispute until the strike was over. 45 
This anti-union policy became easier to operate from the Autumn of 1903 when, as a result 
of a poor Spanish harvest, a deep industrial recession hit Catalan industry. The economic 
conjuncture was to remain depressed until 1909. The level of unemployment, therefore, rose 
rapidly. Thus at the beginning of 1906 it was estimated that 35,000 of the city's 150,000 strong 
labour force was out of work. 46 Already by the Spring of 1904 there were between 3 and 4000 
textile workers unemployed. These workers asked for a public subscription to be opened on their 
behalf, and staged a number of "hunger marches" down the Ramblas, "perhaps without enough 
heart to carry out a more vigorous protest campaign than to parade their rags and squalid frames 
amongst the luxury of the street". The poor agricultural harvests of the years 1904-06 also led to the 
43. La Huelga General, 15 February 1902. 
44. ED, 17 February 1902, ME. 
45. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1905, pp. 16-17. 
46. Boletin, February 1906. 
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flight of peasants from the land, and this led observers to talk of, "the city being overwhelmed by 
an invasion of delinquents". 47 
The combination of employer harassment and industrial recession led to a drastic decline in 
affiliates to the metalworkers' unions, with the result that the Barcelona Metalworkers Federation 
collapsed in 1905. It was not, however, only the metalworkers that were affected. Almost all the 
unions lost members. In Barcelona industrial workers -except for the carters - found it almost 
impossible to unionise. It was therefore left up to skilled workers to maintain a skeletal union 
presence in the city. 
This situation was only to change with the revival of the Catalan economy in 1910. As in 
the years 1899-1903 the economic upturn sparked off a rapid growth in trade union activity. Trade 
unionism was between 19 10 and 1914 to touch sectors of the working class which had in the past 
played only a minor role in the labour movement. Thus, the cotton textile and railway workers 
organised in numbers and successfully launched general strikes. 48 In other industries, however, 
the pattern of industrial conflict remained similar. Artisanal workers continued to oppose employer 
encroachments on their position at the workplace, leading to general strikes amongst power- 
sawyers, cabinetmakers, dyers and compositors. Metalworking, the waterfront and construction 
were also focal points of conflict during much of this period, and in each of these cases the 
escalation of social tensions again provoked the extension of union and employer organisation 
beyond the individual trades. 
The cabinetmakers launched general strikes in 1911 and 1913 aimed at securing an 8 hour 
day, the "regulation" of apprenticeship and a wage increase. On both occasions they were 
defeated. In this latter year the power-sawyers came out for similar motives, and also met with the 
defeat. In 1912 the dyers, met with failure after a particularly dramatic strike. There were about 
2,400 dyers in Barcelona. As has been seen, dying was, like all the textile finishing trades, a 
skilled, male dominated, profession. Yet, the dyers were faced with the growing use of child 
labour. In 1870 an agreement had been signed limiting the number of apprentices to 10 per cent 
the total number of workers in the trade. This agreement had, however, long since been ignored 
by the employers. In 1912, therefore, the dyers union called for a return to the 10 per cent rule and 
for a 24 pesetas a week minimum wage for journeymen. In order to enforce their demand the 
dyers downed tools on 6 March. 'neir union spokesmen maintained that, "it is not a fight to 
increase wages or reduce working hours, it is a moral fikht by men who want to work instead of 
47. La flustraci6n Obrera, 14,16 Apdl 1904,14 May 1904. 
48. The railway workers were involved in an important strike in 1912. This group of workers did not, 
however, appear in the 1905 workers census, and none of the various sources used include wage data 
for railway workers. We have, therefore, decided not to include this group of workers in our study of strikes 
in Barcelona 
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their children". At its high point about 1,700 dyers joined the strike. In mid April, however, they 
were forced to call it off, in part because they had received no support from the highly qualified 
silk dyers. 49 
The following year saw a strike of key importance for the future of Barcelona's 
compositors. As was noted in chapter two, by this time the journeyman competitors faced a 
number of pressing problems. The Barcelona compositors union, LArte dImprimir, had been 
suspended after being involved in an attempted general strike in September 1911. In order to get 
round this suspension the compositors formed a new union, which they called La UniO Obrera de 
lArte dImprimir, in March 1912. By May 1913 the union had as many as 1,300 affiliates. This 
was without doubt the greatest number of members any compositors union in the city had ever 
had. The Unio Obrera was, therefore, in a strong position to improve its members' working 
conditions. Between June 1912 and May 1913 it elaborated a series of demands. These included 
an 8 hour day, aimed at reducing unemployment, and measures designed to "regulate" 
apprenticeship. The threat of typesetting machinery was also to be countered by limiting the new 
machines' production, and ensuring that only qualified compositors could be employed on them. 
Thus when a linotype or monotype was introduced into a new shop only skilled operatives already 
employed there could be trained on it, they would earn high wages, work 7 hours a day, and the 
machines would not be able to type more than a certain number of lines per day. To counter the 
rising cost of foodstuffs, the union called for a minimum 30 peseta a day wage, and finally it asked 
for piece rates to be abolished. 
These demands were presented to the employers' federation, the AssociaciO Patronal de 
Impresors de Barcelona, on 27 March 1913. The major newspapers did accept the union's 
demands. This was an important victory for the workers, as it was the newspaper publishers who 
were introducing mechanised typesetting most rapidly. However, few print shops followed suit. 
The employers' federation replied that it could enter negotiations on all the demands except of the 8 
hour day, because a reduction in working hours would result in their not be able to compete with 
producers from abroad and from other Spanish city's. More moderate union leaders argued that a 
compromise solution could be reached, and that the demand for an 8 hour day should be dropped. 
They were, nevertheless, outvoted, and the strike began on 27 March 1913.50 
Moderates formed a majority in the unions' strike committee, and they were able to 
negotiate a series of concessions on the question of wages, apprenticeship restrictions, piece rates, 
and the use of typesetting machinery. Their efforts, however, were in vain, for the majority of the 
49. LP, 12 April 1912.; AESC 1912, pp. 122-125. 
50. Boletin de la Uni6n Obrera del Arte de Imprimir, 30 June, 31 March, 30 June-30 September 1913; LID, 
28 April 1913; AESC 1913, pp. 103-104. 
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union's rank and file refused to drop any of the original demands. As it was they got very little. 
From the outset the strike had been enthusiastically supported by between 700 and 800 
compositors, but a large number of print shops were able to keep working. In addition the 
compositors received little Support from workers in the industry's other trades. The compositors 
had in fact tried on more than one occasion to organise a federation of all the industry's workers, 
but had met with little success. The main problem appears to have been the limited enthusiasm of 
the lithographers and photoengravers. These workers, unlike the compositors, were under no 
threat from the employers, and therefore felt they had little need for inter-trade co-operation. In 
these adverse conditions the strike started to break up after about three weeks, and the compositors 
finally decided to return to work empty handed on 18 June. Some compositors as a result lost their 
jobs. On the other hand, a large number of print houses did act to calm tensions by increasing 
wages to 5 pesetas a day and abolishing piece rates. 51 
The path taken by the compositors union during 1913 gives an important insight into the 
dynamics of social conflict in Barcelona. The union's moderates were later to claim that on seeing 
that the union had gown rapidly over the previous year its affiliates, "thought that they should take 
advantage of the opportunity to launch the struggle in order to prevent the union from breaking up, 
when what would have been more logical, what would have been in the interests of everyone, 
would have been clear proof that it was not a selfish or momentary enthusiasm that had drawn the 
membership". 52 As we have seen, this pattern of labour organisation, by which the rapid growth 
in affiliation to a previous weak or non-existent union was quickly followed by a general strike in 
the trade or industry, was very common. Its root causes were poor industrial relations, and the 
instability of the trades unions concerned. Once the strike had started, the moderates maintained, 
in the union meetings it was those workers who were in favour of all or nothing that were the most 
vociferous and who won the day. The majority of workers, the moderates continued, wanted a 
compromise solution, but only said so outside the meetings. 53 These comments are clearly biased, 
but they do convey something of the flavour of trade unionism in the city. Decisions regarding 
industrial action were usually taken on a show of hands after mass meetings. In the highly charged 
atmosphere of these meetings it was easy for militants to win the day, and the lack of any union 
bureaucracy meant that there were no full time officials to hold the rank and file in check. 
In metallurgy strikes followed a similar pattern to those of the years 1899-1902. From 
1910, nevertheless, the metal unions were to be somewhat more successful. Economic growth in 
the metallurgical industry was particularly rapid, and union organisers were able to take advantage 
51. LP, 7 May 1913; SO, 18 September 1913; Boletin, June-September 1913; AESC, 1913, op cit. 
52. Boletfn, June-September 1913 
53. Ibid. 
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of the new conjuncture to break the stranglehold of the Society of Mechanical and Metallurgical 
Industrialists over the industry's workforce. A so-called Metallurgical Union had been founded in 
1905, but in 1909 it had only 300 members. 54 In 19 10, however, it launched a recruitment drive, 
and by August its membership had risen to 2,200. As has been noted the metalworkers quickly 
became involved in a dispute, which in many respects appeared to be a rerun of the 1901-1902 
strike. As soon as it became clear the Metallurgical Union was growing in strength a number of 
employers took measures to halt the recruitment of workers in their factories. The union saw these 
measures as a provocation on the part of the employers' federation. In response it adopted an 
increasingly radical discourse, and threatened to call a general strike in the industry. The final 
straw was the sacking of three shop stewards by the country's largest car manufacturer, La 
Hispano Suiza, on 3 September. The union reacted on 10 September by presenting its employers 
with a series of demands, which included a9 hour day, union recognition, and that all disputes in 
progress should be resolved on terms favourable to the workers concerned. The Society's refusal 
to consider these demands led the union to declare a general strike in the industry two days later. 55 
As in 1901 the strikers had great difficulty in convincing the workers of the larger 
Barceloneta plants that they should down tools. Thus, it was only after 1,500 strikers had 
marched down to the Barceloneta on 13 September that they seconded the strike. Alberto del 
Castillo comments: "The news that even the workers of La Maquinista had joined the strike caused 
real concern. -56 However, this support was not to last. The Barceloneta was swamped with 
police in the following week, with the result that a high proportion of the district's strikers went 
back to work. La Maquinista, therefore, soon returned full production. 
As in 1901 the employers federation remained totally intransigent. Again it concentrated on 
encouraging the authorities to take action against the union. In order to justify such action, indeed, 
it came up with the remarkable theory that: "Up until now, except in the odd uncertain case, there 
has been no difference of opinion between the workers and bosses ( ... ) What we have 
is a forcible 
stoppage, provoked by a commission with no relation to the workshops and factories, a kind of 
clandestine power which uses coercion to impose itself. " And concluded: "It is not so much a 
labour conflict as a problem of public order. -57 The metalworkers, therefore, once again faced an 
uphill struggle. From October there was a slow drift back to work and by the end of November 
the 5 to 6000 workers still on strike were in a desperate situation. As a result violence again flared, 
54. La Intemacional, 5 Febriary 1909. 
55. SO, 29 July, 19 August; LP, 11 August, NE, 14 September, NE; ED, 1 August, EE, 2 September, 
ME. 
56. Alberto del Castillo, op cit, p. 332; ED, 19 September, EE. 
57. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1910-1914, p. 41. 
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with the most violent attacks reserved for the management of La Maquinista. Thus in one incident 
an overseer at the plant was assassinated, and in another the director was wounded in a knife 
attack. 58 
There were, as in 1902, calls for the strike to be extended to the rest of the working class. 
On this occasion, however, they were resisted, perhaps because the consequences of the 1902 
general strike was still vivid in peoples minds. The final blow was the Government's decision to 
prosecute the union's central committee and strike committees, supposedly because of 
inflammatory remarks made in a meeting in September. In such circumstances the union was left 
with no alternative but to call off the strike on 12 December. There then followed the by then 
routine sacking on the ring leaders, with over 1000 workers loosing their jobs. 59 
As in 1902, then, the workers had been totally defeated. In the following years, however, 
the employers' federation was not able to reassert control over the labour force. The main reason 
was that, unlike the years 1904-1909, between 1911 and 1914 the industry remained buoyant. 60 
With labour in short supply the metalworkers unions were able to recover relatively quickly from 
the 1910 defeat. Thus a new metalworkers federation functioned by the beginning of 1913, and 
during the year workers in a number of metal trades once again struck for a9 hour day. The 
largest strike of the year, that of the iron foundrymen, ended in defeat. However, despite the fact 
that the employers society boycotted any industrialists who conceded a reduction in working 
hours, the tinsmiths, locksmiths and bronze foundry workers all consolidated a9 hour day. These 
trades only accounted for a small percentage of the industry's workforce. But, for the first time, 
the employers united front began to crumble. 61 
At the same time industrial strife spread outside Barcelona. The need for mutual support 
led to a strengthening of ties between the metalworkers unions of Barcelona, Manresa, Sabadell 
and Terrassa. 62 The employers also looked to extend their organisation. Since 1912 the Barcelona 
employers' federation and the metallurgical section of the FIN had been planning to hold a national 
congress of iron and steel industrialists. The congress was held on 13 April 1913. Most of it was 
taken up with discussions on tariff policy and the economic problems which faced the industry. 
58. Miguel Sastre, op cit, pp. 47-48.; ED, 10 November, ME. 
59. LP, 9 November, ME; SO, 25 November; ED, 12 December, EE, 14 December, ME. 
60. Thus the Barcelona metalworkers could state at the beginning of 1914: uln the recent past, particularly 
in Catalonia, the metal industries have grown at a rapid pace. So much is this the case that in some of them 
more workers could be taken on than are at present employed. This has not been the case for a large 
number of years. " SO, 14 February 1914. 
61. LP, 16 February, 5 March, 17 March, 21 July 1914; AESB, pp. 46-47. 
62. SO, 13 November 1913. 
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Nevertheless, the congress's organisers specifically referred to the need for unity in order to 
combat union demands, and according to La Publicidad one of the congress's resolutions stressed 
the need to support and foment the creation of christian. trades unions, which were "the only 
guarantee of social order". 63 
The congress delegates took the decision to form a National Association of Metallurgists. In 
response to this decision the Catalan metalworkers then decided to form their own regional 
federation. The initiative was taken by the Sabadell metalworkers union, and its reasoning was 
quite clear: 64 
The Spanish metallurgical bourgeoisie, which is already regionally organised in Catalonia, 
has recently held a congress in Barcelona and formed a national federation. All the 
struggles undertaken by our colleagues in the various towns are flattened by the 
bourgeoisie's strong organisation. It uses the argument that this or that demand has not 
been accepted in Barcelona, and then when there is a strike in the capital employers from 
other towns come to the aid of those from Barcelona. 'ne workers should, therefore, forni 
a regional federation for now, and form a national organisation as soon as possible. 
The federation was formed at the beginning of 1914, and by April it had 1,500 members. These 
Catalan unions were also the main supporters of a new national metalworkers federation formed in 
Alicante in july. 65 
Between 19 10 and 1914 in metallurgy, then, the industrialists grip over the labour force 
was broken. During these years the dockers and transport workers were also to call into question 
their employers right to outlaw independent unions. The tramworkers had little success. In 1910 
Barcelona's two largest tram companies, La Anonima and La Compafila General, merged. 
Mariano de Foronda then took over management of the new company, and continued to operate his 
anti-union policy with success. The tram workers were briefly to form a new union in 1914. 
However, the decision was precipitably taken to call a general strike in the trade, resulting in the 
union's collapse. 66 
The dockers were to reorganise far more quickly. Thus in 1910 they were once again to 
challenge the coal merchants right to force all their workers to belong to their friendly society. The 
63. Primer Congreso Nacional de Industrias Metahirgicas, ExposicOn del Cuestionatio (Barcelona, 1913), 
pp. 27-28.; LP, 13 April 1913. This conclusion was not, however, reproduced in the industrialists own 
exposition of the agreements reached. See, Primer Congreso Nacional de industrias Metalarias 
Celebrado el 13 de Abril de 1913 (Barcelona, 1913). 
64. SO, 13 November 1913. 
65. Federaci6n Regional Catalana de Obreros Metal6rgicos, Memoria del Congreso Metalfirgico 
Celebrado en el Palacio de Bellas Artes los Dfas 12 y 13 de Abril de 1913 (Barcelona, 1914). SO, 4 July, 
11 July 1914. 
66. AESC 1914, pp. 297-306, SO, 19 March, 26 March 1914. 
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carters had already been involved in a general strike in March. Two months later, for the first time 
since 1903, the coal unloaders were able to form an independent union, which by the end of July 
had 1,305 affiliates. The coal unloaders were still faced with the problem of a chronic oversupply 
of labour on the docks. Indeed, the problem had worsened during the first decade of the century. 
As has been seen, the Barcelona docks were modernised during this time. Larger wharfs now 
allowed ships to dock sideways, and greater use was made of unloading equipment. 
Consequently, demand for labour was reduced. It was in order to counter this problem that the 
new union called for an eight hour day and for unloading equipment only to be used when at least 
six ships were at anchor. The employers refusal to consider such demands quickly resulted in 
strike action. On this occasion, however, a compromise solution was reached. The coal 
merchants agreed to recognise the dockers'union, and to negotiate a new contract with the 
workers. 67 
No agreement was, however, reached over the question of unloading equipment. Over the 
next few months, therefore, both sides manoeuvred in order to be in the best position if a new 
conflict did erupt. In September the dockers and carters formed another federation of waterfront 
unions, which by December had about 7000 members. As in 1903, therefore, the coal unloaders 
felt they were strong enough to take matters into their owns hands, and as in that year they were to 
be mistaken. On 9 December the union gave the order that ships which were not moored 
"correctly", and ships unloaded with, the use of equipment, should be boycotted. There then 
followed a rapid escalation of hostilities, which soon culminated in another coal unloaders strike. 
Despite a solidarity strike by the carters and other dockers unions the coal unloaders was once 
more defeated. The achilles heal of union organisation at the docks again proved to be the ease 
with which the employers could recruit blackleg labour. Thus, when the strike was finally called 
off on 19 January most of the strikers were unable to find work. Union organisation at the docks 
was, therefore, shattered. Moreover, the carter also found when they wished to return to work that 
many of their places had been taken by blacklegs. As a result they stayed out on strike another 
month, but were finally also forced to admit defeat. Their union was almost totally destroyed, and 
the carter employers' federations then followed the lead of the coal merchants and founded their 
own friendly society. 68 
The coal unloaders and carters' strikes of the years 1910-1911 had again made plain the 
great difficulties faced by the unskilled when they tried to unionise, and this despite the fact that 
they had formed a dockers and transport workers federation. In construction, workers also 
67. ED, 21 July, EE. 
68. ED, 14 December 1910, EE, 31 December, ME; LP, 6 January, 1911, ME, 13 January, ME; 18 
January, ME, 27 January, NE, 14 February, ME, 20 May, NE; SO, 16 December 1910,11 September 
1911. 
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respond to a build up of social tension by extending their organisation. The skilled construction 
workers, however, pressed their demands with considerably more effect. Already in 19 10 the 
Barcelona painters had formed a local federation. 'ne Catalan bricklayers also set up a new 
regional federation in this year. In 1913 this federation split, and the more dynamic Confederation 
of Catalan Bricklayers and Bricklayers Labourers was founded. As the title suggests it aimed to 
break down the barriers between the various trades in the industry, and its long term aim was to 
organise a Spanish construction workers federation. 69 
It was, however, a general painters strike at the end of 1913 which provided the greatest 
impetus to unity amongst the Barcelona construction workers. In the Spring of 1913 the Barcelona 
painters federation presented the Unto i Montepio de Mestres Pintors de Barcelona with a demand 
for the "regulation"' of apprenticeship, the abolition of piece rates, a minimum wage and a closed 
shop. No agreement was finally reached, the main sticking point being the unions'refusal to drop 
the demand for a closed shop. Consequently, over 1000 painters downed tools at the beginning of 
November. Despite the fact that the unions' demands were accepted in a large number of small 
workshops, about 650 workers had to return to work defeated in the following month. 
The strike was, however, of far greater importance than these statistics would suggest, for 
the master painters had sought and obtained the support of the employers organisations in the rest 
of the industry. Accordingly, many construction workers came to the conclusion that they would 
have to establish closer links in order to defeat their bosses. The painters, therefore, received 
strong support during the strike, and a general strike of the whole industry was, in fact, only 
narrowly avoided. More importantly, the strike stimulated the formation of a federation of 
Barcelona construction workers. This federation, officially founded on the last day of the year, 
was the first in the history of the Barcelona labour movement which encompassed workers from 
almost all of the city's construction trades. 70 
The unity of the construction workers was further strengthened in the following year. 
Carpenters, as has been seen, were a group of workers astride both the woodworking and 
construction industries. They had been the leading force behind attempts to articulate industry 
wide federations in woodworking. Thus, the regional carpenters federation they had set up in 
1898 still functioned. In 1903 the decision had been taken to admit an woodworkers, though it 
still remained dominated by the carpenters. More important, in 1911 they were behind the 
69. LP, 20 June 1910, ME, 17 August, ME, 14 October, ME; SO, 26 February, 26 March, 12 August 
1910,10 July, 16 October 1913. 
70. SO, 4 December 1913; US, 6 December 1913; LP, 31 December 1913; AECB, 1913, pp. 114-122; 
Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1910-1914, pp. 248-253. 
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foundation of a federation of Barcelona woodworkers. As in the case of construction, this was the 
first time most Barcelona woodworkers unions had formed part of the same federation. 71 
Two years later the Barcelona carpenters"unions were once agam set on a collision course 
with their employers. In the Spring of 1913 they pres I ented their employers with demands for a 
minimum 5 peseta wage, the "regulation" of apprenticeship, the abolition of piece rates and the 
closed shop. After their demands had been rejected over 3000 carpenters downed tools at the 
beginning of May. The strike was called off at the beginning of June after the employers accepted 
the formation of a mixed commission to study possible improvements in working conditions. The 
commission, however, made little progress, for the master carpenters would only agree to an 
increase in wages, and would not even discuss the question of a closed shop. 
In order to bring matters to a head, therefore, in December the Sant Andreu de Provenqals 
union again put forward the carpenters original demands, and declared a boycott of all those 
employers who refused to capitulate. The Barcelona employers responded by declaring a lock-out 
throughout the city, and the carpenters unions then brought their members out on strike. The 
conflict was further escalated by the decision of the the master carpenters to call for the help of the 
federation of construction industry employers, which had been set up shortly after the 1913 
painters strike. The federation responded positively. Its members agreed that all the carpentry 
workshops should reopen on the 10 February 1914, and that if the carpenters did not return to 
work under the old conditions they would declare a lock-out throughout the construction industry 
fromthe2lst. The Barcelona construction workers' federation argued that this decision 
represented a clear attempt on the part of the employers to destroy their organisation. It was also 
the second time in two months that the construction industry was on the brink of a generalised 
conflict. On this occasion it was averted by the civil governor, who convinced the employers 
federation it should call off the lock-out, and managed to set up an arbitration committee. The 
employers organisation continued to try and hold out against the workers demands but many 
individual masters began to give way, so it finally agreed to accept a 50 cents wage increase. 72 
During the years 1899-1903 and 1910-1914, then, there was severe industrial conflict in 
much of Barcelona industry. The dockers, tramworkers, carters and cotton textile workers were 
all involved in important strikes. Yet many disputes affected skilled workers who laboured in 
relatively small workshops. This fact surprised bourgeois observers. Thus, during the 1910 
Barcelona metalworker and Sabadell woollen worker strikes, El Trabajo Nacional stated that the 
71. ET, 12 September 1903; La Cufja, 1 April 1911. 
72. SO, 13 May, 19 June 1913; 5,12,19,26 February 1914; AESC, 1913, pp. 109-111 .; Miguel Sastre, 
Las Huelgas... 1910-1914, pp. 275-283. 
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"period of disorders and worker agitation without precedent" the Province of Barcelona was 
experiencing was difficult to explain because: 73 
The owners of factories and workshops are found alongside their workers not only in the 
factories - where the employer and workers mix daily - but also in the cafe, the theatre and 
other centres of entertainment, and in the towns during thefiesta mayor and on hunting 
trips. 
Here those social cleavages which separate the workers and industrialists in the great 
industrial centres are unknown. 
Our factories are only just evolving out of domestic workshops. Our employers are in the 
main workers of yesteryear, and in no part of the world has the intelligent worker got the 
same possibilities of becoming a small-scale employer. 
These observations have been supported by some historians. 74 They were certainly not 
totally without foundation. It is true that in many artisanal crafts there was a significant degree of 
social mobility and, as was emphasised in Chapter Two, geographical class boundaries in 
Barcelona were not rigidly defined. Most evidence also-points to the existence of a significant 
degree of social intercourse between skilled workers and their masters. Such contacts were 
particularly common in workshops which employed a dozen or so workers, many of which were 
to be found in the Old Quarter of town and Gracia. Strikes in this branch of Barcelona industry, it 
will be remembered, were not common, and those disputes which did arise were usually settled 
with ease. 
However, the picture painted by El Trabajo Nacional was overdrawn. Many of the 
workshops in Barcelona, though small by international standards, were not minuscule. This was 
the case in metallurgy, where most workers laboured in establishments which employed between 
about 30 and 60 men. In such an environment social advancement became far more difficult; a fact 
which prompted "a metalworker" to respond to the article written by El Trabajo Nacional: 75 
It is true that during their free time, in caf6s, the theatre, and other places where they can 
relax, the Barcelona workers more or less mix with their employers. But class distinctions 
are always apparent. 
It seems impossible the writer should state that the class divide between workers and 
employers is unknown here. ( ... ) 
I do not agree that the worker has a greater chance of becoming a small-scale industrialist 
here than in any other country. For my part I can say that on many occasions I have been 
rebuffed when asking for help'to set up my own business. May others are in the same 
position as me. 
73. ETN, 16 September 1910. 
74. See especially, Enric Ucelay Da Cal, op cit, pp. 52-54. 
75. SO, 14 October 1910. 
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Furthermore, social mobility was by itself no guarantee of class hannony. Tbus, in the 
labour press of the period there were many reports of ex-workers who were now, unfortunately, 
the most tyrannical of employers. As has been suggested, the threat posed to many skilled 
workers by the development of capitalism ensured that in all but the smallest workshops labour 
relations were often poor. Class divisions in Barcelona were not, therefore, primarily the result of 
a growth of large scale industry. They were to a large extent the consequence of a growing social 
divide within the artisanal trades. 
Strikes in Barcelona were often very dramatic. This was in part the result of employer 
intransigence. Thus, especially in industries involved in unskilled work and in metallurgy, 
employer organisations often ran friendly societies with the aim of countering union influence. In 
addition, in a large number of artisanal trades employers put up a staunch resistance to the workers 
demands. This fact is illustrated by data elaborated by Miguel Sastre, which shows that 7,937 
workers were sacked for going on strike between 1903 and 1914. This was by any standards a 
very high figure. Table 4.4. divides the number of workers sacked by industry. 
Table 4.4. Workers Sacked as a Result of Strike Action, 1903-1914 
Industry 
Marine Transport 
Metallurgy 
Gas and Electricity 
Textile Finishing 
Furniture Trades 
Land Transport 
Leather Trades 
Construction 
Printing 
Textiles 
Glass and Ceramics 
Clothing 
Food Industries 
Woodworking 
Coach, Cart and 
Boat Makers 
No of Workers Sacked Workers as percent of 
Sacked Labour Force 
1775 40 
1440 16.1 
350 15.7 
1072 14 
209 7.8 
1369 7.7 
116 7.2 
442 2.9 
104 1.4 
342 1.3 
40 1.3 
245 1.2 
68 0.8 
8 0.2 
00 
Sources: Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas en Barcelona y sus Resultadds, 1903-1914; AECB, "Censo Obrero 
de 1905". 
A large number of the unskilled workers, and in particular dockers and carters, were 
sacked. This is not surprising as it was the unskilled that were most easily replaced by 
blacklegs. 76 However, the metallurgical bourgeoisie also took every opportunity available to sack 
76. This explains why the the gas and electricity workers appear so high in the table. In 1903 the city's 550 
gas workers came out on strike. Of these 350 were sacked, and a friendly society was then set up by the 
employers. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1903, pp. 52-55 
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labour militants. In the other artisanal trades the men were in a stronger position to prevent 
sackings. Nevertheless, in the most conflictive artisanal trades employers still took advantage of 
strike defeats to attack the labour unions. Thus, large numbers of workers in the textile finishing 
and leather trades, shoemaking and bricklaying lost their jobs. 
In those industries in which blacklegs were conunonly used and in which unions were in a 
weak position there was also a high degree of strike violence. Tbus, between 1910 and 1914 25 
employers and 344 workers were assaulted during disputes. Of these attacks 134 involved 
metalworkers, 66 involved carters and 22 involved dockers. Amongst the other artisanal trades it 
was only during a strike called by the carpenters, in which 26 assaults were reported, and strikes 
affecting the locksmiths (a trade closely related to metallurgy ) and textile finishing, with 25 
assaults apiece, that these figures were approached. 77 
It was the artisans who found it easiest to organise and who, therefore, formed the 
backbone of the labour movement. In trades in which there was a high level of industrial 
conflictivity the unions looked to the rest of the working class for support. This explains why it 
was the likes of the metalworkers, bricklayers, carpenters and carters who were at the forefront of 
attempts to form inter-trade and industrial labour federations. Indeed, given the problems workers 
generally faced in forming strong stable unions and in pressing home their demands effectively, 
strikers on a number of occasions looked to the rest of the working class to carry out solidarity 
strikes in support. The need for support also explains why skilled workers often took such an 
interest in organising the unskilled and, on occasions, even female workers. It was this quest for 
mutual aid that led to the development of an awareness of common interests between workers in 
different trades, or put another way, to the appearance of class consciousness. 
This sense of solidarity between the various trades was facilitated by the fact that the real 
wages of both the skilled and unskilled were low, and that most workers had little cover to protect 
them in case of sickness and during all age. 78 Several factors, however, militated against the 
coalescence of a working class culture. As has been suggested, skilled workers still maintained 
frequent contacts with their employers, and their overriding goal could still be to set up as a small 
master. As shall be seen, the desires of this section of the working class found its expression in 
the movement of the Ateneus Obrers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Within the 
working class itself the fragmentation of the trade unions acted as an obstacle to co-operation. So 
did the cultural divisions between skilled and unskilled. In effect, artisanal workers continued to 
view their unskilled colleagues with a certain disdain. This, as was suggested in Chapter Two, 
was particularly so in the case of highly skilled workers such as glassblowers and coopers, who 
77. Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1910-1914, p. 87,129,193,269,331,338. 
78. Chapter Two, pp. 74-75. 
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were relatively well paid and faced no threat to their position within the labour process. Indeed, 
the unions such workers formed felt little need to ally with other unions of the skilled, and 
therefore generally remained aloof from attempts to co-ordinate action. T'hus, for example, the 
Barcelona compositors found it impossible to get the lithographers and photoEngravers to form a 
local printers federation. The coopers did not join the woodworkers federation founded in 1911, 
and when the bricklayers set up a construction workers federation in 1913 they faced the 
opposition of the plasterers, stonecutters and brickmakers. 79 Craft exclusiveness in fact took a 
long time to die away, as the Catalan anarchists found to their cost in 1918 when they decided to 
do away with craft unions and set up industrial federations (Sindicats Unics) in each Catalan town 
or city. 80 
Yet by the first decade of the century in Barcelona most workers clearly felt they belonged 
to a particular class. Thus, even the coopers, though they would never come out on strike in 
solidarity, gave the workers of other trades strong monetary support during strikes. 81 This 
working class culture rested on an emphasis on solidarity rather than self advancement, and at an 
ideological level on a critique of the consequences of technological progress under capitalism. The 
specificity of this culture can be demonstrated by comparing the outlook of the workers with that of 
the shop assistants and clerks, two groups of employees sandwiched between the working and 
middle classes. 
There were about 35,000 clerks and 30,000 shop assistants in Barcelona. The wages of 
most of these employees were no higher than that of the average skilled worker. 82 Most clerks, 
however, refused to unionise, or develop any links with other labour unions. The Socialist 
militant, Arturo Gas Berenguer, was clear as to the reasons: 83 
They form part of the exploited classes, but do they see themselves as such? 
No 
If you talk to them you will see that they do not consider themselves to be workers and, 
indeed, they are indignant if you refer to them as such. Instead of thinking about the 
emancipation of the class, they only think about their own personal emancipation. That is 
to say that though they hate their bosses their only goal is to climb up the ladder of 
promotion and became one themselves. 
79. Pere Gabriel, "Sinclicats", p. 556. 
80. Manuel Lladonosa, El Congr6s de Sants (Barcelona, 1975), pp. 80-1 11. 
81. During the 1910 metalworkers strike only two unions gave more than 1000 pesetas. These were the 
carters and the compositors. The coopers unions followed in third place by donating 540 pesetas. LP, 
September-November 1910. 
82. El Progreso, 19 July 1909; Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", p. 283.; Nuestro Programa, 12 July 1912; LP, 
25 October 1912. 
83. SO, 9 October 1907. 
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Some shop assistants adopted a more combative stance. Thus in 1898 a group of these 
workers formed a union known as the AssociactO de Depenancia Mercantil (ADM). The union 
developed close links with the rest of the labour movement, and its leaders argued that the shop 
assistants formed a part of the working class. However, the union never attracted the support of 
more than a fraction of the city's shop workers. In 1900 it reached a maximum of over 800 
affiliates, but by 1909 this figure had dropped to little more than 300.84 In 1903 a more moderate 
organisation known as the Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Commerg i de la Indlistria 
(CADCI) was founded. It kept on good terms with the shop owners and was in fact, until about 
1913, more of a cultural association than a trade union. The CADCI was far more successful than 
the ADM with over 2000 members by 1912. The reason was given by one of the ADM's leaders 
in 1907 when he stated that, "we are not ignorant of the fact that there are shop assistants who are 
contemptuous of being called workers. Even worse, that they treat their brothers the manual 
workers with a certain disdain". In fact, such views were held by a majority of shop assistants, 
and they were only to begin to change between 1914 and 1918, when as a result of a process of 
capital concentration social advancement in commerce became increasingly difficult. 85 
The feeling of contempt between workers and shop assistants was mutual. Moreover, in 
an age in which "the form of dress reflected social class', 86 it was reinforced by the shop workers 
attire. Thus, M. Sans Orenga, a young shop worker before World War One, states: 87 
What really annoyed the workers about the shop assistants and clerks was their collar and 
tie; the way they imitated the bourgeoisie; and the fact that they laboured apart from other 
workers. To show their contempt they called the shop assistants "table jumpers"' 
(saltataullels) and the clerks "pen-pushers" (pixatinters). These phobias even affected 
union organisation. During years workers in commerce were considered to lack trade 
union spirit and to have copied their ideas from the bourgeoisie, whose policies they 
supported. 
Indeed, though the workers dress varied somewhat from trade to trade it served clearly to 
differentiate them from other social classes. 88 This fact disquieted middle class publicists such as 
84. LP, 3 September 1900, ME; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, p. 325. 
85. SO, 9 November 1907.; Manuel Lladonosa i Joaquim Ferrer, "Nacionalisme CatalA i Reformisme 
Social en els Treballadors Mercantils a Barcelona. El CADCI", in Albert Balcells (ed), TeOda y Pr9dica del 
Movimiento Obrero en Espafia, 1900-1936 (Valencia, 1977). 
86. Claudi Ametlla, Mem6ries Politiques, 1890-1917 (Barcelona, 1963), p. 108. 
87. M. Sans Orenga, Els Treballadors Mercantils dins el Moviment Obrer Catali (Barcelona, 1975), 
pp. 45-46. 
88. M. Sans Orenga states: "A workers dress depended in his work. Lads employed in warehouses wore 
striped overalls. Mechanics and metalworkers wore a blue cotton jacket. Construction workers were clad in 
a light blue shirt and neckerchief -A large number of corderoy overalls were also worn, chiefly 
by dockers 
and carters. The men always put on rope sandles and some type of cap. When they grew up they sported 
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Guillermo Graell, a leading figure in the FTN, who argued that: "Rope sandles, overalls, a peaked 
cap and neckerchief shame no one. The opposite is largely the case. But one senses that a gulf 
separates those who so dress from their superiors, and that their dress is seen as a little humiliating 
and even degrading.,, 89 By this time, however, dress was merely a reflection of the growing social 
divide visible within Barcelona urban society. 
moustaches. They bought a dark suit to get married. This suit was thereafter only taken out of the 
wardrobe to go to other weddings, and to be used as a shroud". Op cit, p. 42. 
89. ETN, 1 November 1907. 
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PART TWO 
THE CATALAN LABOUR MOVEMENT 
1897-1914 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIALISM., ANARCHISM AND LABOUR PROTEST, 1897-1903 
By the turn of the century Socialists and anarchists were the two primary points of reference for 
Spain's labour unions. This is, of course, not to say that all workers were either anarchist or 
Socialist. This was clearly not the case. Most workers were, in fact, non unionised. Moreover, 
many unions were not affiliated to any particular ideological or political grouping, and maintained 
an independent existence. Finally, it would be grossly to over-simplify to imply that all those 
workers who formed part of anarchist or Socialist labour federations were fully conscious 
supporters of their respective cause. In fact, during the first decade of the century the majority of 
workers who voted at election time voted republican, and this included many trade unionists. 
Nevertheless, it would be true to say that it was only the anarchists and Socialists who had 
founded labour federations whose goal was to group together the largest number of workers 
possible irrespective of their occupation. Independent unions looking for working class solidarity 
outside the narrow confines of their trade, and groups of workers who needed help in order to set 
up their own union, therefore, tended to gravitate towards either the anarchists or Socialists. 
Both anarchists and Socialists were, naturally, also active in the cultural institutions of the 
working class. Thus, they played an important role in the lay schools, free-thinking clubs and 
working class choirs that were formed in the late nineteenth century in urban areas. However, they 
were only in contact with workers on a day to day basis through their unions. In addition, it was 
the decisions taken by the unions which impinged upon the workers vital material interests. Thus, 
consequent upon the decision taken at a union branch meeting and the result of negotiations 
between the union officials and the employer the worker could find, for example, his wages 
improved, his working hours reduced, or alternatively could be asked to forgo his daily wage and 
come out on a strike. To gain influence in the working class community, therefore, it was vital for 
anarchists and Socialists to have a strong presence within the unions. 
Workers were not in general interested in the minutiae of a party or labour federation's 
ideology. Instead they were attracted by the benefits which they felt they derived from giving it 
their support. 1 In order to understand the relative success of the anarchists and Socialists it will, 
1. See the comments by Dick Geary in, "Identifying Militancy: The Assessment of Working Class Attitudes 
Towards State and Society", in Richard J. Evans (ed. ), The German Working Class, 1888-1933 (London, 
1982), pp. 223-224. 
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therefore, be necessary to look in some detail at their respective trade union and political practices, 
and their relevance to the needs and aspirations of the Catalan working class. 
In fact by the turn of the century anarchist and Socialist trade union policies were 
diametrically opposed. From the outset the Socialist labour federation, the UGT, adopted a highly 
moderate trade union strategy. It was agreed that wage claims should be modest so as not to 
provoke the employers. Moreover, after a claim had been presented UGT unions were to make 
every effort possible to reach a negotiated settlement. Strikes, the Socialists felt, should only be 
declared in the last resort, and then only if the workers were in a strong position to win the dispute. 
Other workers should give monetary and moral support, but never come out on strike in solidarity. 
it was up to the central committee to decide if possibilities of victory existed, and only if it were 
satisfied of this would it authorise strike payments. The Socialists, therefore, placed emphasis on 
the stability of their unions. The individual union was supposed to build up a large strike fund, 
and it was hoped operate a friendly society and perhaps a consumer co-operative. This system 
became known in Spain as el sindicalismo a base mUltiple. Its corollary was the appearance of a 
body of officials who negotiated wage-rates and working hours. This became clear with the rapid 
growth of the UGT from 1899.2 
The role of the any labour federation, according to the Socialists, was to improve the 
material conditions of its members. The task of social revolution was, however, left to the party. 
During the 1880s, Pablo Iglesias was president of the Spanish Socialist party, the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Espafiol (PSOE). Following the lead of the French Socialist, Jules Guesk, lie 
argued Spain was an fully developed capitalist state with an increasingly impoverished proletariat. 
The PSOE, he argued, would soon be called upon to lead the workers into battle against the 
bourgeoisie. This vision, however, paid scant attention to the real state of political organisation 
within the working class, and rested uneasily with the UGT's moderate trade union strategy. In 
fact, from the 1890s the party became de facto increasingly reformist. The revolution was still 
seen as inevitable. Yet many Socialists now seemed to argue that as a result of Spain's social and 
economic backwardness a modernisation programme would first be needed to bring her into line 
with the major capitalist states. This programme would be carried out by the most dynamic sectors 
of the bourgeoisie, which the Socialists often identified with the republicans. Meanwhile the job of 
the Socialists would be to build up their organisation, and improve the lot of the workers within 
present society. In reality this signified a shift towards electoral politics and a greater 
preoccupation with the need for social reform. The Socialists' stress on the need to reach 
negotiated settlements to industrial disputes, and their belief in the possibility of reform within 
capitalism, in turn, increasingly led them to make contact with representatives of the state. 
3 
2. Manuel P6rez Ledesma, "La Primera Etapa de la UG de T (1888-1897): Plantearniento Sindical y 
Formas de Organizaci6n", in Albert Balcells (ed. ), Teoda y PrJctica, OP cit. 
3. Santiago Castillo y Manuel P6rez Ledesma, Pablo Iglesias. Escrit0s I (Madrid, 1975); Manuel P6rez 
Ledesma (ed. y pr6logo), Pensamiento Socialista Espar)ol a Principios del Siglo: Garcia Quejidd y La 
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It is more difficult to outline a policy to which all anarchists adhered, for they did not form 
part of a disciplined party, but tended to club together in groups which might have only the most 
tenuous links. The following is, therefore, a summary of the majority held position within Catalan 
anarchism between 1900 and 1903. All anarchists were antipolitical in the sense that they did not 
believe a social revolution could be brought about byýpolitical party, but only through mass action. 
Consequently, they held elections to be a farce which only served to direct the workers' attention 
away from the real struggle. The belief that the bourgeois state could be reformed was, they 
argued, equally erroneous, and social legislation a trick which could in no way benefit the working 
class. 
Anarchism unlike Marxism was not necessarily a class based philosophy. Thus, some 
anarchist thinkers stressed the need to liberate humanity from all forms of oppression, and not just 
the workers from exploitation at the hands of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, anarchism was first 
introduced into urban Catalonia by supporters of Bakunin's wing of the International Working 
Men's Association (IWMA), and was from that moment on closely identified with the labour 
movement. This was reflected in the fact that at the turn of the century Catalonia's principal 
anarchist publications saw conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat as the motor of capitalist 
society. Within the anarchist tradition there was also disagreement over the agent of revolution. 
There was a strong individualist component in anarchism, with the consequence that some 
anarchists argued that it was only an audacious group of committed revolutionaries who could 
through attacks on bourgeois institutions spark off an uprising. In the late nineteenth century this 
became known as "propaganda by the deed". These anarchists usually felt trade unions had no 
revolutionary potential, and were inevitably drawn into reformist struggles over working 
conditions. This strand of anarchist thought was by no means absent in late nineteenth century 
Catalonia. Nonetheless, as a result of the upsurge of industrial conflictivity between 1899 and 
1903, most anarchists came to recognise that the unions could be a revolutionary force. 
However, in order to realise their revolutionary potential, the anarchists maintained, the 
unions would have to be constituted along lines very different from those which had affiliated to 
the UGT. The anarchists were opposed to individual unions forming co-operative or friendly 
societies as this might lead to the creation of conservative interests. They were even more opposed 
to the creation of any form of union bureaucracy whom, they argued, would inevitably lead the 
union into collective bargaining within the framework of capitalism. The anarchists most closely in 
touch with the labour movement supported the unions' fight for material gains. However, they 
totally rejected the Socialist view that strikes should only be declared as a last resort. On the 
Nueva Era (Madrid, 1975); Santiago Castillo, "Organizaci6n y Accion Polftica del PSOE hasta su Cuarto 
Congreso", in Santos JuM (co-ord. ), El Socialism en Espaija (Madrid, 1976). 
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contrary, they declared, strikes should be called whenever possible. Moreover, they maintained 
that other unions should react not so much by giving monetary support as by declaring solidarity 
strikes. This was because, in their view, it was only through energy and enthusiasm that the 
bourgeoisie could be defeated. With the import of French revolutionary syndicalist doctrines at the 
turn of the century these tactics, which aimed to harness shop floor militancy to revolutionary 
goals, became known as direct action. From this date the anarchists were to argue that mass rank 
and file strike action would snowball into a revolutionary general strike, which by paralysing 
capitalist society would make possible the transition to the communist or collectivist society of the 
future. 4 
The history of anarchist and Socialist influence within the Catalan labour movement 
stretches back to the turbulent years between 1870 and 1873. Until then popular opposition to the 
state had been led by "progressive", "democratic", and finally "republican" political groupings. 
They all advocated the foundation of a modem, democratic, secular state, in which civil liberties 
would be guaranteed. However, their social programmes were very moderate. They in no way 
wished private property to be abolished, but simply favoured the extension of property ownership. 
In 1870 Michael Bakunin's Italian disciple, Giuseppi Fanelli, visited Spain, and made 
contact with groups of workers in Barcelona and Madrid. I-Es preachings were, it seems, an 
immediate success. Fanelli's stated aim was to introduce the IWMA or First International into 
Spain. However, he conflated the IWMA and Bakunin's own secret Social Democratic Alliance, 
and gave the impression they were the same body. As a result, anarchism was given a head start 
over Marxism in Spain. This became clear at the founding congress of the Spanish branch of the 
First International held in Barcelona in June 1870. The new labour federation, known as the 
FederaciOn Regional Espafiola (FRE), adopted a series of resolutions which though not 
unambiguously anarchist showed a definite Bakunist influence. 5 This became clear two years later 
when the IWMA split between Marxists and Bakunists. Marx's nephew, Paul Lafargue, had 
recently visited Madrid, and managed to convert most of the FRE's leading figures in the city to 
Marxism. However, by far the greater part of the Spanish branch's local labour federations 
remained under Bakunist control. 
Nevertheless, the extent of anarchist influence within the Catalan labour movement should 
not be exaggerated. In Catalonia in 1873 the FRE had between about 30,000 and 40,000 affiliates. 
4. Jos6 Alvarez Junco, op cit, pp. 547-572; George Essenwein, "Anarchist Ideology and the Spanish 
Working Class Movement (1880-1900); with Special Reference to Ricardo Mella", (Unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, University of London, 1987), pp. 162- 163,276-286; Enric Oliv6 Serrat, "El Moviment Anarquista 
CatalA i L'Obrerisme", (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona, 1977), pp. 52-162. 
5. Josep Termes, Anarquismo y Sindicalismo en Catalulla: La Primera Internacional, 1868-1873 
(Barcelona, 1971), pp. 57-120. 
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Yet, it was always an uneasy alliance between Bakunists, co-operativists, republican sympathisers 
and "pure" trade unionists. This was made plain in the early 1880s. After the fall of the First 
Republic in 1874 the FRE was forced underground. In the more open climate of 1881 trades 
unions were again able to function relatively freely, and a new Bakunist labour federation, called 
the FederaciOn de Trabajadores de la Region Espafiola (FTRE) was consequently founded. Its 
headquarters were set up in Barcelona and its leadership was Catalan. However, the FIRE never 
had the same strength in Catalonia as the old Spanish branch of the IWMA. Thus, at its high point 
in 1881 the FTRE had 13,201 affiliates, only about one third of the Spanish total. 6 
The reason was not that the Catalan labour movement was any weaker than in the early 
1870s. This was patently not the case. The problem was that a large number of trade unions had 
broken with the Bakunists. These unions gravitated around the Tres Classes de Vapor. As was 
seen in chapter three the TCV had adopted a very moderate trade union strategy. 7 Furthermore, its 
leaders sympathised with the republicans. Accordingly, they shunned the radicalism of the 
anarchists and, in Barcelona, founded an alternative local labour federation, which looked towards 
state intervention to improve working conditions. 8 
The boom conditions associated with the so-calledfebre d or had, in fact, led to a certain 
stabilisation of labour relations in Catalonia. Thus, unions who could win concessions from their 
employers on the negotiating table were not likely to be attracted by anarchist insurrectionism. 
Indeed, even the Catalan leadership of the FrRE avoided overt revolutionary activity, and tried to 
limit the use of the strike weapon. These tactics have led the student of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century anarchist ideology, Jose Alvarez Junco, to state: "Serrano Otieza (one of the 
FFRE's leading figures) is the man that best personifies the dominant attitude of these years. He 
was a lawyer, and representative of the extreme right of Spanish Bakunism. Under his influence - 
and that of Llunas and Tomas - the labour movement could have taken a reformist, 
bureaucratic, 
road. "9 Thefebre dor, however, ended in the economic crisis of 1885. Thereafter much of 
Catalan manufacturing was smitten by an almost permanent economic recession. Labour relations 
consequently became far harsher. In cotton textiles, as was suggested in Chapter Three, the result 
of the employer offensive of the years 1890-1891 was the TCVs almost total destruction. 
10 This 
offensive had wide-ranging implications for the entire Catalan labour movement, 
for the TCV was 
6. Congreso de la Federad6n de Trabajadores de la Regi6n Espar)ola Celebrado en Sevilla los Dias 24,25 
y 26 de Setiembre de 1882 (Barcelona, 1882), pp. 79-93. 
7. Chapter Three, pp. 79-80. 
8. Josep Termes, op cit, pp. 255-256; Ram6n Caster6s, op cit, pp. 43-101. 
9. Jos6 Alvarez Junco, op cit, p. 469. 
10. Chapter Three, pp. 80-83. 
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the fulcrum around which reformist politics revolved. From 1883 the intensification of social 
conflict was accompanied by state repression of organised labour. The combined result of these 
factors was seriously to weaken the reformists' position within Catalan labour. 
Both Socialists and anarchists were, as a result, presented with new opportunities. During 
the 1870s the influence of Marxism in Spain had largely been restricted to a group of Madrid 
typographers. In 1879 they clandestinely founded the PSOE under the leadership of the ex- 
members of the First International, Pablo Iglesias and Francisco Mora. During the following 
decade Catalonia was the only region in which they experienced a significant growth in support. 
Thus, the first Socialist nuclei was founded in Barcelona in 1879, and over the next ten years a 
number of Socialist centres were set up in urban areas. At the same time two leading Socialist 
militants transferred from Madrid to Barcelona. The first, Toribio Reoyo, settled in Barcelona in 
1879. He was followed by Antonio Garcia Quejido eight years later. The growth of Socialist 
influence in Catalonia was made possible by the development of links between the party leadership 
and the TCV. This is illustrated by the fact that most of the Socialist nuclei established in Catalonia 
during these years were to be found in areas in which the TCV was strong. 11 
Collaboration between the Socialists and TCV was made possible by a number of 
similarities between their political and trade union practices. All Socialists of course were in favour 
of the formation of an independent party of the working class. Yet while Pablo Iglesias, under the 
influence of the ideas of Jules Guesde, argued that the PSOE should steer clear of the "bourgeois" 
republican parties, Francisco Mora maintained the Socialists should support the republicans, 
because under a republic the workers would be able to publicise their views and organise more 
freely. In Catalonia through to the turn of the century it was those Socialists who sympathised 
with Francisco Mora's views that had most influence. In the TCV camp, on the other hand, 
though most the leading figures favoured collaboration with the republicans, occasional statements 
were made in favour of the formation of a working class party. Both the Socialists' and 
reformists' political strategies were, therefore, in a state of flux, with enough points of contact to 
make collaboration possible. 12 Furthermore, at a trade union level they had even more in common, 
for they both rejected the anarchist claim that the unions would be the harbinger of revolution, and 
placed emphasis on the need for a moderate trade union policy. 
The Socialists, then, appeared to have a solid base on which to build. This was apparently 
confirmed in 1888 when they decided to form their own labour federation, the UGT, and put the 
PSOE on a more stable footing. The PSOE's central committee was set up in Madrid. This 
11. Santiago Castillo, "La Implantaci6n del PSOE hasta su Cuarto Congreso (1884-1894)", Estudids de 
Historia Social, nos. 8-9 (1979); Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 328-329. 
12. Antonio Elorza, "Los Primeros Programas del PSOE (1879-1888)", Estudios de Historia Social, nos. 
8-9 (1979); Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 340-342; Ram6n Casterds, op cit, p. 75. 
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reflected the fact that political power within the party was concentrated in the Spanish capital. The 
UGTs founding congress was, on the other hand, held in Barcelona, and its central committee 
elected by the unions of that city. This was not in fact surprising as Catalonia was the by far the 
most industrialised part of Spain, and at first it appeared that the UGT would largely be Catalan 
based. Thus, in 1899 2,381 of the 3,355 unions affiliated were Catalan. This predominance was, 
however, to be short lived. The UGT experienced rapid growth from the end of the century. Yet 
it was from Madrid, followed by Biscay and Asturias that these supporters were largely drawn. 
Thereafter Catalonia was to become increasingly marginal, for while 70per cent of the UGTs 
affiliates were Catalan in 1889, by 1902 the proportion had declined to just 7.7 per cent. (see Graph 
5.1. ). 
Graph 5.1. UGT Affiliates, 1889-1916. 
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In fact this record was not quite so bad as these figures suggest. As shaH be seen, the 
Catalan UGT was to enjoy a considerable influence amongst a number of unions that were not 
affiliated. However, in the 1890s the Catalan Socialists already faced a number of difficulties. In 
the first place, in the late 1880s they split with the TCV. There were two reasons for this split. 
First, the TCV responded to the economic crisis in the cotton textile industry by becoming 
increasingly class collaborationist. Thus, it strongly supported the cotton textile manufacturers 
calls for higher duties on cotton imports, and jointly organised a number of demonstrations aimed 
at pressurising the authorities in this respect. This was a road down which the Socialists could not 
follow. Second, outside Catalonia Pablo Iglesias's "Guesdist" ideology was becoming 
increasingly dominant, leading the party to take a more sectarian line with respect to the 
ýI 
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republicans. Indeed, the foundation of the UGT was itself a symptom of these tensions. 13 The 
split cost the Socialists much worker support, though in parts of the Alta Muntanya, such as 
Manresa and the Ter Valley, their staunch defence of established work practices earned them a 
good deal of sympathy. 
The Socialists also soon found themselves at loggerheads with the anarchists. Faced with 
heavy government repression, an economic recession, employer attacks on union organisation and 
divisive internal wrangling, the FTRE entered into crisis from 1883, and was wound up in 
1888.14 Power within Catalan anarchism now passed into the hands of a number of younger men, 
who enthusiastically supported "energetic" strike tactics, and the use of solidarity strikes to 
generalise strike action. 15 They were able to put these tactics into practice between 1890 and 1893. 
These years witnessed a short lived economic upturn following the tightening up of 
restrictions on the import of non Spanish goods into the last colonies. This boom was 
accompanied by a great surge of industrial unrest. The anarchists were able to ride on the tide of 
this unrest, and thereby increase their support. This is best illustrated by the events which 
surrounded the celebration of May day during these years. At an international conference held in 
1889 the Socialists had agreed that from 1890 on 1 May each year the working class in each 
country would take action in support of an 8 hour working day. Spanish anarchists agreed to 
support this call. In Catalonia, however, this by no means implies that anarchists and Socialists 
were united. For, in consonance with their respective trade union practices, whilst the Socialists 
called for a one day stoppage, the anarchists supported an indefinite strike until their demands had 
been met. 16 In the charged atmosphere of May day there were violent verbal and even physical 
clashes between Socialists and anarchists. As a result, the Spanish Socialist leadership developed 
a phobia of general strikes from which it was never to recover. In Barcelona, nevertheless, the 
anarchists' tactics seem to have been more popular. Thus, even Antonio Garcia Quejido, the 
first 
president of the UGT, was forced to admit that between 1890 and 1891 there had been a swing 
away from the Socialists and towards the anarchists in Barcelona, and that: "During the second 
May day of 1891 they (i. e., the anarchists) were already in charge of the movement and were able 
to stage a general strike, although, as was to be expected, without any tangible results. 
"17 
13. Rarn6n Caster6s, op cit, p. 98; Santiago Castillo, "Los Origines de la Organizaci6n Obrera en 
Espaha: 
de la Federaci6n de Tip6grafos a la UG de T", Estudios de Historia Social, nos. 26-27 (1983), pp. 1 01 -102, 
155-163. 
14. Jos6 Llunas, Los Partidds Socialistas Espatioles (Barcelona, 1892), p. 5. 
15. George Essenwein, op cit, pp. 1 62-193,213-249; Jos6 Alvarez Junco, op cit, pp. 548-552. 
16. See, Joaquirn Ferrer, El Primer, passim. 
17. Die Neue Zeit, no. 20.1901-1902, reproduced in Estudios de 
Historia Social, nos. 1-2 
(1979), p. 270. 
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However, the Catalan labour movement's revival came to an abrupt end in 1893. In that 
year the econornic recovery began to falter, and between 1894 and 1898 Catalan industry suffered 
a severe recession. Furthermore, government repression of labour protest intensified after an 
uprising of landless labourers in the Andalusian town of Jerez. Thus in 1893 in Barcelona: 18 
The first of May there was a demonstration and mass meetings. From the first the police 
repressed the movement. There were detentions en masse and many were imprisoned on 
war ships. These imprisonments were to have a great effect on the popular imagination, 
engendering those tavern songs, more melancholy than revolutionary, the words of which 
brought out a profound and constant hatred of the authorities. 
The combined effect of state repression and the economic slump was to decimate the trade 
unions. And it was in these circumstances that some anarchists despaired of working though 
organised labour and turned to "propaganda by the deed". The first anarchist assassination attempt 
in Barcelona in 1893 -a bomb attack on an army general - was a response to the execution of a 
number of Jerez peasants, and the subsequent repression then led to a decisive shift to 
conspiratorial activity. 19 
By no means all anarchists supported the use of terrorist tactics. Indeed, Catalonia's 
leading anarchist publication between 1887 and 1892, El Productor, argued that they were totally 
counterproductive. 20 Nevertheless, the next five years witnessed a spiral of action and repression 
which these anarchists were powerless to detain. It culminated in June 1896 in a massive round up 
of anarchists, labour leaders, and their sympathisers. They were then imprisoned in the military 
castle of MontjuYc, which overlooked Barcelona, where many were tortured in order to extract false 
confessions of terrorism. Five of those arrested were finally executed. At the same time the 
authorities conducted an onslaught on all aspects of working class social and cultural life. The 
result was to drive the anarchists underground. Their presence within the trade unions was, 
therefore, much reduced, but the authorities actions also led to the creation of the figure of the 
anarchist martyr to the cause. Thus Emili Salut, a young apprentice during the first decade of the 
twentieth century, recalls: "The repeated preachings of our journeymen in the workshops and 
constructions sites (served) to pass on to us the sad legacy of the MontjuYc anarchists, 
for in 
addition to constant oral propaganda, crusading weekly newspapers and small 
fascicles, they even 
reminded us of the wretched castle by singing the various songs they practised 
in the coral 
societies. -21 
k, 
18. Manuel Revent6s, op cit, p. 151. 
19. Manuel Buenacasa, ElMovimiento Obrero EspatIol (Madrid, 1977), pp. 157-160. 
20. Viceng RipOll, TI Productor (1887-1893), Setmanah Anarquista, Difusor de Cultura i Propaganda", 
L'Aveng, May 1987, p. 41. 
21. Emili Salut, op cit, p. 151. 
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The anarchists, then, retained a great deal of diffuse sympathy, but were unable to play an 
active part in the labour movement. Socialist hopes of building up their unions organisations had 
also been dashed. This was pointed out by Josep Comaposada. Comaposada, a shoemaker who 
lived in Barcelona's fifth district, had been a leading figure in Catalan Socialism since the 1880s. 
Looking back on the 1890s he recalled that in a context in which unions were unable to operate 
legally it was impossible to operate those "strong and stable bodies" favoured by the Socialists. 22 
Nonetheless, it was the Socialists who continued to work within the Catalan unions, and who in a 
number of towns played an important part in leading the revival of trade unionism from 1898. 
In cotton textiles, as we have seen, the employer offensive of the early 1890s left the 
workers largely disorganised. By 1895 the TCV retained the support of only a few spinners from 
Barcelona, Badalona and Molins de Rei. Disgusted by the collaborationist policies of the TCV 
leadership other political groupings founded their own textile federations. The anarchists set up a 
Pacte Lhure in the early 1890s, which gained some support in Barcelona and the Ter Valley. It 
was, however, soon to founder. The Socialists had rather more success. They founded their 
alternative to the TCV, the Union Fabril Algodonera, in 1894. At first it was centred on Mdlaga, 
but after the Mdlaga textile union had broken up after an employer lock-out at the end of the year its 
influence was limited in Catalonia. There were cotton textile unions affiliated from Sant Martf, the 
Ter Valley, Vilanova and Vilassar. The Mataro hosiery workers also joined, and Mataro indeed 
became a bastion Socialist support. Finally, the Socialists were also influential within the Manresa 
labour movement. 23 
As a result the crisis which afflicted the labour movement during these years the Union 
Fabril Algodonera remained very weak. Nevertheless, it represented the only organisational link 
between the various textile unions at that time. Yet when union organisation in textiles began to 
recover from 1898 it quickly became clear that the Socialists would not be able to integrate all the 
unions into a federation affiliated to the UGT. 
This reflected a problem which affected both the anarchists and Socialists. In areas such as 
Madrid and the Basque country, it was largely due to the efforts of the Socialists that the first 
labour unions were founded. In these areas, therefore, many workers identified the Socialists with 
trade unionism, and hence saw them as the representatives of the entire working class. In 
Catalonia this was never the case. Here the history of trade unionism stretched back to the 1840s. 
When anarchism and Marxism were introduced into Spain between 1870 and 1873 there was, as a 
result, already a strong tradition of trade union organisation. Consequently, Socialists and 
22. La Justicia Social, 2 July 1910. 
23. Juan de Cataluha, "Los Obreros ... III"; 
Santiago Castillo, "Los Or[gines", pp. 102-104; La Rep6blica 
Social, 3 March 1897,12 January, 20 April 1898. 
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anarchists who wished to establish their own unions were open to the charge that they were 
dividing the working class, given that workers of other political persuasions would not wish to 
join. 
The Socialists and many anarchists tried to counter this charge by arguing that their unions 
were open to all those workers who wished to affiliate, whatever their political viewpoint. The 
UGTs statutes, in fact, stated that it was independent of any political organisation. This fact was 
used by the Catalan Socialists to claim that the aim of the UGT unions was simply to better 
working conditions, and that they had no intention of using the trades unions under their influence 
to indoctrinate the workers. It would appear more difficult for the anarchists to maintain that their 
unions were neutral, for they believed it was through a revolutionary general strike that capitalism 
would be overthrown. Some indeed felt that within the unions it would be the task of committed 
revolutionaries to guide the workers. However, at the turn of the century the majority of Barcelona 
anarchists denied that the unions they operated were specifically anarchist. Instead, these 
anarchists argued that without the need for indoctrination the workers would once organised, in the 
heat of the battle against the bourgeoisie, inevitably come to see direct action as the tactic which 
most favoured their interests whatever their original political beliefs. 24 
Not surprisingly, however, many workers were doubtful as to the neutrality of the Socialist 
and anarchist unions, and wished to operate independent "apolitical" associations. This was a 
problem both the anarchists and Socialists faced right through to 1914. Thus, for example, a 
number of regional craft federations remained independent even though a some of the individual 
unions were affiliated to either the anarchists or Socialists. It was a difficulty the anarchists were 
not to overcome until 1918, when they were becoming increasingly dominant in urban areas, and 
were therefore able to force most workers into their Sindicats Unics. 25 
At the turn of the century neither anarchists or Socialists were in this position. This was 
illustrated by developments within the Catalan textile unions over the next three years. In 1899 
there was a revival of trade unionism in the cotton textile industry. As has been seen, in the Ter 
Valley in order to co-ordinate the textile unions' activities a district federation, known as the 
Commission for the Fourth District, was formed, under the presidency of the "well known 
anarchist" Gaspar Vifiolas. 26 This Commission played a prominent role in the formation of the 
new industry wide textile federation, the FIFE, at the end of the year. The small pro-Socialist 
24. This was, for example, the argument advance by the pro-anarchist Barcelona bricklayers' union. 
See, 
La Protesta, 29 August 1900. 
25. Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 702-709. 
26. Juan de Cataluha, "Los Obreros... IV". Viholas' anarchist beliefs could not, however, have been very 
orthodox, for not only was he a paid official but in 1899 he also stood in local elections 
in Manileu. La Plana 
de Vich, 19 July, 1899. 
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Union Fabril Algodonera held its VI congress in Matar6 between 5 and 6 August. Roda was the 
strongest point of Socialist organisation on the Ter, and the local textile union sent its own 
delegate. The Manlleu union did not, however, attend as part of the Union Fabril, but led a 
delegation of the Commission for the Fourth District. This delegation informed those present that 
it was considering calling a congress open to all the industry's workers. The reaction of the Union 
Fabril Algodonera was favourable and, as a result, a commission made up of affiliates from both 
the Socialist federation and the Commission for the Fourth District was named to organise it. 27 
The decision taken by the Commission for the Fourth District reflected its desire to unify as 
many workers as possible in a single association notwithstanding political differences. The 
Catalan Socialists accepted this argument and, therefore, agreed to disband the UGT affiliated 
UniO'n Fabril Algodonera in order to form part of a larger organisation. The Catalan Socialists 
showed themselves to be, in this respect, very much in tune with the realities of the Catalan labour 
movement. They had since the 1880s been prepared to work with other political tendencies whose 
trade union practice they found acceptable, and the foundation of the UGT did not change this fact. 
On this question, it seems, the Catalans could be differentiated from the Madrid based leadership of 
the PSOE. For tactical reasons, these Socialists paid lip service to the need for labour unions to be 
independent from the tutelage of the party, but in reality they believed their should be a strong bond 
between party and union. In fact, this divergent approach to the relationship between union and 
party probably led to development of a good deal of tension between Barcelona and Madrid. 
The attitude adopted by the Catalan Socialists allowed the = quickly to establish itself. 28 
Joan Codina, a Socialist activist who formed part of the Federation, was later to claim that it was 
from its inception totally anarchist dominated. 29 There was an anarchist presence within the FTE's 
Manlleu leadership, and in the Fourth District generally. This could be seen at the beginning of 
1900 when representatives from the FrE held a meeting with two pro-anarchist labour federations, 
the Ter Valley Craft Workers Union (Unto Comarcal dArts i Oficis de la Conca del Ter), and the 
Federation of Ampurda Cork Workers. At this meeting a "solidarity pact" was signed, and it was 
agreed to form a commission which was organise the founding congress of a new Confederation 
of Spanish Workers. 30 
Clearly the idea was to form a new anarchist dominated labour confederation. The scheme, 
however, came to nothing, and the main reason was opposition within the ranks of the FIE itself. 
27. LP, 9 August 1899, ME. 
28. See Chapter Three, p. 86. 
29. Juan de Catalufla, "Los Obreros IV". 
30 LP, 4 March 1900, ME; La Protesta, 2 March, 8 April 1900. 
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This opposition was effective because, despite the claims of Joan Codina, the Federation was in no 
way anarchist dominated. 'nis was indeed admitted by the anarchists themselves. For example 
the anarchist weekly, El Productor, was later to state that at the FTE's founding congress, "there 
were delegates of various political persuasions (tendencias sociologicas), though the vast majority 
maintained a purely trade unionist perspective". 31 
This political diversity was reflected in the FIFE's internal composition. The remnants of 
the TCV had affiliated and exercised considerable influence through its president, Ramon 
Fontanals. Within the FIE he held the important post of president of the First District, which 
encompassed Barcelona and the surrounding towns, and played a key role in the recruitment drives 
the FIFE launched during the year. The Socialists, however, were in a stronger position. The 
maintained the support of textile unions in the towns of Manresa, Mataro, Sant Martf and Roda. 
They were also the dominant tendency within the FIFE's mouthpiece, Revista Social. The paper's 
administration was to be found in Manlleu. However, its director was Toribio Reoyo, and it was 
the Catalan Socialists who therefore appeared most regularly in its pages. Moreover, another key 
figure in the FIFE, Josep Genolla', was a Socialist. Genolla was president of the Fourth District 
when it was founded. He moved on to preside the Sant Marti textile union, then the Sixth District 
(Manresa and its surrounds), finally to replace the Manlleu union activist, Angel Aguilar, as the 
FTE's president in August 1900. The anarchists were, in fact, the poor relations in the FTE. 
Their influence was almost entirely limited to the Fourth District, and depended on such figures as 
Gaspar Vifiolas, and Jaume Roma, president of the TorellO textile union. 32 
The anarchists' subordinate position within the FrE becomes even clearer if the policy it 
pursued is examined. The FIE never condoned the class collaborationism of the old Catalan wide 
TCV. On the contrary, in response to the mill owners attacks on working conditions and 
established work practices it bitterly criticised their greed and selfishness. Indeed, even the old 
TCV leaders had to adopt a more strident vocabulary to keep up with the times. Nevertheless, as 
was noted in Chapter Three, the FIFE leadership counselled prudence in taking strike action. In 
addition, much of the old organisational structure of the TCV was resurrected, including the 
employment of paid officials. Both these decisions flew in the face of direct action. Moreover, the 
FTE's General Secretary, Josep Guiteras, held the equally unanarchist belief that unions should 
form friendly benefit societies and operate strike funds. 33 The FTE's leaders also supported the 
implementation of the Government's social legislation. Thus, in February 1900, Guiteras and 
Fontanals visited Madrid with the aim of convincing the Minister of the Interior and leading figures 
31. El Productor (EP), 27 July 1901. 
32. For GenolIA's Socialist credentials see, ES, 27 December 1901. 
33. Santiago Castillo refers to Guiteras as an "old Socialist militant". "Origines", p. 104. 
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within the parties of the opposition not to support a campaign launched by the cotton textile 
employers which aimed to ensure that the proposed law on female and child labour would permit 
them to work more than an 11 hour day and 48 hours Per week night work. Fontanals and Guiteras 
were strongly criticised by a number of anarchists, who accused them of reformism and of 
collaborating with the bourgeoisie. 34 Nevertheless, their actions were vindicated at the FrE's 
second congress, which approved a resolution in favour of the setting up of local commissions to 
oversee the work of the juntas locales de reforrms sociales the Government intended to set up to 
ensure its social legislation was implemented. 35 
The FrE claimed to be an independent, "neutral", organisation, only concerned with trade 
union affairs. No labour federation could, however, be completely neutral. The trade union 
practice advocated by the Federation was clearly not anarchist inspired. And while no group was 
dominant, during 1900 the Socialists were able to play a leading role within the FTE. The majority 
of Socialists were, however, too astute to jeopardise their position by trying to force the Federation 
to join the UGT. This became clear at the FrE's second congress held in the Summer of 1900. 
At this congress the Matar6 branch proposed that the FIE affiliate to the UGT. Yet the 
proposition was not finally voted upon, and it was precisely Toribio Reoyo who opposed its 
discussion. Reoyo, though a compositor, represented the Ripoll cotton textile workers at the 
congress, and he presided over the session in which the question was brought forward. He replied 
that discussion of the subject would only lead to disunity, thereby playing into the hands of the 
bourgeoisie, and that the time was not yet ripe to join the UGT. Because of their interest it is 
worth quoting his subsequent arguments at some length. He continued: 36 
Taking this into account, I have to declare that if as a compositor and Socialist I am in 
favour of the Spanish UGT and that all the unions, craft federations and unions of craft 
federations join, as a delegate of the Ripoll textile union I feel all attempts at confederation 
are premature. The Textile Federation has to adapt its plans to a series of special 
circumstances which do not effect the UGT nor any other association. Moreover, it has 
continually to intervene to solve disputes between workers and employers, and has to cope 
with an endless number of strikes. In these circumstances I repeat all attempts at 
confederation are premature. This (will be the case) while the Federation does not achieve 
the growth in the number of workers necessary, does not spread to all those provinces in 
which there are textile workers, and while there is not the conviction needed, on the part of 
the membership, to unite with another organisation (i. e., the UGT), and accept, comply 
with, and defend its goals, its statutes, and its leadership. Without this either one of the 
organisations which have united could be damaged, if not both at once. 
34. Juan de Cataluha, "Los Obreros 
35. Revista Fabril, 5 July, 12 July, 19 July 1900. 
36. Revista Fabril, 19 July 1900. 
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The argument put forward by Reoyo that the FIFE was not yet strong enough to join the 
UGT is by itself difficult to accept, for if the membership figures given at this congress are 
anywhere near the truth then the FIFE had at least twice as many members as the UGT. Reoyo 
appears, on the one hand, to have been worried by the opposition any move to join the UGT 
would occasion. On the other, he was aware - and this was made quite clear in his statement - that 
the high level of industrial conflict in cotton textiles stood the FIFE apart from those unions 
affiliated to the UGT. More than the FTE's overall membership, then, Toribio Reoyo seems to 
have had doubts, given the climate of industrial relations in the industry, as to the Federation's 
long term stability, and of its ability to follow the moderate strike policy advocated by the Socialist 
leadership. In this respect, as has been seen, he was not mistaken. 
The vast ma ority of delegates at the congress, including Josep Guiteras and Ramon 
Fontanals, supported Reoyo's stance. However, at the end of the year, as a result of the employer 
offensive against the cotton textile unions the balance of Political forces within the FTE was 
drastically to change. 37 Already at the beginning of 1900 the FIFE leadership had threatened the 
Ripoll employers with a general strike if they did not lift the lock-out they had imposed in the 
Freser. This was the first time that, in exasperation, it had contradicted its conciliatory approach to 
industrial disputes. The Freser lock-out, nevertheless, proved just a warning. The employers' 
assault on the FFE began at the end of the year and left the majority of its members either locked- 
out or on strike. In such circumstances drastic action had to be taken. Amongst the rank and file 
the belief had already been growing that a general strike would be necessary to halt the 
industrialists in their tracks. Once the offensive was underway a number of Barcelona trade unions 
went further and called for a solidarity strike of the entire Catalan working class. Its aim would be 
to pressure the Government into restoring constitutional guarantees, and to force the employers to 
reopen their factories. 
This initiative was apparently supported by the FrE's central committee. The decision to 
support a general strike, however, immediately had the effect of alienating the Socialists. That this 
was the case could be seen when a delegate from the FIFE, Joan Matamala, a leading figure in the 
Ripoll textile union, visited Madrid to ask Pablo Iglesias to sign a letter supporting the workers and 
protesting at the attitude of the authorities and the Catalan industrialists. The letter had already been 
signed by the Madrid anarchist, Federico Urales, and the leader of the Barcelona republicans, 
Alejandro Lerroux. Nevertheless, a meeting of the PSOE's National Committee refused to give its 
consent because, they argued, the effect would be to favour the declaration of a general strike to 
which they - unlike Lerroux and the anarchists - were opposed. 
The Socialists then accused the 
37. For this offensive see, Chapter Three, pp. 88-91. 
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anarchists of being behind the general strike, and once it was clear by the middle of December that 
it had failed the mouthpiece of the Madrid Socialists, El Socialista, triumphantly announced: 38 
Let this misfortune serve as a lesson to the workers everywhere. Let them see who best 
advises them, the anarchists, who continually call for general strikes, or the Socialists, who 
recommend they flee from them and solidly organise themselves in order to demand little 
by little - because at present there is no other way - working conditions that better their sad 
state, and ensure that when they come into conflict with their employers they do not allow 
themselves to be influenced by pernicious sentimentalism, but calculate and reflect on their 
actions. 
This attitude was endorsed by the Catalan Socialists. Thus, Josep Comaposada commented: "The 
general strike has passed off with its oft repeated victims: dreamers who took it seriously, and 
thought the time had arrived to launch a coup. And ... until the next one. 
', 39 
The Socialists, however, did not make clear what their alternative was. They had, along 
with representatives of the TCV and independent trade unionists, been dominant within the F71E 
during 1899 and the first half of 1900. During this time they had pursued a moderate trade union 
policy under the belief that only through negotiation and by avoiding all out conflict would they be 
able to build a strong labour federation in cotton textiles. They hoped to fashion this federation 
along the lines of the British New Model or the German Free Trades Unions. Thus, it was to be 
staffed by paid officials, and offer strike pay and friendly benefits to its members. 
40 But the 
employer assault on the textile unions at the end of the year, backed up by police and civil guard, 
had made this vision unrealisable. In this respect the situation was very similar to that between 
1889 and 1891. During the second half of 1900 the base had become increasingly convinced that 
to halt the industrialists a general strike would be necessary, and at the end of the year the FTE's 
central committee saw no alternative but to endorse this policy. The Socialists phobia of the 
concept of the general strike led them radically to oppose the action. This was probably not the 
most sensible course to have pursued, for the anarchist press could easily respond 
by accusing the 
Socialists of abandoning the cotton textile workers. In the Alta Muntanya the general strike call 
seems largely to have been followed by those textile workers who were not already on strike or 
locked-out. Many of them, therefore, probably sympathised with the anarchists' reaction. 
Although the failure of the strike may also have led them to reflect on the efficacy of the general 
strike weapon. 
38. ES, 14 December 1900. 
39. ES, 8 February 1901. 
40. To quote A. SoIA, a Socialist militant from Roda, they 
favoured the foundation of labour federations 
that, "are as solid as the powerful federations run by our 
brothers and sisters in the above mentioned 
countries (Germany, England and Belgium), and which 
imitate their tactics, discipline and cohesion". La 
Guerra Social, 27 June 1903. 
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In 1900, then, the Socialists had played a key role in Catalonia's foremost labour 
federation. This seemed a good foundation on which to build up a strong presence within the 
Catalan labour movement. By 1901, however, this dream was in ruins, for not only had the cotton 
textile workers been forced out on a general'strike, but the FIFE had been totally destroyed. In 
Barcelona between 1899 and 1903 events took a not altogether dissimilar turn. 
In Barcelona in the mid 1890s only a handful of trade unions had been affiliated to the 
UGT. However, the Socialists had considerably more influence in the labour movement than this 
would suggest. The UGT headquarters, located in the fifth district, was the only labour federation 
which operated in Barcelona at that time. Moreover, it was open to all unions that wished to join 
even if they were not members of the UGT. Several unions took advantage of this fact to establish 
themselves in the UGTs offices, known as the Centre de Societats Obreres, without affiliating to 
the UGT. 41 More surprising, not even all the UGTs leadership was Socialist. Thus, for 
example, the republican, Luis Zurdo Olivares, became president of the UGT in May 1896. He 
resigned several months later. Nevertheless, when a new UGT central committee was elected in 
November it included representatives of a number of unions that had not formally affiliated. 
During these years, then, the UGT was very much an umbrella organisation which allowed the 
Socialists considerable influence outside the limited circle of unions that were members. 42 
As in cotton textiles, therefore, the Socialists appeared to be in a good position to take 
advantage of the trade union revival of 1899. Unfortunately they were hindered by a split which 
had since the early 1880s developed between the UGT leadership and the local branch of the 
PSOE. This split became particularly serious when at the end of 1898 the Barcelona PSOE 
decided to form it own labour federation, the Grup de Corporacions Obreres, in opposition to the 
UGT. 43 It is difficult to pin-point the reasons for this split, for the Socialist press made absolutely 
no comment. The veteran Socialist militant, Juan Jose Morato, was later to state that it was the 
result of "internal personal rivalries"', but this explanation seems inadequate. 44 Possibly, tension 
between the two organisations was a result of the fact that the Barcelona PSOE was more in tune 
with the Madrid Socialist leadership, who emphasised the leading role of the party, and would 
probably have wished the UGT to be a more homogeneous Socialist organisation. 
45 
41. Thus of the 10 unions which resided in the Centre de Societats Obreres in May 1897 5 probably 
belonged to the UGT. 
42. Santiago Castillo, "Los Origines", p. 239; La Repijbka SOC'al, 22 September 1897. 
43. ES, 30 December 1898. 
44. J. J. Morato, El Partido Socialista Obrero (Madrid, 1976), p. 139. 
45. The leading figure in the Barcelona branch of the PSOE, Josep Comaposada, wrote on Catalan aff airs 
in El Socialista, and appears to have been closely allied to Pablo Iglesias. 
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Table 5.1. Trades Linked to the Centre de Societats Obreres and Grup de Corporacions Obreres during 1900. 
Centre de Societats Obreres 
Shopworkers, ADM 
Locksmiths 
Union of Spanish Railway Workers*+ 
Marblers*+ (UGT) 
Carriage Makers*+ 
Woollen Dyers*+ (Joined UGT 1900) 
Coal Unloaders*+ 
Wood Unloaders*+ 
Cereal Unloaders*+ 
Colliers and Haulers*+ 
Tres Clases de Vapor*+ 
Card Painters*+ (UGT) 
Sant Marti Painters 
Sant Marti bricklayers 
Bookbinders 
Compositors, L'Art d'Imprimir* 
Shirt Makers* 
Tavern Assistants 
Hatmakers " La Fulla " 
Various Trades* 
Grup de Corporacions Obreres 
Trades Dependent on Tailoring* 
Painters " La Defen sa " *+ (Joined UGT 1900) 
Papermakers*+ 
Mechanical Ernbroiders*+ 
Blacksmiths*+ 
Wood Turners*+ 
Furniture Fitters and Varnishers*+ 
Iron Foundrymen*+ 
Iron Boilermakers*+ 
Confectioners*+ 
Trades Being Organised in November 1900 
Electricians 
Hotel and Tavern Workers 
Wax Chandlers 
Makers of Cardboard Boxes 
Brewers 
Sources. La Publicidad, El Socialista, 1899. 
Shopworkers, ADM 
Locksmiths* 
Hatters " Fulistes 
Power Sawyers* 
Rollers and Pressers 
Coachmen 
Harness Makers* 
Copper Boilermakers 
Imitation Cabinetmakers* 
Sant Marti Cotton Textiles 
Barbers 
Shoemakers, L'Igualtat* 
Installers of Mosaics* 
Hosiery Workers* 
Brass and Tinsmiths* (UGT) 
Arts and Crafts (UGT) 
Whatever the reasons for the split, It did not prevent the two Socialist headquarters from 
rapidly expanding during 1899. They remained the only labour federations to function in the city. 
As a result, a large number of unions were founded by members of one or other of the Socialist 
associations. Furthermore, some Barcelona unions which had at first set up in other premises 
subsequently moved to one of the Socialist headquarters. An idea of the relative strength of the 
UGT Centre and PSOE Grup can be attained by counting the number of unions which participated 
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in the rival May day demonstrations the Socialists organised, along with the unions which were 
affiliated to one or other of the federations. (see Table 5.1. )46 
As the table indicates a total of 52 unions maintained some kind of contact with the Centre 
or Grup during the year. This represented the bulk the city's trade union organisations. The 
Centre remained the most influential association with between 16 and 22 unions affiliated between 
October and November, while about 11 unions formed part of the Grup. This division, but also 
the Socialists' relative strength was reflected in a comment by the anarchist weekly La Protesta 
that: 47 
Last Tuesday 32 unions from Barcelona and its Llano met to try and organise a federation. However, as soon as the two bands of Socialists came face to face there was no holding back the storm. 
Poor working class in the hands of the Socialists! 
The Socialists' influence should not, however, be exaggerated. Many of the unions that 
had made contact with the Socialists did so simply because there was no alternative. This was 
particularly the case of those unions that had participated in the May day demonstrations. The May 
day meetings of 1899 were the first to be held in seven years. Only the two Socialist federations 
had made preparations to hold meetings. Any union that wished to demonstrate its sense of 
working class solidarity and support such demands as an eight hour day would, therefore, have to 
contact the Socialists. Moreover, the loyalty of even those unions which resided in one or other 
Socialist headquarters was also in doubt. As has been seen the UGT had been prepared to take in 
unions that were not members of the UGT, and table 5.1. makes clear how few of the unions 
which operated from the Centre actually were members. 
The precariousness of the Socialists' position became clear in the following year. During 
1900, as was seen in Chapter Four, the labour movement grew rapidly in strength, and industrial 
conflict became notably more severe. Tbus began a spiral of labour discontent that would peak in 
1902 and 1903.48 The UGT headquarters had been moved to Madrid in September 1899. 
Nevertheless, the two Socialist federations operated as previously. They continued to play a key 
co-ordinating role within organised labour, and were indeed able to expand their membership. 
46. Those unions under the title Centre de Societats Obreres with no symbol after their name simply 
supported the Centre's May day demonstration. Those with the symbol * were affiliated at some time 
during the year, and those with a+ were affiliated at the end of October. In the case of the Grup de 
Corporacions Obreres, again, those unions with no symbol after their name merely attended the Grup's 
May day demonstration. Those with the symbol +were affiliated between June and August. The symbol 
(UGT) signifies they definately belonged to the UGT. LID, 22 October 1899, ME; ES, 24 Novemeber 
1899. 
47. La Protesta, 27 August 1899. 
48. See Chapter Four, pp. 121-136. 
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Moreover, the Centre and Grup also entered into negotiations. These were to bear fruit in the 
following year when they were finally to fuse. However, by the end of 1900 the Socialists' profile 
within the labour movement was lower than it had been in 1899. This was reflected in the fact that 
the growth of the two Socialist associations had not kept pace with the overall expansion of union 
organisation in Barcelona. Evidence suggests there was a connection between the eclipse of the 
Socialists, and in growth of industrial conflict in the Catalan capital. As has been pointed out the 
Socialists had adopted a moderate trade union practice, and therefore argued that the workers 
demand should not be exaggerated, and that strikes should only be called as a last resort. During 
1900, as a result, they were to be found not leading the unions into battle against the bourgeoisie, 
but trying to rei,., in them in. Consequently, the played practically no part in the major strikes which 
were declared during the year. 
Two examples illustrate this situation particularly well. In 1899 the only painters union in 
Barcelona, La Defensa, formed part of the Centre. In 1900, however, a new painters union called 
La Fraternal was founded. From the start it adopted a more aggressive stance than La De e a. .f ns 
This proved popular and as a result its membership rapidly outstripped that of La Defensa. Then in 
June 1900 La Fraternal called for a5 pesetas minimum wage, an 8 hour day, and the "regulation" 
of apprenticeship. The employers reaction was to lock-out all the painters in the industry, 
including those affiliated to La Defensa. The Socialists were outraged, but their criticism centred 
on La Fraternal, which they maintained had provoked the lock-out though its "excessive" 
demands. Thus El Socialista informed its readership: "Thanks to the unpremeditated resolution of 
a union in Barcelona, founded by elements in favour of uproar and rowdiness, an attitude which 
endangers the existence of the unions, our companions from the painters and decorators union, La 
Defensa, have been obliged to suffer the consequences of an employer coalition, which has thrown 
them out of the workshops. ', 49 
The second example illustrates the extent to which the Socialists were out of step with the 
growing radicalism of many Barcelona unions. The largest strike called in 1900 affected 1,300 
mechanics. It attracted widespread working class sympathy but was finally lost. The Socialists, 
however, were very critical of the way the strike was run. For example, Josep Comaposada 
argued that: "The 11ýrincipal causes (of the strike's defeat) were; the error of expecting simple 
enthusiasm to be enough; the rejection of the efficacy of strike funds to finance the workers 
resistance; and the hastiness with which the struggle was entered into, without the workers' 
organisation yet having the necessary consistency". 50 In other words the union's fundamental 
49. ES, 15 June 1900. 
50. ES, 23 November 1900. 
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mistake was, for Comaposada, not to have followed the policies advocated by the PSOE and 
UGT. 
'Me lack of Socialist support for aggressive union tactics, and hence their criticisms of the 
way in which the years major disputes had been conducted, laid them open to the charge - as in the 
Alta Muntanya - that they had no qualms about abandoning the workers if they were not part of the 
Socialists' organisation. The Socialists rejected this argumentý and countered that there was no 
reason why "well organised and far sighted unions", who were biding their time in order to call for 
improvements in working conditions when circumstances were favourable, should bale out other 
who had gone on strike without being sufficiently prepared. 51 
Nevertheless, the Socialists lost influence in the main branches of Barcelona industry 
during the year. They had from the start little support in the construction industry. The carpenters 
and bricklayers unions had almost without exception remained aloof from the Socialist 
associations, and during 1900 it became clear that only a minority of painters sympathised with the 
Socialists' trade union practice. In metallurgy they had had more success, but during the year the 
iron foundrymen and boilermakers left the Centre leaving the copper boilermakers and locksmiths 
as the only metal unions which supported the Socialists. Significantly, they were also the most 
reformist. This was especially clear in the case of the locksmiths, whose union flag consisted of 
two arms intertwined, representing harmony between labour and capital. 52 In printing the 
Socialists experienced a similar haemorrhage of support. The compositors union, LArt 
Vmprimir, had actually been founded in the PSOE's headquarters in 1899, but left soon 
afterwards. It was followed in 1900 by the bookbinders, thereby leaving the Socialists with no 
influence within the printing industry. 53 
The difficulties faced by the Socialists represented an opportunity for the anarchists. As 
has been seen, they were driven underground in the mid 1890s, and only in 1900 were they again 
able to make their presence felt within the labour movement. The sharpening industrial conflict of 
these years, moreover, provided them with a favourable terrain on which to work, for while the 
Socialists tried desperately to halt the escalation in the number of strikes, they were happy to 
encourage the unions to present their employers with maximalist demands, support strike action if 
the demand were not met in full, and then call for solidarity strikes. 
As a result the anarchists speakers were to become increasingly in evidence at union 
meetings during 1900. None the less, the anarchists still remained in the shade of the 
Socialists. 
51. ES, 19 October 1900. 
52. LP, 24 April 1900, ME. 
53. Boletin, 31 December 1899; LP, 12 August 1900, ME. 
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Thus, the efforts by a pro-anarchist carpenters union, La Nova Unto, to form a new local 
federation ended in failure. 54 Furthermore, the anarchists were still in no position to organise a 
rival May day demonstration, though this year they were at least able to console themselves with 
the fact that they had disrupted proceedings at the Socialist gathering. It was not until 1901 that the 
tables were turned, and anarchist sympathisers came increasingly to dominate the Barcelona labour 
movement. Of key importance in this process was the meeting of 13 anarchists groups in 
Barcelona on 13 April 1901. At this meeting they decided to name a commission which would 
organise meetings and other acts; actively operate within the trade unions, "destroying the tutelage 
exercised by the authoritarian Socialist party"; and publish a weekly newspaper, to be called El 
Productor. 55 The first number of El Productor was published on 6 July. In reality it was 
published by a group of anarchists who had formed around the shoemaker, Joan Baptista Esteve 
(pseudonim, Leopoldo Bonafulla). It combined some theoretical pieces with detailed information 
on the labour movement, and soon achieved a wide circulation in working class circles. Another 
anarchist weekly entitled La Huelga General was published from the end of the year. Its backer 
was Francesc Ferrer, a wealthy ex-republican who had been converted to anarchism during exile in 
France in the 1890s. His foremost collaborator was Anselmo Lorenzo, who had first become 
active in labour politics at the time of the First International. He was by the turn of the century 
considered the "grandfather" of Spanish anarchism. Ferrer was to become famous as the founder 
of the Modem School of rationalist education in Barcelona. However, though close contact was 
maintained with the group who published El Productor, Ferrer and Lorenzo had far less influence, 
and their publication took on a largely theoretical character. 56 
During 1901 Leopoldo Bonafulla and his collaborators launched a large number of 
meetings in support of striking workers, and two major protest campaigns against the 
Government. The meetings were not specifically anarchist. Bonafulla's close collaborators did, of 
course, participate in them. The most famous was Teresa Claramunt. She was originally 
from 
Sabadell, but was now based in Barcelona and dedicated herself to organising the 
female textile 
workers. Yet, other speakers only accepted parts of the anarchist creed. Such was the case of 
NEguel Guitart. Guitart, as we have seen, had taken rather a moderate stance as 
General Secretary 
of the FIE in 1900. Seemingly radicalised by events at the end of the year, 
however, he moved 
down to Barcelona, and at these meetings combined fierce antipoliticism and calls 
for a bloody 
revolution, with continued support for the idea that unions should provide 
friendly benefits. Such 
54. LP, 16 October 1900, ME; ES, 27 October 1900. 
55. LP, 12 April 1901, ME; La Protesta, 18 April 1901. 
56. For Francesc Ferrer and the Modern School see especially, Joan 
Connelly Ullman, op cit, pp. 61-62. 
149-176.; Pere SoIA, Francesc Ferrer i Guardia LEscola Moderna (Barcelona, 
1978). 
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was also the case of Luis Zurdo Olivares. ZurdO Olivares was still a republican, but at the 
meetings he rather eccentrically combined support for an independent Party of the working class, 
with defence of the revolutionary general strike. 57 
Nevertheless, what all these speakers had in common was that they favoured a more 
combative union strategy, and a more forceful opposition to government policy than that offered by 
the Socialists. The first big meeting organi sed by the anarchists was held at the end of March to 
protest at the conduct of the authorities and support a strike in Igualada. During the rest of the year 
a number of meetings of this type were held. They were very popular and attracted two or three 
thousand workers a time. In July and August the anarchists also launched a campaign against 
government repression of a strike in La Cortifia. The strike had been anarchist led and, therefore, 
the Socialists refused to participate. Nevertheless, in Barcelona the campaign was a great success. 
The anarchists were able to draw large crowds to their meetings and also received the support of 
some republican elements. In November there followed a campaign against the Government's 
proposed strike legislation. The Government had recently introduced a bill into the Cortes which 
specified the lapse of several days between the calling of a strike and the actual withdrawal of 
labour power in order for it to be declared legal. Both anarchists and Socialists argued that the bill 
represented an attack on the right to strike. Nevertheless, in Barcelona it was the anarchists who 
seized the initiative. Thus they formed a commission which then called a series of meetings the 
largest of which, held on 24 November, received the support of 49 unions and was attended by a 
crowd of several thousand. 58 In all at least 68 Barcelona unions affiliated to one or more of the 
anarchist organised protest meetings held during the year. 
As a result of the escalation of social conflict and political tensions, then, the anarchists 
confrontationalist style had attracted widespread working class sympathy. Support for the 
anarchists was, however, strongest amongst workers in trades in which labour relations were 
especially poor. The bricklayers and bricklayers labourers unions had a high profile in the 
anarchist camp. The same can be said of the painters union La Fraternal, and the carpenters union, 
La Nova Unio. The anarchists also received strong support from the mechanics and iron 
foundrymens' unions, and through them from the Barcelona Metalworkers' Federation when it 
was founded in November 1901. By 1901 Anarchist sympathisers also dominated the 
compositors' union, LArt Vmprirnir, and the tanners', cabinetmakers' and carters' unions. 
Finally, support within the cotton textile finishing trades was strong. As was noted in 
Chapter 
Three it was workers in these trades, along with such figures as Teresa Claramunt, who 
reorganised the female Barcelona textile workers at the end of 1901. Not surprisingly, then, the 
57. LP, 31 March, ME; 14 July, NE, 1901. 
58. LP, 24 November 1901, NE; EP, 30 November 1901. 
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new union was anarchist led. It therefore represented a total break with the TCV, which had 
dominated trade union organisation in the city in the late nineteenth century. Indeed the cotton 
textile workers, able to speak for the first time in many years, were unanimous in their 
condemnation of the male TCV leadership, who they maintained had made no effort to improve 
their working conditions. The structure of the new union was, indeed, to be very different from 
that of the TCV. Thus dues were to be very low, and there were to be no strike funds for, in the 
words of Teresa Claramunt, "to fight the bourgeoisie and defeat it was is needed is energy". 59 
Between 1902 and 1903 some of the aforementioned unions were to work for the 
formation of specifically anarchist craft or industrial federations. This was the case of the 
Barcelona painters, who founded a regional painters' federation at the end of 1902. The Barcelona 
bricklayers followed suit and set up a supposedly national federation of bricklayers and bricklayers 
labourers (in reality only Catalan unions were affiliated) in Febuary 1903. Finally between 31 May 
and 2 June 1903 the Barcelona metalworkers were able to found their own regional federation. 
The bricklayers and metalworkers federations were organised in direct competition with the 
Spanish Socialists, who set up their own federations at a similar time. However, the UGT labour 
organisations had little impact in Catalonia, with only the Socialist bricklayers federation having a 
solitary Catalan union affiliated. 60 
These Barcelona trade unions, then, were at the forefront of the anarchist recruitment drive. 
In addition, other unions, though less conspicuous, also sympathised with the militant speakers at 
anarchist organised rallies. This level of support allowed the anarchists finally to form a local 
federation in opposition to the Socialists at the end of 1901. La Huelga General stated that in line 
with anarchist postulates it would have no strike fund, for the workers would only triumph 
through "the energy and high level of consciousness they demonstrate in their acts". Subscriptions 
would, moreover, be voluntary, and the federation's funds would - once administrative costs had 
been dealt with - be dedicated to "acts of solidarity". 
61 
The growth in anarchist support was not, however, limited to Barcelona. There had been a 
rapid growth in labour organisation throughout much of Spain. Social conflict had increased 
Particularly dramatically in Andalusia, an area from which the anarchists had since the early 1880s 
received strong backing. 62 These developments encouraged the anarchists to try and set up their 
59. EP, 30 November, 7 December 1901. 
60. EP, 20 December 1902,21 February, 21 March, 28 March, 6 June 1903; La Guerra Social, 28 March 
1903; El Trabajo (ET), 12 September 1903; Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 504-505. 
61. La Huelga General, 15 December, 25 December 1901. 
62. Temma Kaplan, Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903 (Princeton, 1977), p. 200. 
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own labour confederation in competition with the the PSOE and UGT. As we have seen, the 
attempt by a number of Catalan unions in February 1900 to organise such a confederation ended in 
failure. The Madrid based bricklayers union, El Porvenir del Trabajo, was to be more successful. 
In June it made a call for the celebration of a congress open to all workers in Joan Montseny's 
(pseudonym, Federico Urales) La Revista Blanca. Urales was originally a cooper. He had been 
active in the Catalan labour movement in the 1880s, but subsequently moved to Madrid. It was on 
his initiative that a campaign had been launched in 1897 to press for a judicial review of the 
Montjufc trial, and his efforts gained him widespread recognition on the left. He published La 
Revista Blanca from the following year. It was the only nation-wide anarchist publication of any 
note at the time, and it was therefore through its pages that the Catalan anarchists largely relied for 
information on the rest of Spain. 63 
When the note from El Porvenir del Trabajo appeared, then, it did not fall on deaf ears. 
The congress was finally held in Madrid in October 1900. From Catalonia there were delegates 
from unions in the Ampurda, Terrassa, and from the Barcelona bricklayers. The new 
confederation founded at this congress was known as the FederaciOn Regional Espafiola de 
Sociedades de Resistencia (FRESR). Federico Urales claimed in his memoirs that 52,000 
workers were represented, though this was no doubt an exaggeration. 64 The so-called Regional 
Office was at first fixed in Girona. This was a recognition of the strength of the Ampurda cork 
workers, who had affiliated with between 6000 and 8000 members. Soon after, however, they 
suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of their employers, so the Regional Office was moved to 
Barcelona in the new year. 
This congress was not, in fact, very well organised. Indeed, during its first year in 
existence the FRESR barely functioned. This is illustrated by the fact that in April 1901 the 
Barcelona Regional Office complained that most of the unions which had affiliated had not sent any 
money to cover costs. 65 It was in order to lay more solid foundations that the confederation's 
second congress was held, again in Madrid, between 14 and 16 October 1901. It was a far more 
important affair than the congress of the previous year, with 50 delegates who represented 175 
unions present. The expansion of anarchist influence in Catalonia can be seen by the fact that there 
were 11 Catalan delegates representing 23 unions at the congress. 11 of these unions were from 
Barcelona, and there were also delegates representing unions from the industrial towns of Terrassa 
63. For the MontjuYc campaign see Chapter Six, pp. 204-209. More information on Federico Urales and 
La Revista Blanca is to be found in, E. R. A. 80, EIS Anarquistes, Educadors del Poble: "La Revista Blanca" 
(1898-1905), Pr6log de Federica Montseny (Barcelona, 1977). 
64. Federico Urales, Mi Vida. Vol. 1. (Barcelona, 1930), p. 72. El Socialista maintained that at most 34,000 
workers were represented. ES, 26 October 1900. 
65. La Protesta, 19 April 1901. 
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and Sabadell near Barcelona, Reus and Valls in the province of Tarragona, Sant Feliu de Guixols 
on the coast near Girona, and Castellvell and Catellar in the Alt Llobregat. 
The congress aimed to set out the Confederation's organisational structure and define its 
political goals. At the congress the delegates signed a "solidarity pact". This pact outlined the 
internal structure envisaged by the delegates. On the one hand there were to be district labour 
federations which grouped together all the workers in a particular area. On the other hand there 
would be national craft federations made up of all the workers of the same or similar trades. Great 
stress was, however, laid on the autonomy of the individual parts. Before going on strike unions 
were advised to consult with the leadership of their respective craft federation, but once a strike had 
been declared the workers were to receive all possible support. Moreover, there were - in typically 
anarchist fashion - to be no dues: the expenses of the Regional Office were to be met by voluntary 
subscriptions. 
The congress dealt with a number of questions involving working conditions, such as the 
need to abolish piece rates, and to take measures to prevent the employment of female and child 
labour. Nevertheless, attention focused on the the role of the general strike. A rather ambiguous 
resolution was passed which stated: "We propose to the congress that as the principle of the 
general strike has been accepted in order to achieve an 8 hour day and to free political prisoners 
(presos sociales) it now be put into practice when the injustices of the bourgeoisie and abuses of 
the authorities make it necessary. " Much clearer was a manifesto signed by the delegates which 
combined virulent antipoliticism with support for a "universal strike" to overthrow capitalism. 66 
The congress's concentration on the question of the general strike reflected a concern felt 
by anarchists throughout the country. In Barcelona during 1901, indeed, it became an obsession. 
The pro-anarchist meetings held during the year were punctuated by continuous calls for a general 
strike. As a result, the general strike assumed a talismanic quality, and came to be seen by many of 
the speakers as a panacea for all the workers' ills. Thus the general strike was recommended to 
force employers to recognise the workers right to form trade unions and in solidarity with striking 
workers; to pressure the government into releasing political prisoners or to withdraw its strike 
legislation; and finally as the only means of overthrowing capitalism. Nor were these calls so 
much hot air. As was seen in Chapter Four, on 9 May a number of Barcelona unions tried to 
organise a general strike in support of the tram drivers. There were as a result clashes between 
strikers, backed up by women and youngster, and the police, resulting in the declaration of martial 
law. Several days previously clashes had accompanied the May day celebrations. This year the 
anarchists were finally able to celebrate their own meeting and demonstration. At the same time 
in 
66. EP, 2 November, 23 November, 7 December, 14 December, 28 December 1901; Federico Urales, 
op cit, pp. 72-73. 
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order to ensure the stoppage was general gangs of workers - with women and children at the 
forefront - stoned any trams that were running, and broke the windows of factories whose 
employers had refused to stop work. 67 
Nevertheless, it was as a result of the metalworkers strike, which began in November 
1901, that the anarchists were finally to realise their dream and preside over a general strike of the 
entire working class. The anarchists were influential within the Metalworkers' Federation, and its 
first president, Ramon Homades, was a strong anarchist supporter. When the strike was declared, 
as was noted in Chapter Four, the metallurgical employers took a totally intransigent line. The 
leadership of the Metalworkers' Federation, therefore, came to the conclusion that a solidarity 
strike of the entire working class would be necessary for the metalworkers to be victorious. Such 
action was, of course, strongly advocated by the pro-anarchist leaders of other Barcelona unions. 
Accordingly, at a meeting held on 1 January 1902 it was agreed that if the the civil governor did 
not come up with a solution to the dispute by the 3rd a general strike would be declared. 68 
The general strike went ahead as planned but proved a failure. The Metalworkers 1) 
1U_ 
Federation reacted by adopting a more conciliatory tone. A commission was formed by a number 
of republican counsellors along with members of the more liberal wing of the Catalan regionalist 
party, Lliga Regionalista, in order to try and find a solution. This commission suggested that a 
committee of worker and employer representatives be formed, along with two engineers, to see if it 
was feasible to reduce working hours. These discussions did not finally bear fruit. However, the 
fact that they were taking place at all provoked harsh criticismrrko'lhe anarchist press. Thus the 
anarchists accused the metalworkers of having kept them out of sight in order not to be accused by 
the Government of being led by "foreign elements". Consequently, they maintained, the 
metalworkers had not pursued an energetic line of action and had let the strike drag on 
interminably. Leopoldo Bonafulla, indeed, went so far as to say that the strike was now lost. 69 
Within the Metallurgical Federation, then, there were elements in favour of a negotiated 
settlement. The refusal of the metallurgical bourgeoisie to make concessions, however, ma et eir 
position untenable. After the negotiations had failed it again became clear that action by the rest of 
the working class would have to be taken if the metalworkers were not to be defeated. Moreover, 
workers from other trades came to see the victory of the metalworkers as vital to the whole labour 
movement. The anarchists also reassessed their position. They still criticised the handling of the 
67. LP, 2 May 1901, ME. 
68. LP, 2 January 1902, ME. 
69. EP, 25 January, 1 February 1902; La Huelga General, 25 January, 5 February 1902. 
179 
dispute but once again stressed the need for the working class to take decisive action on the 
metalworkers behalf 
It was in these circumstances that a mass meeting attended by about 5000 workers was held 
on 15 February. At the meeting anarchist speakers made repeated calls for a general strike. There 
was some confusion as to whether the strike would simply be in solidarity with the metalworkers 
or aimed at overthrowing capitalism. Most of the trade union rank and file probably believed the 
former to be the case, but some anarchist speakers hinted at the latter. Thus, for example, Mariano 
Castellote, the president of the Barcelona bricklayers' labourers union: "Supported the general 
strike because in his opinion it was the only means by which the workers could be victorious. For 
once production had been brought to a halt, despite the army, the civil guard and the police, the 
bourgeoisie must necessarily succumb. -70 As we have seen, the general strike was successfully 
declared on the following day. There was, however, to be no generalised uprising against the 
authorities. 
The 1902 general strike represented the high point of anarchist influence within the 
Barcelona labour movement. The extent of this influence was recognised by La Publicidad when 
it stated that anarchists and Socialists, "have for some time now competed for the leadership and 
organisation of the Barcelona and Catalan working class. The libertarians have prevailed, perhaps 
because there are more of them and they are more active,?. 71 As has been emphasised, the growth 
of anarchist influence over the past two years had been made possible by the escalation of 
industrial conflict and social tension between 1899 and 1902. It was against this background that 
they anarchists confrontationalist tactics seemed to make sense. One of the defining characteristics 
of Catalan anarchism was the way in which its sympathisers constantly mobilised the working 
class against the authorities and bourgeoisie. Indeed, it could be argued that anarchism could only 
flourish as a mass movement in societies in which such mobilisation was viable. This was also 
probably the greatest difference between the anarchists and Socialists, who took a far more 
conciliatory stance, and looked for negotiated settlements to disputes with the state and employers. 
The anarchists continued to enjoy considerable support during 1903.24 unions were 
affiliated to the local anarchist labour federation, and through campaigns and protest meeting they 
were once again able to extend their influence further afield. They were favoured by the fact that 
the level of industrial conflict remained high. Strikes peaked in June and July. Pro-anarchist trade 
unionists were involved in many of these disputes, leading Leopoldo Bonafulla at one point to 
predict that another general strike was shortly to be declared. It was not, however, to be. In fact, 
70. ED, 17 February 1902. 
71. LP, 25 February 1902, ME. 
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the anarchists attempted to declare two further general strikes during the year, and both ended in 
failure. 72 
The first was called in solidarity with the workers of Reus. In January the Reus carters had 
come out on strike, and at the end of the month the rest of the town's labour force had downed 
tools in support. The Barcelona anarchists called a solidarity meeting on 2 February. Several 
thousand workers attended and 30 unions gave the meeting their backing. Encouraged by these 
results the anarchists planned a general strike for 9 February. However it was a total flop, with 
very few workers seconding the call. 73 
The second attempted general strike was rather better prepared. The escalation of class 
conflict in Catalonia and other parts of country encouraged the Barcelona based Regional Office of 
the FRESR to launch a campaign for the release of Spain's political prisoners. The campaign was 
a considerable success. Simultaneous meetings were held in urban areas in many parts of the 
country on 14 June. The Regional Office planned to keep the pressure up by holding further 
meetings until the beginning of August. If the political prisoners had not been released by then, a 
three day general strike was to be called throughout the country. The general strike was finally 
restricted to 3 August. However in Barcelona, despite the fact that 65 unions had published a fly 
sheet giving their support, the strike's repercussions were to be limited. 74 
For many workers, then, the credibility of the general strike weapon was open to question. 
The February 1902 general strike had received almost unanimous support in Barcelona. Yet the 
metalworkers had still been defeated, many workers detained and their unions closed down. These 
workers did not, therefore, wish to see a repeat performance, especially for causes which did not 
seem as vital as the victory of the metalworkers. The workers' reticence struck at the heart of 
anarchist ideology. The anarchists had been able to harness rank and file militancy, but seemed 
unable to channel it in a positive direction. Thus between 1901 and 1903 they had tried constantly 
to declare general strikes, often without it being clear what exactly they wished to achieve: whether 
to win a specific battle or provoke a revolutionary general strike. Indeed the answer to this 
question seems to have been unclear to many anarchists, and their line of reasoning was probably 
that a general strike was the best means to achieve a partial victory, and that with any luck the 
stoppage might become a revolutionary general strike. By the Summer of 1903, however, a 
rethink was obviously needed. Of course it would be difficult for anarchists to question the 
validity of the whole concept of the revolutionary general strike. Yet some anarchists had 
begun to 
72. EP, 7 February, 21 March, 20 June, 27 June 1903. 
73. EP, 7 February, 7 March 1903. 
74. EP, 4 July, 11 July, 18 July, 25 July, 1 August, 8 August 1903. 
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ask whether it was advisable to declare general strikes on all Possible Occasions. For example 
before the strike in solidarity with the workers of Reus there was division within the anarchist 
ranks, with some anarchists arguing that the Reus working class had undertaken no consciously 
rebellious acts, and that if a general strike were declared merely to support economic demands its 
revolutionary significance would be lost. 75 Nevertheless, it was not until after 1907 that there was 
any serious debate on this question. 
It was worker disaffection with the anarchists' constant calls for a general strike that the 
Socialists hoped to tap in order to win back support. As we have seen the Socialists began to fade 
from centre stage in 1900. In 1901 the pace of their decline quickened as a number of unions left 
Centre de Societats Obreres and set up their headquarters elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Socialists 
maintained their complete opposition to the anarchists trade union practice. This could be seen in 
the aftermath of the 1902 general strike. From the first the Madrid Socialists did their utmost to 
prevent the extension of the strike outside Catalonia. El Socialista maintained that if the Socialists 
had seconded the movement the result would have been the formation of a military government 
(gobierno defuerza) and a bloody repression. Moreover, it argued that the general strike had been 
totally ineffective. There had been no plan and no leadership, and consequently only the workers 
had suffered. Finally it concluded that if the workers had been in a stronger position than the 
bourgeoisie then they should have attempted a social revolution. 76 
By adopting this line of argument what the PSOE was doing was reaffim-ning its reformist 
trade union and political policy, while at the same time trying to maintain the goal of social 
revolution intact. The line taken by the Madrid party leadership was strongly supported by the 
Catalan Socialists. 77 However, as in the case of the general strike called by the FIFE in January 
1901, the Socialists' unequivocal condemnation of the general strike probably lost them support in 
Catalonia. Certainly they could point to the ineffectiveness of anarchist tactics. However, as has 
been emphasised, by February 1902 many workers genuinely believed that for the metalworkers to 
win their strike there was no choice but to call a general strike in solidarity. In this atmosphere 
it 
was relatively easy for the anarchists to portray the Socialists as collaborating with the authorities, 
and working for the defeat of the Catalan labour movement because it was not 
in their hands. 
Indeed, Josep Comaposada was later to admit that, "support for the idea of (a general strike) 
spread like lightning, making it totally impossible for its detractors to use reasoned argument 
against it. Whoever did so was not only considered to be anti-revolutionary and therefore and 
75. See the comments of the Barcelona correspondent of the Mahon anarchist weekly 
El Porvenir del 
Obrero, quoted in ES, 13 May 1903. 
76. ES, 27 February, 7 March 1902. 
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enemy of the working class, but was also seen as working for the defeat of the metalworkers. 
Such was the general belief,. 78 Comaposada was, in fact, able to experience this reaction at first 
hand, for along with three other Socialists he was expelled from the Barcelona shoemakers union, 
La Igualtat. Toribio Reoyo, for his part, was expelled from the compositors union, LArt 
d'Imprimir. 79 
Despite this experience the Catalan Socialists maintained the same stance in 1903, and took 
advantage of the failure of the general strike in favour of the workers of Reus to form what could 
be called an anti-general strike front. Under Socialist guidance a number of unions held meetings 
on 9 and 14 February, in which they rejected the use of the general strike. They also decided to 
form a new local federation and published a manifesto. This manifesto did not reject the general 
strike per se, but argued that it could only be put into practice when bourgeois society was ripe to 
be overthrown. At present, it maintained, the working class's lack of culture and consciousness 
made this impossible. And in these circumstances, it concluded, the declaration of general strikes 
could only result in repression of the labour movement and, therefore, would strengthen the 
bourgeoisie. 80 
The manifesto was signed by 19 unions, most of which had been in close contact with the 
Socialists between 1899 and 1902. The UGT central committee also sent a letter of support, and 
urged these unions to form a new labour federation which would wean the working class away 
from anarchist influence. Nevertheless, the Barcelona Socialists did not significantly increase their 
support in working class circles during the year. In February they did form a Catalan Socialist 
federation, and they began publishing a new Catalan Socialist weekly called La Guerra Social. 81 
However, its impact in Barcelona was limited. Thus, the Centre de Societats Obreres had been 
closed down after the February 1902 general strike, but despite the intentions of the unions which 
had signed the manifesto no replacement was opened during the following year. Clearly the high 
level of class conflict was still a barrier to Socialist recruitment in Barcelona, with the result that in 
the Summer of 1903 La Guerra Social was forced to admit that it was the anarchists who had the 
greatest influence in working class circles. 82 
78. La Justicia Social, 16 June 1910. 
79. La Guerra Social, 4 April 1903; EP, 8 August 1903. 
80. ES, 27 February 1903. 
81. ES, 14 February 1903. 
82. La Guerra Social, 27 June, 4 July 1903. The connection between fierce social conflict and anarchist 
influence was, indeed, recognised by El Socialista. Thus, in the Summer of 1903 
it commented 
disaprovingly on the large number of strikes that had broken out in Barcelona and a number of 
Andalusian 
towns. It the stated that in Barcelona the unions lacked the necessary cohesion to put 
forward such 
ambitious demands, and claimed that: "The object of these strikes, more than to achieve a positive result, 
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Between 1888 and 1903, then, the Socialists failed to conquer the leadership of Catalonia's 
labour unions. One of the main reasons for this failure, it has been argued in this chapter, was that 
by the turn of the century their trade union practice was unsuitable to Catalan conditions. It was 
the Madrid Socialist leadership who had first emphasised that in order to build up a strong 
organisation it was necessary to adopt a prudent trade union strategy. Such a policy was easy to 
pursue in a city in which capitalist development had had only a limited impact on the dominant 
artisanal trades, and where, consequently, relations between masters and men were still relatively 
cordial. 83 The UGT was, as a result, a great success in Madrid, and by the first decade of the 
century about half of its members came from Madrid province. (see Fig. 5.1. ) 
Madrid was the power base of Spanish Socialism, and it was therefore the conduct of 
industrial relations in Madrid that shaped official union and party practice. In Catalonia, moreover, 
the Socialists first taste of trade union organisation had been within the reformist TCV. This fact 
tended to reinforce the Catalan Socialists' support for the policy of the Madrid based PSOE. 
Indeed, the Barcelona Socialists had never totally split with the TCV, and they would often work 
together against the anarchists. Thus, between 1890 and 1893 members of the TCV participated in 
the Socialists' May day demonstrations. Later in the decade, in 1899, the remnants of the 
Barcelona TCV joined the Centre de Societats Obreres, and two of its leading figures, Ramon 
Fontanals and Joan Vidal, became members of the Centre's committee. 84 In addition, between 
1899 and 1903, the TCV once again attended the Socialists' May day meetings. 
However, in Catalonia from the n-ýid-1880s class conflict became increasingly intense. 
Furthermore, until the late 1890s the authorities dealt with labour protest with a heavy hand. From 
about 1900 the state made some attempt to put labour relations on a more stable footing but, as the 
example of the destruction of the FTE demonstrates, it was still on occasion prepared to take 
decisive action against union organisation. Of course, class conflict and state repression were 
closely interrelated phenomena, for it was in areas in which there was a high level of class conflict 
that the state felt it necessary to defend the interests of capital and "restore order". The break up of 
the FTE was a particularly severe blow for the Socialists, because it deprived them of their 
principal trade union base in Catalonia. Nevertheless, in some of the Alta Muntanya textile towns 
- especially in the Ter Valley - the Socialists still retained some support. 
This was probably 
because traditions of bureaucratic union organisation, which stretched back to the days of the old 
Catalan TCV, still put a break on anarchist recruitment in these areas. 
seems to be to produce the stoppage of the greatest number of trades possible. This is what the 
anarchists long for. " ES, 3 July 1903. 
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Unlike the Socialists, the anarchists thrived on intense social conflict. Between 1899 and 
1903, therefore, they were able to organise a coalition of forces in favour of militant union tactics, 
and the mobilisation of working class protest against state policies. T'he anarchists were favoured 
by the fact that most Catalan workers had been unable to structure professionally run craft or 
industrial labour federations. On the contrary, as was emphasised in Chapter Four, outside the 
textile industries paid officials were not employed. Union committees were highly democratic and 
were made up of workers who dealt with union business in their spare time. Most workers had 
found it impossible to organise effectively in the 1890s, and so between 1900 and 1903 (as 
between 1910 and 1914) they were eager for their grievances to be redressed. In addition because 
there were no union bureaucracies to hold back rank and file militants in the heated atmosphere of 
the mass meetings it was easy for the most radical propositions to win the day. This was 
especially the case as unions tended to be unstable, and so shop floor activists feared that if action 
were not taken immediately enthusiasm would wear off and the chance would be lost. 85 
It was within this context that anarchist direct action could seem a plausible strategy. The 
anarchists, therefore, tended to have the greatest support in trades in which industrial relations 
were poor. This support does not seem to have been limited to any specific group of workers. 
Thus the anarchists could gain the backing of artisanal workers, like the bricklayers and 
compositors, and of industrial workers such as cotton textile power-loom weavers and carters. 
What, however, does seem to have been a common element was that workers in unions under 
anarchist influence tended to look outside the narrow confines of their trade for support from other 
sections of the working class. Indeed, it was the anarchists rather than the Socialists who took the 
lead in advocating the formation of unions which cut across craft lines. From about 1907, in 
typically syndicalist fashion, this stance developed into a policy in favour of the formation of 
industrial unions. 86 
In contrast, those unions which remained within the Barcelona Socialists' sphere of 
influence for a number of years did not usually represent workers in the most conflictive trades. 
This, for example, was the case of the marblers in the construction industry, and the copper 
boilermakers in metallurgy. Both maintained close links with the Socialists from 1889-1890 right 
through to 1914. In each case the union represented a trade which remained somewhat aloof 
from 
the major industrial conflicts in their respective industry. It was also notable that during the 
1890s 
the Catalan Socialists built up nuclei of support amongst artisanal workers in the towns of 
Tarragona and Sitges south of Barcelona. From the turn of the century they were also able 
to 
dominate union organisation in Reus and Tortosa. Indeed, by the end of the 
decade their relative 
85. See Chapter Four, pp. 122,138-139. 
86. Chapter Seven, p. 260. 
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strength in these areas contrasted with their lack of support in Barcelona itself. A common 
denominator of the labour relations in the artisanal trades in these areas appears to have been a 
lower level of industrial conflictivity than that apparent in the Catalan capital itself. 87 
However, although the 60-odd Barcelona unions in some way linked to the anarchists 
favoured a more combative stance than that advocated by the Socialists, they did not accept all 
aspects of anarchist ideology. Many were clearly not committed supporters of the anarchist cause. 
Thus relatively few unions sent delegates or even adhered to the FRESR's national congress's, and 
less than 30 seem to have affiliated to pro-anarchist local federation formed at the end of 190 1. 
Indeed, as has been stressed, not all the speakers at the 1901 rallies organised by Leopoldo 
Bonafulla and his colleagues were unambiguously anarchist. In fact once one descends from the 
level of the political leadership to that of the trade union rank and file it becomes increasingly 
difficult to fit workers into such neat categories as anarchist, Socialist or republican. Thus, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, many workers could quite happily go to anarchist trade union 
meetings and then vote republican at election time. 
The gap between anarchist ideologues and the union base can also be seen over the 
question of the role of the state. Anarchists rejected all forms of state intervention. Yet many 
workers close to the anarchist camp did not see all social legislation as a sham, and indeed hoped 
that the implementation of the act limiting the use female and child labour would lead to an 
improvement in working conditions. The Barcelona mechanics, for example, explicitly came out 
in favour of such an act in a booklet they published in 1900 setting out their union statutes. 88 
Furthermore, there were tensions between the anarchist ideal of trade union organisation and 
reality. Few union statutes had such impeccably anarchist credentials as those of the Barcelona 
textile workers union formed in 1901. Thus, despite anarchist claims that not money but energy 
was needed to win industrial disputes, most Barcelona unions tried to build up some kind of strike 
fund, and some paid accident benefits. This last category included the Barcelona bricklayers. 89 
Moreover, the anarchists' claim that outside agencies should not be brought into 
negotiations over working conditions were not taken very seriously. In fact Barcelona civil 
governors were constantly involved in discussions aimed a solving industrial disputes. Such 
discrepancies could lead to serious policy disagreements between the anarchist elite and trade union 
activists. A good example such a conflict was the 1901-1902 metalworkers' strike. 
Despite the 
87. For a quantitative survey of Socialist nuclei in Catalonia see, Xavier Cuadrat, Socialismo y 
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fact that the anarchists were very influential within the Metalworkers' Federation, in January 1902 
the metalworkers' union leadership discussed a possible solution to the dispute with the civil 
governor and a commission of politicians. Indeed, it was only because of the total intransigence of 
the metallurgical bourgeoisie that the anarchists' arguments finally won the day and February 
general strike was called. 
A particularly extreme example of the tension which could exist between the anarchist 
theoreticians and the trade union rank and file is provided by the example of Sabadell. Sabadell, 
one of the areas of greatest anarchist support outside Barcelona. Socialism never took root in the 
town. The reasons appear at least in part to have been contingent. As has been suggested the 
Socialists entered Catalan trade unionism through the contacts they established with the TCV. 'Ihe 
woollen textile workers, however, never joined the TCV and were consequently less exposed to 
Socialist influence. Instead from the 1880s it was the anarchists who were to establish themselves 
as the dominant force in Sabadell trade unionism. 
As was noted in Chapter Three, in 1899 the Sabadell trade unions were able to form a local 
labour federation, the Federado Obrera Sabadellenca (FOS), which was to publish El Trabajo. 
The most influential figure within the FOS, and the director of El Trabajo when it reappeared, was 
the woollen power-loom weaver, Carlos Piazza. Under Piazza's leadership the FOS stressed the 
need for the labour movement to be well organised. In practical terms this meant that unions 
affiliated to the FOS were required to pay dues, and it was agreed in 1901 that Carlos Piazza 
become a paid official. 90 These decisions were defended in syndicalist terms. Thus it was argued 
that only when the the workers were united and their unions strong would they be able to carry out 
the revolutionary general strike. 91 As in the case of the Socialists, however, this perspective 
tended to push the revolution into the indefinite future, and therefore set the FOS apart from the 
dominant tendency in Barcelona anarchism. 
Paradoxically, there were at the same time a group of hard line anarchists in Sabadell who 
published articles in the anarchist weekly La Protesta. Between 1899 and 1900 La Protesta was 
published in Valladolid by Ernesto Alvarez. Ernesto Alvarez came from Madrid and was a 
compositor by trade. He had worked together with Pablo Iglesias in the Madrid compositors 
union, but had in the early 1880s been won over to anarchism. 92 He had over the next ten years 
developed close contacts with the Catalan anarchists, and La Protesta therefore carried 
frequent 
articles on the Catalan labour movement. 
90. For the FOS's statutes see, ET, 18 April 1903. 
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The Sabadell anarchists were more sectarian than those grouped around Leopoldo 
Bonafulla. Unlike Bonafulla they opposed co-operation with other left-wing groups and favoured 
overt anarchist control over the unions. Through La Protesta these anarchists maintained a 
constant critique of the FOS. During 1899 they argued that it was authoritarian and excessively 
centralised. Moreover, they maintained that through its support for industrial tribunals and because 
of its attempts to achieve an impossible harmony between capital and labour the FOS was in reality 
perpetuating the exploitation of the working class. 93 
The veteran anarchist Jaume Sallent was the most regular contributor in La Protesta. As an 
example of the FOS's reformism he outlined its behaviour during the 1899 Seydoux strike. 
According to Sallent, when the Sabadell working class had declared a spontaneous general strike in 
support of Seydoux they had shown themselves willing to stay out until the dispute had been won. 
Despite this, he continued, a commission named by the FOS asked the industrialists to reopen their 
factories, and signed a document in which it promised that the blacklegs who worked inside the 
Seydoux plant would face no further harassment. Sallent finally went on to claim that, "the 
woollen workers are to blame for all that has gone on, because they are the most numerous and 
reactionary branch (of the FOS)". 94 In January 1900 this group of anarchists stated that the 
Sabadell bricklayers, cabinetmakers and brickmakers had left the FOS and intended to form a 
separate local federation. 95 This comment seems to indicate which were the most radical unions in 
Sabadell. The anarchist hopes were not, however, to be realised, for no other federation was 
formed. 
In order to gain more influence in Catalonia an agreement was reached between groups of 
anarchists from Barcelona, Sabadell and Terrassa to publish La Protesta in Sabadell from June 
1900. The experiment was not, however, to be a success. These anarchists had a significant 
influence in the union of various trades (oficios varios) but not in the rest of the Sabadell labour 
movement. This can be seen from the memoirs of Alba Rosell. Rosell was at this time a young 
power-loom weaver who had recently been attracted to anarchism. On hearing that La Protesta 
was to be published in Sabadell he offered his help to Jaume Sallent, who informed him: "Some of 
us are active in the woodworkers, bricklayers and printers unions, but in general we do not 
intervene in La Obrera (i. e., the FOS) because the atmosphere is not propitious. "% La Protesta, 
therefore, received little support, and was forced to return to Valladolid in October. 
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Nevertheless, during 1901 the FOS was to develop closer ties with the Barcelona 
anarchists. The Sabadell woollen power-loom weavers joined the FRESR in January 1901. In the 
same month Carlos Piazza died, and publication of El Trabajo was suspended until October. 
When it reappeared it took a more openly anarchist line. Moreover, two Sabadell delegates 
attended the FRESR's second congress held in October. After the congress the FOS decided to 
form a "Propaganda and Organisation Committee" to put into effect the resolutions passed at the 
congress, and hoped in the near future to organise another congress in Barcelona, which would 
found a district labour federation integrated within the FRESR. 97 
This period of open co-operation culminated in February 1902 when the Sabadell labour 
movement enthusiastically seconded the Barcelona general strike. In 1903, however, tensions 
began to resurface. Thus, no Sabadell delegate attended the FRESR's third congress held in 
Madrid in May 1903. Moreover, at the beginning of August El Trabajo declared that it was not 
sorry that the general strike to secure the release of Spain's political prisoners had failed, because 
badly organised stoppages always ended in bloody repression. Later in the month the woollen 
power-loom weavers attended a congress held by the Socialists in Badalona in order to set up a 
new textile federation. 98 The federation failed to take off, but the uneasy relationship between the 
anarchists and Sabadell weavers was again exposed. 
During the years 1899-1903, then, the Sabadell labour movement formed what might be 
termed the right-wing of Catalan anarchism. It operated within the sphere of anarchist influence, 
but laid great stress on the need for solid union organisation, and was wary of militant direct action 
tactics. The woollen power-loom weavers were the strongest supporters of this stance. 
Underlying their position was the nature of social relations in the woollen textile industry. As was 
stressed in Chapter Three class conflict in cotton textiles had not reached the extremes it had in 
some other branches of Catalan industry, with the result that the woollen weavers were - with the 
exception of those in the Seydoux factory - able to reach negotiated settlements to industrial 
disputes. Consequently, they were suspicious of the anarchists' all or nothing tactics. 
This does not, however, mean that the criticisms of the FOS were of no relevance to the 
anarchist wing of the labour movement. As we have seen, by 1903 it seemed clear that to call a 
general strike on every possible occasion did not represent a serious trade union strategy. 
Moreover, the practice of founding labour confederations in which unions affiliated paid no dues 
had proved a failure. This was highlighted by the fate of the FRESR. Despite the efforts of the 
Confederation's second congress there was little contact between the unions nominally affiliated. 
This is shown by the fact that the FRESR's Regional Offices continued to complain that they 
97. ET, 26 January, 12 December 1901,1 February 1902. 
98. ET, 15 August, 29 August 1903; La Guerra Social, 12 September 1903. 
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received very few voluntary contributions to running costs. Thus although Federico Urales 
claimed that in October 1901 the FRESR had 73,000 members - over twice as many as the UGT - 
this was simply a paper figure, and had very bearing on reality. 99 However, in the Autumn of 
1903 the Catalan labour movement went into rapid decline. It was not until later in the decade that 
there was any serious discussion of these questions. 
99. EP, 10 January 1903; Federico Urales, op cit, p. 72. El Socialista was very 
fond of joVing about the 
difference between the FRESR's supposed membership, and the funds 
it received. See, for example, 
ES, 6 June 1902. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE REPUBLICAN CHALLENGE, 1897-1903 
The years between 1899 and 1903 not only marked a revival of trade union organisation. They 
were also to witness a rapid politicisation of Catalan society. The detonator of this process was 
Spain's loss of her last colonies - Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines - after a short and 
militarily disastrous war with the United States. This defeat followed two years of fighting 
between the Spanish army and Cuban separatists. Until this date, outside working class circles, 
criticism of the Restoration political system had generally been muted. Some middle class 
intellectuals had argued that inefficient government was the root cause of Spain's economic 
backwardness, but in most of the country their views had little echo. The events of 1898 changed 
all of this. The remnants of Spain's once vast colonial empire had been lost precisely at a time 
when Europe's major capitalist states had begun to consolidate their own empires. This led to a 
heightened sense of the disparity in wealth and power between, on the one hand Spain, and on the 
other the United States, Britain and Germany, and to much anguished debate on the reasons behitid 
the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon powers. It was generally agreed that the undemocratic, corrupt 
and inefficient official parties of the Restoration system bore the lions share of the responsibility. 
Accordingly, plans were drawn up for the formation of new political groupings which would carry 
through a thoroughgoing modernisation of the Spanish state and economy. I 
This movement, which was soon to be known as regenerationism, gained widespread 
support. Outside the narrow circles of the financial and agrarian oligarchy all social classes had 
their economic grievances. The colonies provided a vital outlet for Catalan manufactures. The 
industrial bourgeoisie - and in particular the cotton textile manufacturers - therefore 
feared that the 
end of their monopoly in these markets would prove a decisive obstacle in the way of further 
economic development. Farmers throughout Spain argued that no attention was being paid to 
irrigation and hydraulic works programmes which could lead to great increases in yield, while 
retailers and industrialists saw their chances of advancement blocked by the poverty in which most 
of the population lived. Moreover, the new climate of social unrest and heated political 
debate 
Provided an opportunity for politicians on the left to mobilise the working class against the men 
and policies of the Restoration system. 
1. Joseph Harrison, 
Review, Vol. 9. no. 1 
A& C-4týr" C v%" 6ý- 
"The kMovement in Spain after the Disaster of 1898", European 
Studies 
(January 1979). 
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It was in urban Catalonia that this protest movement achieved the greatest consistency. Up 
until 1898, as we have seen, Catalonia's haute bourgeoisie had supported the Restoration system. 
Many of its political representatives favoured administrative decentralisation, but this goal was 
pursued within the dynastic parties and not by a separate political formation. Yet, between 1874 
and 1898 an important shift was to take place in the balance of forces within the ruling oligarchy. 
in the 1870s the weight of industrial interests in the oligarchic block was slight. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that even in Catalonia agrarian and financial interests were still predominant in 
bourgeois circles. However, through to the end of the century Catalonia continued to industrialise. 
In the rest of the peninsula only Asturias and the Basque country followed suit. Accordingly, in 
1898 the gap between the increasingly industrial Catalan economy and the rural based economies 
of most other Spanish regions was wider than ever before. 2 
As a result, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie had grown more powerful, and was more 
aware of the breaks imposed on the region's economic development by the dominant oligarchy. 
However, it was only with the loss of Spain's remaining colonies that many Catalan industrialists 
finally despaired at the ability of the Restoration system's governing classes to create a modem 
(authoritarian) capitalist state. The result of the "disaster" of 1898 was, therefore, a break between 
key elements within the Catalan haute bourgeoisie and the dominant classes within the Spanish 
state. Over the next three years their political representatives made contact with a group of 
Catalanists who favoured intervention in the political process. They were to be found in the Centre 
Nacional Catald under the leadership of Enric Prat de la Riba. Few within the haute bourgeoisie 
had previously paid much attention to Catalanism. But, it could now provide an ideological 
rational to the industrialists' realisation that, too weak to take control of central government, it 
would only be through political decentralisation that they would be able to play a leading role in 
shaping Catalonia's future development. 3 
Nonetheless, the Catalan bourgeoisie moved cautiously. At first it supported the 
Conservative Silvela-Polavieja ministry which, on taidng power in March 1899, pledged itself to 
it revolution from above" (i. e., to reform from within the system). The new ministry was, 
however, soon to take two decisions which were to alienate its Catalan supporters. 'Me first cause 
of disagreement was new taxes on trade and industry introduced by the minister of finance, 
Raimundo Fernandez Villaverde. These taxes aimed to reduce the massive budget deficit run up 
during the colonial wars. They were progressive in nature and, indeed, proved 
important revenue 
2. Borja de Riquer, "El Conservadurisme Politic CatalA: del FracAs del Moderantisme al Decencis de la 
Restauraci6", Recerques, no. 2 (1984); Miguel lzard, Manufactureros, Industriales y Revolutionarios 
(Barcelona, 1979), pp. 57-77.; Jordi Nadal, "La Industria Fabril Espahola en 1900. Una Aproximaci6n", 
in 
La ECOnomia Espat)ola en el Siglo XX Una Perspectiva Hist6tica (Barcelona, 1987). 
3. Borja de Riquer, Viga Regionalista: La Burgesia Catalana y el Nacionafisme, 1898-1904 (Barcelona, 
1977), pp. 155-203. 
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earners. Yet in Catalonia it was precisely those classes most willing to support the Government 
who were the most affected. In Barcelona it was not the large-scale industrialists who reacted most 
virulently but the shopkeepers. The shopkeepers had already been badly hit by wartime taxes and 
by the depression of 1895 and 1898, and many feared that the new fiscal measures could result in 
their bankruptcy. Their protest gave a significant popular edge to opposition to the new tax, and 
will be dealt with in the following section. 
The second and and perhaps even more important cause for disagreement between the 
Ministry and Catalan bourgeoisie was the Government's decision not to implement the so-called 
Concert Economic. The Government had previously agreed to the Concert after negotiations with 
the bourgeoisie's political representatives. Through it the amount paid by Catalonia into the coffers 
of central government was to be subject to a pact between the Government and the Catalan 
provincial councils. The Ministry's backtracking on this point was taken as a sign that it as not 
really interested in undertaking a programme of reforms favourable to Catalan industry. 
It was as a reaction to these measures that the most powerful elements within the Catalan 
bourgeoisie allied with the Centre Nacional Catald to form a new party with a programme of 
political autonomy for Catalonia. This party, known as the Lliga Regionalista, was founded in 
April 1901. The match had several advantages. As in other parts of Europe the Catalan 
bourgeoisie was too intelligent to form a party which obviously defended its own class interests, 
but instead aimed to fashion a political force which could appear to represent those of society as a 
whole. Catalanism could form the basis for such a force, for it provided an interclass ideology 
which could appeal to everyone who lived in the country. The Lliga was, as a result, able to use 
the argument that its mission was to defend Catalonia against hostile central governments as a 
means of mobilising mass support. This argument was made more credible by the fact that 
Catalanists had already in the 1880s gained a certain support with sections of the petty and 
middling bourgeoisie, and amongst more reformist elements within the labour movement. As shall 
be seen this support was to grow rapidly during 1899. The alliance between Catalanists and 
industrialists was made possible by the majority of members of the Centre Nacional Catald were 
socially conservative. The Lliga did, in its first years, have a minority liberal wing. However, the 
dominance of the conservatives can be seen, for example, in the party's support for corporate 
rather the universal suffrage, and - of more importance for our study - 
in the continued criticisms to 
be found in its mouthpiece, La Veu de Catalunya, of the strike movements of these years. 
Consequently, the Lliga came to be seen as the "party of order" in Catalonia. 
4 
Discontent was, however, by no means limited the the region's industrialists. 
In Barcelona 
the petty bourgeoisie, with shopkeepers at the forefront, reacted to Villaverde's 
fiscal reforms by 
4. lbid, pp. 167-211. 
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refusing to pay their taxes. This protest movement, known as the tancament de caixes, was to last 
from June through to November 1899. Within Spain 
re middle class opposition to the 'gime had 
already been most notable in Catalonia. The Catalanists had since the early 1880s gained support 
in petty bourgoeois circles and played a key role in a similar protest movement during 1882. 
Nevertheless, the campaign represented by far the greatest mobilisation of this class since the days 
of the First Republic. The protests led to the imprisonment of a number of shopkeepers and to the 
declaration of martial law in Barcelona province. They were not ultimately to be successful. 
However, the campaign quickly acquired Catalanist overtones and, as J. Marian Pirretas, a leading 
figure in the protest pointed out, its most salient long term effect was to create a "decentralising" 
and "regionalist" mentality amongst "middle and well-to-do classes". 5 Industrialists affiliated to 
the Foment gave their support to the shopkeepers even though they had serious reservations as to 
the advisability of taking such drastic action. They were also supported by Catalanists in the 
Centre Nacional Catald. As a result, these industrialists and Catalanists were able to present 
themselves as the voice of the shopkeepers and, therefore, convert much of this protest to support 
for the party they were in the process of founding. Consequently, during the first decade of the 
century the Lliga Regionalista had an important middle and lower middle class base. 
The Barcelona working class, however, was largely absent from this campaign. Protest 
against the new taxes seems only to have generated some support amongst shop assistants and 
amongst the most reformist sectors of the labour movement. Outside middle class circles a 
"Permanent Commission" was formed to support the shopkeepers demands. It consisted mainly 
of shop workers, though it did include the Catalan Socialist, Basilio Martfn Rodnguez. However 
it played virtually no active role in the dispute. 6 
The only working class institutions to back the protest were the Ateneus Obrers. 'I'he most 
important of these, the Ateneu Obrer de Barcelona, had already taken part in a campaign organised 
by the Foment in 1898 against the concession of any measure of autonomy for Cuba, and 
supported all the protest movements involving the bourgeois and middle classes which led up to 
the foundation of the Lliga in 1901.7 However, these Ateneus were by the turn of the century the 
foremost representatives of the reformist tradition of working class politics which, as has been 
seen, had its heyday in the early 1880s. That this was the case was made clear by the Ateneus' 
internal structure. They were basically educational establishments. There were two types of 
members: full members, who attended classes, and honorary members. These were persons of 
5. F61ix Cucunill, Te la Restauraci6 MonArquica al Tancament de Caixes", Hist6ria de Catalunya Salvat, 
pC remia de Vol. 5., p. 246.; J. Madan Pirretas, ElTancamentde Caixes. Descri i6delMovimentG 1899 
(Barcelona, n. d. ), p. 235. 
6. LIP, 30 June 1899, ME, 6 July, ME. 
7. Borja de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista, p. 96. 
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high social standing who gave donations. The Ateneus accepted government subsidies, and were 
quick to invite the civil and military authorities to the prize giving ceremonies they held at the 
beginning of each academic year. At the same time their publications were class collaborationist. 
Thus they emphasised the importance of self betterment through saving, and encouraged their 
working class readership to try and set up as small-scale industrialists. 8 
Working class sympathy for the middle class's demands did not, however, extend outside 
these rather narrow reformist circles. The reason behind the bourgeois's inability to mobilise 
working class support behind its demands at least in part lies in the heightened industrial conflict 
and growing social divide visible in late nineteenth century Catalan society. The result, was has 
been noted, was the appearance of a fairly well defined working class culture and anti-capitalist 
ideology. Consequently, the Lliga Regionalista would be unable to gain a significant working 
class following, even though it disguised bourgeois interests behind the slogan "the defence of 
Catalonia". This transformation in the workers' mentality was particularly clear in the case of 
cotton textiles. This was stressed by Josep Comaposada who, in an intelligent analysis, observed 
that the protectionist campaigns launched by the cotton textile industrialists between 1884 and 1886 
were supported by all sections of the population including the working class. As a result of this 
pressure, he continued, the manufacturers were able to get their protectionist schemes approved. 
Under the new conditions the industrialists were to earn great sums of money. However the 
workers, he observed, did not benefit from the new conjuncture. On the contrary, any move they 
made to improve their working conditions was bitterly opposed by their employers. It was, he 
concluded, these same industrialists who were the leading figures within Catalanism, and who 
again called for the workers' support. The workers, however, had leamt from experience to take 
no notice. 9 
Josep Cornaposada, in his analysis, implied there was a link between Catalanism and 
bourgeois interests. It was the Spanish Socialists, whose opposition to regionalist or nationalist 
demands was well known, who most vociferously denounced such links. In 1899, for example, 
they celebrated the lack of working class participation in the tancament. According to El 
Socialista 
the protest movement only benefited the bourgeoisie. It maintained that the workers 
knew this and 
8. This section is based on a reading of, Revista del Ateneo Obrero de Barcelona, 
1886-1908; Boletin del 
Ateneo Obrero de Gracia, 1904-1906; Fomento Martinense (Ateneo Obrero), 1905; Rayo de 
Luz, 
Boletin del Ateneo de San Andres de Palomar, 1908-1911. The only important work on the 
Ateneus is, 
Pere SOIA, Els Ateneus Obrers i la Cultura Popular a Catalunya, 1900-1939. El Ateneu 
Enciclop6dic 
Popular (Barcelona, 1978). We would, therefore, agree with Josep Termes that there was a pro-Catalanist 
sentiment within the Ateneus at this time, but not with the implication 
that this could be extended to the 
rest of the labour movement. See Josep Termes, "Els Ateneus Populars: un 
intent de Cultura Obrera", 
L'Avenq, no. 104 ( March 1987), pp. 9-11. 
9. ES, 15 June 1900. 
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that they therefore opposed the tancwnent in the name of working class internationalism. Thus it 
stated: 10 
Yesterday the Biscayans (i. e. , the Biscayan workers), by refusing to doff their caps to the sounds of the Guernicaco; today the Catalans, by not adding their voice to that chorus of hatred, Els Segadors; have clearly shown that they recognise their class interests and know that they have stronger ties with the workers of Castile than with the likes of Chava'-' Alzola, Sedo, and Sallares, the vampires of their respective regions. I 
The Catalan Socialists fully supported their Spanish colleagues in this respect, and used 
their influence in the Catalan trade union press to denounce Catalanism. To give but one example, 
Amparo Martf stated in the pages of Revista Fabril in April 1900: 11 
The (textile) workers of Catalonia are especially praiseworthy for federating and uniting 
with the workers of other regions and thereby demonstrating their clear judgement, 
avoiding the pitfalls put in their way by the followers of regionalism, whose retrograde and 
archaic ideal does not prosper amongst the workers, because they know perfectly well that 
their common enemy is capital, and against it they unite to counter, through continuous and 
well informed action, the abuses and oppressions it daily commits against the wages and dignity of the workers. 
However, it was not only the Socialists who adopted an anticatalanist stance. When El 
Socialista criticised the tancament in 1899 it received letters of support from the Barcelona 
coachmen's union, and from the Barcelona based railway workers'union, the Sindicato General 
de Ferocarriles. This last letter was written by the union's General Secretary, Luis Zurdo Olivares. 
As was seen in the previous chapter, Zurdo Olivares who a republican who had developed close 
contacts with the Barcelona anarchists. As in the case of El Socialista, Zurdo Olivares argued that 
it was the bourgeoisie that was behind the antigovernment agitation of 1899, and stated: 12 
We who are not Catalans, nor Basques, nor Castilians, nor anything but workers fighting 
against capital and in favour of universal brotherhood; we who do not allow ourselves to be 
deluded by the conjuring tricks of the bourgeoisie, who bled us in Melilla, in Cuba and in 
the Philippines, and who take advantage of any event so that Jesuitism - which in these 
commotions plays the first card - might show its hand. We protest at the cries of "down 
(with Castile)" heard in Barcelona, and at the "tole tole", the rallying cry of the bourgeois 
press in Madrid and various provinces. 
The potent mix of anti-capitalist and anticlerical rhetoric visible in the letter will be commented on 
shortly. For the present it may be noted that Zurdo Olivares also contrasted bourgeois Catalanism 
with working class internationalism. 
10. ES, 20 October 1899. 
II- RF, 20 April 1900. This was not necessarily a view unanimously held by the leadership of the 
FTE, but 
it does seem significant that it should appear on the second page of Revista Fabril'S 
first number. 
12. ES, 27 October 1899. 
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Most anarchists took a similar stance. Anselmo Lorenzo was already well known for his 
anticatalanist views, and Francesc Ferrer suffered from an "anticatalanist phobia". 13 More 
important, those anarchists grouped around Leopoldo Bonafulla's El Productor were also strongly 
critical of the dominant current within Catalanism. Thus, for example, in a meeting held in 1901 to 
protest at the repression of the strike in La Coruha, "Teresa Claramunt attacked Catalanism, and 
defended human brotherhood and the universal fatherland. She said that the Catalanists wanted a 
r- - 
true Catalonia but the Catalans to be slaves". 14 
At the turn of the century, then, Catalanism and bourgeois interests were conflated by a 
wide spectrum of working class opinion. This identification seems to have originated in the mid- 
1880s, from which time Catalanism became, socially, increasingly conservative. However, it was 
greatly reinforced between 1899 and 1901 when key sectors of the bourgeoisie - albeit very 
cautiously - swung behind the Centre Nacional Catald. It has it is true recently been argued that the 
labour movement's criticisms were aimed exclusively at the Viga not at Catalanists per se, and that 
an alternative popular Catalanism could be seen in working class circles. 15 However, for our 
period at least, this interpretation raises a number of serious objections. In the first place, the 
majority of anarchists showed little sympathy for Catalanist ideals. In Barcelona a small number of 
anarchists grouped around the magazine LAvenir were favourably inclined towards Catalanist 
demands, but they had almost no influence within the trade unions. 16 The mainstream anarchists 
(and of course Socialists) did not offer any left wing alternative to the Catalanism of the Dip 
based on an analysis of the relationship between national and class oppression. Instead they stated 
that they were opposed to all "particularisms", and proclaimed that the future anarchist society 
would be a "great region, a single fatherland covering all the earth, which would not legislate on 
custom or dress and would proclaim the people's right to live outside (or perhaps beyond) the 
harsh rule of the exploiters, however they be disguised-. 17 For this reason the anarchists did not 
defend the use of Catalan but argued that all men should speak a single universal language. They 
believed this language could be esperanto, and therefore encouraged working class unions and 
cultural associations to teach it. 18 
13. Alba Rosell, Recuerdos //, p. 26. 
14. LIP, 21 July 1901, NE. 
15. Enric Oliv6 Serret, "L'Anarquisme i el Catalanisme. Entre el Mite i la Confusio", LAvenq, no. 102 
(March 1987). 
16. Alba Rosell, Recuerdos //, pp. 12-13.; Enric Oliv6 Serret, "El Moviment Anarquista", pp. 
622-624. 
17. EP, 13 July 1901. 
18. ET, 12 November 1904,13 October 1906; COngresO de Constituci6n de la 
CNT, pp. 53-56.89. 
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Indeed, the fact that bourgeois interests dominated Catalanism seems to have had a 
profound impact on the Catalan workers' vision of the place of the Catalan language and culture in 
society. Information on this question is naturally scanty. Nevertheless, an incident at one of the 
meetings held in 1901 to protest at the repression of the La Corufia strike seems significant. 
During July and August of that year, La Veu de Catalunya had on several occasions criticised the 
conclusions reached at meetings held by the Barcelona trade unions. In this particular meeting held 
on 11 August, Segalas, a representative of one of the unions present and an anarchist sympathiser: 
"Began by stating that he was speaking in Catalan, but that he was ashamed of addressing them in 
the same language in which La Veu de Catalunya was written. "19 A large crowd was present but 
no protests were to be heard. In fact, so widespread was criticism of Catalanism within the trade 
unions that in a meeting held in 1900 the leading figures in the Barcelona TCV, Ramon Fontanals 
and Joan Vidal - who were trying to dispel their class collaborationist image - joined in, stating: 
"That behind the Catalanist whistles hide the industrialists' protests at the freedom of the workers 
II to unionise, and the reactionar-ie s protest at the pardon conceded to the victims of the Cambios 
Nuevos trial. For this reason they warned the workers not to be manipulated by the 
reactionaries.,, 20 
It should be emphasised that the relationship between Catalanism and social class was to 
change over time. Over the following two decades the bourgeoisie would find it difficult to 
maintain their dominant position in the Catalanist camp. During much of the nineteenth century the 
Catalan bourgeoisie had undergone a process of "Castilianisation", renouncing the Catalan 
language in favour of Castilian, which was more acceptable in polite society. The break with the 
central oligarchy was seen by much of this class primarily in economic terms. A separate political 
party, it was felt, would be in a stronger position to negotiate concessions from central 
government. The waving of the Catalan flag might be a useful means of gaining mass support. 
However, it should not get in the way of such discussions, and too radical a stance might goad the 
Spanish military to take action against the Lliga, and produce social upheaval in Catalonia itself. It 
was for this reason that the bourgeoisie's political representatives insisted the new party be called 
14 regionalist" rather than "nationalist" or "Catalanist". As a result, sectors of the urban petty 
bourgeois doubted the sincerity of the industrialists conversion, and argued in favour of the 
formation of a more democratic and radical political force. Indeed, these demands were voiced by 
a significant current of opinion within the Lliga itself during the first three years after its 
formation. 
21 These divisions were to result in a split within the Lliga in 1904. And, in December 
1906, the 
19. LP, 11 August 1901, NE. 
20. LP, 8 May 1900, NE. 
21. See the comments by Borja de Riquer, Viga Regionali sta, pp. 303-312.; 
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dissidents were to found a new party called the Centre Nacionalista Republic& Yet its moderate 
centre-left stance attracted only limited working class support. It was not until after 1914 that 
substanf ial numbers of workers were to take a more comprehensive position with respect to 
Catalanism. 
Before that time Catalanists whatever their political make-up received little working-class 
backing. However, as has been emphasised, the politicisation of Catalan society between 1899 
and 1903 opened the door to those parties which looked for support to the working class. in the 
1890s, only a small percentage of electors bothered to vote at election time. However, once it was 
clear that the Restoration system was in difficulties this situation was to change dramatically. In 
Catalonia the transformation of the political landscape was most rapid in Barcelona. In the Catalan 
capital the Restoration parties had, until the turn of the century, been opera4V,; the turno with a fair 
degree of effectiveness. Yet, in the elections of March 1903 almost 48 per cent of the census 
voted, and the dynastic caciques were banished from Barcelona. 22 In these elections the Lliga 
clearly established itself as the party of the right. On the left, on the other hand, the Socialists 
made no headway. In 1890 they had received only 3,782 votes in the whole of Spain, but 47 per 
cent of these votes were from Catalonia. Yet in the March 1903 elections, though nationwide the 
Socialist vote had climed to 14,500, in Catalonia in absolute terms it had actually declined, and 
only represented 2 per cent of Socialist voting strength. In Barcelona in 1903 they did not even 
present a candidature, leaving the door open for the republicans to establish themselves as only 
political force with a large working class following. 23 
It is particularly noticeable that this growth in political support for the republicans coincided 
with the increase in anarchist influence within the Barcelona trade unions. This fact raises the 
question of the exact relationship between anarchism and republicanism. As was noted in the 
introduction some historians have argued that there existed an "anarcho-republican" cultural 
milieux in urban Catalonia from which the Socialists were supposedly excluded. An analysis of 
the development of republicanism between 1899 and 1903, and of the contacts between anarchists, 
Socialists and republicans during this period makes it possible to appraise the validity of such 
claims. 
The expansion of republicanism during these years was based on solid historical 
foundations, for despite the introduction of anarchism and Marxism into Spain in the 1870s 
worldng class support for the republicans by no means evaporated. In late nineteenth century 
Catalonia the urban worldng class and petty bourgeoisie was united in its opposition to the 
22. For Catalan electoral data see, Albert Balcells et al, Les Eleccions Generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 
1923 (Barcelona, 1982). 
23. lbid, pp. 57-86.; Santiago Castillo, "Los Orfgenes", pp. 144-145.; ES, 12 July 1903. 
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Bourbon monarchy and Canovas's Restoration. 24 The republicans derived their support from the 
fact that they had, since they became a serious political force in the 1860s, been the principal 
vehicle of this opposition towards undemocratic, centralising, Spanish governments. Like the 
regenerationists the republicans bitterly criticised the political regime set up after the overthrow of 
the First Republic. However, they stressed not so much the need for the economic modemisation 
of Spain, as the necessity to democratise political life. Thus the most popular republican grouping, 
the so-called Federalists, condemned the turno and called for free and fair elections. At the same 
time they defended the labour unions against state repression, and drew attention to the class nature 
of many of the Restoration's policies. They were particularly vociferous in their condemnation of 
indirect taxes on consumer goods, known as the conswnos, because they hit the poor hardest. 
They also led the opposition to military levies known as quintas. These levies were unjust because 
they allowed the rich to buy their way out of military service through redemption payments, 
leaving the sons of peasant and working class families to fight the Spanish oligarchy's colonial 
wars. 
In all of these respects the Federal Republicans remained very much in tune with popular, 
and particularly working class, ideology. As has been seen, since 1874 the labour movement had 
been engaged in an almost perpetual struggle with the central authorities. Moreover, the consumos 
and quintas remained major grievances right through to 1914. Indeed the quintas were never more 
unpopular than during the colonial wars of 1896-1898. Casualties from the fighting - or more 
commonly from disease - were very high. As many as 200,000 Spaniards were said to have died 
in Cuba, with the vast majority, of course, coming from poor backgrounds. As news of these 
events unfolded so anger the workers anger increased. It reached its peak in 1898-99 when the 
broken remnants of the Spanish army disembarked in Barcelona and other Catalan ports. 25 At the 
same time, continued opposition to the payment of the conswnos was illustrated by the fact that 
social and political unrest in urban areas was invariably accompanied by attempts to bum down the 
tax booths at which they were paid. 26 
The republicans also gave expression to another key element in radical middle class and 
working class ideology: anticlericalism. In urban Catalonia, until the Canovist Restoration, 
resentment at the church had been a result of its support for absolutism. This support by no means 
totally disappeared thereafter. The most notorious religious congregation, the Jesuits, in particular 
retained close links with the ultramontane Carlists, whilst liberalism was still anathernatised 
from 
24. Claudi Arnetlla, op cit, p. 112. 
25. Gerald Brenan, op cit, pp. 59-60.; Carlos Serrano, Fin del Imperio. Espatla 1895-1898 
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26. In Barcelona, for example, during the 1901 tramworkers strike tax 
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the pulpit. The church did not wish to lose the mass rural base its support for Carlism had given it. 
Nevertheless, between 1874 and 1898 it made an all out effort to reconquer the new regime's 
ruling classes. In this it was to be very successful. In Catalonia from the turn of the century much 
of the clerical hierarchy was to transfer its support to the Lliga. Nevertheless, contacts with the 
regime were still maintained, especially though the figure of Antonio Maura, the leading 
Conservative politician of the years 1903-1910. By 1900, then, with the sons of both bourgeois 
and aristocratic families once again educated in Catholic schools, the power and influence of the 
church was at its highest point since the promulgation of the disentailment laws. This could be 
seen in a growing clerical presence, particularly in the cities, coupled with a rapid growth in the 
number of religious orders, many of which moved to Spain to escape the secularising laws of the 
French Third Republic. 27 
In Catalonia this interdependence between the church and the dominant classes could be 
seen in such figures as the financiers, Eusebio GUell and the Marques de Comillas. Their interests 
included large investments in the colonies. Indeed, it was a shipping company owned by the 
Marques, La Transatldntica, that transported troops to Cuba and the Philippines at a handsome 
profit. In the following decade, with the aid of government subsidies, they were also to invest 
heavily in Morocco. And, when hostilities broke out with the natives La Transatldntica was once 
again used to ship out troops. GUell and Comillas were, at the same time, prominent in their 
support for Catholic educational and beneficial institutions, and workers circles. The latter were 
seen by the trade unions as centres for the recruitment of blacklegs. Moreover, the link with the 
colonial wars gave a particularly bitter edge to popular opposition to the church. The 
interconnections between the church and big business also led left wing republicans to talk of a 
clerical plutocracy which dominated Spain. 28 In Catalonia this mutual support could be seen in the 
case of the Lliga Regionalista. Thus it was clear, the church supported the interests of the 
dominant classes, and these were often defended in religious terms. 29 By attacking the church, 
therefore, it might appear that the pillars of society would be shaken. In addition, attacks on the 
church were encouraged by the fact that it was the most visible and - perhaps more important - the 
most vulnerable part of the ruling order. 
Although separated from the centralist oligarchy by economic interest, then, the Catalan 
bourgeois did not break with the ultra conservative Catalan church. This stance, it should 
be 
noted, ran against the tendency visible in France for the bourgeoisie to distance 
itself from the 
27. Un Segle de Vida Catalana, V61.11., p. 1225.; Joan Conelly Ullman, op cit, pp. 137-138.; 
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28. Joan Connelly Ullman, op cit, pp. 78-79.268.; Angel Duarte, "El Republicanisme", pp. 
198-204. 
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Church and embrace liberal rationalism. During the nineteenth century liberal rationalism had 
already gained a great following in urban petty bourgeois and working class circles, and was, 
indeed, the staple of republican ideology. It presupposed that the major battle lines within society 
were drawn up between the forces of "liberty", "science" and"progress" on the one side, and 
"reaction" and "obscurantism" on the other. The continued links between bourgeoisie and church 
meant that in Catalonia (as in the rest of Spain) the left remained unchallenged as the champion of 
progress. However, the fact that political battles were so often conducted in these terms did benefit 
the bourgeoisie in one respect. The church was seen as the foremost embodiment of the forces of 
theocratic antiliberalism. Accordingly, it was easy to believe that the main obstacle to progress was 
not so much the economic power of the bourgeoisie itself as the ideological influence of the 
church. 30 
This antagonism towards the church was, at the same time, encouraged by a number of 
more prosaic considerations. Most important was the fact that inmates in the church's beneficial 
institutions were forced to elaborate artisanal manufactures and, in the case of women, sew, wash, 
and iron. This was seen as representing unfair competition by both working class families and 
small-scale industrialists. Anticlericalism was most notable in working class circles. However, 
the ideals of freethought and liberty still retained a notable power of attraction amongst sectors of 
the petty bourgeoisie and lower middle class. For this reason, in the late nineteenth century, 
anticlericalism combined with opposition to reactionary state policies could provide the basis for 
left-wing popular interclass politics. At a grass roots level the populace's vision of republican 
society was perhaps best summarised by the Sabadell Republican, Met Caflamares, who, in a 
speech made shortly after the overthrow of Isabel H in September 1868 stated: "Citizens: do you 
know what the Republic means? It means white bread; that everyone should have his own share of 
meat; it means the abolition of the consumos and of the quintas; that no worker should have to beg 
when old and above all it means out with the clergy!,, 31 
Such views reflected the belief, which was still held by many workers and petty bourgeois 
radicals at the turn of the century, that life would be better under a lay, democratic, republic. 
However, republican politics had by no means flourished during the 1880s and 1890s. The 
Restoration system had, through its alliance with the caciques, effectively marginalised the 
republicans from political life. The republicans had not been able to offer a serious challenge to the 
dynastic parties, and at a local level republicanism tended to splinter into a large number of clubs 
and discussion circles, which often maintained only the most tenuous links between each other. 
30. For European developments see, E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, PP. 317-318.; Idem, "Religion 
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This dispersion was reflected at a national level, where a number of republican parties were 
spawned in the years after 1874. 
It would be an exhaustive undertaking to catalogue all the republican groupings which 
operated in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Basically, however, one could talk of a 
republican right which was dogmatically liberal and therefore supported only limited state 
intervention, and which favoured electoral opposition to the regime's official parties. These 
republicans had a strong petty bourgeois base, but only gained the support of reformist sectors of 
the labour movement. Then there was a republican left, which supported a comprehensive 
programme of social reform, and which advocated insurrection against the state. Indeed, between 
1888 and 1892 a labourist wing of republicanism was consolidated, and adopted a quasi socialist 
stance. These left-wing republicans had the greatest working-class support. 
By the 1890s the republicans had managed to reduce the diversity of parties. Most Catalan 
republicans belonged to two coalitions. On the right was to be found the Republican Fusion, and 
on the left the Revolutionary Republican Union. The Republican Fusion continued to work within 
the political channels opened up by the Restoration system. The left-wing republicans, however, 
disgusted by successive governments' manipulation of elections, and continued state repression 
called for electoral abstention (el retraimiento) as a prelude to armed insurrection. El retraimiento, 
however, was more a reaction to weakness than a carefully thought out strategy. This is indicated 
by the fact that these same republicans were to change tack and participate in elections in the more 
favourable climate after 1898. The fact remained that at its base Catalan republicanism still 
consisted on a large number of autonomous clubs. These clubs, especially at election time, might 
agree to follow a specific set of policies and/or a charismatic leader, but remained isolated the rest 
of the year round. The republicans, therefore, still had neither the electoral machine nor the 
disciplined organisation structure needed to challenge the official parties effectively. 32 
However, the problems faced by the republicans were not only organisational. In the first 
place, the intensification of class conflict was widening the divide between their middle class and 
working class supporters. The republican right whose support had largely been based on elements 
with an ideological affinity to the TCV was, as a result, left in a particularly delicate situation. 
Secondly, from the 1880s Catalanists had been enticing the republicans petty bourgeois base away 
with some success, as was to become clear during the 1899 tancament de caixes. 
32. The most important study of republicanism in late nineteenth century 
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This, then, was the situation in which the Catalan republicans found themselves after the 
"disaster" of 1898. They did not participate in the agitation which surrounded the tancament. Only 
the republican right gave its passive support. The left, however, felt alienated from a movement 
which enjoyed the support of the Catalan. bourgeoisie, was led by Catalanists, and which they felt 
had clear right-wing connotations. 33 Instead the republicans played a leading role in two 
campaigns launched between 1898 and 1899. The first was in protest at clerical influence in state 
and society. The second aimed to pressure the government into granting a judicial review of the 
MontjuYc trial. At a political level, these campaigns were to reveal that despite the problems the 
republicans had faced, when conditions were favourable they could still attract wide-ranging 
popular support. At the same time, however, they also confirmed the evidence gleaned from trade 
union sources that the Socialists had established themselves as an important force in Barcelona 
working class circles. In the social sphere, the campaigns were to show just what a potent 
mobilising force anticlericalism could be. 
Two incidents - supposed religious involvement in the loss of the last colonies, and the rise 
to power of the "clerical" Silvela Government served to bring the question of clerical influence in 
Spain to the fore. 34 The first anticlerical meetings were held in Barcelona in April 1899, with the 
republicans playing a leading role in their organisation. The meetings were well attended. Their 
tone was set by the left-wing federalist, Lorenzo Ardid, who stated that if "the advance of reaction" 
were not halted, then the events of 1835 (when a number of convents were burnt to the ground) 
would be repeated. 35 
More important, however, was the campaign for the judicial review of the MontjuYc trial, 
which, as we shall see, also had strong anticlerical overtones. It originated at the end of 1897 
when, on returning from exile to Madrid, the Catalan anarchist, Federico Urales, made contact 
with the young and flamboyant left progressive republican, Alejandro Lerroux. Lerroux was the 
director of the republican weekly, El Progreso. Already known for his personal courage and 
vehement oratory, he was fiercely anticlerical, and combined support for the republican left's 
policy of the retraimiento, with the belief that the Spanish monarchy would only be brought down 
by a civil-military uprising. Because of his position and leftist reputation, Urales asked Lerroux to 
launch a campaign in favour of the Montjtffc prisoners. Over the previous months, mounting 
evidence had come to light that the "confessions" of the accused had been obtained through torture. 
The importance of MontJuYc as a symbol of government repression within the Catalan working 
class has already been discussed. Lerroux, who was convinced of the need to mobilise working 
33. Angel Duarte, "El Republicanism", pp. 693-701. 
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class opposition to the regime, realised the potential of the campaign, and quickly took up Urales' 
offer. Over the next few months, therefore, El Progreso ran a continuous campaign in support of 
the MontjuYc prisoners. As a result, sales of the paper rose rapidly in Catalonia, and Lerroux 
gained a reputation as a champion of the working class. 36 
In Catalonia the republicans had not unanimously opposed the Montjuic trial. Nevertheless 
all were carried along by the campaign. The first meeting was held in February 1898. nere was 
then a long pause, primarily due to the Hispano-American war, before the campaign was renewed 
at the beginning of 1899. The first important meeting of the year was held in March, but it was 
between July and September that the campaign reached its climax. 
During this campaign the authorities were, naturally a principal target of the speaker's 
wrath. The Spanish military, whose reputation had suffered grievously as a result of the colonial 
wars, were also the object of fierce criticism, as was the Catalan bourgeoisie. Finally, every 
opportunity was taken to attack the influence of the clergy with, as shall be seen, serious 
consequences. The Summer agitation began on 2 July with a number of meetings held 
simultaneously throughout Catalonia. The Barcelona meeting was probably the most important of 
the whole campaign, and serves to illustrate the mobilising potential of anticlericalism and its 
results. The meeting was attended by about 7000 people, and the speakers included Alejandro 
Lerroux - on his first visit to Catalonia - and Pablo Iglesias. The popularity which had preceded 
Lerroux could be seen by the fact his speech, in which he called for armed insurrection against the 
state, was met by a "delirious ovation". Pablo Iglesias, on the other hand, had to be content with 
"loud applause". An anticlerical element was present in many of the speeches. Most radical was 
Ferando, the representative of the Sant Marti coopers, who stated that, "the persecution of the 
workers originated in Caspe street (the location of the largest Jesuit convent in Barcelona) and was 
supported in another Caspe". Moreover, in conclusion he: "Alluded to the events of 1835 and 
(said he) thought that they would be repeated if clericalism kept up its evil influence aimed at the 
destruction of liberty. , 37 
Ferando's words were almost to become reality even before he had expected. Thus, after 
the meeting a part of those present marched on the Jesuits' convent in CasPe street. Once on the 
scene they hurled a barrage of stones at the building to shouts of "death to reaction and 
clericalistW'. They were finally dispersed by mounted civil guard, and even some of the 
Jesuits 
themselves. However, the disturbances continued in the afternoon. First, several priests being 
chased through the streets and forced to hide in a cavalry barracks. Later, between about 
2000 and 
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3000 people, "youngsters in the main", moved down to the petty bourgeois VI district of the left of 
the Ramblas, and began stoning shop windows. Street lamps were also smashed, and an effort 
was made to stop all the theatre performances in progress. That night the Sarriaý steam train was 
also attacked, and it was rumoured that the Jesuits' convent had been set on fire. 
In the following days, these incidents spread throughout Barcelona. Shop windows and 
trams were stoned, leading the tram companies to suspend the service on the third. The most 
serious incident, nevertheless, occurred in the Poble Sec, where only the action of neighbours 
prevented a religious girls school being burnt to the ground. 38 Anticlerical fervour during these 
years was not limited to these events. The Montjtffc campaign had to be temporarily halted in the 
Autumn when the Government suspended constitutional guarantees following the tancanwnt de 
caixes. It finally drew to a close in April 1900, when the sentences of the remaining prisoners 
were commuted. However, the highly charged nature of anticlericalism was again revealed in 
another campaign launched between 1900 and 1901 to lim it the number of religious orders in 
Spain. Large meetings were held in Barcelona on 31 March and 21 April 1901. At the first of 
these meetings the anarchist militant, L6pez Montenegro, stated that a young girl had been 
kidnapped by the Jesuits. This revelation was greeted by cries of "let's get her out ourselves", and 
"let's repeat 1835". Again the meeting was followed by a demonstration which converged on the 
Jesuit convent in Caspe street, where it was dispersed by the Civil Guard. As an epitaph a few 
days later on 1 May the Maristas convent in Barcelona was broken into and vandalised. 39 
These incidents - on which up until now little stress has been laid - illustrate a number of 
important points. A number of years later, in July 1909, during a week long general strike in 
Barcelona, a number of religious institutions were burnt to the ground. The events of these days 
were subsequently to be given the name of Tragic Week. The anticlerical protest of the years 
1899-1901 demonstrate that the impetus which made events possible was already present. Hatred 
of the clergy was by this time deeply embedded in working class ideology, and came bubbling to 
the surface when the moment was propitious. Nor was anticlerical feeling limited to Barcelona. 
Meetings held in urban Catalonia during these years were almost invariably a great success. In 
Manlleu, for example, at the end of July 1899 a meeting in support of the judicial review of the 
MontjuYc prisoners attracted between 4000 and 5000. At the meeting the speakers were 
interrupted 
by cries of "down with the Jesuits" and "death to the workers' executioners". "Manlleu 
has never 
seen anything like it"' was the verdict of the correspondent of La Publicidad. 
40 Ile representatives 
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of the working class could not, therefore, fail to note that anticlericalism was a powerful weapon in 
their hands. They might also have reflected that if anticlerical sentiment were not channelled 
effectively it could be released in an orgy of destruction. 
This does not seem to have worried some of the more radical republican speakers. 'nie 
Catalan Socialists, on the other hand, took a more responsible stance, and none called for convents 
to be burnt down. Nevertheless, they did support the general aim of speakers at the 1899 
meetings, which was to reduce the power of the clergy and to replace the turno by a system of 
democratic government. The Socialists played a very active part in the Montjufc campaign. This 
was reflected in the fact that when the campaign's executive committee was chosen in May 1899, 
although the extremist republican Isac Bulla became president, Toribio Reoyo was elected vice- 
president. Reoyo was to be a key speaker in the campaign meetings held in Barcelona that 
Summer. Moreover, those groups and individuals which wished to give their support had to write 
to the Barcelona PSOE's labour union, the GCO. 41 
The position of the Catalan Socialists was fixed in the speeches made by Toribio Reoyo 
during that Summer. As has been seen, in the 1899 campaign meetings fierce attacks were made 
upon the church and state. Many of the speakers combined these criticisms with a call for the unity 
of all the "forces of progress". The important point to note in this respect is that Toribio Reoyo 
supported this stance. Thus, in a speech made in Tarragona he argued that the events surrounding 
the Montjuic trial, "represent a fight between liberty and reaction, which is trying to impose itself'. 
He then went on to claim that "the Jesuits have seized all the money in Barcelona", and that the 
only role for the army was to massacre the Spanish people. In conclusion he called for "the unity 
of all liberals". 42 In a meeting held in Palafrugell later in the same month Reoyo was more explicit 
as to why the workers should join hands with the republicans. La Publicidad reported: 43 
Mr Reoyo addressed himself especially to the workers, in order to declare to them that they 
should direct all their efforts towards carrying out the revolution. However, they should 
not imagine that they would make up its leadership, because at present, unfortunately, the 
working class is not educated enough to lead it. "(But) with calm and serenity we will 
acquire all that is needed to lead the revolution, and will be able to say: long live the 
working class. " 
Josep Comaposada, the second most important Socialist speaker in the campaign, was also 
bitterly critical of the clergy, although his analysis was in Marxist terms more orthodox 
in the sense 
that he closely linked the clergy to the bourgeoisie. However, like Reoyo he favoured a 
broad left- 
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wing alliance, and argued that: "If concrete form is not soon given, through concrete deeds, to the 
unity of all the elements on the left, we will have to resign ourselves to vilification and slavery. -44 
The Catalan Socialists' calls for the unity of the left conflicted with the stance adopted by 
the Madrid hierarchy of the PSOE. As has been seen, the majority of Madrid based Socialists still 
rejected any kind of alliance with the "bourgeois" republican parties. 'lliese differences were aired 
at the party's fifth congress, held in Madrid between 17 and 20 September 1899. At this congress 
the Barcelona Socialists tried to overturn the decision taken by the 1888 party congress that under 
no circumstances should the party sign electoral pacts with the republicans. Thus they presented a 
motion which asked the question: "In the face of the advance of reaction, is it desirable that the PS 
should change its tactics with regard to some elements of the bourgeoisie (i. e. , the republicans)? " 
It was only withdrawn when the Madrid section presented a counter motion, which represented an 
important concession. It argued that the 1888 agreement should remain substantially intact. Yet, it 
opened the d 
ýO 
o-operation with the "advanced parties of the bourgeoisie" in order to counter any OOT 
reactionary threat to political liberties. 45 
However, the position adopted by the Catalan Socialists was significant in another respect. 
Some historians have claimed that there were close ideological affinities between republicans and 
anarchists. Unlike the Marxists, it has been argued, the anarchists and republicans did not see 
class struggle as the motor of history. Instead they saw the struggle between different sets of ideas 
as the key to historical change. And, unlike the Socialists, both anarchists and republicans 
fervently believed in liberal rationalism. 46 
The evidence presented above throws such an interpretation into doubt. Though the 
Catalan Socialists probably did not pursue lay education with the vigour of anarchists and left-wing 
republicans, they were clearly anticlerical and saw themselves as part of a progressive left which 
was engaged in a life or death struggle against "reaction". In fact, throughout Europe the 
membership of so-called Marxist parties continued to be drawn to liberal rationalist thought. 
Indeed, over Europe as a whole E. J. Hobsbawm points out that, "the period of most rapid growth 
of official atheism coincides with the heyday of the Second International, 1880-1914". And that in 
German social democratic libraries Darwin and anticlerical works such as Dodel's Moses were 
44. LP, 21 Sept 1899, ME. 
45. ES, 22 Sept 1899. Another focus of disagreement was a motion presented by the Alicante branch, 
which stated that: "Those individuals who support Catholicism or any other religion which is not based on 
the principles of liberty, morality and laicism, will be excluded from the party except in involuntary or 
justifiable cases. " The motion was supported by Reoyo, but was finally dropped after having been 
criticised by, among others, Pablo Iglesias. 
46. Jos6 Alvarez Junco, op cit, pp. 515-527. 
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more widely read than Marx or even Kautsky ever were. 47 Moreover, as we have seen, it would 
be wrong to suggest that those anarchists closely linked to the labour movement did not see class 
conflict as the key to change within capitalism. Furthermore, the centre and right of republicanism 
had little sympathy for the anarchists, and supported the Government Is repression of them after the 
1890s' bomb outrages. 48 These republicans argued that it was preferable for the labour movement 
to be Socialist dominated, because the Socialists would lead the workers away from 
insurrectionism, and under their guidance labour would became a serious and disciplined 
opposition to the Rest oxation regime. Nevertheless, it would be true to say that the left of Catalan 
republicanism had developed contacts with the republicans. These links would grow stronger 
between 1899 and 1901 and, as a result, both at an economic level and at a political level the 
Socialists became increasingly marginalised from the mainstream of the Catalan labour movement. 
This is a question to which we shall return presently. 
The campaigns of 1899 had a further result. They had confirmed that the republicans 
retained wide-ranging popular sympathy. The first signs that the Restoration system was entering 
into crisis also opened up new possibilities. Nevertheless it was clear that to mount a serious 
challenge to the regime the republicans would have to overhaul their organisational structure and 
bring their ideology up to date. Finally, it was also obvious that in Barcelona at least the working 
class would to a large extent have to form the basis of any such opposition. This was particularly 
the case given the success the Catalanists had had in mobilising middle class protest during the 
year. A mesocratic: element was not absent from the campaign for a judicial review of the MontjuYc 
trial. Nevertheless workers formed a majority of those present at the meetings. This working 
class predominance was especially clear when the masses past from words to action. The "groups 
of big lads" (grupos de grandullones) who took to the streets in July 1899 were certainly of 
working class origin. Furthermore shopkeepers were one of their principal targets. Indeed, in 
response a number of shopkeepers and industrialists formed a Defence League which aimed to 
curb attacks on commercial property. 49 
The centre and right of republicanism was ideologicafly the worst equipped to deal with the 
new conditions. As we have seen, in the 1880s they had based their support on the on the petty 
bourgeoisie and reformist sectors of the labour movement. Between 1898 and 1899 the 
Republican Fusion tried to rebuild such a reformist coalition. In this attempt it had the backing of 
the Barcelona rump of the TCV. Thus in the 1898 elections the TCV supported the 
Fusionists in 
Opposition to a JustIcia candidature formed by more radical left wing elements. 
In May of the 
following year an Ateneu Socialista was founded with the participation of the 
TCV, and called for 
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the formation of a "republican working-class block". The initiative, however, came to nothing. 50 
The fact was that the kind of labour politics possible in the early 1880s were no longer viable. For 
not only were the republicans faced with competition from the Catalanists for their petty bourgeois 
and reformist working class base. More important the intensification of social conflict and the 
demise of the TCV between 1885 and 1892 had undermined the foundations on which refonnist 
working class politics rested. This became increasingly clear between 1899 and 1901 for, as we 
have seen, the TCV played only a minority role within the FIFE and, once the cotton textile labour 
federation had been destroyed, the anarchists came increasingly to dominate the Barcelona labour 
movement. 
There were, in fact, only two serious attempts to adapt republicanism to the new times, and 
both came from the left. In the first place, the "socialist republican", Joan Salas Anton, tried to 
fashion a powerful, republican led, working class co-operative movement. A large number of co- 
operatives had been formed in Catalonia since the 1880s. In general they were very small, and 
tended to specialise in the sale of bread and groceries. 51Their main task was the provision of 
relatively cheap and wholesome food in an age when the adulteration of foodstuffs was common 
practice. They were formed by workers, with journeyman playing a particularly important role in 
their development. 52 This perhaps reflected the fact that artisans were more likely to possess the 
know how and small savings necessary to set a co-operative up. 
By the turn of the century they had proliferated greatly. Thus in Barcelona there were at 
least 38 co-operatives. Five of these were producer and the rest consumer co-operatives. A 
similar situation could be seen in other Catalan towns. In Manlleu alone, for example, there were 
five co-operatives, all of which sold consumer goods. 53 The first reliable membership figures 
were elaborated by the Anuari dEstadistica Social de Catalunya somewhat later in 1913. It 
estimated that there were 9,819 co-operativists in Barcelona Province. 54 This represented just 
over 4 per cent of the total workforce. Production co-operatives were much rarer than those selling 
consumer goods. Workers often opened such co-operatives during strikes in order to put pressure 
to bear on their employers. This was, for instance, the tactic followed by the 
Barcelona bakers, 
barbers and cabinetmakers between 1900 and 1901. Producer co-operatives which operated on a 
permanent basis were, however, far less common. Thus, in 1899 there were only three significant 
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producer co-operatives in Barcelona. Two were run by the brickmakers, and the other was 
operated by the blacksmiths and carriage makers' union. 55 
Co-operativism had been strongly supported by the Catalan republicans. For, basing 
themselves on the Proudhonian ideal of the community of small artisanal producers, many saw co- 
operatives as the only means by which workers could free themselves from wage labour. But, in 
our period support for co-operativism extended to more right-wing circles. Thus, in the firs it 
decade of the twentieth century leading figures in the Ateneu Obrer de Barcelona, social catholics 
and members of the FIFN all saw co-operatives, run by the employers and their workers, as a 
means of diminishing social conflict. Moreover, in the long run, it was felt, such co-operatives 
could serve peacefully and harmoniously to transform society. 56 On the far left, the anarchists 
also accepted that co-operatives (in this case formed exclusively by workers) could help accustom 
the working class to run their own affairs. Yet they also warned that the co-operativists could 
become a privileged "fourth estate" below which there would be a miserable "fifth estate" 
composed of the remainder of the working class. 57 
There was, therefore, an significant degree of support for the ideals of co-operativism. 
This contrasted with the more sombre analysis of the actual functioning of the Catalan co- 
operatives undertaken by the various left-wing groupings. The most common criticism of the co- 
operatives was that they were "individualist" and "isolationist". This critique was provoked by the 
fact that the consumer co-operatives tended simply to divide the benefits between their members, 
and in general made little attempt to aid other working-class institutions. Thus, for example, the 
organ of the Catalan Socialists, La Guerra Social, stated in 1903: "In this city (i. e. , Barcelona) 
there are fifty or more consumer co-operatives. But they are isolated, alone, and possess very little 
capital, all of which makes it impossible for them to develop and expand. " This same criticism 
was expressed by such ideologically diverse figures as Miguel Rent6, a leading light in the Ateneu 
Obrer de Barcelona, and Ignasi Claria, the director of La Huelga General. 58 
Joan Salas Anton had been actively involved in Catalan co-operativism since the early 
1890s, when he developed close contact with the Sabadell republicans, and was consequently able 
to observe the functioning of a particularly large and well run co-operative, 
known as La 
Sabadellense, at close quarters. In the following years Salas Anton developed 
his own co- 
55. LP, 26 August 1899, ME; 1 October, ME. 
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operative vision. Thus he declared that he was a socialist, and argued that the transformation of 
society would be achieved not through violent revolution but through education. He maintained 
that co-operativism. would play a central role in this transformation. However, he countered the 
co-operatives' critics by stating that for this to be possible "individualist" co-operatives would hav-e 
to give way to "collective co-operativisnf'. Collective co-operatives, he maintained, would be 
distinguished by the close contacts they would maintain with the rest of the labour movement. 
Thus the future co-operatives would provide: "Assistance in case of illness and unemployment, 
strike payments when conflicts with capital make them necessary, propaganda and education, all of 
which, in one way or another, can favour the working class. " At the same time, he argued, that by 
educating the workers, "modem co-operativism tends to construct the society of the future with 
present day society, because it is an example of what future society will be fike-. 59 
Salas Anton, therefore, tried to reconstruct the co-operative movement from the left. He 
aimed to distance the co-operatives from possible right-wing connotations, and tie them firmly to 
organised labour. In 1899 he was a leading figure at a co-operative congress, which was behind 
the foundation of the Regional Chamber of Co-operatives of Barcelona and the Balearic Islands. 
At the turn of the century twenty of Barcelona's thirty eight co-operatives were affiliated, and Salas 
Anton was its first president. 60 Nevertheless, it was only in 1901 that he tried to put his 
programme of collective co-operativism. into practice. In this year he laid out his plans to set up the 
so-called Barcelona Hotel Comunal. This body, he declared, "should distance itself from the 
routine functioning of present day co-operatives, which devote all of their income to individual 
purposes. Instead it should devote the major part to the improvement of the proletariat". 61 nus it 
was planned, in the first place, to found a consumer co-operative only open to trade unionists. 
Part of the benefits would go to the members and be used to build up reserves. However, the 
remainder would be handed over to the trade union movement. With the benefits the Communal 
Hotel would be constructed. This was to be a large building in which all the unions would be able 
to install their headquarters, in which classes would be given, conferences held and leisure 
activities programmed. Furthermore, the Hotel Comunal itself was seen as part of a vaster scheme 
by which all the city's industry and commerce would be taken over by the working class. 
62 
The scheme received wide-ranging trade union support. A total of twenty seven 
Barcelona 
unions -a number of which were at that time closely 
linked to the anarchists - agreed to finance the 
59. Angel Duarte, "Pere Corominas: entre la Universitat, la MilitAncia Republicana i els Cercles 
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project. 63 it was given a particularly enthusiastic welcome by the Sabadell labour movement. 
Thus a meeting was held in the town in support of Salas Anton's co-operative plans in October 
1901. it was organised by the Sabadell power-loom weavers union, which had already set up a 
commission to study the benefits of co-operativism. The speakers included Salas Anton, the 
veteran Sabadell anarchist, Joan Faine, and representatives of the Barcelona cabinetmakers, 
carpenters and bricklayers unions. Faine gave his total support to the scheme. His remarks 
indicate that in Sabadell some anarchists were closer to the republicans than the "hard liners" 
analysed in the last chapter. 64 Indeed, the reaction of the anarchists was not in general hostile. 
e For example, Mir i Miro, the director from the pro-anarchist weekly published in Mahon, El 
Porvenir del Obrero, declared himself to be an "enthusiastic co-operativist", whilst Leopoldo 
Bonafulla stated that he did not oppose those co-operatives that displayed solidarity towards the 
labour movement. 65 
The reaction to Salas Anton's project, then, seemed for a moment to open up the 
possibility that he would be able to form a powerful co-operativist movement under republican 
auspices. This hope, however, soon proved to be an illusion. There were two reasons behind 
Salas Anton's failure. In the first place from 1901 politically he was to became increasingly 
isolated. During this year, as class conflict intensified so the anarchists put into effect their general 
strike tactics. Salas Anton soon voiced his opposition, and was for this reason strongly criticised 
by the anarchists. In 1903 Salas Anton also showed himself strongly critical of the dominant 
current in Barcelona republicanism, represented by that time by the Lerrouxists. This hostility 
towards Lerroux and the anarchists led Salas Anton to come into increasingly close contact with the 
Catalan Socialists, with whose peaceful trade union strategy he sympathised. By the second half 
of the century, indeed, it was the Socialists who were the strongest supporters of collective co- 
operativism. 66 At the same time Salas Anton's co-operativist project ran into practical problems. 
It got off the ground in 1901 with the opening of a consumer co-operative, but the repression 
which followed the February 1902 general strike seems to have put paid to any further 
developments. Furthermore, it appears that the Catalan co-operatives did not live up to Salas 
Anton's expectations. Most continued to operate as previously, and played little part in the wider 
struggles of the labour movement. 67 it was only as a result of the arrival of Alejandro 
Lerroux in 
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Barcelona that the republican's were able successfully to build a mass working class following in 
the city. 
It was in March 1901 that, inspired by the popularity he had achieved during the MonýuYc 
campaign, and realising that Barcelona would be the centre of any anti-monarchist revolution, 
Lerroux decided to transfer to the Catalan capital, and participate in the general elections to be held 
that month. The story of the growth in republican support in Catalonia and especially Barcelona 
after the arrival of Lerroux is well known. The electoral data is by itself eloquent. In the March 
1901 elections, when the republicans showed the first signs of revival, they received between 4000 
and 4,500 votes in Barcelona. There then followed a rapid growth of electoral support. T'he 
republicans greatest triumph was the March 1903 general election, when they received about 
35,000 votes in Barcelona. This represented 67 per cent of the voters and 30 per cent of the 
census. The bulk of these voters were of working class origin. The importance of this working 
class vote can be estimated if it is considered that there were at that time about 60,000 workers with 
the right to vote in the city. 68 
All authors agree that the organisational key to the republicans' success was a total overhaul 
of the structure of republicanism in the city. Lerroux's great achievement was to have created, 
from the atomised and unruly collection of republican clubs that existed at the beginning of the 
century, a modem mass party. There were two main aspects to this process. On the one hand, the 
party's supporters had to be continuously mobilised, and firmly tied to the party through a series of 
common interests. Lerroux was able to do this by holding frequent meetings and social 
gatherings. At the same time he created a large number of republican clubs known as Fraternities. 
These clubs were not only concerned with the party's political affairs, but also offered schooling, 
social welfare facilities, entertainment, and set up consumer cooperatives. 
On the other hand, it was necessary to create a centralised and unified party apparatus. In 
Barcelona this object was achieved through the formation of a staff of professional politicians, and 
an electoral machine capable of preventing electoral fraud. Yet for the republicans to be effective 
throughout Spain, a unification of the various political tendencies was necessary. There had been 
growing rank and file pressure in this direction since the 1890s, and with the new opportunities 
opened up the crisis of the Restoration and the upsurge in popular protest this pressure naturally 
became more intense. At the end of 1902, sure of his position in Barcelona, lxffoux responded to 
these demands by offering the leadership of a new unified party to the moderate ex-president of the 
First Republic, Nicolas Salmeron. Leffoux had to take this step so as not totally to divide the 
Spanish republicans. However, it was also to lead to a number of difficulties, 
for outside 
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Barcelona (and Valencia, under the leadership of Blasco Ibanez) republicanism still retained a 
traditional middle class air, and had little in common with the disciplined, proletarianised, party 
forged by Lerroux. The new party, known as the Republican Union was, nevertheless, founded 
in March 1903, and included the bulk of Spain's republicans in its ranks. 69 
In Barcelona right-wing republicans previously affiliated to the Republican Fusion joined 
the party. Leffoux, nevertheless, remained very much in control. Ideologically, therefore, 
Lerroux's success represented the victory of the republican left in Barcelona. There were perhaps 
four basic components distinguishable within Lerrouxist ideology. These were opposition to the 
Bourbon state, anticlericalism, anticatalanism, and what may be termed labourism. The first two 
elements were, of course, already key features of nineteenth century republicanism. Lerroux's 
anticatalanism was, also, not such a clear departure as has often been suggested. As has been seen, 
the dominant tendency within political Catalanism had become increasingly conservative in the late 
nineteenth century. In the early 1890s many left republicans had already reacted by adopting a 
very critical stance. Between 1899 and 1901 much of the Catalan haute bourgeoisie swung behind 
these Catalanists. As a result, in working class circles many came to confuse the interests of the 
bourgeoisie as a social class with Catalanism. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
Lerroux should play the anticatalanist card as a means of combating the Viga and attracting 
working class support. Especially as such a policy had the advantage of affording the Lerrouxists 
the protection of the Liberal party, which saw the Catalanists as the Restoration system's greatest 
enemies. 70 
These elements of Lerrouxist ideology, therefore, added nothing new to the republican 
tradition, although Lerroux's forceful oratory and populist style no doubt ensured that he was able 
to put the republican message over far more effectively than ever before. Lerroux's labourism 
was, however, more innovatory. Social conflict had been the achilles heal of late nineteenth 
century republicanism. As it intensified and as social differentiation became more marked so the 
republicans found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the interests of the heterogeneous social 
groups they referred to as "the people". However, as a result of these developments left wing 
labourist groups had been founded in the various republican parties, which 
developed contacts 
with the anarchists. Lerroux continued in this line, but took it a step 
further by propitiating the 
confusion between his ideology and that of the anarchists. As a republican 
Lerroux never aimed to 
form a specifically working class party. This was reflected in the make up of the 
Republican 
Union in Barcelona. Though predominantly working class, it maintained the support of a 
fraction 
of the middle class. Moreover, it was from the middle class that 
its leadership was primarily 
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drawn. However, the growth of industrial conflict, and the repression met out by the Monarchist 
governments in the 1890s had had a radicalising effect on a number of bourgeois intellectuals and 
politicians. Accordingly, anarchist ideas had become something of a fashion. Lerroux had been 
closely associated with these developments. At the same time he saw that it was vitally important 
for the republicans to attract working class support. It was, therefore, relatively easy for him to 
adopt what may be termed a philo-anarchist stance in order to obtain working class backing. 
Thus, for example, Lerroux presented his support for the retraimiento in not totally 
unambiguous terms as antipoliticism. And when in 1901 he decided to participate in elections he 
justified the shift by arguing that the elections and parliament would simply be used a platforms for 
revolutionary agitation. 71 Furthermore, he presented the Republic as a stepping stone on the path 
to the emancipation of the working class. To give one example, at a meeting of the Barcelona 
power-sawyers union he: 72 
Explained that although at present he belonged to the republican party, he had never forgotten the ideal of perfect justice and equality; of the beautiful city of the future, in which 
all humanity would form a single family, free from selfishness. (And concluded) "I'll 
always fight with you for your complete emancipation. '9 
Finally, Lerroux reacted to the escalation of class conflict in Barcelona by giving his 
support to the anarchists' militant trade union strategy. A number of indicators in this direction 
have already been given. In the previous chapter we saw how Luis Zurdo Olivares, who was in 
close contact with Lerroux, was a prominent figure in the anarchists' trade union meetings during 
1901. In addition it was noted that in December 1900 Lerroux backed the attempted general strike 
in support of the cotton textile workers despite the opposition of the Socialists. nis support for 
direct action could also be seen in the speeches LerToux made in a tour of Catalonia between 
August and September 1901. For example, in the speech he gave to the power-sawyers he advised 
them, "that if the power-sawyers' employers to not agree to their terms, and they have to go on 
strike to impose them, the strike must be revolutionary", given that, "peaceful strikes are lost. It is 
only revolutionary strikes that end in victory,,. 73 Indeed so identified was Lerroux with the 
anarchists' strike tactics that the Socialists made no distinction between them, and therefore 
carefully distinguished the union practice advocated by both the anarchists and Lerrouxist 
71. The existence of wide-ranging anarchist support for Lerroux was later remarked upon by Federico 
Urales, Mi Vida, op cit., pp. 16-17,41-47. A discussion of this question is also to be found in Joan B. Culla, 
opcit, pp. 16-17,41-47. Joaquin Romero Maura is therefore mistaken in his claim that Lerrouxist and 
anarchist ideology were always clearly diff e rentiated. Op cit, p. 115. 
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republicans from their own peaceful, gradualist, strategy. Thus, El Socialista stated at the 
beginning of 1902: 74 
Only revolutionary - read violent - strikes are of use to the workers. Peaceful, ordered, 
strikes are good for nothing except vainly using up funds and providing the employers with 
easy triumphs. This is, more or less, what the anarchists and libertarians, Lerroux and 
other revolutionaries who take as their model the Barcelona Deputy, tell the workers. 
This aspect ofLerrouxist ideology represented a clear break with the past. Through to the 
1890s, even the most left wing republicans had favoured a prudent trade union strategy, and 
advocated the strike weapon only as a last resort. 75 Lerroux's philo-anarchism, his fierce 
anticlericalism and insurrectionary rhetoric gained him a great deal of anarchist sympathy. Already 
in 1898 he had helped Federico Urales to found his Revista Blanca, and over the next two years it 
was common practice for anarchists and left republicans to publish articles in each others journals. 
These contacts between left republicans and anarchists were facilitated by the strong current in 
favour of unity visible amongst the working class trade union base. Lerroux's sympathy for the 
anarchists could again be seen in October 1900 when he attended the FRESR's founding congress, 
and read out the closing manifesto. Then, during August and September of the following year, he 
went on a propaganda tour though Catalonia. At a number of the meetings he shared the same 
platform as anarchists, especially Leopoldo Bonafulla. 76 
At the same time El Productor, the leading anarchist publication in Catalonia, adopted a 
tolerant attitude towards Lerroux. It remained antipolitical, but did not put Lerroux in the same 
category as other "bourgeois" politicians. This tolerance could, for example, be seen in the report 
of the above mentioned meeting at the headquarters of the Barcelona power-sawyers. Lerroux 
spoke along with a number of republican politicians. El Productor commented: 77 
We should not be sincere if we did not state that everything was spoken of except that 
which was the object of the meeting, namely trade union propaganda. Almost all the 
speeches consisted of political and even, we should say, electoral propaganda. The 
exception was Lerroux, who, if the truth be said, showed himself worthy and sincere when 
he stated that the meeting was of a purely economic character, and that it was 
his duty to 
accept this. 
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It then went on to praise the contents of Lerrouxs speech. This understanding was, 
indeed, denounced by La Guerra Social, in 1901. The Socialist mouthpiece, in fact, went so far as 
to accuse the Barcelona anarchists of voting republican in the last election, stating: 78 
Let it clearly be understood that the anarchists as such have no organisation. Divided and subdivided into groups and commissions they are to be founded scattered all over the place. 
Their field of action are the organisations of the free-thinkers, republicans and masons. In some of these associations they hold posts, though not as anarchists. 
In Barcelona it is well known that they have descended on the republican centres, in which they have a certain influence, consequent upon their being the first to comply with the agreements taken on such questions as the vote, inspection of electoral tables and everything else to do with elections. This is what they did at the last election despite their antielectoral claims. 
Between 1901 and 1903, then, it is clear that both Lerroux and those anarchists grouped 
around Leopoldo Bonafulla drew support from the same cultural milieux. Many workers who 
sympathised with the militant or anarchist trade union leaders voted republican at election time. 
Both Lerroux and the anarchists were successful because their ideology was in tune the radical 
strike and protest movements which swept Catalonia after the "disaster" of '98. On a trade union 
level Lerroux's supporters did not oppose - indeed they appeared actively to encourage - the strikes 
waves of the years 1900-1903. At the same time, they were at the forefront of the anticlerical 
agitation of these years, and were able to take advantage of the growing anticatalanism visible in 
working class circles. Finally, the party inspired by Lerroux was also able to channel opposition 
to the Restoration system into support for its vision of the future republic. This was to be the 
antithesis of the present regime: a modem lay state, which would set up social welfare programmes 
and guarantee individual liberties and freedom of expression. Moreover, according to Lerroux's 
philo-anarchist vision it was only to represent a staging post on the road to a totally classless 
society. 
Between 1900 and 1902 the Socialists became increasingly isolated from the mainstream of 
Barcelona labour politics. Their critique of Lerroux and the anarchists stemmed from the fact that 
they saw themselves as a prudent and responsible opposition to the Monarchy. Consequently, as 
was seen in the previous chapter, they were fiercely critical of the anarchists' strike tactics. 
Similarly, although anticlerical, they could not endorse calls made by anarchists and left 
republicans for convents to be burnt to the ground, or even for Jesuits to be exhibited in cages 
along the roads. In general, they felt alienated from the insurrectionary fervour of these years and 
the belief that Lerrouxists and anarchists seemed to hold that every strike and protest movement 
might, at least, lead to the overthrow of the Monarchy, and perhaps to the overthrow of capitalism. 
78. Cited in ES, 5 July 1901. 
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The radicalism and philo-anarchism Of Lerrouxism during this period also permits a further 
consideration. If a long term perspective is taken, it becomes clear that a necessary cond'don for 
the success of both anarchism and Urrouxism was the radicalisation of key sectors of the Catalan 
proletariat from the 1880s. It is impossible to imagine the existence of a republican party similar to 
that captained by Lerroux existing alongside the class-collaborationist TCV. 
The analysis of Lerrouxism from this perspective also allows a number of interesting 
comparisons to be made between republicanism in and outside Barcelona. A phenomenon which 
has oft been commented on is that, whilst Urrouxist- style republicanism became dominant in 
Barcelona, this was not necessarily the case in other Catalan industrial towns. Of the areas on 
which the study has centred, the information available on the Ter Valley is not good enough to 
carry out a comparison of the influence of the various republican tendencies. T'he information 
available for Sabadell is fortunately far better. In this town the so-called Federal Republicans 
remained dominant, and like the Lerrouxists they maintained close links with the labour movement. 
Unlike the Lerrouxists, however, the Federalists did not justify the anarchists' militant trade union 
tactics. Nor did they adopt Lerroux's anticatalanist rhetoric. On the contrary they showed a certain 
sympathy towards Catalanism. In the only serious study of Sabadell republicanism during this 
period, Esteve Deu has suggested that an important factor in the continuing strength of Federalism 
was the lower percentage of immigrant workers in the town as compared to Barcelona. Catalan 
workers, he argues, were less likely to be influenced by Lerroux's anticatalanism, and by his 
demagogic pseudo-revolutionary campaigns. 79 However, the argument that Lerroux's success in 
Barcelona was made possible by large scale immigration is unsustainable. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, during these years immigrants still formed a relatively small percentage of the Barcelona 
working class, and many of these immigrants came from Catalan speaking areas. 
Once it is agreed that the causes behind Lerroux's success can only be understood by 
studying the internal dynamics of Catalan society, the argument that the continuing strength of 
Federalist republicanism can be related to the predominance of an autochthonous working class in 
Sabadell naturally collapses. A more fruitful way of looking at this question could be to compare 
and social structures and types of union organisation in Sabadell and Barcelona. The woollen 
textile industry was predominant in Sabadell. Social conflict was not generally as severe 
in this 
industry as in some sectors of the Catalan economy. As a result trade union organisation was more 
stable, and the union strategy pursued by the woollen workers more cautious than that of many of 
the Barcelona trades. This we would argue probably facilitated the survival of Federalism as a 
dominant force in Republican politics. The fact that class conflict was not as pronounced could 
permit the popular interclass base of nineteenth century republicanism to remain more 
intact than in 
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Barcelona. As a result, the need for a Lerrouxist style proletarianised, phi lo-an arch ist, republican 
party was not so strongly felt in Sabadell. 
However, there was a further important factor. Unlike their colleagues in cotton textiles the 
woollen textile manufacturers did not in general abandon the official Monarchist parties and give 
their support to the Lliga Regionalista. This was probably a result of the fact that the woollen 
textile manufacturers exported a lower percentage of their production to the last colonies. When 
these colonies were lost, therefore, dissatisfaction with the Restoration parties was not so great. 80 
This question is in need of further investigation, but it may well be that one of the consequences of 
the woollen textile manufacturers continuing support for the regime was that in Sabadell 
Catalanism was never confused with bourgeois politics to the extent it was in Barcelona. That this 
was the case is suggested by the functioning on an important Centre Catald in the town during the 
first decade of the century which urged the workers to vote republican. 81 
The previous sections may have given the impression that Lerrouxism could be considered 
the "political wing" of Catalan anarchism. The Socialists, at least, claimed that this was the case. 
However, it was never in fact so. Indeed, although Lerroux appeared to support anarchist inspired 
strikes, it was the the high level of industrial conflictivity in Barcelona that was to bring the 
contradictions between his ideology and that of the anarchists to the fore. Despite the convergence 
of the years 1899-1901 there remained key ideological differenceýbetween the two forces. The 
anarchists, at least theoretically, opposed electoral participation. Moreover, their goal was a social 
revolution which would usher in the communist or collectivist society of the future. Despite the 
ambiguities of the Lerrouxist discourse the Spanish Republican Union offered no such alternative. 
It was an interclass force whose aim was the installation of a republic and, though Lerroux might 
claim it would be a bridge to a future classless society, other sectors of the party had very different 
views on the subject. Indeed, Lerroux's aims were very much in question. Historians have, in 
fact, almost unanimously seen Lerroux as a demagogue, in the sense that that there was a gap 
between the claims he made and his real intentions. In particular, his revolutionary rhetoric never 
seemed to be matched by his actions. This divergence first became clear during the February 1902 
general strike. Lerroux had, we have suggested, been a strong supporter of revolutionary strike 
action. None the less, this did not prevent him from studiously avoiding any implication 
in the 
events of that week by staying put in Madrid and making no public comment on the strike. 
Once it 
was over, however, he made a strong and widely publicised defence of the strikers 
in parliament. 
With this he aimed - by and large successfully - to channel working 
class support for the strike in 
his direction, and to silence criticism of his inactivity while 
it was in progress. 82 
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However, it was as a result of Lerroux's behaviour during the general strike that a growing 
number of anarchists came to see Lerrouxism as a movement which led the workers away from 
their real interests. It was, these anarchists argued, only by joining the trade unions and, through 
these unions, participating in the class struggle, that the workers could work towards their 
emancipation. All other political activity was superfluous. Such criticisms had already been 
voiced in 1901, especially as a result of Lerroux's decision to participate in the elections of that 
year. This was a decision which had apparently opened the eyes of more than one anarchist. 83 El 
Productor, despite the contacts maintained between Lerroux and Bonafulla, did not support 
participation in elections. In its pages there were also occasional attacks on Lerroux, such as the 
one made by "Claudio Escamilla", who argued that despite the claims made by Lerroux that he 
would carry through "the revolution in parliament" in his interventions to date he had simply 
shown himself to be a "Spanish patriot", and was, therefore, as far as the Catalanists from the 
anarchist dream of the "universal fatherland". 84 
The hard-line anarchists who wrote La Protesta took a more radical stance. When Lerroux 
was elected to parliament in March 1901 it asked leading anarchists to give their opinion on the 
worth of Lerroux as a parliamentary deputy. The idea was to make clear it was impossible for 
anarchists to give their support to Lerroux. Not surprisingly, then, all the replies published were 
highly critical. For example, "Teofilo Lagardia", writing from Barcelona, denounced the anarchist 
support Lerroux had received, and went on to argue that it was the anarchists' duty to deny the 
claim made that Lerroux would sit in parliament under the title "republican anarchist". He 
concluded that Lerroux was deceiving the masses and using them for his own political ends. At 
the same time, La Huelga General, at least outwardly, took a similarly antipolitical stance, and 
claimed that a future bourgeois republic would probably be as repressive as the present 
monarchical regime. 85 
Lerroux and the anarchists continued to maintain contacts during 1902 and 1903.86 
Nevertheless, after the February 1902 general strike criticisms in the anarchist press became far 
more generalised. The most coherent critique of Lerroux was to be found in the pages of El 
Productor in a series of articles written by the anarchist shoemaker, Joaquin Coca, between 
September and December 1903. Coca, who a played a significant part in the anarchist revival of 
83. Federico Urales, op cit, pp. 85-87. 
84. EP, 30 November 1901. 
85. La Protesta, 22 June 1901; La Huelga General, 3 Jan 1903. 
86. For example, in March 1903, Lerroux could still speak alongside the well known anarchists, 
Castallote 
and Casanovas, in a meeting in Matar6. EP, 23 March 1903. 
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1901, maintained that Lerroux had been sent to Barcelona by the government authorities for two 
main reasons. The first was to "disorientate" the workers, and lead them away from anarchism 
down the path of electoral politics: a terrain where nothing positive could be expected. This object 
had been attained, Coca argued, through two separate though interconnected means. First Lerroux 
had pretended to be an anarchist. T'hus he had promised never to be elected, "and had obtained the 
support of Spain's leading anarchists by mixing the republican filth with the anarchist honey, and 
giving them to understand his object was to carry out a republican revolution and, once this had 
been achieved, carry the masses on to a social revolution". This anarchist support he admitted was 
still significant. For this reason, Coca stated, it was necessary to combat, "a lot of anarchists who 
speak seriously of radicalism (i. e. , Lerrouxism)", and who favoured, "alliances of radical forces 
in which we are included". At the same time, Coca maintained, Lerroux gained support through 
his anticlerical rhetoric. This allowed him to take advantage of the anticlericalism of many 
anarchists to appear on the same platform as them. Yet his real goal was to deflect the workers 
attention away form their real enemies, the "bourgeois, exploiters and parasites of all classes". 
The second reason Lerroux had been sent to Barcelona, Coca continued, was to destroy the 
labour movement. This his followers did by provoking divisions within the trade unions, and 
trying to get as many as possible to set up their headquarters in the future republican Casa del 
Pueblo. Lerroux and his followers were, therefore, Coca concluded, "frauds who have no 
scruples". The anarchists response should, in consequence, be not to tolerate - as occurred at 
present - that anyone call himself anarchist and republican at the same time, and to launch an 
actively antipolitical campaign. 87 Some anarchists, in fact, took Coca's advice. Thus, during the 
1903 municipal elections they organised a series of antielectoral meetings, one of which ended in 
clashes between anarchists and republicans. 88 
The interpretation advanced by Coca achieved, with a number of variants, wide currency in both 
anarchist and Socialist circles. In this way the myth of Lerroux sent to Barcelona to undermine the 
labour movement became the left's alternative of the Lliga's vision of Lerroux sent to Barcelona to 
halt the advance of Catalanism. The previous pages should leave no doubt as to the partiality of 
this interpretation. Yet its obvious inadequacies should not obscure the existence of a kernel of 
truth. Lerrouxism, more so than nineteenth century republicanism, by adopting a labourist philo or 
pseudo anarchist rhetoric, would now become an obstacle to the development of exclusively 
working class political and trade union options. This, as shall be seen, was to become crystal clear 
between 1907 and 1909, when a newly emerging Socialist and anarchist inspired labour federation 
came into direct conflict with the Leffouxists. 
87. EP, 12 Sept, 17 Oct, 24 Oct, 19 Nov, 12 Dec 1903. 
88. EP, 3 Oct, 10 Oct, 14 Nov 1903. 
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Growing anarchist criticism of Lerrouxism during 1903 could, indeed, have led to a 
weakening of the working class base on which the Republican Union rested in Barcelona. 
However, as was seen in the previous chapter, the anarchists themselves found themselves in 
considerable difficulties at that time. In the first place the failure of two general strikes they tried to 
launch led to discontent. More important, the onset of a severe economic recession in the Autumn 
of 1903 undermined the belligerent trade union movement on which their strength rested. As a 
result, during the depression years of 1904-1909 the anarchists were to have a far lower profile 
than in the previous period. It cannot be sustained that the growth of Lerrouxist style 
republicanism was based on its taking advantage of the "void" left by the demise of the anarchist 
national labour federation, the FRESR, at the end of 1903.89 As we have seen, the growth of 
republicanism preceded any such collapse. Indeed Lerrouxism was to go into a slow decline from 
1904. And until 1909 at least it was the depoliticisation in working class circles which 
accompanied the onset of recession, together with the realisation that the Restoration system was 
not about to collapse, which was behind a fall in the number working class votes for the 
republicans. Nonetheless, it would be true to say that the disorganisation of the Barcelona trade 
unions did allow Lerroux to maintain an important degree of working class support without having 
to worry about a strong and troublesome anarchist inspired labour movement. 
In conclusion, then, in Barcelona the Lerrouxist republicans were, between 1901 and 
1903, able to channel much popular and especially working class support into the party they were 
in the process of creating. This growth in support for the Lerrouxists was accompanied by an 
expansion of anarchist influence within the trade unions. At the other end of the scale, the 
Socialists found themselves increasingly marginalised from working class trade union and political 
life. It has been argued that the Socialist's loss of support cannot be put down to their exclusion 
from an "anarcho-republican" cultural milieux. Admittedly this study had concentrated on trade 
unionism, and the analysis of the cultural institutions of the Catalan working class is still in its 
infancy. Nevertheless, as has been seen, in 1899 the Catalan Socialists looked towards an alliance 
with the republicans, and adopted much of their liberal-rationalist rhetoric. Moreover, many centre 
and right wing republicans sympathised to a far greater extent with the Socialists than with the 
anarchists. And, during the first decade of the century, the republican co-operativist, Joan Salas 
Anton, alienated from the violence of the Lerrouxists and anarchists, was drawn ever closer to the 
Socialists. 
However, it would be true to say that many left republican militants had developed close 
contacts with the anarchists. This may in part have been tactical. The republicans centred their 
activity in the political arena whilst the anarchists were most active within the unions. Iley did 
not, therefore, directly threaten each others' position. Accordingly, they could each ward of the 
89. This is the interpretation advanced by Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 414-415. 
223 
Socialist threat in their respective sphere without coming into conflict. Between 1898 and 1903 in 
Barcelona these contacts were to become more pronounced. This rapprochement was based on the 
extreme anticlericalism of both anarchists and Lerrouxist republicans, and on the philo or pseudo 
anarchist stance which Lerroux seemed in many respects to adopt. The Socialists felt alienated 
from what they regarded was infantile revolutionism, whose only result, they maintained, would 
be to play into the hands of the Spanish right. Yet, the Socialists' political strategy suffered from 
the same drawbacks as their trade union practice. They had pushed the goal of social revolution 
into the distant future, and looked to work from within the regime to democratise and reform it. 
The dominant oligarchy, however, showed little appetite for social or political reform. The result 
was to strengthen the hand of those anarchists and left republicans who hoped an insurrectionary 
putch could bring the regime down. The honeymoon between anarchists and Lerrouxists was, 
however, soon to come to an end. Thus Lerroux was, after the general strike of 1902, 
increasingly seen in left wing circles as a demagogue whose revolutionary rhetoric used to gain 
working class support. The years after 1904 were also to see a radicalisation of Catalan Socialist 
ideology. Both these factors combined to make it possible for Catalan anarchists and Socialists to 
draw closer together. It is to this period that the final chapter will now turn. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TBE GENESIS OF TBE CNT AND TBE FAILURE OF CATALAN SOCIALISM,, 
1904-1914 
The years between 1904 and 1906 were, indeed, to see the Catalan labour movement at a low ebb. 
As a result some anarchist militants became increasingly disconnected from the working class, 
moved in the d6classe bohemian circles of Niezche and Stimer, and possibly became involved in 
terrorist activities. Indeed, many of the anarchists who maintained contact with the trade unions 
began to doubt their revolutionary potential. This could be seen in March 1904 when a small 
anarchist dominated local federation once again began to function in Barcelona. This federation 
was behind the organisation of a congress of unions from Catalonia and the Balearic Islands which 
was held in Sabadell between 30 October and 1 November. At the congress "partial strikes" were 
rejected in favour of the revolutionary general strike. Moreover, there were strong criticisms of 
trade unionism, and it was finally decided that the unions should be dissolved and be replaced by 
anarchist affinity groups, who would operate within the working class, and take the initiative when 
the time for action came. 1 
However, not all anarchist sympathisers who retained links with the trade unions supported 
the stance taken by the leadership of the Barcelona federation. In particular, the organ of the 
Sabadell FOS, El Trabajo, came out in favour of the strengthening of trade unionism. El Trabajo 
was encouraged by the growth of the French labour confederation, the ConfM&ation Generaledu 
Travail (CGT), which by 1906 had about 300,000 affiliates. The CGT declared itself to be 
syndicalist. As has been stressed, the basic component in syndicalist doctrine was anarchism. 
Indeed, it seems that the trade union practice of the Spanish anarchists was of some importance in 
the elaboration of syndicalist ideology. Hence, the syndicalists rejected parliamentary socialism, 
and supported revolutionary action by the trade unions. In reality this policy can best be described 
as antipolitical. in that no useful role was envisaged for a party of the working class. Nevertheless, 
the CGT declared itself to be apolitical. There were three main reasons for this. First, as we have 
seen, anarchists (and Socialists) faced the difficulty that when they formed unions under their 
control they were open to the charge of splitting the labour movement. Yet, if the syndicalists 
union practice could be presented as somehow neutral and outside the realm of politics they could 
1. On the individualist anarchists see, Emili Salut, op cit, pp. 81-82; Angel Pestaha, "Historia de las Ideas y 
Luchas Sociales en EspaMa , VI", Orto (August 1932), pp. 24-27.; 
Rafael N6nez Florencio, op cit, p. 69. 
On the local federation and Catalano-Balear congress, La flustrad'on Obrera, 12 March, 2 April, 14 May, 11 
June, 16 August 1904; ET, 25 October, 12 November 1905. 
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counter this charge. Indeed, the need for anarchists to give the impression that they did not directly 
control unions under their influence was probably the major reason for the elaboration of 
syndicalist doctrine. Moreover, the apolitical banner served to stop "politicians- (i. e., Socialists or 
republicans) from taking over the unions. Finally, though the CGT was anarchist dominated there 
was an important Socialist and reformist opposition within the confederation. The concept of 
apoliticism allowed all workers affiliated to militate in and vote for the party of their choice as long 
as they did not try and propagate their views within the CGT. 
The CGT, then, was more broadly based than the Spanish anarchist labour organisations - 
the so-called "free pacts"- formed in the late nineteenth and first years of the twentieth century. its 
union practice was also to change over time. At the turn of the century the French syndicalists, like 
Spanish anarchists who worked within the unions, argued that the revolution would be the result 
of a series of increasingly bitter industrial disputes. Workers, therefore, were seen as being 
radicalised by the experience of the class struggle, though some syndicalists also adhered to the 
view that it was the role of a conscious minority of militants to inspire the masses. The CGT 
followed this policy during the boom years of 1902-1908 in France. Its success was, however, 
limited, and the CGT suffered a series of heavy defeats at the hands of the state. The led to severe 
criticism of the CGT leadership by the non-syndicalist elements within the confederation. 
Furthermore, the practice of some of the syndicalist militants began imperceptibly to change. 
Within a non-revolutionary context any labour federation would have to concentrate on the day to 
day running of the unions. This involved the need to build up union organisation and negotiate 
industrial disputes. Consequently, many revolutionary syndicalists came to argue that all union 
victories were "partial expropriations" of capital. The result was that the CGT's revolutionary 
goals began to fade into the background. This tendency became clear from 1909.2 
There could, therefore, be both moderate and revolutionary interpretations of syndicalism. 
El Trabajo sounded a cautious note. Following the CGT it maintained that unions should aim to 
improve wages and working conditions in the short run, and work towards the overthrow of 
capitalism in the future. However, it opposed actions which would endanger the very existence of 
the trade unions. Thus, in a clear reference to the anarchists' continual attempts to call general 
strikes at the turn of the century, it criticised, "the impetuosity of certain elements who had thought 
they could make these bodies (i. e., the unions) carry out acts for which they were neither prepared 
nor educated". Furthermore, El Trabajo argued that trades unions should be apolitical, and that all 
3 workers should join together to seek their emancipation. 
2. F. F. Ridley, Revolutionary Syndicalism in France (London, 1970), passim; Nicolas Papayanis, Alphonse 
Merrheim. The Emergence of Reformism within Revolutionary Syndicalism, 1871-1925 (Dordrecht, 
1985), passim. 
I ET, 25 January 1905; 30 June, 7 Sept, 26 December 1906; 12 January 1907. 
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Between 1904 and 1906, then, El Trabajo stressed the need to rebuild the Catalan trade 
unions. Once again, therefore, the Sabadell FOS was be found on the moderate or "realist" wing 
of Catalan anarchism. It was on the initiative of El Trabajo that the Catalan unions launched their 
only significant campaign of these years. The campaign was undertaken in close collaboration 
with the CGT- In 1905 El Trabajo informed its readership that the CGTs Bourges congress had 
decided to press for the introduction of an eight hour day from 1 May 1906. This reform was not 
to be achieved by legal, reformist, means. Instead, from 1 May all workers would simply abandon 
their workplace after having laboured for eight hours. The demand was, consequently, to be 
conquered through their own "direct action". 4 
El Trabajo maintained throughout 1905 that the campaign should be seconded by the entire 
working class. The proposal generated considerable enthusiasm. The campaign, led by pro- 
anarchist and syndicalist elements, began in earnest from January 1906. Articles supporting the 
stoppage were published in all the working class press, pamphlets were printed, and a large 
number of fly sheets distributed. Furthermore between 15 and 16 April a meeting was held in 
Valls to discuss action to be taken on 1 May. In all 50 delegates from 100 unions attended. They 
represented the core of the Catalan labour movement. The meeting declared itself in favour of 
direct action but, taking count of the realities of the times, asked only that those unions and 
localities who were in a strong enough position second the movement. 5 
The object of the campaign was, as might be expected, not to be achieved. In Barcelona 
and several other towns the workers came out on 1 May. However, they went back to work on the 
next day and made no effort to stop work after eight. hours. The reasons were clear. The 
economic recession was still very deep, and union organisation far too weak for such a 
revolutionary demand to have any chanc e of success. Yet, it did bring a large number of Catalan 
unions into closer contact. It also confirmed that pro-anarchist workers still played a important role 
within the labour movement. Finally, for the first time the Catalan unions and French CGT were 
able to co-ordinate their activities. 
The campaign also stimulated discussion on the possibility of regrouping the individual 
Catalan unions into a new confederation. The FRESR had moved to La Coruila in August 1905 
and was now completely inoperative. The idea was encouraged by the fact that in Barcelona there 
was an increase in union activity from the end of 1906. Moreover, the economic recession eased 
somewhat in the following year. Anarchist union leaders also felt that it was of the utmost 
importance to relaunch the labour movement in order to counteract the tendency, as they saw it, for 
workers to abandon their unions and occupy themselves solely with politics. 
4. ET, 28 January 1905 
5. La Cuf)a, 16 January, 26 April 1906; ET, 21 April 1906; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 165-166. 
227 
Indeed, between 1905 and 1907 the Catalan political landscape was totally transformed. 
On 25 November 1905 the Diga Regionalista's satirical weekly Cu-Cut! published a cartoon 
lampooning the army. That night, in retaliation, army officers vandalised the offices of Cu-Cut! 
and La Veu de Catalunya. These events triggered new alignment of political forces in the region. 
The Liberals in power soon capitulated to the demands of the military and passed a law making 
criticisms of the army an offence subject to military jurisdiction. The Lliga Regionalista reacted by 
captaining a coalition of forces, known as Solidaritat Catalana, which stretched from the Carlists to 
some republicans. Their slogan was "the defence of Catalonia". The coalition's zenith was 
reached in the April 1907 elections when it gained a massive 53,000 votes in Barcelona, and broke 
the hold of the dynastic caciques over much of rural Catalonia. Solidaritat Catalana was supported 
by more moderate republicans who had been in the Republican Fusion and opposed Lerroux's 
leadership of Barcelona republicanism. It was, however, opposed by Lerroux who stated that he 
would never enter into a coalition with reactionary Carlists and clericals. As a result the 
Republican Union broke up, and in 1908 Lerroux formed his own Republican Radical Party. 6 
This division between Leffouxists and Catalanists would result in a fierce political struggle. 
Anselmo Lorenzo maintained that the workers reaction should be to "scorn the bourgeois solidarity 
and the bourgeois antisolidarity and reconstruct worker solidarity, the precursor of that great 
human solidarity". 7 The first serious discussion of this question took place at the end of 1906 
when the mouthpiece of the pro-anarchist Madrid stonemasons' union, La Voz del Cantero, wrote 
a series articles urging the creation of a new confederation on the lines of the French CGT. Both 
El Trabajo and La Cufia, the mouthpiece of the Catalan based woodworkers' federation, showed 
themselves favourably disposed, but maintained that it would first be necessary for the individual 
unions to recruit more members. 8 
It was in these circumstances that the Catalan Socialists were able to take the initiative, and 
play a leading role in the creation of a new union confederation, albeit at the more modest level of 
Barcelona city. This may at first sight be surprising, given the Socialists had not increased their 
support in Catalonia since 1903. However, they did have one factor in their favour. In the 
economically depressed conditions of these years few unions would sympathise with the 
anarchists' militant strike policy. In a manner similar to the years 1898-1900, therefore, the 
Socialists might, through their stress on the need for solid trade union organisation, be able to play 
an important role in the reorganisation of the labour movement. In this respect, however, they 
6. For political developments during these years see, for example, Joan Culla, op cit, pp. 139-197. 
7. ET, 11 May 1907 
8. Enric Oliv6 Serret, "El Moviment Anarquista", pp. 321-323.; La Cuha, 21 February 1907; ET, 29 
December 1906. 
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faced a number of difficulties. By themselves they were not strong enough to lead a union revival. 
They would, therefore, have to collaborate with union activists close to the anarchist camp. Yet, 
their reaction to the 1902 general strike had earned them the title of enemies of the working class, 
and between 1904 and 1906 they remained locked in bitter conflict with the anarchists. It was, 
therefore, clear that in order once again to play a leading role within the Barcelona labour 
movement they would have seriously to reconsider their policies. 
Such a reappraisal took place between 1904 and 1908. As a result the Catalan Socialists 
appeared to break with the moderate trade union practice of the past and adopted a syndicalist 
veneer. This change was a response to conditions in Catalonia, but cannot be understood without 
reference to events in the rest of Europe. The years after 1900 saw a growth in the influence of 
syndicalist ideas throughout much of the continent. Furthermore, in Socialist circles a left-wing 
opposition had grown up to the de-facto reformism of the Second International. These leftists did 
not, in general, advocate the use of the general strike to overthrow capitalism. Nevertheless, they 
did call for a move away from the, in their view, excessive concentration on elections, and 
supported the use of mass strikes for political ends. 9 
In Barcelona a number of Socialists linked to shopworkers"trade unionism provided the 
stimulus for change. The two most important figures in this respect were Antoni Badia Matamala 
and Antoni Fabra Ribas. Badia, Matamala was president of the Barcelona shopworkers' union, La 
AssociaciO de Dependencia Mercantil almost without a break between 1902 and 1908, and was the 
man who, in practical terms, did most to engineer a compromise between the various tendencies 
within the Barcelona labour movement. Fabra Ribas, on the other hand, was the theoretician 
behind the new strategy. University educated, he had first entered labour politics in 1898 when he 
helped to organise the shopworkers, in his home town, Reus. He spent most of the time between 
1901 and 1908 abroad. Here he made contacts with left-wing Socialists and became influenced by 
syndicalist ideas. Fabra Ribas seems, in particular, to have been influenced by the French Socialist 
left. These Socialists rejected the subordination of the unions to the party, and claimed that the 
unions had a clear role to play in rising workers' consciousness. Indeed, Fabra. Ribas was 
sceptical as to the value of electoral politics. Instead he stressed the need for militant rank and file 
action by a united working class. Moreover, in typical syndicalist terms he suggested capitalism 
might be overthrown through a general strike. In France a united socialist party (the SFIO) had 
recently been founded. It took on board many of the ideological postulates of the left Socialists. 
Thus, unlike the PSOE, it did not try and set up its own labour confederation, but instead worked 
9. Dick Geary, European Labour Protest, pp. 123-125.; Even in Britain during these years there was a 
considerable growth in support for syndicalism. See, Bob Holton, British Syndicalism, 1900-1914 
(London, 1976). 
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through the CGT. In view of the weakness of the UGT Fabra Ribas hoped to apply a similar 
formula, first to Catalonia, and perhaps eventually to the whole of Spain. 10 
The victory of the tendency captained by Fabra Ribas was assured at the Socialist congress 
held on 27 and 28 September 1908 to reorganise the by then defunct Catalan Socialist Federation. 
Fabra Ribas, who had recently returned from abroad, became the Federation's secretary, and he 
was also elected to the post of editor of its mouthpiece, La Internacional. 11 'ne Socialists change 
of outlook significantly coincided with the eclipse of the figure of Toribio Reoyo. Nevertheless, 
Fabra Ribas would have to face the opposition of a group of Barcelona Socialists who adopted 
what may be referred to as an orthodox "Pablist" stance. Josep Comaposada, meanwhile, adopted 
a position of sceptical neutrality. 
The initiative to found a new, effective, local federation was taken by the AssociaciO de 
Dependencia Mercantil in the Summer of 1907, when it invited all the Barcelona unions to a series 
of meetings in order to discuss the question. At that time union organisation was very weak, and 
the small anarchist inspired federation had once again ceased to function. The formation of some 
kind of co-ordinating body was, therefore, an obvious necessity. It was for this reason that an 
important number of pro-anarchist, republican and independent unions agreed to the plan. The 
new federation, known as Solidaritat Obrera (SO), was, accordingly, founded on 3 August 1907 
with the support of over 50 Barcelona unions. Two months later the first number of its 
mouthpiece of the same title also appeared. 12 
At first SO gained wide-ranging support. This included all those anarchists who did not 
support individualist doctrines. Thus, Francesc Ferrer gave money for the publication of SO, and 
a down payment to rent new larger headquarters in September 1908; Anselmo Lorenzo encouraged 
anarchists to join; and the city's leading anarchist publication, Tierra y Libertad, gave the federation 
its blessing. Barcelona Socialists grouped around Fabra Ribas also strongly defended the new 
body, and even advised unions under their influence to leave the UGT in order to join. Finally, the 
Leffouxists, hoped to attract SO into its circle of influence and gave it their protection. 13 
10. Nuestro Programa, 30 June 1903; Revista Socialista, 16 May, 1 June, 16 June, 1 November, 16 
November, 1 December 1904,1 January, 16 February 1905; La Internacional, 6,20 November 1908. 
Antonio Fabra Ribas, La Semana Trigica, El Caso Maura, El Krausismo, Pr6logo de Antonio P6rez Bar6 
(Madrid, 1975), pp. 15-17, n. l., p. 214.; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, n. 3., pp. 288-289.; For the left-wing 
French Socialists see, Roger Magraw, "Socialism, Syndicalism and French Labour', in Dick Geary (ed. ), 
Labour and Socialist Movements, op cit, pp. 74-86. 
11 - La Internacional, 30 November 1908. 12. Josd Negre, Recuerdos de un Viejo Militante (Barcelona n. d. ), pp. 7-8.; Angel Pestaha, "Historia de 
las ideas 
... en Espaha, W, 
Orto (November 1932). 
13. Josd Negre, op cit, p. 9.; Boletin, August 1908; SO, 13 February 1908; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 
179-209.; Joan Culla, op cit, p. 180. 
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OROAJJO DO UAS SOCISDADES ORIJBIRAS 
During the first month of SO's existence the idea which emerged most forcefully was the 
need for working class unity in order to build up a strong labour federation, which would be in a 
position effectively to defend its members' interests against the bourgeoisie. The stress on 
autonomous working class action could be seen in the caption which appeared in the first number 
of SO. (see Fig. 7.1. ). In it a worker was shown asleep, drugged by bourgeoisie propaganda. 
This was a reference to the political struggles of the period between the Lerrouxists and Solidaritat 
Catalana, which had attracted so much attention. The worker's dreams were the autonomy of 
Catalonia and the republic. Echoing Anselmo Lorenzo, only SO, it was claimed, could awaken the 
workers, improve their working conditions, and lead them down the path to their emancipation. 
Indeed, it appears that the name SO was devised in opposition to Solidaritat Catalana.. 14 
The federation tried to balance the different tendencies within its midst. 15 The Socialists, it 
would be true to say, because of their continued weakness in the Barcelona labour movement, 
relied on moderate independent unions to stop the anarchists from dominating the federation. 
However, in the depressed economic climate of these years even more militant trade unionists 
would be discouraged from undertaking any kind of revolutionary adventure. In fact, the need felt 
to strengthen union organisation led to a reaction against the revolutionary voluntarism of the turn 
of the century anarchist "free pacts". 16 This spirit was reflected in the organisational structure of 
SO. As was noted in Chapter Five, unions affiliated to the "free pacts" paid no dues. This made it 
impossible to run a labour organisation effectively. SO retained the decentralising ideals of 
previous anarchist bodies, but affiliated unions had to pay a small sum per member to the Federal 
Commission. The change in stance may in part have been the result of the Socialist presence 
, within SO. However, it was also no doubt a consequence both of bitter experience and of the 
example of the French CGT. The CGT, as seen, declared itself syndicalist, but member unions 
had to pay dues. 
The unitarian nature of SO allowed it to gain widespread support. At its peak in July 1908 
71 unions were affiliated representing between 10 and 15,000 workers. 17 This figure, moreover, 
included most of the city's largest unions. SO, therefore, was not only supported by more militant 
unions, which had been at the forefront of the strike wave which engulfed the city between 1901 
and 1903. Unions representing more moderate groups of workers, who usually maintained an 
independent existence, and certainly had no sympathy for the anarchists' trade union strategy, also 
became members. This included a number of shopworkers unions. In the construction industry 
14. Jose Negre, op cit, p. 9. 
15. Thus the first so-called Federal Commission included Antoni Colomer, of no known political 
persuasion, as General Secretary, with Antoni Badia and Jaume Bisbe, representatives of the federation's 
Socialist and anarchist wings respectively, as secretaries. The General Secretary was - with the exception 
of several months in 1908 -a neutral figure through to July 1909. 
16. SO, 26 October 1907. 
17. SO, 12 July 1908. 
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the stonemasons, marblers, stonecutters, plasterers and engravers affiliated. In woodworking they 
were joined by the proverbially elitist coopers, along with a number of highly skilled craft unions 
like the hatters and makers of musical instruments. SO's ability to obtain such universal support 
needs to be related to the the economic depression of these years. The high level of unemployment 
and continued weakness of union organisation kept even the most militant union activists in check. 
This made it possible to form a labour federation which, though committed to revolutionary goals, 
put the need to strengthen the unions before any other consideration. This in turn encouraged the 
more moderate unions mentioned above to give their support. 
From the outset SO aspired to be more than just a local federation, and it was soon to 
correspond with unions in other parts of Catalonia, and even from the rest of Spain. 18 From 
February 1908 it encouraged unions from outside Barcelona to "spontaneously join", and in the 
following month it convinced the newly formed Badalona labour federation to turn its inaugural 
meeting into an act open to all Catalan unions. It proved a great success, with the result that it was 
decided to hold a congress in SO's Barcelona headquarters to form a new regional federation under 
the same name. 
Meanwhile, a number of so-called "propaganda tours" by SO's leading figures encouraged 
the growth of trade union organisation visible throughout much of urban Catalonia during the year. 
Thus, when the regional congress was finally held between 6-8 September there was an important 
trade union contingent present. This included 55 Barcelona unions, 60 unions from outside the 
Catalan capital, along with five local labour federations. 19 The regional congress is not a perfect 
guide to SO's organisational strength, because all Catalan unions were invited and many chose not 
to join. Nevertheless it does provide an important guide to its areas of influence outside Barcelona. 
There were few surprises. Most of the delegates were from the industrial towns clustered around 
Barcelona, from the Maresme and from the Ter Valley. There were, finally, also representatives 
were Reus and Tarragona in Tarragona Province, where the Socialists had a significant degree of 
support. However, the quantitative impact of SO should not be exaggerated. More unions 
sympathised than actually joined. Thus, from outside Barcelona there were probably never more 
than 20 unions representing at most 5000 workers affiliated. 
Nevertheless, the leadership of SO could with some justice claim that up to September 
1908 the federation had enjoyed considerable success. However, during the latter part of 1908 and 
1909 a series of problems came to the fore, which placed a great strain on the organisation. In the 
first place, the federation came into conflict with 1, erroux's Radicals. This conflict was in many 
ways inevitable. Between 1904 and 1906 the Lerrouxists had adopted a paternalist attitude 
18. SO, 30 November 1907 
19. SO, 13 February, 14 March, 5 July, 18 September 1908. 
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towards the anarchists, and aided them when they were persecuted by the authorities. At the same 
time some anarchists continued to treat Lerroux with benevolence. Nevertheless, as has been seen, 
from 1902 there was growing criticism of Lerrouxist republicanism in anarchist circles. Similar 
charges continued to be made between 1904 and 1906. However, with the fortunes of the 
Barcelona unions at such a low ebb they did not endanger Lerroux's position. The situation was to 
change in 1907 with the appearance of SO. At first the Lerrouxists tried extend their paternalist 
cloak over the federation. However, they were soon to become alarmed by its syndicalist 
vocabulary, and responded by publishing a number of articles in their daily newspaper, El 
Progreso, dismissing anarchist doctrines. 20 
Certainly the Lerrouxists had good reason for disquiet. The bulk of their supporters were 
working class. Nevertheless, they were not a working class party and, primarily concerned with 
the struggle for political power, they had never seriously attempted to fashion their own labour 
federation. The growth of a powerful labour organisation dominated by anarchists, syndicalists 
and Socialists would, therefore, pose a serious threat to their working class base. 
The Lerrouxists' apprehensions were soon to be confirmed. Anarchists and Socialists 
within SO were, of course, not adverse to picking a quarrel with the Lerrouxists, as they believed 
that they would as a result be able to open republican workers' eyes to the fact that they were being 
deceived. The conduct of the ex-anarchist Radicals, Ignacio Claria and Josep Maria Dalmau, 
provided them with the opportunity. The two men were compositors. They ran a printing house 
known as La Niotipia. It was meant to be a co-operative. However, not all the workers employed 
were shareholders. A number of anarchists within the compositors union, LArt Vmprimir, 
argued that the shareholders, led by Claria and Dalmau, treated the other workers very poorly. 
Moreover, most of the time these shareholders took better paid work in other shops, and only 
returned to La Niotipia when they had no such work. This occurred when a strike was called in 
the print room of the left-Catalanist daily, El Poble Catald, during 1908. As a result a number of 
workers already employed in La Niotipia were sacked. This, the anarchists in LArt Vmprimir 
maintained, showed that La Niotipia was in fact a capitalist enterprise. Claria and Palau, they 
concluded, should therefore be expelled from the union. 
The question was discussed in two highly charged meetings held by LArt dI"Trimir on 
21 and 28 July 1908. The proponents of the expulsions were in the majority. Nonetheless the 
matter was referred to a delegate meeting of SO, which unanimously approved the expulsions. 
This was not, however, the end of the matter. Claria' and Palau were also employed in the print 
room of the Leffouxist daily, El Progreso. The paper had agreed that all its workers should be 
20. Joan Culla, op cit, p. 180. 
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unionised. As Claria and Palau had been expelled from their union, then, LArt dImprimir asked 
that they be sacked. The Lerrouxists had now been brought into the front line of the conflict. 
They had no wish to sack two loyal followers. They, therefore, encouraged Claria and Palau to 
from their own union. Then, in a letter addressed to LArt dImprimir on 25 September El 
Progreso argued that the dispute was an inter-union affair in which they could not intervene. 
Nevertheless, it agreed to abide by a decision taken by SO. 
From this date the dispute was to become increasingly embittered. By their actions the 
Radicals hoped to by-pass L'Art dImprimir, mobilise support within the unions, and get the 
decision to classify La Niotipia as bourgeois overturned by SO. They were, however, to be 
disappointed. The Metalworkers' Union, affiliated to SO but under Lerrouxist influence, formally 
asked for a delegate meeting to be called to discuss the question. Meetings were, accordingly, held 
on I and 8 October, and in the latter meeting it was agreed to uphold the previous decision to 
declare La Niotipia bourgeois by 30 votes against 7 with 9 abstentions. 
El Progreso now tried to play for time. It still refused to expel Claria and Palau but now 
stated it would abide by the decision taken by a commission named by the leadership of SO. When 
the commission, as was to be expected, found against the ex-anarchists it appeared for a moment 
as if the Lerrouxists had given way. On 5 December El Progreso stated that it had sacked Claria 
and Palau. However, it soon became clear that this was only a tactical ploy. An important by- 
election was to be held in Barcelona on 13 December and the Radicals did not wish to alienate any 
working class voters. The results were, in fact, surprisingly favourable, and immediately 
21 afterwards El Progreso announced its intention of readmiting the sacked men. 
SO responded by launching an all out attack on El Progreso. LArt d'IrVrimir had already 
declared a boycott of El Progreso at the end of 1908, and SO followed suit on 2 January 1909. 
The campaign against the Lerrouxist daily was backed up by the distribution of flysheets and 
pasting of posters on walls. This on occasion led to physical confrontations with republican 
militants. Moreover, meetings were held in towns in which the Socialists or anarchists had an 
important trade union presence. Despite efforts made to disrupt them by the Radicals they 
invariably gave their support to SO. LArt d7mprimir now looked to press home its attack. At its 
instigation on 7 February SO held a meeting open to all those who wished to attend "to denounce 
El Progreso". It was, however, broken up by Urrouxist activists before any conclusions had been 
reached. 
21. Boletin, August, September, November 1908; April 1909, supplement; SO, 9 January 1909. 
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In response SO decided to up the ante, and called an assembly of the "organised working 
class" in order to judge El Progreso. T'he assembly was held in SO's headquarters on 21 March. 
it was attended by representatives from 47 Barcelona unions, 6 local federations, 2 craft 
federations and 45 unions from outside the Catalan Capital. They represented the bulk of the 
Catalan trade union movement. The meeting was attended by the director of El Progreso, Emiliano 
Iglesias, who tried unsuccessfully to defend the paper's record. After he had retired Rosendo 
Vidal, who represented the Sabadell FOS, put forward a motion which called for El Progreso to be 
declared an "enemy of the organised working class" if within 8 days it had not accepted LArt 
d'Imprimir's demands. The motion was approved by 78 votes in favour, 4 against and 8 
abstentions. 22 
The leadership of SO had, therefore, obtained the support of the majority of the Catalan 
unions. In this way it had been able to assert the federation's independent class line. It had also 
attempted to undermine the Radicals working class allegiance. This had not been done directly. 
Despite the experience of the Solidaritat Catalana Lerroux had maintained his working class and 
popular base. 23 Indeed, during 1908 internal diýsent led the Solidaritat Catalana coalition to break 
up, leaving the Lerrouxists in a stronger position than at any time since 1905. A direct assault 
upon Lerrouxism. would, therefore, have been a hazardous undertaking, and would have laid SO 
open to the charge that it had become involved in "politics". Lerroux himself, who was at this time 
in Argentina, was, therefore, not mentioned in SO's criticisms. Instead, SO argued that its quarrel 
was with the three administrators of El Progreso, and had been provoked by the fact that the paper 
had supported the "bourgeois" owners of La Niotipia. Thus SO argued that the conflict, "is simply 
a dispute between a bourgeois company and a union". However, the implication was that El 
Progreso and, by extension, the Radicals supported the bourgeoisie and were, therefore, the 
enemies of the working class. This was most clearly expressed in an article published in March 
1909 in which SO warned, "we recommend El Progreso does not forget that Solidaritat 0brera is a 
powerful organisation of conscious men and a schooling ground for the proletariat, where the 
sound advice is given that nothing is to be hoped from the bourgeoisie WHATEVER CLOTHES 
THEY WEAR, and that the workers will only emancipate themselves through their own 
efforts,,. 24 
22. SO, 26 March, 9 April 1909. The final vote was taken very late. A number of representatives from 
outside Barcelona had, therefore, already left. 
23. Joan Culla, op cit, p. 180. 
24. SO, 9 Jan 1909. The claim that all bourgeois were the same whatever their political aff Nations was 
repeated continually during these months. Thus, for example, SO had already stated in September 1908 
that: "Our terrain is exclusively that of the class struggle and our common enemy the bourgeois whatever 
clothes he wears. " SO, 26 Sept 1908. In a similar vein the compositors union stated that: "For the Arte del 
ImPtimirthere are no red bourgeois and white bourgeois, simply bourgeois exploiters and exploited 
workers. " Boletin, April 1909, Supplement. The implication was, of course, that whatever they might say 
the Lerrouxist leadership was as bad as the rest of the bourgeisie. The confederation's mouthpiece was 
more explicit as to the reasons for the conflict with the Radicals in March 1909 when it stated that even if 
there had been no dispute it would have been necessary for SO to difff erentiate itself from the Radicals 
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Yet, despite the support SO gained from the Catalan unions it made little impression on the 
Radicals' working class base. 25 That this was the case is confirmed by the results of the December 
1908 by-election and the May 1909 municipal elections in Barcelona, at which the Radicals 
obtained 30,000 and 34,000 votes respectively. There are perhaps two main explanations of SO's 
inability to influence large numbers of republican workers. Firstly, of course, given the 
federation's syndicalist stance it offered no direct political challenge to the Radicals. They, 
therefore, remained the only unambiguously left-wing party strongly rooted in the city's history. 
More important in this context, however, was that union organisation in Barcelona still remained 
weak. As has been noted, at its high point SO had between about 10 and 15,000 members in 
Barcelona. Yet, if shopworkers are included (and there were several shopworkers, unions in SO) 
this only represented between 5.6 per cent and 8.4 per cent of the city's working class. The level 
of strikes, moreover, was at the lowest point of the whole period 1899-1914. Union activity, 
therefore, remained very much a side show in the great political circus. 
The Lerrouxists' continuing strength in working class circles, indeed, allowed them to 
strike back at SO to some effect. "Many workers formed part of the (Lerrouxist) Casa del Pueblo 
and Solidaridad at the same time, "26 and the Radicals had considerable influence in a number of 
Barcelona unions. As the dispute became increasingly bitter from September 1908 the Radicals 
used two tactics. On the one hand they tried to discredit SO's leading figures. On the other they 
mobilised opposition within the federation against the decision to classify the Neotipia as 
bourgeois. The support they received was not inconsiderable. Nevertheless, it proved insufficient 
to block the measures proposed by LArt d7mprimir. The Radicals, however, did not concede 
defeat. They then tried to undermine SO by persuading those unions under their influence to leave. 
By 1908 a total of 8 unions done so, and other-unions affiliated had lost members because 
Lerrouxist sympathisers had resigned. 27 
However, ideological differences not only led to a split between SO and the Radicals. 
Conflict also broke out within the federation itself When SO was formed great effort was made to 
construct a solid, united, body. Figures like the anarchist, Jaume Bisbe, and the Socialist, Antoni 
for: "El Progreso must inevitably be an enemy of syndicalism, because syndicalism, in its modern form, 
supports the class struggle. Thus, given its revolutionary character, it could never second the plans of any 
political party, because no party has in its programme the abolition of capital, and without this our 
emancipation is impossible. Therefore, those who say that they wish to emancipate us ARE LYING and 
KNOW THAT THEY ARE LYING. " SO, 26 March 1909. 
25. This was admitted by LArt dImprimirin April 1909 when it stated: "The republican workers have been 
influenced by the string of lies they read (in El Progreso), (... ) and firmely believe anything that, taking 
advantage of their good faith, the three enemies of the working class (i. e., El Progreso's three 
administrators) tell them. " Boletin, April 1909, supplement. 
26. Angel Marvaud, op cit, p. 185. 
27. LID, 19 Apdl 1909, NE. 
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Badia, played a key role in this respect. Bisbe, who was General Secretary for a few months in 
1908, recognised that a compromise between the various tendencies was necessary, "even if for it 
to be possible we have to sacrifice part of our own beliefs". This compromise had, according to 
Antonio Badia, made it possible for anarchists and Socialists, who had in the past bitterly attacked 
each other to, "work in unison for our common emancipation". 28 
The problem was that there were still very real ideological differences between the two 
groupings which could not simply be swept under the carpet. An seemed to agree that syndicalism 
was the guiding principle behind SO, but there were disagreements as to what exactly this meant. 
The first cause for disagreement centred on the question of "politics". The Socialists appeared to 
take as their model the CGT's 1906 Chartre dAmiens. This charter stated that the CGT was to be 
apolitical, and that workers affiliated could form part of any political party they wished as long as 
they did not try and spread their views in the union. Yet many anarchists and syndicalists within 
the federation continued to maintain that elections were a farce and that class parties served no 
useful function. This "antipolitical" current was particularly strong in SO's mouthpiece, which 
was run by two anarchists, Jaume Bisbe and Tomas Herreros. During the latter part of 1908 it ran 
a particularly provocative series of articles by the Catalan anarchist, Josep Prat, one of which 
bitterly criticised the PSOE's concentration on elections. 29 
However, conflict between anarchists and Socialists not only centred on the role of the 
political party. The related questions of union stategy and labouf s response to social legislation 
also continued to cause controversy. Anarchists within SO supported direct action. On the other 
hand, despite the Socialists supposed sympathy towards syndicalism they did not abandon el 
sindicalismo a base multiple. This could be seen in SO's September 1908 regional congress. At 
this congress the Socialists had an important degree of support. Only a small minority of 
Barcelona delegates were pro-Socialist. Outside Barcelona, however, they were far stronger, and 
they received the backing of delegates representing unions from Mataro, Manresa, Roda, 
Tarragona and Reus. This allowed them to gain the upper hand. This became clear over the 
question of union tactics. A commission, the majority of whose members were Socialist, 
presented a motion which stated that before taking strike action a union should take into account the 
state of the industry, possible repercussions of the strike in other branches of the trade, the 
percentage of workers unionised, and whether there were sufficient funds to 
finance the strike's 
first stages. Most important it stated that if a union wanted financial support for a strike 
it would 
have to consult with the Federal Commission. If the Commission agreed to the strike then the 
union would be entitled to strike funds, but if not it could only expect voluntary and moral support. 
The commission's proposals bore great similarity to the strike tactics advocated 
by the UGT, and 
28. SO, 9 November 1907,5 June 1908. 
29. SO, 7 August 1908. 
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were therefore, not surprisingly, strongly combated by the anarchists. After much debate a 
compromise was finally reached. The original motion was passed along with the addition: "Our 
main weapon will be direct action. However, other tactics can be used when the circumstances so 
require.,, 30 
Two points should be noted. First, the Socialist motion showed, despite the views 
expressed by Fabra Ribas, how little syndicalist ideological baggage they had in reality taken 
onboard. For the whole point of revolutionary syndicalism was that the revolutionary general 
strike should be the result of a massive build up of industrial conflict, and it was difficult to see 
how this could take place if all sorts of obstacles were put in the way of strike action. Second, the 
final resolution was totally contradictory, for direct action and la base mUltiple were two mutually 
exclusive union strategies, which could in no way be combined. This reflected the extent to which 
SO was a fragile compromise with a very uncertain future. 
Controversy over this issue was, furthermore, compounded by a dispute over the role SO 
should play in the Barcelona junta local de reformas sociales. As seen, these juntas were set up at 
the beginning of the century to oversee the implementation of state social legislation. The opposing 
views anarchists and Socialists held on the question of social legislation have already been 
discussed. From the outset SO adopted an ambiguous position on this question. Antoni Badia, as 
usual tried to reconcile the different points of view, maintaining that as the unions affiliated were 
autonomous they could hold the most diverse opinions on the subject. 31 However, divisions came 
out into the open at the end of 1908. The September regional congress accepted the need to fight 
for the implementation of laws relating to the Sunday rest day and the employment of minors. 
However, there was also a vote of protest against the Barcelonajunta local, "because of its 
concomitances with the bourgeoisie". Another anarchist inspired motion which stated that the 
workers should never have anything to do with bodies of this type was discussed but not finally 
approved. Nevertheless, the anarchists were in the future to argue that the decision had been taken 
to have nothing to do with the Barcelonajunta local. The situation became more tense in 
November when a number of Barcelona unions affiliated to SO participated in elections held to 
renew the junta local. Other unions, however, refused to participate, and accused those that had 
done so of breaking a resolution passed at the last congress. 32 
Divisions of this kind naturally served to weaken the federation. The Socialists claimed 
during 1908 that the anarchists were using the supposedly non-political nature of SO to try and 
impose their own domination. They were particularly critical of SO's mouthpiece, and maintained 
30. SO, 18 September 1908. 
31. SO, 14 March 1908. 
32. SO, 18 September, 18,25 December 1908; La Intemacional, 11 Dec 1908. 
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that the pro-anarchist stance of some of SO's members was stopping some unions from joining 
and making others think of leaving. 33 Indeed, internal strife combined with the dispute with the 
Radicals had led to a weakening of the federation from mid-1908. Thus, the September 1908 
congress was attended by only 55 Barcelona unions even through 72 had been affiliated a few 
months previously. This decline in membership was to continue through 1909, and by July of this 
year perhaps only 43 unions remained affiliated. 34 
Moreover, divisions within SO were not wholly limited to anarchists and Socialists. The 
moderate course which SO in practice pursued led some anarchists, who favoured working within 
the unions, to take an increasingly critical view of the confederation. The first anarchists to take 
such a stance were Leopoldo Bonafulla and Teresa Claramunt, who published El Rebelde between 
1907 and 1908. These two veteran anarchists had played a leading role in labour protest at the 
beginning of the century. They now took more of a back seat role, but their views were still 
influential in anarchist circles. Although they at first supported SO they soon changed their minds, 
stating that while they were revolutionaries SO was not. In particular they opposed any 
collaboration with republicans and Socialists, and urged anarchists not to abandon their affinity 
groups. In the latter part of 1908 and during 1909 some of these criticisms began to be echoed in 
Tierra y Libertad. Anarchists like Anselmo Lorenzo showed their disquiet at the fact that SO had 
not adopted a clearly revolutionary stance. They were also suspicious of collaboration with the 
Socialists, and argued that if the federation was not to become a reformist body it would have to be 
firmly led by a minority of committed militants. 35 These tensions resulted from different readings 
of syndicalism. In Catalonia, on the one hand, there were those whose stressed the need to build a 
united labour movement. On the other, were the extremists who emphasised the necessity of 
constructing a revolutionary organisation led by anarchists. These two tendencies have usually 
been referred to by historians as revolutionary syndicalist and anarcho-syndicalist. 36 Over the next 
twenty they were to be locked in combat for control of the anarchist wing of the Spanish labour 
movement. 
By 1909, therefore, SO had a very uncertain future. Despite Fabra Ribas's radical rhetoric 
it did not seem that the Socialists and anarchists had enough ideological affinities to sustain SO. In 
fact, over the following year, in a context of heightened industrial conflictivity and confrontation 
with the state, the coalition of forces represented by SO was to break up. The first taste of 
increasing industrial unrest came in the cotton textile industry. As was seen in Chapter Three, 
33. SO, 14 March 1908; La Intemacional, 11 December 1908. 
34. Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, p. 350. 
35. Joaquin Romero Maura, La Rosa, pp. 475-476.; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 353-355.; Enric Oliv6 
Serret, "El Moviment Anarquista", pp. 352-359. 
36. See especially, Antonio Bar, La CNTen los Af)os Rojos (del sindicalismo al anarcosindicalismo 1910- 
1926) (Madrid 1981). 
240 
between 1908 and 1909 as a result of the growth of trade union organisation in cotton textiles 
masters and men soon came into conflict. 
The most serious dispute was in the Rusin-ol company worktown just outside Manlleu. 
Until that date the Socialists had done well on the Ter. At the end of 1908 a congress was held to 
form a district labour federation in the area. SO attached great importance to this event, and saw it 
as a continuation of the September regional congress. The congress stated that the new federation 
would be free from "political or religious dogmas9l, that the unions affiliated would have no 
contacts with the bourgeoisie, and that they would centre their attention on the class struggle. 
However, the congress was dominated by the Socialists. 'Mis became clear when a resolution was 
passed which stated that, like the powerful labour organisation in Britain, Germany, Belgium and 
the United States, they would adopt el sindicalismo a base multiple. 37 
This dominance was, nevertheless, threatened by the attacks by the bourgeoisie on union 
organisation in the industry. In June 1909 SO responded to the "efforts made by the bourgeoisie 
of Manlleu, San Feliu de Codinas, Barcelona, Olot and other towns to destroy the workers' 
organisation" by calling a delegate meeting to be followed by an assembly open to an union 
members. These meetings were held in Granollers on 10 and 11 July. The assembly's 
conclusions were significant because for the first time since the foundation of SO the possibility of 
calling the region's working class out on strike was discussed. Thus it was agreed that if the 
disputes in progress were not speedily resolved the region's textile workers should come out on 
strike, "resorting to all known methods in order to achieve victory". In order to ensure success SO 
and the Barcelona cotton textile union, the Ram de LAigua i Art Fabril, would, moreover, co- 
ordinate their activities, and when they felt the time was right extend the general strike to the rest of 
the labour movement. 38 It is doubtful, given the weakness of union organisation in much of 
Catalan industry, whether this agreement would have been workable. Yet, once again employer 
hostility to union organisation was forcing Catalan labour down the path of violent protest. 
However, before the assembly's resolutions could be put to the test a far more dramatic 
conflict between Catalan workers and the Spanish state came to the fore. Between 1904 and 1909 
the police and courts continued to interfere in the running of the trade unions and, on occasion, 
arrested labour leaders. The authorities responded to criticism by claiming that they were simply 
combating terrorism. Indeed, the spectre of terrorism coloured this whole period, very much as it 
had in the 1890s. The circumstances were, however, very different. In the 1890s anarchist 
attacks had been directed at leading political and military figures, and the anarchists involved had 
been more than willing to accept responsibility. Yet when the terrorist outrages were resumed in 
37. SO, 25 December 1908,8 January 1909; La Intemacional, 1 January 1909. 
38. LP, 27 June 1909, ME., 14 July, NE.; El Poble Cataki, 16 July 1909- 
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1904, they were limited to the planting of bombs in the lower class quarters on the city. Moreover, 
the anarchists themselves denied any responsibility. 'ne question of who exactly was behind the 
bombings of these years is, in fact, still a very open one, and any attempt to find an answer would 
take the investigator on a difficult journey through the Barcelona underworld of declasse sub- 
proletarians, police informers, bribery and corruption. 39 
Whoever was responsible, what is clear is that many workers with libertarian sympathies 
who worked within the unions had no part in the bombings. Ilis did not, however, guarantee that 
they would be spared police harassment. The state had never distinguished very clearly between 
union militants and terrorists, and it was, therefore, to be expected that the working class press 
should claim that anarchists were being falsely arrested and accused of being terrorists so as to 
prepare a repetition of Montjtffc. As occurred during the agitation in favour of a judicial review of 
the Montjtffc trial, the clergy (on occasions even accused of planting the bombs) were felt to 
occupy a prominent position amongst those reactionary forces to blame for the violations of civil 
liberties. 40 
Tension mounted at the beginning of 1907 when the "Vaticanist" Conservative, Antonio 
Maura, became Prime Minister. It was the opinion of his government that the Barcelona bombings 
were part of a plot by anarchists and Lerrouxists to overthrow the Monarchy. In January 1908, 
therefore, after a bomb had gone off in Barcelona killing two people, constitutional guarantees 
were suspended in Barcelona province, and a so-called "anti-terrorist bill" introduced into 
parliament. If passed the bill would have given the authorities greater powers to close down 
anarchist publications and centres, and to detain suspected anarchists. There followed an outcry 
against the bill, which was seen as an attack on trade union rights and the freedom of expression. 
This reaction was not solely confined to the labour movement. Outside Catalonia a "left-wing 
block"" made up of Liberals and republicans was formed to combat the bill. 
In Catalonia, on the other hand, organised labour took the lead. In May SO decided to 
launch a campaign of union meetings in order to bring pressure to bear on the Government. The 
most salient result of Maura's action was to radicalise the vocabulary employed by the federation. 
In a statement which gives a good indication of the workers views on the composition of the 
Spanish ruling elite, SO claimed that Maura was a Jesuit. He was subservient to the Vatican and at 
the same time under the control of the Catalan bourgeoisie. The bill, SO continued, was a weapon 
39. Joaquin Romero Maura has no doubt that the anarchists were behind the bombings, but other 
authors are far more circumspect in their conclusions. See especially, Joaquin Romero Maura, "Terrorism 
in Barcelona and it Impact on Spanish Politics, 1904-1909", Past and Present, No. 41 (December 1968).; 
Joan C. Ullman, op cit, pp. 177-188.; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 209-221.; Rafael Whez Florencio, op cit, 
pp. 70-82. 
40. ET 11 June 1905,10 November 1906. 
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aimed primarily at the working class, and SO stated that if necessary force would be used against 
it. At the end of May and beginning of June a series of well attended meetings were held marked 
by fiery speeches from the platform. They were followed by a manifesto signed by 69 unions 
from throughout Catalonia. The manifesto threatened that with the passage of the bill any 
possibility of the peaceful evolution of society would be lost, and the proletariat would have no 
choice but to carry out a revolution. 41 
Under intense pressure Antonio Maura finally dropped the bill at the end of June. The 
respite would, however, prove only a temporary one. In July 1909 anti-government protest in 
urban Catalonia would reach new heights, and culminate in an armed insurrection known as Tragic 
Week. The cause of the protest was Spain's growing involvement in Morocco. From the turn of 
the century Spain had sought to colonise the north of the country. All sections of the country's 
elite had their reason for intervening. For the Monarchist parties the expansion was an affirmation 
that Spain was still an important European power. For the military it offered an opportunity for 
active service and advancement, while Catalan business hoped to sell the Moroccans their surplus 
production. Furthermore, two large mining concerns were formed to exploit the iron and lead 
deposits found in the territory. The Catalan financiers and businessmen, the Marques de Comillas 
and Eusebio Gilell, had shares in one of the companies, as did leading Monarchist figures. 42 As in 
the case of Cuba and the Philippines, however, it was the workers and peasants who would 
actually have to do most of the fighting. 
From June 1909 the Spanish government had been building up the army's presence in the 
region. In response, Moroccan tribesmen began to attack Spanish positions. The first skirmish 
occurred on 9 July when a railway line belonging to the two mining companies was attacked, and 
two workers killed. The Spanish Prime Minister reacted by calling up army reservists. These 
were men who had been selected for military service but had not yet been called up. Many now 
had wives and children and their call up would, therefore, leave their families in poverty. This 
measure could not fail to be unpopular. The experience of the late nineteenth century colonial wars 
was still fresh in the workers' minds, and a repeat performance was feared. 43 
The first troops began to leave for Morocco from the port of Barcelona on 12 July. As a 
result the port immediately became the focus for noisy demonstrations against the war. The 
culmination of this phase of protest came on Sunday 18 July. The soldiers who had to embark 
were accompanied through the centre of town by a great multitude. When the finally embarked in 
41. ET, 6 June 1908.; SO, 12 July 1908. 
42. Joan C. Ullman, op cit, pp. 259-284. Between 1905 and 1909 a large number Of articles were 
pubished in the mouthpiece of the FTN, El Trabajo Nacional, discussing the possibility of opening up new 
markets in Morocco. 
43. Emili Salut, op cit, p. 105.; Alfredo Bueso, op cit, p. 29. 
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the midst of a tumultuous throng they were accompanied by cries of down with the war, down 
with Maura and Comillas, let the rich and let the friars go, and you're going to defend a company 
not Spain. On 19 July news came through of a bloody battle between the Spanish army and 
Moroccan militia. In response people took to the streets, with the result that in the following days 
there were clashes between demonstrators and police in the Ramblas. Of the Catalan political 
parties only the Radicals launched a vigorous protest campaign in Barcelona. They were followed 
by SO, which hoped to hold a series of meetings throughout Catalonia. 44 
The ideology espoused by both Radical and trade unionist speakers was very similar and, 
as the cries of the protesters suggest, expressed popular feeling. It was argued that the 
Government's adventure in Morocco did not benefit the majority of the population. On the 
contrary, the workers were being sent to Morocco to defend the interests of Comillas, GUell and 
the mining companies. In this respect it was not lost oh the workers that troops were being sent to 
Morocco in ships belonging to the Marques de Comillas. Comillas and Gilell, it has been noted, 
were leading social catholics, and Antonio Maura was seen as having close ties with the Vatican. 
This led to the belief that the Spanish church was closely involved in the colonial war. 
The most dramatic anti-war meeting was organised by SO, and took place in Terrassa on 
Wednesday 21 July. It was attended by about 6000 people. There were fiery speeches from the 
anarchist, Mariano Castellote, and Fabra Ribas. The public responded with continuous ovations, 
women cried out and there were calls for the war to end. Josep Comaposada was later to state that 
he had never seen anything like it. The final motion, which was unanimously approved, 
threatened a general strike. In addition it added an anti-clerical note by stating that if anyone should 
go and fight in Morocco than it should be the clergy, for they did not produce anything, had no 
family, and were the only ones interested in the triumph of christianity. 45 Popular outrage had 
now reached a critical point, and the Government had to take some action. It chose repression. On 
Thursday morning, the Minister of the Interior, Juan de la Cierva, suspended all antiwar meetings, 
and ordered the arrest of anyone heard shouting antiwar slogans. The following day the Barcelona 
civil governor, Angel Osorio, y Gallardo, prohibited all telegraphic and telephonic communications 
with Madrid. Barcelona was now isolated and, as Joan C. Ullman has stated, consequent upon 
the Government' s action, "the antiwar protest had either to die or take a revolutionary turn". 
46 
Already on 18 June in what was probably the most radical speech of his career, Pablo 
Iglesias had threatened a general strike, and if this was insufficient to stop the war, revolutionary 
action. The Catalan Socialists, under the leadership of Fabra Ribas, urged the Madrid PSOE 
44. Josep Comaposada, "Los Sucesos de Barcelona I" ES, 29 October 191 0; E1 Poble Catal'i, 19 July 
1909.; El Progreso, 19 July 1909. 
45. Antonio Fabra Ribas, op cit, pp. 31-32.; Joan C. Ullman, op cit, pp. 312-313. 
46. lbid, p. 315. 
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leadership to take action as soon as possible. Yet, in private Pablo Iglesias remained cautious. He 
knew that if a general strike were called the Government would take reprisals, and that this would 
put in jeopardy the organisation the Socialists had over the years built up. The scale of the protest 
movement finally made action unavoidable, so it was decided to call peaceful general strike from 2 
August. By then, however, the initiative had passed to S0.47 
The federation had planned to hold a meeting open to all the city's unions on 23 July, to 
decide what action to take. The meeting was, however, banned. As a result, anarchist and 
syndicalist militants argued that a general strike should be called. Fabra Ribas was informed of 
their deliberations by the leading anarchist, Tomas Herreros. The Socialists' reaction was 
unfavourable. Fabra Ribas pointed out that the PSOE already planned to call a general strike on 2 
August, and argued that the entire Spanish labour movement should act in unison on that date. Yet 
the Catalan Socialists really had no choice but to accede. Memories of the 1902 general strike were 
still fresh in their minds, and they feared that if they opposed the strike they would once again be 
branded enemies of the working class. The FederacIOSocialista Catalana, therefore, agreed to the 
plan, and in a secret meeting held in the headquarters of SO on Saturday 24 July a strike committee 
was elected, with Fabra Ribas representing the Socialists. 48 
The strike committee informed union leaders from outside the capital of their plans on the 
following day. On Monday moming pickets came out in force. Many shopkeepers and 
businessmen sympathised with the workers' aims and so offered no resistance. Accordingly, by 
midmoming the city was at a total standstill. Moreover, the strike call was seconded throughout 
urban Catalonia. The aim of the strike committee was ostensibly to organise a peaceful protest 
which, according to some reports, would only last one day. The intensity of popular feeling, 
nevertheless, ensured their would be no return to work on the Tuesday. Instead, the strike quickly 
developed into an insurrection. The first signs of violence occurred on the Monday, when workers 
attacked the trains to stop them operating, and a demonstration held in the Ramblas was fired on by 
the police. It was, however, on Tuesday aftemoon that the revolt really began. Barricades were 
put up in working class areas, and crowds began to attack and bum down the city's religious 
institutions. Outside Barcelona telephone and telegraph links were also cut and, inevitably, 
consumos tax booths were set alight. 
The unpopularity of the Church in working class circles has already been stressed. The 
hated Maura government was felt to be steeped in clerical influence, and the clergy involved in the 
Moroccan adventure. The opportunity was, thus, taken to destroy the Church's infrastructure 
47. Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 367-372. 
48. Leopoldo Bonafulla, La Revoluci6n de Julio (Barcelona 1910), P. 14.; AntoniýFabra Ribas, op cit, pp. 
35-36.; Joan C. Ullman, op cit, pp. 318-333.; Interview with Fabra Ribas, ES, 20 August 1909. 
245 
whilst it was unable to protect itself. The main aim of the workers on the barricades was the 
overthrow of the Conservative administration. As we have seen, in 1908 there had already been 
threats to resort to armed revolt. The call up of the reservists was the match which lit the fuse. 
Many of the workers on the barricades no doubt looked to the installation of a republic. In 
Sabadell, indeed, the republic was proclaimed on Wednesday. Barcelona, nevertheless, remained 
the key to future developments. For there to be a revolutionary alternative to the present 
Government, political leadership was necessary. Anarchists had from the start hoped to turn the 
strike into a revolution. Yet they recognised that by themselves they were not strong enough to 
take the lead. Miguel Moreno, the SO representative on the strike committee, therefore, asked the 
Radical leadership to take charge. With Lerroux not yet in Spain, however, Emiliano Iglesias had 
no wish to become involved in a movement which he felt had no chance of success. He, therefore, 
declined the offer, and suggested the strike should be called off as soon as possible. In 
desperation Fabra Ribas and the Socialists called on the nationalist republicans of the Centre 
Nacionalista Republicd to lead the movement. However, they received the same response. 
Consequently, the revolt had no clear leadership or sense of direction. When, therefore, troop 
reinforcements arrived in Catalonia on Thursday, and it became clear that the strike had had no 
repercussions outside Catalonia, the insurrection soon petered out. 49 
The events of these weeks once again showed how difficult it was for reformist politics to 
operate in the context of the Spanish state. Despite the experience of the colonial wars of 1895- 
1898 the Monarchist parties had maintained the unjust system of redemption payments, and despite 
the suffering the decision would cause, the Maura government showed no qualms at sending 
reservists to the Moroccan front. Furthermore, peaceful protest was made impossible de the de- 
facto suspension of constitutional guarantees. 
The Government's stance made life particularly difficult for the Spanish Socialists. T'hey 
did not wish to step outside the bounds of legality. Nevertheless, in order to maintain their 
credibility they had to take some action. The Catalan Socialists, under the radical leadership of 
Fabra Ribas, were quick to demand the calling of a general strike. However, they were still linked 
to the Spanish organisation, and by the time action was agreed they had been upstaged by the 
anarchists and syndicalists. 
49. Joan C. Ullman has carried out a highly detailed study of Tragic Week, op cit, pp. 343-505. However 
Ullman is, it seems, mistaken in her claim that the church burning was a Radical plot to divert workers away 
from revolutionary action. For the spontaneous nature of the church burning see, Joaquin Romero Maura, 
La Rosa, pp. 519-520.; Joan Culla, op cit, p. 212. Contemporaries stressed that the protest was 
leaderless. See, for example, Leopoldo Bonafulla, op cit, p. 68.; Claudi Ametlla, op cit, p. 268. ES, 20 
August 1909. 
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However, the strike committee quickly lost control on events. By Tuesday the strike had 
developed into a popular - largely working class- revolt against the central authority. This fact 
determined the course the movement would take. Conflict between the working class and Catalan 
bourgeoisie played practically no part in the revolt. As we have seen, trade unionism was at this 
time still weak, and (with the exception of cotton textiles outside Barcelona) industrial conflict was 
at a very low ebb. This explains why workers burnt churches and did not take over factories. SO 
was still a small organisation and could not hope to lead such a movement, particularly as many 
workers involved hoped that their efforts would result in the proclamation of a republic. 
For this reason, despite their class line, the leaders of SO hoped the republicans would step 
in. 50 The conjuncture, then, opened up new possibilities for the republican parties. Yet it was also 
fraught with danger. As we have seen all the Catalan republican groupings refused to intervene. 
In reality only the Radicals could have done so to some effect. However, they were afraid that if 
they led a movement which was doomed to failure they would, once it was defeated, suffer heavy 
repression. In this respect they were probably not mistaken. Tkough the Restoration system had 
since 1898 showed signs of breaking up it still had the support of the army, and there is no reason 
to suppose that it would not have been able to crush a republican rebellion. Yet, at the same time, 
the Radicals would have to justify such inhibition to their working class supporters, many of 
whom played an active part in the insurrection. 
In this respect they were, in fact, to be quite successful. Tragic Week was followed by 
brutal government repression. Hundreds of workers were imprisoned and five men - including 
Francesc Ferrer - were finally shot. 51 While the repression continued the leadership of the Radical 
party tried to distance itself from the events of Tragic Week. However, the Maura Government fell 
on 21 October 1909, and constitutional guarantees were restored soon after. From this date the 
Radicals totally changed their tune. They strongly defended the workers involved and, on 
occasion, even claimed to have been behind the revolt. SO was still banned, and no other political 
grouping wished to dispute the political capital to be gained from this claim. The Lerrouxists were, 
therefore, once again able to rally working class support behind them. This was made apparent by 
the Radicals excellent showing in the May 1910 general election in the city. 
1910, nevertheless, was to be the year in which the party began its slow decline in 
Barcelona. The immediate cause was the decision taken by Alejandro Lerroux to move to Madrid 
and convert the Radicals into a national party, which would offer a left of centre opposition to the 
Liberals and Conservatives. Accordingly, the party shifted to the right. Its old extremist rhetoric, 
aimed preferentially at the working class, was therefore replaced by a more measured vocabulary, 
50. Josep Comapqýada, "Los Sucesos de Barcelona III", ES, 12 November 1909. 
51. Ferrer was falsely accused of having used SO to orquestrate the revolt. 
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targeted to a far greater extent at a middle class audience. In Barcelona this change in stance 
coincided with a number of financial scandals involving Radical local counsellors. As a result, the 
party lost credibility amongst its working class base. Thus, in the city's December 1909 municipal 
elections the Leffouxists received about 32,000 votes. Yet in November 1913 they received only 
17,000.52 
However, between 1910 and 1914 the balance of political forces in Catalonia was upset by 
another factor. The economic upturn of these years led to a rapid growth of trade union 
organisation. Much of the growth took place outside the principal labour federations. 
Nevertheless, both the UGT and SO benefited from the new conjuncture. The UGT, in particular 
increased rapidly in size. Thus from about 41,000 affiliates in mid 1910 it reached the figure of 
147,128 in January 1913, though it subsequently fell back to 119,000 members by August 1914. 
As was seen in Chapter Four, in Barcelona during 1910 industrial conflict escalated 
rapidly. A climax was reached between September 1910 and January 1911 when large strikes 
affected the metallurgical industry, the Barcelona docks, transport and the Sabadell woollen textile 
industry. As during the years 1901-1903, therefore, organised labour thrust itself onto the political 
stage. Similarly, as social strife became more acute so the anarchists' and syndicalists' were able 
to force themselves to the forefront of labour protest. Thus they were able to take control of the 
Federal Commission of SO, and leave the Socialists without representation. They also gained 
increasing support amongst a number of important Barcelona unions. They took over the 
leadership of the rapidly expanding Metallurgical Union. They also enjoyed the sympathy of the 
local Waterfront and Transport Workers' Federation, and in particular that of the carters' union. At 
the same time, bricklayers, painters, carpenters, compositors, bookbinders, shoemakers, tanners 
and textile finishing trades' unions gave strong backing to the syndicalists. Once again, these 
unions tended to represent workers in the city's most conflictive trades and industries. 
The growth of union organisation in much of urban Spain also encouraged SO's leadership 
to push ahead with a scheme to form a national confederation. In syndicalist circles the idea of 
forming such a confederation had been widely discussed before 1910. When SO was founded in 
1907 the federation's mouthpiece immediately supported the idea. Then, in the latter half of 1908 
when a campaign was launched in favour of a number of imprisoned workers from Alcala del 
Valle, closer links were established with a number of unions from outside Catalonia. Finally in 
delegate meetings held in April and June 1909 it was decided that SO's next congress would be 
national, and that in the meantime all non-Catalan unions could join but would not have to pay 
dues. The 1910 Federal Commission was, therefore, only putting into practice a decision already 
52. Joan Culla, op cit, pp. 214-273. 
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reached. The national congress was quickly organised, and held in SO's Barcelona heaquarters 
between 31 October and 1 November 1910. It agreed to call the new national organisation the 
ConfederacIO'n Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). Its headquarters was set up in Barcelona. '11le 
leadership of the CNT was, therefore, put in the hands of SO's Barcelona leadership, and SO 
renamed the Confederacto Regional del Treball (CRT). 53 
From the Summer of 1910 SO extolled the virtues of direct action. The divisions within 
the anarchist and syndicalist camp, which first became apparent between 1908 and 1909 were, 
however, still present. The clearest exponent of a moderate reading of syndicalism was Joaquin 
Bueso. Bueso, a compositor by trade, had been a Lerrouxist. However, he had broken with the 
Radicals after having joined SO in 1907. Bueso was put in charge of the make up of the CNT's 
mouthpiece (which retained the name Solidaridad 0brera) in December 1910. In the Summer of 
that year he argued that Socialists and anarchists should continue to work together within the 
unions, and that these should remain politically neutral so as to group together the greatest number 
of workers possible. Bueso also felt that those workers who defended la base mUltiple should be 
admitted into the SO. This might, he argued, at first reduce revolutionary enthusiasm. However, 
it had the advantage that they would retain the support of workers who might otherwise, "fall into 
the net treacherously cast out by the bourgeoisie", and in any case, he maintained, the workers 
would be radicalised by daily experience of the class struggle. Bueso, then, wished to maintain the 
broad trade union front represented by SO. Implicitly, his stance also implied the CNT should 
continue to place emphasis on the need to strengthen the unions, and not be carried away by 
revolutionary adventures. 54 
Bueso, was opposed by the anarchist revolutionaries. In the pages of SO the case against 
Bueso was taken up by F61ix Montenegro, who maintained that as syndicalism was a revolutionary 
doctrine. Accordingly: 55 
When the anarchist- socialist works within the unions he should not sacrifice his doctrines. 
On the contrary, he should lead the workers onwards to direct, revolutionary, action. For 
(as I Bueso recognises) without the revolution he will never be free, and without forming 
conscious individuals within the unions it will be impossible to build the new society out of 
the ruins of the old. 
The dispute between Bueso and Montenegro reflected different interpretations of 
revolutionary syndicalism. Both Bueso and Montenegro maintained that they had the same goals. 
Yet the type of organisation they proposed was in fact very different. Bueso stressed the need for 
53. SO, 19 August 1907; 15 April 1909; Angel Pestaha, "Historia de las Ideas, XVI", Orto 
(January, 1934), p. 37.; Congreso de Constituci6n, op cit. 
54. ET, 24 July 1910. 
55. SO, 29 July 1910. 
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the CNT to be a broad coalition of forces, and, though did not intend it, it would be easy for such 
an Organisation increasingly to lose sight Of its revolutionary goals. F61ix Montenegro, on the 
other hand, whether he realised it or not, was arguing that the CNT should be a revolutionary body 
subject to anarchist control. 
Over the following months discussion of the question continued in the Ateneu Sindicalista, 
formed by SO in 1909. At first it was unclear which camp the leadership would support. In the 
first months of 1910 the composition of SO's Federal Commission was very unsettled. It was 
only with the election of another compositor, Josep Negre, as General Secretary in July, that a 
degree of stability was achieved. On a formal level the Federal Commission, under Negre, seemed 
to be closer to the position outlined by Joaquin Bueso than that of F61ix Montenegro. Thus, like 
the anarchists behind the FRESR at the turn of the century, it tried to maintain the myth that the 
CNT was ideologically neutral, and stated it was made up of workers of various political 
viewpoints. Similarly, it argued that workers who supported la base mUltiple could affiliate, 
though it hoped they would be convinced by the superiority of direct action tactics. 56 
Nevertheless, the new Federal Commission took a very different stance from its 
predecessors. The new leadership unambiguously supported the tactics of direct action and the 
revolutionary general strike. Moreover, the Commission argued that it was the task of "conscious 
workers" (i. e., anarchist militants) to guide the workers. This became clear in a reply to an article 
published by the anarchist weekly, Solidaridad Obrera, of Vigo. The article opposed the formation 
of the CNT because of what it saw as the inevitably reformist nature of trade unionism. Here the 
Federal Commission disagreed. It argued that only through trade union action could the proletariat 
be emancipated. Nevertheless, it continued that it was only the presence of "conscious working 
class elements" in the unions' midst which would stop them from going down the reformist path. 
The change in direction between the pre-Tragic Week SO and the CNT could be seen in the latter's 
founding congress. Here it was agreed that syndicalism was a means towards the emancipation of 
the proletariat. This would come about as the result of the revolutionary general strike, which 
would inevitably be a violent confrontation between the workers and the forces of the bourgeois 
57 state. 
The radicalisation of So's ideology during 1910 led relations with the Catalan Socialists to 
become increasingly tense. Furthermore, the decision to create a new confederation, which would 
inevitably compete with the UGT for working class support on a national level, also led the 
Socialists seriously to reconsider their position within the Catalan syndicalist organisation. Like all 
other working class organisations, the Socialists suffered from the repression which followed 
56. Congreso de Constitucidn, op cit, p. 59. 
57. SO, 13 May 1910.; Congreso de Constituciön, op cit, p. 56-, pp. 75-78. 
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Tragic Week. The Socialist weekly, La Internacional, had to close down, and Fabra Ribas was 
forced into exile. However, they were not to be without a publication for long. Reus was to 
become an increasingly important branch within the regional party. In November 1909 the Reus 
Socialists brought out their own publication entitled La Justicia Social (LJS). The significance of 
Reus was confirmed in December of the following year when a congress held to reform the Catalan 
Socialist Federation decided that Reus should be its headquarters and ILJS its mouthpiece. 
The reaction of the followers of Fabra Ribas to the syndicalists' plans to set up a national 
organisation is not altogether clear. They probably hoped to use their influence within both SO and 
the UGT to get the two unions to hold a joint congress at which they would unite. This is 
indicated by an article published in US in April 1910. It argued that SO displayed more energy 
than, and did not suffer from the excessive centralism of, the UGT. On the other hand, it was 
more sectarian and lacked the UGT's practical organisational spirit. It therefore concluded that a 
fusion would bring out the best in both bodies. 58 
However, such a possibility was remote. The Madridpased Socialist leadership had no 
interest in such a deal. On the contrary, its only interest was to strengthen the UGT. The Catalan 
syndicalists apparently adopted a more conciliatory approach. They maintained that the CNT 
would not be formed in opposition to the UGT. It simply aimed to group together all those unions 
which, because they favoured direct action, did not wish to join the Socialist union. Moreover, 
SO's Federal Commission stated that it did not wish pro-Socialist unions to leave, and the CNT's 
founding congress held out the possiblity of a fusion with the UGT in the near future. 59 
Yet, such talk fitted ill with the Barcelona syndicalist leadership's total support for direct action. In 
reality, those Socialists who remained affiliated faced the uncomfortable prospect of forming the 
n-finority wing of an increasingly radicalised pro-anarchist confederation. Moreover, if they did 
remain affiliated, the reaction of the PSOE-UGT leadership would have probably left them no 
choice but to break with their Spanish comrades. Fabra Ribas was in exile in France during 19 10. 
Together with the leader of the French Socialist party, Jean Jaure's, he called on the Catalan 
Socialists to remain affiliated. 60 The opposite decision was, however, taken. Instead of 
Mobilising support within the CRT against its anarcho-syndicalist leadership, at the Catalan 
Socialists' 1910 regional congress the decision was taken to leave the newly formed CNT. 61 The 
decision was obviously of key importance in the future development of Catalan Socialism. The 
Socialists would be saved a bruising battle with the anarchists for control of the CRT. Yet they 
58. US, 2 April 1910. 
59. SO, 24 June, 29 June, 2 December 1910; Congreso de Constituci6n, p. 56. 
60. Manuel Tuh6n de Lara, El Movimiento Obrero, p. 490. 
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would also be isolated from Catalonia's largest labour organisation. And, whatever their views 
might be on the policy of the PSOE-UGT leadership, their future was now inextricably linked with 
that of the Spanish Socialists. 
The Catalan Socialists were not only worried by the radicalisation of SO's ideology during 
1910. The biggest difference between the years 1907-1909 and 1910-1911 was that in the new 
social climate anarchists and syndicalists could try and put their ideas into practice. Thus, with the 
build up of social conflict in Barcelona SO encouraged the workers to pursue aggressive strike 
tactics. It also tried to organise a number of solidarity strikes. The first such attempt was made on 
27 July 1910 when the federation called for a general strike in solidarity with striking Biscayan 
mineworkers. Its impact was very limited. Undaunted, however, SO called for another solidarity 
strike with the workers of Bilbao on 5 September. The atmosphere was more favourable. 
Nevertheless, only about 5000 workers downed tools in the Catalan capital, and the strike had no 
impact in the provinces. There were a number of reasons behind these setbacks. First, the 
strength of Barcelona trade unionism should not be exaggerated. Despite the growth of union 
organisation during these months there were still probably only about 25,000 unions workers 
unionised in Barcelona. Second, following the move to the right signalled by Alejandro Lerroux, 
the Radicals actively opposed the strikes. Third, not only did the syndicalists have to contend with 
the opposition of non affiliated unions. As shall be seen, several unions within the confederation 
also opposed the strikes. Yet, undeterred by these failures the Barcelona CNT continued down it 
chosen path. In October it offered to declare a general strike in support of the Barcelona 
metalworkers. The striking metalworkers finally declined the offer. Then, in January 1911, it 
followed up this rebuff with another call for a general strike, this time in support of workers on the 
Barcelona waterfront. Yet again, however, it had little impact. 62 
It was not until September 1911 that the CNT was involved in a serious attempt to halt 
production in the Catalan factories. The background to this effort was a flare up in the fighting in 
Morocco. Military activity had been on the increase since the Spring, and there were a number of 
bloody clashes between Moroccan tribesmen and the army in the late Summer. In part as a result, 
two parallel protest movements were launched. The first, organised by Socialists and republicans, 
was called specifically to oppose Spanish intervention in Morocco. The second was part of a 
campaign launched by the French CGT which aimed to mobilise international working class 
opinion against a possible European war. The struggle of the great powers for influence in 
Morocco was seen by the CGT as the main focus of tension at that time. In Spain the CNT gave 
strong support. The campaign began with a congress held in Paris on 8 July, which was attended 
by the CNT's General Secretary, Josep Negre. There then followed a series of meetings in Paris, 
Berlin, Madrid and Barcelona at the end of July and beginning of August. The Barcelona meeting 
62. LP, 28 July 1910, ME.; US, 17 September 1910. 
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was an enormous success, turning out to be the largest indoor gathering seen in the city for a 
number of years. Once again, therefore, the depth Of Popular opposition to the colonisation of 
Morocco became apparent. 'Me meeting closed with the threat of decisive action if war broke out 
as a result of inter-imperialist rivalry over Morocco. The representative of the French CGT, 
Demoulin, stating that the workers should oppose such a war with a revolutionary general 
strike. 63 
It was in this atmosphere, in which opposition to the war was becoming increasingly 
vociferous, that a strike wave broke out in several parts of the country. The conjuncture, 
therefore, appeared increasingly revolutionary. There were clear parallels in this respect with the 
run up to Tragic Week. However, the Spanish labour movement was in 1911 considerably 
stronger, and the CNT and UGT in a position to take advantage of the situation. Their reaction to 
these events was, however, to be very different. The CNT held its first congress between 8 and 
11 September 1911 in Barcelona. A secret session was held after the congress had officially ended 
in which it was agreed to declare a general strike to protest at the war. A strike or revolutionary 
committee was then elected, and in subsequent meetings it was decided the stoppage should begin 
on 18 September. However, one of the committee members, Miguel Sanchez Moreno, turned out 
to be a police spy. By using his information the authorities were able to act decisively and arrest 
the strike committee along with other leading anarchist figures a week before the strike was to 
begin. When it was finally declared in Barcelona the strike was followed by most of the iron 
foundry workers and by workers involved in the textile finishing trades. Yet, it was overall a 
failure. Once again, moreover, it was not seconded outside the Catalan capital. 
Nonetheless, the crisis was still not at an end. In fact, the strike had a considerable impact 
in a number of Spanish regions. The Saragossa local labour federation declared a general strike on 
the same day. On the following Monday general strikes were also declared in Seville, La Coruffa 
and Valencia. They were followed by El Ferrol on the following day, and Gijon on the 
Wednesday. These were all areas in which there was a significant anarchist presence. The most 
serious events occurred in a number of Valencian towns where the strikes, led by anarchists and 
left-republicans, took on an insurrectionary character. The Spanish Prime Minister responded by 
declaring martial law throughout Spain, and only regained total control of the situation at the end of 
the week. 64 
The CNT, then, did everything in its power to radicalise the crisis. The PSOE leadership, 
however, took exactly the opposite line. As in July 1909 it did not wish to call a general strike. It 
63. LP, 9 August 1911, ME; SO, 11 August; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 525-542. 
64. LID, 19 September 1911, ME; Manuel Buenacasa, op cit, pp. 40-42.; Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 567- 
571. 
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was finally pressured into declaring a national protest strike on 18 September. It was not, 
however, to begin until the 21 st and was to last for only 48 hours. The Government, forewarned, 
had no difficulty in taking preventative action. In fact, it was in reality a gesture which it was 
hoped would serve to save face. Once, again, therefore the Socialists had put the need to 
safeguard their own organisation before possible revolutionary adventures. They were no doubt 
correct in their assessment that there was still no opportunity of overthrowing the Monarchy. 
Despite the growth in union activity of the past two years labour agitation was still limited to only a 
few provinces. In particular the agrarian South remained quiescent during these years. And the 
state was still well placed to crush any attempted revolution. Yet, the Socialists' stance did not go 
down well amongst many union activists. Not only were the syndicalists able to repeat their 
charge that the Socialists were traitors and ador-mideras (sleepers). There was also considerable 
discontent within the PSOE itself In particular, the younger generation of militants, and hard-line 
trade unionists, like the Basque miners leader Facundo Perezagua, were unhappy at the line the 
party had taken. This discontent was, as shall be seen, particularly notable in Catalonia. 65 
In this region Government repression was vigorous. 162 workers were detained, 
including most the CNTs leading figures. Furthermore, the CNT was declared illegal and its 
headquarters closed down. In the following month the authorities also began to close the 
headquarters of all those Barcelona unions which were affiliated. It was a blow from which the 
CNT was not to recover until 1915. Government repression also affected the PSOE-UGT. 
Several leading Socialists were arrested, and the Madrid Casa del Pueblo was closed down. 
Nonetheless, both the party and union were soon able to function normally once again. Clearly the 
Government regarded the Socialists as more moderate and "responsible" opposition than the 
anarchists, and acted accordingly. 66 
Between 19 10 and 19 11, then, anarchists and syndicalists were once again to be found at 
the forefront of labour protest in the Catalan capital. As in 1901-1903 this did not, of course, 
mean that all workers affiliated to SO and later the CNT were committed syndicalists. Indeed, 
within the confederation there was considerable discontent at the revolutionary tactics employed by 
the Federal Commission under the leadership of Josep Negre. This was expressed in internal 
opposition the general strike calls made during these years. This opposition was not only limited 
to the Socialists. Thus, for example, according to the moderate republican publication, La 
Publicidad, the July 19 10 general strike was launched by anarchists, and opposed by, "the healthy 
elements within Solidaridad Obrera". US maintained that the September 1910 general strike failed 
because the confederation's largest unions, "opposed an idea which could not succeed because the 
65. Manuel TuFlon de Lara, El Movimiento Obrero, pp. 514-515.; Juan Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 323-324.; 
Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, pp. 538-545,557-584. 
66. LP, 14 October 1911, ME., 1 December 1911. . 
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atmosphere was inappropriate-. 67 Moreover, the strMng metalworkers rejected the proposal that a 
general strike be declared on their behalf, and the carters did not not support the general strike 
declared by the Barcelona CNT in support of the dockers. 
These disagreements were, it appears, the outward expression of an internal struggle for 
power within the confederation between those who wished to maintain the relatively moderate line 
pursued by SO between 1907 and 1909, and the supporters of the radicalisation initiated by Negre. 
That such a struggle existed was confirmed by La Publicidad in October 1910. It noted that some 
of the workers affiliated were unhappy at the decision taken to replace the caretaker of the CNT's 
Barcelona headquarters, and stated that as a result, "a meeting will be held to deal with the matter, 
brought about, so we have heard, by the mutual distrust between the anarchists and the trade union 
elements, who are in dispute over control of the centre',. 68 
The supporters of Josep Negre were able to maintain their predominance. However, 
discontent at the policies pursued led a number of unions to leave the union. The size of the 
opposition can be estimated if it is considered that in September and October 1910 between 45 and 
49 Barcelona unions were affiliated, whilst only 42 attended the CNT's founding congress. This 
represented less than half the unions that operated in Barcelona at this time. Indeed, after the defeat 
of the metalworkers, dockers and carters strikes at the end of the year the Barcelona CNT was 
much weakened. Thus, in September 1911 it had just 7,776 affiliates, less than SO during 
1909.69 
The unions which left SO during this period were varied in nature. Nonetheless, a number 
of similarities could be discerned. Firstly, with one small exception, all the shopworkers unions 
previously affiliated left. The last to do so was the Associacw de Dependencia Mercantil (the union 
which had done most to set up SO) in 1911. That this was the case is not surprising given the 
moderate trade union practice and lack of class consciousness of these workers. Secondly, unions 
which broke with SO-the CNT were often quite strong, and the workers they represented were in a 
relatively comfortable position. Such, for example, was the case of the stonemasons, stonecutters, 
plasterers and Sants bricklayers (who had already left in 1908) in construction, and the coopers in 
woodworking. These unions, as was noted in Chapter Five, were amongst the least likely to 
support the anarchists militant trade union practice. 
67. US, 17 Sept 1910. The republican uGrupo de Obreros", who distdbuted af lysheet against the strike 
also claimed that SO's largest unions, had opposed it. See Miguel Sastre, Las Huelgas... 1910-1914, pp. 
80-81. According to El Diluvio , on the other hand, two of the 
largest unions, the carters and coal 
unloaders, abstained and stated that they would join in if the strike had become generalised by breakfast 
time. ED, 6 September 1910, ME. 
68. LIP, 8 October 1910, ME. 
69. SO, 8 September 1911. Disillusioned by the tactics followed by the CNT Joaquin Bueso also left to 
form part of the Catalan PSOE at the end of 1911. 
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By 1911, in fact, the CNT represented considerably less than half the city's unionised 
labour force. An important focal point of opposition was formed by the shopworkers. Especially 
important in this respect was the highly moderate CADCI, which by 1910 had about 1,600 
affiliates. Not far removed from the shop assistants in ideological terms were a number of waiters' 
unions, which had no contact with the CNT, and which in 1910 had about 1000 affiliates between 
them. Other large independent unions in 19 10 were the railway workers, with over 1000 
members, and several coopers with about 800. To which should be added a whole host of smaller 
unions which preferred to maintain an independent existence rather than form part of the CNT. 70 
Moreover, the situation in the rest of Catalonia was worse. In September 1911 the CNT 
had only 4159 Catalan affiliates from outside Barcelona. In particular it had lost the backing of 
workers from Manresa, Vic and the Ter, Matar6 and the Maresme, Reus and Sitges, where the 
Socialists had considerable influence. Support for the Catalan regional federation of the CNT was, 
accordingly, limited to workers from several industrial towns in Barcelona Province. Most notably 
Terrassa and Sabadell (though the CRT temporarily lost its union base in Sabadell after the strike 
defeat of 1910), followed by mostly artisanal unions from the towns of Badalona, Igualada, 
Vilanova and Villafranca. 71 
The illegalisation of the CNT in September 1911 was, of course another serious blow. 
Reorganisation proved a slow and difficult process. Nevertheless, it was favoured by the fact that 
the economic climate remained buoyant. A syndicalist local federation once again operated in 
January 1913, and the syndicalist mouthpiece, Solidaridad Obrera, reappeared on the following I 
May. A new regional committee was then elected in July. The reorganisation was, however, to be 
short lived. After an attempted general strike in August in support of the striking cotton textile 
workers the CRT was yet again illegalised, and its leading figures arrested. It was not now to 
function until the following August. 72 
The situation was, however, somewhat more favourable than the previous paragraph might 
suggest. Solidaridad Obrera never stopped publication. Indeed, from late 1913 a vigorous 
campaign was launched to convert the weekly publication into a daily. Furthermore, as was seen 
in Chapters three and Four, trade union organisation strengthened considerably during these years. 
At the same time moves were afoot amongst the workers in a number of trades afflicted by severe 
social conflict to transform craft into industrial unions. The syndicalists were very much involved 
in this process. 
70. Manuel Lladonosa i Joaquin Ferrer, op cit, pp. 292-293. Membership figures for a large number of 
Barcelona unions are to be found in LP, 16 Nov 1910, ME. 
71 
. Congreso de Constituci6n, op cit, pp. 
99-104.; SO, 8 Sept 1911. 
72. LP, 7 January 1913.; SO, 17 May, 3 July 1913., 26 March, 6 August, 20 November 1914. 
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In textiles the Barcelona syndicalists were behind the organisation of the female cotton 
textile weavers union, La ConsOncia. As has been seen, the weavers showed themselves to be a 
highly radical and volatile group of workers. Just the sort who favoured the syndicalists militant 
union tactics. Moreover, the syndicalists were able to extend their support to several other cotton 
textile unions - most notably those of Igualada and Vilanova i la Geltr-6 - which had an important 
female contingent. In addition, they retained the sympathy of the Sabadell and Terrassa woollen 
textile union, and were strongly supported by the Barcelona cotton dyers. Nevertheless, though 
they were in a strong position within the National Textile Federation founded in December 1913, 
they had to share the leadership with the Socialists, who were in command of the textile unions of 
Matar6 and the Maresme, Reus, and to a certain extent the Ter Valley. 
This balance of political forces was reflected the discussions and resolutions approved at 
the Textile Federation's first congress. Socialist influence could be seen in the decision to set dues 
at a relatively high level, and in the call on unions to exercise caution before coming out on strike. 
However, the anarchists were it seems instrumental in the congress's decision not to appoint paid 
officials, in the agreement to recommend unions affiliated not to accept the intervention of outside 
bodies during industrial disputes, and in the accord strongly to criticise the Instituto de Refoorwws 
Sociales. Furthermore, the agreement that if the Government did not enforce the decree it had 
recently proclaimed, limiting working hours in the industry to 10 a day, then the federation's 
committee would, after having consulted with the membership, declare a general strike in the 
industry and call for a9 hour day, also had an anarchist ring to it. Finally, the anarchists also 
benefited from the congress's decision to leave it to the Barcelona textile unions to elect the 
federation's central committee. This allowed Joan Martf, president of La ConsOncia, to become 
General Secretary. As a result of these decisions, as was noted in Chapter Three, the Nacional 
Textile Federation adopted a more leftist and combative stance than any of its predecessors. This 
was reflected in it decision to exclude the TCV, and declare it"yellow and bourgeois-. 73 
In metallurgy the syndicalists' dominance was more clear cut. In Barcelona when a new 
metalworkers' federation was founded at the beginning of 1913 it was in syndicalist hands. 
Moreover, the syndicalists maintained their leading position in the Catalan Metalworkers' 
Federation set up in January 1914. This became clear at the federation's first congress held the 
following April, when a motion presented by the central committee rejecting state intervention in 
industrial disputes, and supporting direct action, was approved by a majority of ten to four. The 
Catalan Metalworkers' Federation together with the Alicante metalworkers union were then 
73. LP, 27,28 December 1913.; SO, 1 January 1914.; US, 3 January, 7 February 1914. ManIleu had 
replaced Roda as the centre of Socialist support in the Ter. Thus in June 1911 the Manlleu textile union, 
L Art Fabril, joined the UGT. US, 17 June 1911.; See also Chapter Three, p. 107. 
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responsible for the organisation of the Confederation of Spanish Metalworkers. The aim was to 
create a rival to the UGT metalworkers' federation which had functioned since the turn of the 
century. Its founding congress was held in Alicante in July 1914, and it was set up despite the fact 
that the UGT dispatched two delegates to the congress to try and reach a settlement. 74 
The syndicalists were also to enjoy an increasingly dominant position in construction. In 
1910 a regional bricklayers' federation had been founded. Its headquarters were to be found in 
Reus. Under the captaincy of the Reus union it became increasingly pro-Socialist, and established 
close contacts with the UGTs national bricklayers' federation. In response, in June 1913 a 
number of Barcelona unions broke with this federation, and formed their own Confederation of 
Catalan Bricklayers and Bricklayers' Labourers. There was no doubt as to the new organisation's 
political leanings. Its first communique was very explicit in this respect stating that: "As the 
methods which the state reformists try and make believe are of value have failed, to emancipate 
ourselves we must put into practice the tactics of direct action. " The new confederation proved 
more successful than its rival. It gained the support of most the towns around Barcelona, and soon 
had over 2000 members. As a result the Bricklayers' Federation was left with only a minority of 
Barcelona bricklayers affiliated, and its support was largely limited to a number of bricklayers' 
unions centred on the Maresme and the province of Tarragona. Not satisfied, however, in 1914 
the syndicalist Confederation began to work towards the foundation of a national bricklayers' 
federation to rival the UGTs organisation. It hoped finally to set up a national confederation of 
Spanish construction workers. Their dream was not yet to be realised. Nonetheless, in Barcelona 
when a local construction workers' federation was set up at the end of 1913 the syndicalists were 
again in control. 75 
By 1914, then, syndicalism was the most influential current within Catalan trade unionism. 
This is not of course to suggest that the majority of unionised workers joined syndicalist 
organisations. As has been seen, there was a significant anti- syndicalist current in a number of 
unions. Moreover, despite the sympathy of many militants, craft and industrial federations did not 
tend officially to join the CNT or CRT because of the political divisions such a decision would 
entail. 76 The CRT also found it very difficult to operate effectively in the political climate of these 
74. Federacidn Regional Catalana de 0breros Metaltirgicos, op Cit, p. 26.; SO. 4 June, 11 June, 9 July 
1914. In April 1914 the regional metalworkers' federation had 1,500 members. 
75. El Progreso, 4 August 1909.; SO, 18 November 1910; 10 July, 17 July, 16 October, 6 December 
1913., 19 July 1914.; US, 6 December 1913,23 May 1914.; LP, 8 July 1910, ME., 31 December 1913. 
76. A good example of the latter is the Catalan Based woodworkers' federation, the Federaci6 del Ram 
d'Elaborar Fuster. In June 1911 it had 1,465 members. The larger Barcelona carpenters unions and about 
40 per cent of the total membership was aff iliated to the CNT. However, in order to maintain its unity the 
federation remained independent. This could be seen in a delegate congress held in November 1911. 
In 
previous months negotiations had been held to fuse with Spain's other woodworkers' f ede ration , which 
belonged to the UGT. These negotiations, however, failed. The reasons were explained at the congress, 
where delegates agreed that they could not accept statutes which did not respect their "traditional 
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years. The only official membership figures for this period refer to October 1913 when the 
confederation was officially suspended. At that time 30 Barcelona unions were affiliated 
representing 5,155 members. Also affiliated to the CRT were the local labour federations of 
Vilanova, Vilafranca, Igualada and Sabadell with roughly 2000 members. 77 Yet these figures by 
themselves do not reflect the importance of the syndicalist presence in Catalonia. ne syndicalists 
played a leading role in many of the region's craft and industrial federations. Furthermore, during 
industrial disputes they were able to mobilise far more workers than were actually affiliated to their 
unions. Particularly important was the fact the syndicalists stronghold was Barcelona, for it was 
only from the Catalan capital that most craft and industrial federations could be articulated 
successfully. 78 
1913 also saw a significant reorientation of syndicalist tactics. With the 
escalation of industrial conflict in 1910-1911 anarchist militants had pushed for the declaration of 
solidarity strikes on all possible occasions. In this respect the tactics employed could hardly be 
differentiated from the strategy pursued by the Barcelona anarchists between 1901 and 1903. In 
fact the only real difference between the FRESR and CNT at this point appeared to be that affiliates 
to the latter had to pay dues. As in the case of SO this would in the future give the CNT that 
minimum of consistency necessary for a labour confederation to function effectively. However, as 
the events of 1911 proved the obsession with general strikes left the CNT wide open to 
government repression. Within the Confederation there were many who favoured a calmer 
approach. They were not at first heeded. Nonetheless, the situation was to change after the 
attempt to call a general strike in favour of the striking cotton textile workers in August 1913 once 
again led to the CRT being illegalised. Thus, in November a new committee elected to reorganise 
the CRT stressed the need to avoid, "epileptic reactions which tire the members and result in 
disorganisation". The new line was reiterated in the following year in a number of articles 
published by Solidaridad Obrera, which stressed that general strikes should only be declared when 
it was certain a majority of workers would second them. 79 
autonomy", and which did not leave the individual unions free to decide whether or not to join the UGT. La 
Cuft, 1 May, 1 June, 1 December 1911, Congreso de Constitucion de la CNT, pp. 99-104. 
77. SO, 5 March, 26 March, 6 August, 20 November 1914. 
78. Syndicalist moral was also bolstered by the fact that the years 1910-1914 saw a great escalation of 
social conflict over much of continental Europe, accompanied by further growth in support for syndicalism. 
Solidaridad Obrera carried regular features on these developments. Moreover, between 27 September 
and 2 October 1913 an International Syndicalist Congress was held in London. Josep Negre, who was 
living in France at the time, represented the CRT. SO hoped the congress would lead to the foundation of 
a new syndicalist international to rival the Socialist 11 International. In this respect, however, they were to 
be 
disappointed. 
79. In March 1914 the editors of SO actually criticised the Barcelona railway workers'union for voting 
in 
favour of a general strike in support of the striking tramworkers. They stated that: "if this weapon should 
be 
discredited because it has often been used without success then the f ault will lie with the workers, who 
resort to it at all times without taking into account the general atmosphere. The people, and only 
the 
people, can carry out a general strike. " SO, 19 March 1914. Never before, at least since 
the turn of the 
century, had the syndicalists criticised rather than applauded an attempt to call a general strike. 
In October 
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As in the case of the French CGT, therefore, the Catalan syndicalists was seemingly 
coming to realise that if they wished to build up their organisation and defend their members 
material interests successfully they could not simply declare general and solidarity strikes at every 
turn. Nevertheless, between 1913 and 1914 the CRT leadership cont u5. in ed to pursue an aggresive 
union strategy, and in no way diluted the ideological foundations on which the organisation had 
been built. On the contrary, it became increasingly insistent that unions affiliated put into practice 
the tenets of direct action. At the same time it launched a campaign against reformist trade union 
leaders who favoured negotiations with the authorities. The CRT also maintained its hostility 
towards political parties. It was, in particular, bitterly critical of the Radicals who, as we have 
seen, from 1910 opposed the syndicalists' militant union tactics. Finally, the CRT kept its distance 
from Catalanism, which it continued to see as an ideology at the service of the bourgeoisie. 80 
Though, therefore, the syndicalists had only a skeletal union presence, they appeared to be 
in the strongest position to advantage of any further growth of union organisation. This would be 
confirmed during the years 1916-1919. There were a number of factors behind the syndicalist's 
relative success. First, they were best placed to capitalise on the high level of social strife visible in 
key branches of Catalan industry. As has been seen, they had most success in attracting workers 
who reacted to growing industrial conflict by looking outside the narrow confines of their craft for 
support amongst workers in other branches of their industry. In fact, it was the anarchists and 
syndicalists to a far greater extent than the Socialists who stressed the need to break down craft 
barriers and form industrial unions. The need to combat craft divisions was already noted in the 
anarchist press at the beginning of the century. 81 It was, nevertheless, from 1910 that syndicalists 
laid emphasis on the fact that only industrial federations (sindicatos de ranw) could compete 
effectively with the bourgeoisie. 82 
the paper admitted that: "The energy used up, the blood generously spilt, has made us cautious and 
prudent. " SO, 29 October 1914. See also SO, 27 November 1913,26 March 1914. 
80. SO, 1 March, 12 June, 31 July, 2 Oct 1913,2 April, 17 April, '25 June, 17 July 1914. Solidaridad 
Obrera only dealt with the question of Catalanism on a couple of occasions between 1913 and 1914. The 
Most important article was published at the end of 1913 and dealt with the question of the Mancomunitat. 
This was to be a Catalan wide administrative body formed by the fusion of the region's four provincial 
councils. The Lliga Regionafista had pushed strongly for its creation, and it was clear that the Viga would 
be in control of the new body. SO, however, came out against the foundation of the Mancomunitat It 
argued that it would benefit the few to the cost of the majority, and concluded: "It is not the autonomy that 
the bourgeoisie asks for that the workers desire and perennially struggle for. The economic 
independence to which the worker aspires is wider, more just and equitative. It is an autonomy that begins 
at the level of the individual, then expands within the community to take in the whole of humanity. That 
which does not conform to this model of democracy is not and cannot be democracy because its point of 
departure - capital - is mistaken, and falls apart when subjected to even the most cursory analysis. 
" SO, 30 
October 1913. 
81. El Productor, 5 September 1903. 
82. SO, 16 December 1910,8 October 1914. 
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There were, however, other factors behind the syndicalist success (and Socialist failure) 
The role of the state was of particular importance in this respect. Xavier Cuadrat has argued that 
the state's manipulation of elections, by effectively blocking the parliamentary road to power, lent 
feasibility to the anarchist doctrine of antipoliticism. Furthermore, he maintains that the state's 
failure to implement its own social legislation and play an effective role in regulating industrial 
relations generated support for the anarchist doctrine of direct action. 83 
Yet the workers' reaction to the policies of the Restoration state were not as simple as 
Cuadrat' s analysis would lead one to suppose. As we have seen, workers did participate in 
elections and, in Catalonia, most gave their support to the republicans. Nevertheless, the working 
class press was often sceptical as to the value of these elections, and the politician was often 
presented as a figure only in politics for his own benefit. The career of Alejandro Lerroux did little 
to dispel this belief. This was not sufficient to convince many workers that they should not vote, 
for the result would be to leave all state organs in the hands of the Right. However, it did create a 
climate from which anarchists and syndicalists could benefit. 
The impact on working class attitudes of the state's lack of interest in the observance of 
social legislation is also difficult to gauge. The first point to note is that such legislation was not 
totally disregarded in Catalonia. It is true that although Spain's first social laws reached the statute 
book in 1900 a factory inspectorate was not created until 1907. Moreover, it was underfunded and 
lacked effective powers to impose fines. However, as we have seen, provision was also made for 
the creation of juntas locales de re rmas sociales. These juntas , made up of a number of worker : fo 
and employer representatives under the presidency of the mayor, were empowered to visit factories 
and (subject to ratification in case of appeal by ajunta provincial chaired by the civil governor) they 
could impose fines. Where they were set up many trade unionists worked within them to ensure 
social legislation was complied with. Their effectiveness should not be exaggerated. 
Nevertheless, in towns where the unions were relatively strong and workers able to exercise a 
certain influence over local government they did at least go some way towards ensuring the 
legislation was respected. In most areas, however, the unions were weak and employers had a 
decisive influence over local government. In such areas the government made no effort to 
intervene and, consequently, the juntas locales were either not set up or were under the influence of 
employers, in which case social legislation was ignored. 84 
When the Cortes approved Spain's first social laws Socialists and left republicans made 
plain that they considered the measures insufficient. Nevertheless, during the first years of the 
83. Xavier Cuadrat, op cit, p. 56. 
ri / ra ajo 84. Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Secci6n Segunda, Memo al General de la InspeccOn de Tb 
Correspondiente al Alo 1914 (Madrid, 1 916), p. 65.; Memorial General... 1913 (Madrid, 1 915), p. 66. 
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century most workers I organisations tried to ensure the legislation passed by parliament was 
implemented. This, as was seen in Chapter Five, was the case of the FTE, which strongly 
campaigned in favour of a bill limiting female and child labour. In general workers saw the juntas 
locales as a useful weapon in their fight against employer abuses. Thus, when thejuntas were 
formed it was on the workers' initiative. Where they could employers, often backed up by the 
local authorities, would try and sabotage them. 85 Indeed, pro-anarchist unions were often 
involved in elections to the juntas locales. This was even the case in Barcelona, where during the 
first decade of the century a number of reformist and social catholic representatives had connived 
with the authorities to take over the junta local. Thus, in November 1910 44 Barcelona unions 
formed a coalition aimed at ousting the social Catholics. 15 of these unions had attended the 
CNT's founding congress. These included such important CNT unions as the carters, tanners, 
and Barcelona bricklayers. 86 
Catalan workers, therefore, by no means fully accepted anarchist claims that no good could 
ever come from state sponsored social legislation. They in fact made considerable effort to ensure 
the legislation was enforced, but were usually disappointed by the results. As a result many 
workers showed themselves to be increasingly doubtful as to the possibility of social legislation 
working to their benefit. 87 Hence, trade union leaders often disparaged the efforts of the 
government in this respect. For example, shortly after the outbreak of the 1913 cotton textile strike 
in Barcelona, the president of La Consuincia, Mauricio Puig, rejected the government's offer of 
legislation limiting working hours in the industry because, "the workers have learnt their lesson, 
for they have a good memory and know that the governments are not to be trusted". 88 
The best single piece of evidence in favour of the anarchists case was in fact provided by 
this strike. As was seen in Chapter Three the strikers finally agreed to return to work after the 
Government had published a Royal Decree limiting working hours in the industry to 60 per week. 
However, once work had resumed the authorities made little effort to enforce the decree and many 
employers ignored it. As a result the attitude of the textile workers towards state intervention 
hardened. This could be seen at the founding congress of the National Textile Federation in 
December 1913. As we have seen, it was a broad coalition between syndicalists, Socialists and 
independent trade unionists. Nevertheless, it declared the Instituto de Reformas Sociales set up at 
the beginning of the century to oversee the implementation of social legislation, a "ridiculous body 
85. Memoria General... 191 l(Madrid 1913), p. 60. 
86. LP, 16 November 1910, ME., 19 November, ME. 
87. In 1913 Catalan factory inspectors admitted that: "in many cases the workers show sympathy for the 
inspectorate. However, they observe the indolence of the authorities and the delays in enforcing any 
affect the well being of the workers, both because the punishments are not sufficiently exemplary and 
because the culprits have sufficient influence to avoid them. Consequently amongst many workers 
the 
Suspicion that their hopes will not be fulfilled is beginning to manifest itself, and amongst others the 
feeling is becoming more pronounced. " Memoria General... 1913, p. 68. 
88. LP, 23 July 1913. 
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without force". 89 It was this lack of effective state action that was used by anarchists and 
syndicalists to justify their opposition to any form state intervention either in the form of social 
legislation or arbitration tribunals. This opposition gained increasing currency within trade union 
circles. A good example of this attitude in provided by the key resolution at the first congress of 
the Regional Metalworkers' Federation held in April 1914, which stated: 90 
Let's not fall into the trap of believing that on returning to work the government will 
regulate wages, hours and working conditions. We remember that when the railway 
workers, Rio Tinto miners, textile workers and other less important trades came out on 
strike they were tricked out of their just demands( ... ). This committee recommends, though does not impose -for it is neither absolutist nor imperialist - that direct action be adopted as the most effective means of achieving social justice. 
Similar attitudes were, it appears, widely held in working class circles by this time. 
Although the picture outlined is a complex one, then, one clear factor does emerge. Within 
the context of the Restoration state it was extremely difficult to put reformist policies into practice. 
This fact favoured the syndicalists. The Socialists were, on the contrary, the main lol,,, sers. As has 
been stressed the goal of the UGT had from the outset been to form stable trade unions which 
would peacefully negotiate over working conditions with their employers. From the late 1890s the 
PSOE had shown itself reluctant to step outside the bounds of legality, paid increasing attention to 
elections, supported the implementation of social legislation, and enthusiastically worked through 
the channels opened up by the state. The returns on this policy were, however, slight. 
Consequently, the anarchists could coherently present their anti-statist and, it appeared, 
unambiguously revolutionary alternative. 
Indeed, it seems significant in this respect that in Catalonia Socialists often seem to have 
been more successful in towns in which their was some continuity in trade union organisation, and 
where the workers had a significant influence in local politics. These were usually towns in which 
thejuntas locales functioned. The reason appears to be that, unlike the anarchists, Socialists were 
willing to use the levers of state power to the workers advantage and in these towns that could do 
so to some effect. In the textile industries the situation is perhaps best illustrated by the example of 
two areas in which the Socialists had considerable support: Matar6 and the Ter Valley. In Matar6 
the Socialists had an important presence in local government, and the towns hosiery workers were 
able to ensure that social legislation was to an important extent complied with. In the larger Ter 
Valley towns, as we have seen, the male cotton spinners were able to form relatively durable 
unions. There were a number of workers representatives elected as councillors. Moreover, juntas 
89. US, 3,10 January 1910. 
90. Federacion Regional Catalana de Obreros Metaldrgic0s, OP cit, p. 26. 
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locales functioned during most of the period under consideration, with union leaders playing an 
important pan in the proceedings. 91 
Furthermore, the Socialists' problems were compounded by the state's periodic recourse to 
repression, which made it difficult to form stable trade unions. This problem was particularly 
acute in Catalonia where industrial relations were often so poor. Indeed, it seems that a snowball 
effect was in evidence by which intense social conflict generated support for syndicalism, and this 
in turn made government repression more likely. 92 Finally, the inability to defeat the Monarchist 
parties at election time also encouraged popular support for the overthrow of the state. This could 
be seen both in July 1909 and September 1911. In consequence, as we have seen, the cautious 
PSOE leadership was put on the defensive, and anarchists and syndicalist militants able to take 
centre stage. 
It was to a large extent for these reasons that from about 1906 the Catalan Socialists had 
begun to distance themselves from the Madrid based PSOE-UGT leadership. Despite the break up 
of SO in 1910 the Catalan Socialist weekly ILJS was very critical of the Spanish Socialist 
hierarchy. Between 1910 and 1914 the Madrid Socialists maintained the de-facto reformism of 
previous years. Indeed, in the aftermath of Tragic Week the Socialists broke with their isolationist 
past and signed a so-called conjunciOn with the various republican groupings. Its principal aims 
were, so it was claimed, in the short run to prevent Antonio Maura from ever returning to power, 
and in the long run to establish a republic. However, it was to all intents and purposes an electoral 
pact. 93 
91. In Matar6, since the 1890s, the Socialists were consistently able to get their representatives elected 
in local government elections and, according to Maria Dolors Capdevila and Roser Masgrau, they "carded 
out political work within the municipality successfully". Op cit, p. 4. In the Ter Valley a number of town 
counsellors were elected over the years. Thus, in the local elections held in July 1909 seven Catalan 
counsellors were elected, three from Roda, two from Manlleu, one from the Ter Valley town of Montesquiu 
and one from Sitges. El Poble Cataki, 20 July 1909. In the larger Ter Valley towns juntas locales 
functioned throughout much of the period. The influence that could be exercised through a junta local is 
illustrated by the case of Reus. The Reus labour movement had been dominated by anarchists in the late 
nineteenth century. However, from the turn of the century the Socialists gained increasing support. It was 
a town in which the junta local functioned quite eff ectively. Reus's most influential Socialist, Josep 
Recasens i Mercad6, stated in his memoirs that when it was set up in 1904, "Colleagues of ours formed 
the majority of the committee members. It was this along with the campaigns carded out by the Barcelona 
weekly previously stated (the Socialist La Lucha Sociaý which allowed us to combat the old anarchists and 
make our presence felt". Josep Recasens i Mercad6, Vida Inquieta (Barcelona, 1985), p. 62. 
92. The state does, indeed, seem to have been more prepared to use repression when a strike was led by 
the anarchists than when it was Socialist led. For example the Llberal government of Jos6 Canalejas took a 
very conciliatory stance with respect to a rather violent strike of Biscayan miners organised by the 
Socialist 
union leader, Facundo Perezagua, in August-September 1910. Juan Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 298-312. 
The contrast with the Government's reaction to the Barcelona metalworkers and Sabadell woollen workers 
strikes in September 1911 is clear. 
93. See, Juan Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 262-266,276-286.; Antonio Robles Egea,,, La Conjunci6n 
Republicano-Socialista", El Socialism en Espafla, op cit, PP. 109-130. 
264 
The pact was in many ways inevitable. Leading Spanish Socialists had developed the 
argument that Spain was still a backward country with strong aristocratic features. In consequence 
before socialism could be established a bourgeois revolution would first be needed to modernise 
the country. This revolution should be carried out by the republicans who represented the most 
advanced sectors of the bourgeoisie. In such circumstances a pact with the republicans was the 
obvious course of action. This was particularly so because the republicans still enjoyed 
widespread petty bourgeois and working class support, and the Socialists would therefore reap 
considerable electoral advantage from such an agreement. 
This analysis was, however, never accepted by the majority of Catalan Socialists. Fabra 
Ribas's friend, Josep Recasens i Mercade, stated that monarchist and republican governments were 
the same - mere tools of the bourgeoisie - and that talk of the need to pass through a republican 
stage before reaching socialism was therefore absurd. Though not clearly articulated the 
implication was that Spain had already passed through its bourgeois phase and was ripe for 
revolution. Fabra Ribas remained sceptical of the benefits of electoral politics, and argued that 
though elections provided a useful opportunity for the Socialists to get across their views, 
capitalism would only ultimately be brought down through the revolutionary overthrow of the 
state. For the workers to be in a position to carry out the revolution, he maintained, the conjuncion 
should be broken and an anarchist-Socialist proletarian front take its place. 94 
At the same time in US a concerted attack was mounted on the PSOE's organisational 
structure. The paper criticised the PSOE's centralism, the National Committee's attempts to stifle 
open discussion within the party, and the fact that the party leadership was drawn from a very 
narrow base and had no knowledge of working conditions outside Madrid. The Catalan Socialists 
advocated as an alternative the decentralisation of the party, which they maintained should take on a 
federal character. The National Committee, they stated, should be elected by the whole party 
congress and not by the branch in which it resided (always Madrid), the PSOE's regional 
federations should be strengthened, and representatives from these federations form part of the 
National Committee. 95 
These were, in fact, years of some optimism in the Catalan Socialist camp. They remained 
very weak in Barcelona. Nevertheless, the number of Catalan affiliates to the UGT grew 
from a 
low of 469 in 1908 to 5,652 in February 1916. They had several important points of 
influence 
amongst textile workers. Moreover, they retained the support of local unions 
in Sitges, Tarragona 
and Tortosa, and through the Reus local labour federation they extended their 
influence to a 
number of Tarragona land labourers' unions. US had also become the main vehicle 
for internal 
94. US, 19 November 1910,16 August, 18 Oct 1913. 
95. US, 19 September 1914,3 February 1915. 
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opposition to party policy. Significantly, it sold well in Asturias and especially the Basque 
country; areas which had also seen calls for a shift away from electoral politics, and for a more 
radical union strategy. 96 
It was, however, to be a false dawn. From 1915 the Catalan Socialist Federation was to 
become increasingly weak, and US disappeared at the end of 1916. It was not they but the 
anarchists who were to take advantage of the great escalation of social conflict in Catalonia between 
1916 and 1919. The Catalan Socialists lack of strength at home was reflected in their 
disappearance from the stage of Spanish Socialist politics. They had seemed well place to offer a 
radical alternative to the PSOE-UGT leadership. Yet between 1918 and 1920 they were absent 
from the leftist tercerista wing of the PSOE. 
There were perhaps two main causes of this ultimate failure. In the first place US's radical 
rhetoric was often not matched by the Socialists' actions, and Fabra Ribas's leftist alternative was 
never really put into practice. During 1913 US tried hard to improve relations with the anarchists 
and began publishing a section called El Desarme de los Odios. However, the Catalan CRT 
maintained its distance. It was pleased by the divisions which had opened up in the Socialist 
camp, but hoped this would result in the break up of the UGT and lead the "healthy elements" in 
the Socialist confederation to join the syndicalists. 97 As during the years 1907-1909 the problem 
was that their remained profound ideological divisions between the Catalan anarchists and 
Socialists. Thus, Socialists still supported social legislation, and tried to work through the 
channels opened up by the state. Moreover, even Fabra Ribas's call for a more combative union 
practice was by no means followed by all Catalan Socialists. In reality a cautious approach to 
strikes continued to prevail. For example, in 1914 in Barcelona two general strikes called by the 
cotton textile and tram workers ended in defeat. Recasens i Mercade, who in many other respects 
supported Fabra Ribas, did not go along with him on the question of industrial militancy. Thus he 
was strongly critical of these strikes and commented: "It is imperative, in our opinion, that the 
Catalan and especially the Barcelona workers radically change their methods, if they do not want 
our region to be a constant hindrance to the development of the Spanish labour movement. -98 It 
was not, therefore, according to Recasens, the Socialists who should alter their tactics but the 
Catalan working class. 
The Socialists' prudent trade union practice still cause them difficulties, and the 
combination of the volatility of the rank and file, employer intransigence and state repression 
96. Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 423-452.; Maria Dolors Capdevila i Roser Masgrau, op cit, pp. 7-8.; 
Juan 
Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 335-336; Carlos Forcadell, Parlamentarismo y Bolchevizacidn. 
El Movimiento 
Obrero Espallol 1914-1918 (Madrid, 1972), pp. 40-44,103-106,172-205. 
97. SO, 30 October, 6,13,27 November, 4 Dec 1913; 9 April, 2 July, 6 August 1914. 
98. LJS, 14 April 1914. 
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continued to hinder Socialist penetration. Two examples may serve to illustrate this point. The 
first concerns the Barcelona compositors. As was seen in Chapter Five, after the 1902 general 
strike the Socialist, Toribio Reoyo, was expelled from the ranks of L'Art d'Imprimir. Thereafter, 
until 1911, the union remained strongly syndicalist. However, after having seconded the CNT 
sponsored general strike in 1911 it was banned. In March 1912 it was reformed under a new 
name, the Unio Obrera de L'Art d'Imprimir. The opportunity was taken to unite all the Barcelona 
compositors. Therefore, the new union was more broadly based than its predecessor, and 
included both anarchists and Socialists in its ranks. In order to maintain unity it declared itself 
ideologically neutral, and refused to join either the CRT or the UGT's Typographical Federation. 
The union grew rapidly in size, thereby stimulating the Compositors to present their 
employers with a series of demands. Socialists such as Toribio Reoyo and the newly converted 
Joaquin Bueso attained positions of influence within the union. They were the moderates 
mentioned in Chapter Four. They tried to convince the workers not to come out on strike 
immediately, and not to present all their demands. Yet their exhortations were in vain. Carried 
along by the enthusiasm of the moment, the workers struck on 7 May 1913 and refused to 
compromise on any of their demands. The employers, however, stood firm, and the compositors 
had to return to work empty handed in the following month. As a result the possibility of building 
up a strong compositors union in which the Socialists played a significant role was lost. 99 
The second example is more important. It concerns a strike which broke out in the Reus 
cotton textile industry during 1915. It was provoked by the textile manufacturers, and its 
significance lies in the fact that, as a result, the Socialists'position within the National Textile 
Federation and the Reus labour movement was put under threat. By the beginning of 1915, in 
fact, the Socialists had strengthened their position within the Textile Federation. The Barcelona 
cotton textile union, La ConsOncia, never recovered from the traumatic end to the 1913 textile 
strike. Accordingly, in 1914, the Textile Federation's committee was moved from Barcelona to 
Matar6, and the well known Socialist militant, Constantino Perlasio, became General 
Secretary. 100 At the same time, the Socialists maintained a strong position within the Reus trade 
unions. There were a number of cotton textile factories in Reus, operated largely by female labour. 
During the first decade of the century these workers were non unionised. The pillars of organised 
labour in the town were, therefore, artisanal. In 19 10 the local labour federation was finally able to 
set up a cotton textile workers' union, which by the Summer had about 1000 members. 
Yet, 
supposedly in order to avoid retribution from the manufacturers, the leadership of the union 
did not 
99. See Chapter Four, pp. 138-139. 
100. Juan cle Catalunya, "La Federaci6n Fabril y Textil", La justicia, 22 March 
1930.; Albert Balcells, "La 
Mujer Obrera", op cit, pp. 64-68. 
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consist of cotton textile workers. It was made up of delegates from each of the unions affiliated to 
the local federation, with the Socialist, Miguel Mestre, as president. 101 
Over the next five years the union leadership had to deal with a number of strikes in the 
industry. The intransigence of the local industrialists made it very difficult to reach negotiated 
settlements. Matters came to a head in 1915 after a dispute had errupted in the town's largest 
cotton textile factory, La Fabril Cotonera. It began in March when the owner shut down the 
weaving section of his factory after the workers had asked for a series of improvements in working 
conditions. The conflict then spread, first to the rest of the factory and finally to the entire Reus 
working class. Once declared by the union the strike centred on the workers' demands that all the 
weavers be readmitted and that the union be officially recognised. It proved very difficult to 
resolve, first because the industrialist affected was pressurised by the most hard line sectors of the 
Reus bourgeoisie, and by the Catalan cotton textile employers' federation, not to make any 
concessions. Second, because the female cotton textile workers, like their Barcelona colleagues in 
1913, became highly radicalised and refused to accept any transaction. 
This fact allowed a small group of Reus syndicalists to increase their influence amongst the 
strikers. The Reus Socialists' reaction to these events was contradictory. A more moderate section 
within the party, captained by Recasens i Mercade, rejected any escalation of the dispute, and 
criticised the strikers for not reaching a compromise. Yet, a more radical wing of the party, led by 
Miguel Mestre, though in favour of negotiation, supported the decision taken by the workers first 
to ask the other Reus unions to come out in support and then, when they were becoming 
increasingly desperate, for the Nacional Textile Federation to call a general strike. The 
Federation's Mataro leadership, however, was unenthusiastic. Furthermore, the La ConsOncia 
stated that it would only respond if the Reus workers adopted the aggressive union tactics 
associated with direct action. The result was that the general strike failed to materialise and the 
Reus textile workers had to return to work defeated. 102 
The outcome of the dispute once again showed how difficult it was to operate the Socialists' 
trade union strategy in Catalan cotton textiles. If employers could not be forced to negotiate with 
the workers' representatives then stable union organisation became an impossibility. On this 
occasion Nfiguel Mestre, following the advice of Fabra Ribas, had been willing to pursue a more 
combative stance. But the result had been to divide the party, and the loss of the strike was a 
serious blow to the prestige of the Reus Socialists. Moreoverl in the following year 
leadership 
of the Nacional Textile Federation passed out of Socialist hands for similar reasons. During 1916 
101. La Internacional, 6 November 1908; US, 21 May, 17 September 1910. 
102. Albert Arnavat, Classe contra Classe. El Conflicte Social del 1915 a Reus (Reus, 1985), passim; 
Mada Dolors Capdevila i Roser Masgrau, op cit, pp. 24-25. 
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the Barcelona cotton textile workers once again flooded into La Consta'ncia. They immediately 
called for a wage increase and came out on strike in July. The federation's committee officially 
supported the strike, but considered the demand ill timed. As a result, once the strike had been 
defeated, it faced a barrage of criticism and had to resign. Leadership of the federation then passed 
into the hands of the pro-syndicalist Barcelona sizers and calenders union. 103 
Moreover, the UGT's union practice, and the fact that the Madrid Socialists were in charge 
of party policy created additional difficulties. Unions were often put off joining the UGT because 
t dues were relatively high, and yet stingent conditions were placed on the use of UGT funds to 
support strikes. They could, therefore, legitimately ask what was the point of joining. 'Ibis 
probably helps to explain why the Catalan Socialists had considerable influence in sectors of 
Catalan labour, but managed to pursuade very few unions to join the UGT. 104 Some Catalan 
Socialists also admitted that unions did not join the UGT because they saw it as "political" and 
subordinated to the PSOE. 105 This problem was heightened as a result of the decision to move the 
UGT's headquarters from Barcelona to Madrid in 1899. It was later claimed that the move had 
been made, "because Catalonia, and particularly Barcelona, was no longer at the centre of the 
party's forces". 106 Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that at least part of the reason for 
the move was the desire on the part of the Madrid Socialists to bring the UGT under closer control. 
That this was the case is indicated by the fact that from this date the UGT became increasingly 
identified with party policy. This became especially clear after 1908, and the process was to 
culminate in the UGT's overt support for the republican- socialist conjuncion. 107 
From this date the Catalan Socialists were handicapped by the fact that political power 
within the party was concentrated in Madrid. The party leadership maintained a firm grip on the 
provinces. In part this was due to the moral authority of Pablo Iglesias. Yet the leadership also 
exercised a great deal of control over the party congresses, which were invariably held in Madrid. 
103. Pere Gabriel, "Sindicats", pp. 544-551.; Albert Balcells, "La Mujer", pp. 68-72. 
104. The stringent requirements imposed before a strike could be given monetary support meant 
that very few strikes involving UGT unions had official backing. This produced considerable 
disquiet. For example, in 1914 the railway workers' union, Reus Nord, formed part of the UGT's 
national federation of railway workers. Nonetheless, the union's president stated that dues were 
too high. He pointed out the workers affiliated to the union paid 50 cents a month. Half this money 
was sent to the central committee of the railway workers' federation to be found in Madrid. At the 
same time, in order to receive strike aid over 50 per cent of the railway workers in the locality had to 
be unionised, and the local union had to be able to support them on its own for at least two weeks. 
These requirements, he continued, were almost impossible to comply with and the union was, 
therefore, paying its dues to the federation's committee for nothing. This, he maintained, was why 
the federation had lost over 30,000 affiliates in the previous year. La Uni6n Ferroviaria, Reus 
NOrte, May, August 1914. This example, again illustrates the fact that the UGT was best suited to 
the needs of workers in a strong bargaining position, for whom strike action was a last resort. 
105. US, 11 May 1911,17 January 1914. 
106. J. J. Morato, Lideres del Movimiento Obrero Espaf)ol, 1868-1921 (Madrid, 1972), p. 289. 
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This was in part possible because of the existence of so-called cunero delegates: party members 
who theoretically represented unions from other parts of Spain, but who in fact came from 
Madrid. 108 
There was, in consequence, a tendency to view the PSOE as an alien body without roots in 
Catalonia. A belief which was probably strengthened by the notable cultural and linguistic 
differences between Catalonia and Castile. The UGT was also increasingly seen in this light after 
the decision was taken to move its headquarters to Madrid in 1899. This decision was of the 
greatest importance for the future development of Spanish Socialism. The centralisation of the 
UGT in Madrid could not fail to make it unpopular amongst many workers. Madrid, it should be 
remembered, was better known for its court and state functionaries than for its industry. Why 
then, many Catalan workers could ask themselves, should they who laboured in the country's 
greatest industrial cities be subject to decisions taken in Madrid? Union organisation amongst 
railway workers between 1909 and 1911 provides a good example of this hostility. In 1909 the 
Spanish Socialists formed the Railway Workers'Union. In 1910 they collaborated with Barcelona 
trade unionists in the setting up of the so-called Autonomous Catalan Section. However, in 1911 
there developed a split over Socialist plans to form a national federation. The Catalan Section 
stated that the organisers of the founding congress were trying to make all those who wished to 
federate adopt the same statutes as the UGT Madrid railway workers' union. It also asked why it 
was necessary to centralise the federation's executive at one point, and in a clear reference to the 
UGT stated that it refused to contribute to, "the cost of other bodies which are not totally working 
class, and with whom the majority of railway workers do not feel identified". 109 
It was for this reason that Catalan Socialists became increasingly crifical of the party and 
unions' organisational structure. The ir attempts to restructure the PSOE, however, proved 
unsuccessful. At the party's key Tenth Congress in October 1915 Recasens i Mercade did manage 
to end the practice by which the National Committee was elected by the Madrid branch alone, and it 
was agreed that in certain circumstances representatives of the party's regional federations could 
attend and vote at national committee meetings. Yet they were never actually to do so. In reality 
power within the party remained firmly in the hands of the Madrid executive. 
110 
Under the impact of their failure to provide a clear radical alternative to the UGT-PSOE 
leadership or restructure the party the Catalan Socialists' position collapsed. Between 
1917 and 
1919 they continued on the one hand to try and build bridges with the CNT, and on the other to 
decentralise the PSOE. They were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. Frustration was the result. 
108. J. J. Morato, El PSO, p. 181.209. 
109. SO, 1 May 1911. 
110. Carlos Forcadell, op cit, pp, 121-122. 
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Left-wing militants like Andreu Nin, therefore, left the Socialists and resolved to work within the 
CNT. This helps to explain why the only communist Party to be formed in Catalonia during the 
1920s - the Bloc Obrer i CanWerol - was the work of CNT dissidents. More moderate Socialists 
for their part also gave up trying to reform the PSOE from within and formed their own 
independent Socialist party in 1923: the social-democratic and Catalanist Unio Socialista de 
Catalunya. During the Second Republic both these parties were to exercise greater influence in 
Catalonia than the remnants of the PSOE's Catalan Federation. III 
Yet more important than this was the fact that no party of the worldng class was to play a 
leading role in Catalan left-wing politics before the Spanish Civil War. In part this could be put 
down to the fact that syndicalists and anarchists retained a strong position within the labour unions. 
No working class party could hope to succeed electorally without first gaining an important trade 
union following. This possibility was, however, to a large extent blocked by the anarchists. The 
anarchists represented primarily a trade union movement. At election time they offered no 
alternative to left-wing republicanism. Despite the decline of the Radicals from 1910, therefore, 
the republicans continued as major force in working class politics. Thus, despite the anarchists 
avowed contempt for the "bourgeois" republicans, in many respects they remained unwilling 
bedfellows through to the outbreak of war in 1936. 
111. Albert Balcells, "El Socialismo en Catalufla durante la Segunda Rep6blica" , 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most of Catalan industry belonged to one of two 
sectors: textiles and the artisanal trades. Nevertheless, a number of similar characteristics could be 
discerned. All Catalan industry was faced with the problem that the level of internal demand was 
both limited in scope and varied greatly according to the harvest. 711iis fact put a number of 
obstacles in the path of the region's economic development. Catalan firms tended to be small in 
size, and often did not have the capital resources necessary to carry through large scale 
mechanisation and the total reorganisation of work structures in their plants. Moreover, in many 
branches of the economy the size of the internal market did not justify a switch to serial production. 
The situation, of course, varied greatly from industry to industry. In cotton textiles a 
factory based industry had developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, for even in Spain 
demand for cheap cotton garments was great enough to justify the expenditure on plant and 
machinery. Between 1860 and 1900 the technological transformation of the industry continued 
apace, aided by the relatively low cost of the new equipment. In weaving the power-loom replaced 
the hand-loom in most establishments, and its introduction was associated with the replacement of 
male by cheaper female labour. In spinning from the 1880s, moreover, attempts were made to 
replace male by female workers on a new machine known as the ring-frame. Nevertheless, in 
1914 in European terms the industry's structure was still in many respects archaic. This could not 
only be seen in the small-scale of the Catalan enterprises. It was apparent in the practice through 
which in order to reduce capital outlays larger enterprises hired out much of their work to small, 
marginal establishments, many of which still employed hand-looms. 
In the artisanal sector of the economy the picture was even gloomier. Manufacturers found 
it difficult to specialise in a particular line of work and, in any case, few had the resources 
necessary to carry through major structural reorganisations of their plants, even when this was 
technologically feasible. The clearest example of this problem is provided by the Catalan 
metallurgical industry which, as has been seen, remained small-scale and technologically backward 
through to 1914. As a result of these problems, skilled and artisanal workers remained a 
fundamental component of Catalan industry, and the new class of factory based serni-skilled 
workers, whose numbers increased so rapidly in the European core states between 1880 and 1914, 
remained of little importance in Catalonia. However, this is not to imply that much of Catalan 
industry was untouched by the advance of capitalist relations of production. As has been stressed, 
in the artisanal trades, through such means as the transformation of apprenticeship into cheap 
labour, the use of piece rates and the piecemeal introduction of cheap labour, employers 
hoped to 
reduce costs and increase productivity. 
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The manufacturers' attempts to cut costs, however, ran up against determined worker 
opposition. Craft workers, as has been seen, retained a strong position on the shop floor. These 
workers put up a tenacious resistance to deskilling. Their position was strengthened because 
competition between the manufacturers often hampered the elaboration of a coordinated response to 
the workers' demands. On the other hand employer opposition and, more importantly, state S 
repression, made very difficult the formation of craft associatiorýwhich could negotiate wages and 
working conditions. The result was a long drawn out, often subterranean, battle over the "frontier 
of control". In the artisanal sector of the economy industrial strife was at its sharpest in 
metallurgy. In this industry manufacturers were faced with heavy foreign competition. This made 
them particularly unwilling to enter into negotiations with their workforce. In order to compete 
with foreign suppliers the metallurgical manufacturers were determined to maintain a 10 hour day 
in the industry, and tried to reduce costs by putting pressure on wage rates, and undermining 
apprenticeship restrictions. The larger Barceloneta firms were to a large extent able to impose 
social control. Smaller enterprises had less success. In order to strengthen their position in 1900 
the Barcelona manufactures founded a city wide employers' federation. It was for this reason that 
the 1901 metalworkers' strike quickly spread throughout the city. The intransigence of the 
metallurgical bourgeoisie led strikes in this industry to take on a particularly violent character. In 
other artisanal trades strikes rarely reached such a violent pitch. Yet as the century progressed they 
also tended to become more wide ranging, and in Barcelona by 1914 both the construction workers 
and wood workers had founded their own local federations. 
In cotton textilesemployers were able to replace male by female power-loom weavers 
without difficulty. This probably reflected the fact that power-loom weavers were in a relatively 
weak position on the shop floor. Thus, the level of skill required in order to operate a power-loom 
was low, and entry restrictions non existent. In rural areas and in the Alt Llobregat company 
towns industrialists were also able to impose social control without difficulties, and those 
enterprises engaged in spinning replaced men by women on the new ring-frames. In the Ter 
Valley towns, on the other hand, the industrialists came up against similar difficulties to employers 
engaged in artisanal manufacture. They faced a group of workers who operated a form of entry 
restriction into trade, and who, moreover, enjoyed the support of the rest of the community. 
Attempts to replace male workers by female spinners, therefore, led to bitter conflict. Indeed, 
in 
the principal Ter Valley towns the factory owners efforts to replace the men were not to 
be 
successful. Thus in Manlleu, Roda and Sant 11ipblit, male spinners still operated the ring-frames 
in 1914. In woollen textiles the situation was somewhat different. The under capitalised 
Sabadell 
woollen textile manufacturers did not even try and force through new 
divisions of labour. 
Nevertheless, the presence of two highly productive French firms in 
Sabadell proved a 
destabilising element. As a result, the relative social calm in the town was punctuated 
by crises in 
1899 and 1911, when the Sabadell woollen workers tried to 
impose generally accepted work 
practices on the French manufacturers. 
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Skilled workers under threat at the point of production tended to look outside their own 
trades for support. This explains the moves towards the formation of inter-craft and industrial 
labour federations between 1899 and 1914. In order to improve their position vis a vis their 
employers these workers also felt it necessary to aid the less skilled to form their own unions, and 
hence strengthen the entire labour movement. Such an attitude was at the root of the development 
of a specifically working class consciousness in urban Catalonia. As has been stressed, it would 
be mistaken to think of most workers as committed anarchists, Socialists or republicans. Many 
unions wished to remain independent of any political faction, and even when in a labour federation 
of a particular political persuasion the workers by no means accepted all aspects of that federafion's 
ideology. 
Nevertheless, in Barcelona and its surrounds, in those trades and industries in which 
conflict was severe, anarchists and syndicalists gained an important degree of support. Skilled 
workers were in the vanguard of the Barcelona labour movement, and it was amongst a number of 
skilled trades that they gained particularly strong support. This could be seen between 1901 and 
1903, when the metalworkers, bricklayers, carpenters, compositors, tanners, and workers 
involved in the textile finishing trades became strongly identified with the anarchists. This raises 
the question of why these workers should have given their support. Students of the British and 
French labour movements often still argue that syndicalism was a movement best suited to the 
needs of artisanal workers. Thus, it has recently been stated that it expressed the struggle of 
workers not yet trained in capitalist factory discipline against the imposition of managerial 
authority. In a similar vein, claims have been made that the decentralised syndicalist unions 
reflected the craft workers strength on the shop floor. Amongst factory workers, on the other 
hand, lack of bargaining power at a local level had to be compensated for by the centralisation of 
union organisation. 1 Certainly rank and file opposition to the imposition of unpopular work 
practices was an important component of syndicalism, but there is reason to doubt whether it was a 
specifically craft based movement. In Catalonia it is true that the Socialists had considerable 
influence amongst workers in a number of textile towns. Yet the Ter Valley spinners, who gave 
the Socialists considerable support, were hardly archetypal factory proletarians. Instead, they were 
skilled workers under threat from technological innovation. Moreover, the anarchists were not 
only supported by skilled workers. In Barcelona syndicalists were behind the unionisation of the 
female cotton textile workers, and they also received the backing of the waterfront unions, and 
particularly the carters. The Sabadell power-loom weavers also gave the anarchists guarded 
support. 
1. Robert Holton, "Revolutionary Syndicalism and the British Labour Movement", 
in W. J. Mommsen and 
Hans-Gerhard Husung, op cit, p. 281 .; 
M. J. Hanagan, op cit, pp. 215-216. 
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Perhaps a more fruitful way of looking at syndicalism is to see it as an ideology which 
could potentially gain the support of workers who were not integrated into a country's political 
structure. The syndicalists, as has been emphasised, rejected the formation of a political party of 
the working class and participation in elections. They also opposed state social legislation and state 
arbitration of industrial disputes. Such an ideology could only flourish in a country in which 
workers had no possibility of influencing government policy through parliament, and in which the 
state made little attempt to address workers grievances and intervene in order to stabilise labour 
relations. Similarly the concept of the revolutionary general strike aimed at overthrowing the state 
and capitalism gained adepts in a context in which the "parliamentary road to socialism" did not 
seem viable. The syndicalist concept of direct action had a similar pedigree. It reflected the 
difficulties faced by Catalan labour to enter into collective bargaining with industrialists. The case 
of the 1902 general strike in Barcelona illustrates this point. When the metalworkers strike broke 
out in November 1901 there were significant elements within the union who wished to reach a 
compromise with capital. Yet the intransigence of the metallurgical bourgeoisie made their position 
untenable. They could not turn to the government for help. They were, therefore, finally driven to 
call on the entire Barcelona working class to come out on strike in solidarity. 
An international comparison might serve further to illustrate this point. In Britain and 
Germany by 1914 large national craft, industrial and general labour unions had been formed. In 
Britairýcollective bargaining procedures had been established over wide sections of industry. In 
Germany labour relations were harsher, especially in heavy industry, where employers refused to 
accept the presence of trade unions. Nevertheless, in the skilled sector of the economy centrally 
managed labour federations had been established. In both countries the process was accompanied 
by the burgeoning of a trade union bureaucracy, which negotiated wages and working conditions 
on behalf of the membership. Syndicalism was never the dominant labour ideology in these 
countries. Instead it took the form of an opposition. In part it reflected the concerns of skilled 
workers under threat from capitalist development, who felt union officials were not conducting a 
sufficiently vigorous campaign on their behalf. The shop stewards movement in the British 
engineering industry is a good example of this brand of syndicalism. Syndicalism could also gain 
the support of workers who had previously been unable to unionise because of employer 
opposition, and who had therefore missed out on the benefits of collective bargaining. The 
growing influence of syndicalism amongst Ruhr metalworkers during the turbulent years of 1918- 
1919 is a case in point. 2 Such workers were anxious to make up for lost time, and angered 
by 
industrialists refusal to countenance union activity in their industry in the past were quick to strike 
for improvements in working conditions. As has been emphasised such an attitude was apparent 
within many Barcelona unions between 1899 and 1914. In some trades 
in the wood working and 
2. James Hinton, The First Shop Stewards Movement (London, 1973); Dick Geary, Radicalism and the 
German Worker: Metalworkers and Revolution 1914-1923", in Richard J. Evans (ed. ), 
Society and Politics 
in Wilhelmine Germany (London, 1978). 
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construction industries between 1901 and 1903 workers were encouraged to pursue aggressive 
strike tactics by victories they achieved against their unprepared employers. In metallurgy the 
major Barcelona strikes ended in defeat. Yet, as has been seen, the workers had little choice but to 
adopt the strike weapon. 
The dominant tendency within Spanish Socialism, however, attempted to create labour 
federations on the British or German model. In order to build such organisations they believed it 
necessary to curtail unpremeditated actions which might put the unions' future at risk. Thus they 
stressed the need for strikes to be called only in the last resort, and left it to the UGT's central 
committee to decide whether a general strike should be declared official and be given monetary 
support. This policy was at the root of many of the difficulties the Socialists faced in Catalonia. 
The example of the Catalan cotton textile industry illustrates this point. A strong regional textile 
federation had operated with paid officials in the 1880s. The Socialists hoped it would provide a 
strong platform on which they could build. Yet between 1891 and 1914 the cotton textile 
bourgeoisie's attack on union organisation prevented the successful operation of a regional textile 
federation for any length of time. 
S 
In these circumstances the "Pabl., Jst" Socialisý it seems, gained the greatest support in 
trades and industries in which social conflict was not severe, and in which the potential existed for 
the organisation of stable, bureaucratically run, labour federations. This was the case in Madrid 
and Asturias, two of the principal areas of Socialist support in Spain. In Madrid social relations 
between masters and men were relatively close. In Asturias the main industry was mining. Class 
conflict in this industry was to intensify from 1917. However, in 1910 when the Asturian miners' 
federation, the SMA, was founded, it was hoped to resolve disputes through negotiations with 
union officials. Thus the SMA, "was centrally organised with a single treasury, and unions could 
only make demands and call strikes through the executive". 3 Nevertheless in Biscay, the third 
main area of Socialist influence in Spain, the situation was rather different. Between 1890 and 
1916 much of the Socialist support in the region came from the miners of the open cast iron ore 
mining fields outside Bilbao. The number of skilled workers required in these mines was very 
small, and replacements could easily to found for the unskilled majority. The miners could not, 
therefore, bargain effectively with their employers, nor could they form stable unions. 
Consequently, in order to bring pressure to bear they tended to generalise strike action. The ease 
with which blacklegs could be recruited also led these miners7strikes to be very violent affairs. 
This, it becomes readily apparent, was not the strike practice favoured by the Madrid based 
Socialist hierarchy, and yet the Socialists dominated the coalfields. The answer to this apparent 
paradox is twofold. In the first place the Socialists held an advantage in that they were the 
first to 
unionise the mine workers. Secondly, the Socialist mine workers' leader, Facundo Perezagua, 
3. Adrian Shubert, "The Social Origins of Labour Militancy: Asturias, 1860-1914", 
(Unpublished Ph. D., University of London, 1982). 
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and his liutenants, consistently flouted official union policy in order to retain the support of the 
miners. Indeed, at the height of strikes in 1892-1893 and 1911 they were forced to radicalise their 
stance in order to stop the anarchists from gaining supp ort in the mining towns. 4 
In the late nineteenth century, however, the Catalan Socialists were unwilling to take such a 
path. Indeed, between 1899 and 1903 they retained links with the reformist TCV. As has been 
stressed, in Barcelona the Socialists had considerable success in organising workers in periods of 
economic crisis and when union organisation was very weak. However, as the number of strikes 
grew they tended to lose ground to the anarchists. In this respect the period 1900-1903 has been 
analysed in some detail. In the Alta Muntanya a not altogether/ situation unfolded. 'ne Socialists 
were able to gain some support amongst the cotton textile workers of Manresa and the Ter Valley. 
However, their position was shaken because bourgeois opposition to union organisation forced the 
workers to call a number of general strikes in the industry. Nevertheless, in the Ter the Socialists 
were able to maintain their position better than in Barcelona. They were on the one hand able to 
point to the disastrous consequences of those general strikes actually attempted. It has also been 
suggested that in cotton textiles there was already a tradition of socialist style trade unionism, with 
the employment of paid officials, strike and friendly benefits. Moreover, in this area Socialist and 
independent worker councillors had had an impact in local government. These circumstances 
probably strengthened the Socialists' hand. Yet the Socialists faced further problems in Catalonia. 
In 1899 the UGT moved from Barcelona to Madrid and thereafter became increasingly identified 
with party policy. Workers often resented the subordination of their unions to a specific polifical 
cause. Furthermore, there was disquiet at the centralisation of authority within the PSOE-UGT, 
and opposition to fact that Madrid was the power base of Spanish Socialism. 
It was to try and overcome these problems that the Reus Socialist, Antoni Fabra Ribas, 
adopted an alternative Socialist strategy. This strategy was based on ideas developed by left-wing 
French Socialists. It accorded greater importance in the battle for Socialism to the economic 
struggles of the working class. Moreover, Fabra Ribas rejected the belief that the Socialists should 
run their own labour confederation. Instead he believed that like the French unified Socialist party, 
the SFIO, they should work within independent unions. At an organisational level many 
Catalan 
Socialists also tried to end the monopoly of power exercised by the Madrid branch of the party, 
and argued in favour of a decentralisation of party structures. The policy defended 
by Fabra Ribas 
was, however, ultimately to fail. The successful pursuit of a left-wing alternative to 
"Pabl. ist" 
Socialism would always be difficult in Catalonia, where the radical ticket was seemingly well 
covered by the anarchists. But Fabra Ribas's alternative was, in fact, never whole 
heartedly 
supported. Many Catalan Socialists continued to back a cautious strike policy, and retained 
their 
faith in electoral politics. There was also uncertainty as to whether to work within 
the UGT or the 
4. Juan Pablo Fusi, op cit, pp. 233-242. 
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officially pro-syndicalist Catalan unions. This was brought to the fore in 1910 when the CNT was 
founded, and when despite the opposition of Fabra Ribas, it was decided to break with the new 
confederation. Finally the Catalan Socialists were also unable substantially to reform the 
organisational structure of the PSOE. Power remained fy in the hands of the Md party mul adri 
leadership. 
Without a strong union base in Catalonia, and especially in Barcelona, the Socialists could 
never hope to mount an effective challenge to the republicans at election time. As has been seen, 
the republicans still enjoyed considerable worker support, for in a country ruled by authoritarian 
governments the promise of a democratic lay state could still attract many workers. Yet despite the 
fact that in Barcelona and its surrounds the Socialists had by 1910-1914 relatively little influence, 
the Catalan syndicalists also had to rethink their trade union practice. They had gained an 
important degree of support at the height of the 1901-1903 strike wave. However, their attempts 
to call general and solidarity strikes on every possible occasion, and their policy of forming labour 
federations whose members paid no dues, made it impossible for them to operate union 
organisations effectively. This could be seen in the case of the anarchist rival to the UGT, the 
FRESR, which failed to take off. 
From 1904 a reaction against these policies set in amongst some syndicalists. Though 
these syndicalists claimed to support direct action they also stated that rash actions which could 
only lead to the destruction of the unions should be avoided. In reality - although they would have 
denied it - these syndicalists were putting union organisation before revolutionary goals. A similar 
tendency could be seen within the French CGT, and was to become increasingly dominant from 
1909. This was perhaps an inevitable development in a non-revolutionary context, for in order 
best to defend the material interests of a union's membership, it was necessary to maintain that 
union intact. Yet within the context of Catalan trade unionism this tendency found it difficult to 
gain the upper hand. Both SO and the CNT agreed that their affiliates should pay dues. This gave 
these organisations the minimum consistency required for them to be able to operate effectively. 
However, in Barcelona, as the number of strikes grew between 19 10 and 1911, the CNT's 
Barcelona leadership once again began to call for general strikes whenever the opportunity 
presented itself. Moreover, anarchist revolutionaries began openly to argue that in order to prevent 
it from becoming a reformist body the CNT should be led by a militant elite. It was not until 1913 
that the more moderate strand of Catalan syndicalism gained the upper hand. This 
followed an 
unsuccessful attempt to call a general strike in support of the textile workers, as a result of which 
the Catalan CRT was once again declared illegal. 
The new CRT leadership argued that in order to avoid a repetition they 
had to be more 
cautious. Before 1914 this new policy did not result in any watering down of syndicalist 
postulates. With the rapid growth of the CRT between 1916 and 1918, 
however, such a tendency 
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did become visible. Thus, in order to attract the maximum number of workers possible, the CRT's 
1918 Sants congress agreed simply to recommend unions affiliated adopt direct action. 5 If the 
CRT had continued down this road it could completely have lost sight of its revolutionary 
objectives. For this to have occured, however, it would have been necessary for the state to have 
accepted labour's place within the political nation. This was what happened in France during these 
years, where after the outbreak of war in 1914 the General Secretary of the CGT, Leon Jouh 
"" aux, joined a coalition government. As a result, increasingly integrated into the capitalist state, the 
majority wing of the CGT to all intents and purposes abandoned revolutionary syndicalism. 6 In 
Catalonia between 1918 and 1923 developments were to follow a very different course. With the 
end of a war time boom social conflict became increasingly violent. The state vacillated between 
conciliation of labour and repression. However, at a local level the police and military became 
closely identified with the employers. This period was only brought to a close by the Primo de 
Rivera Dictatorship of 1923. The result was not only that revolutionary syndicalism remained the 
most influential doctrine in working class circles, but that the revolutionary anarchists or anarcho- 
syndicalists took control of the CRT. 
5. Manuel Lladonosa, El Congrds de Sants, pp. 70-74. 
6. Nicolas Papayanis, op cit, pp. 85-134. 
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